Selected Annual Proceedings of the Florida Conference of Historians

Editor
Irvin D. S. Winsboro

Annual Meetings 2000/2001

Volumes 8/9
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Selected
Annual Proceedings
of the

Florida
Conference
of
Historians
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Letter from the Editor

Polybius, Greek historian and noted author of *Universal History*, once noted about the authorship of history: "For there are plenty of mistakes made by writers [of history] out of ignorance, and which any man finds it difficult to avoid. . . . Readers should be very attentive to and critical of historians, and they in turn should be constantly on their guard." Although long familiar with Polybius's admonition, his words never rang truer than when I undertook the editing process for this work. The experience has been exhilarating but also frustrating—all too frequently the joy of editing interesting manuscripts dissipated under the strain of rectifying faulty syntax, non-sequiturs, and curious attempts at *Chicago Manual of Style* documentation. Nevertheless, I now take pride in completing the *Proceedings, Vols. 8/9* for the Florida Conference of Historians, a venerable organization that expected and deserved my best efforts as editor of this project.

This edition of the *Proceedings* represents the latest in a long string of FCH publications, all of which present the broad viewpoints of historical scholarship and pedagogical approaches for which the FCH Annual Meetings have become such melting pots over the past three decades. Throughout its work over these years, as exemplified by its peer-reviewed *Proceedings*, the FCH has steadfastly promoted and rewarded the search for cutting edge scholarship and teaching at all levels in the State of Florida. Indeed, the FCH's success in these endeavors has been recognized and celebrated well beyond the boundaries of its home state. Perhaps this edition of the *Proceedings* will contribute in a small way to that tradition of excellence.

In editing this volume, I received help from many colleagues. I wish to thank the members of the Board of Editorial Advisors for their critical assistance in reviewing and narrowing down the rather sizable number of manuscripts submitted for publication. In particular, I am grateful to the yeoman work of Dr. Eric Strahorn, Dr. Gary Mayfield, and Dr. Enrique Marquez of Florida Gulf Coast University on the manuscript review process. FGCU President and Professor of History, Dr. William C. Merwin, lent personal support for this project and for my professional commitment to it. Finally, Betsy L. Winsboro and Dr. J. Calvitt
Clarke III deserve my highest praise and respect for their unflagging assistance throughout the long editing and production process. Without the assistance of Betsy and Jay, this work might never have been completed; they deserve my highest praise.

Again, I am honored to have been selected by the FCH to edit this book. With its publication, I join the ranks of notable past editors, all of whom deserve the FCH membership’s respect and gratitude for their professional efforts. Like the past editors, I would urge the FCH membership to support the publication of the Proceedings through submission of Annual Meetings papers. The officers, members, and supporters of the FCH look forward to furthering the aims of the organization and the professional study and teaching of history through future publications of the Proceedings.

Irvin D. S. Winsboro
Fort Myers, Florida
February 2002
Thomas M. Campbell Award

The Florida Conference of Historians is proud to maintain the Thomas M. Campbell Award for the best paper presented in the Annual Proceedings.

Over thirty years ago, Dr. Thomas (Tom) M. Campbell proved the driving force behind the creation of the Florida Conference of Historians, initially called The Florida College Teachers of History. It was his personality and hard work that kept the conference moving forward. Indeed, he was the personification of the Conference in its formative years.

Tom was a professor of U.S. diplomatic history at Florida State University and a fellow student and close colleague of noted historian George C. Herring, whose generous financial support has underwritten this award. Along with Professor Herring’s support, and Professor Campbell’s many graduate students’ support, The Florida Conference of Historians is proud to maintain this award in the memory of Dr. Campbell.
Florida Conference of Historians
2000 Annual Program

Hosted by
Anthony J. Beninati
Valencia Community College
Orlando, Florida

Thursday, March 30

7:00-10:00 Registration and Reception

Friday, March 31

8:00-9:00 Continental Breakfast and Continuing Registration

9:00-10:15 General Session I

"Have I Crossed the Line?: Personal Reflections on Civic Activism and Scholarship in Contemporary Miami"

Guest Speaker: George Bush, University of Miami

10:30-11:45 General Session II

Papers: "History, Distance Learning, and the Professorate: An Experiential-Based Model," Irvin D. Solomon, Florida Gulf Coast University

"The Wedding Cake Approach to On-Line Instruction: A Transformation Paradigm for Developing Web-
Based Courses," Anthony J. Beninati, Valencia Community College

12:00-1:45 General Session III

Paper: "Celluloid Suburbs: The American Middle Landscape on Film," Phillip Dolce, Bergen Community College

2:00-3:15 Concurrent Session 1

Moderator: Blaine T. Browne, Broward Community College

Papers: "Rig Veda and the Position of Women in Ancient India," Debra Hannon, Orange County Public Schools

"Women as Symbols in the Spanish Civil War," Sara B. Keough, Jacksonville University

2:00-3:15 Concurrent Session 2

Moderator: Jean McNary, Zephyrhills High Schools

Papers: "Dynamite and Ditches: Florida’s War on Mosquitoes in the 1920s," Gordon Patterson, Florida Institute of Technology

"Anti-communism and the Civil Rights Movement in Miami, 1957-1963: The David and Goliath Story," Kisha King, Broward Community College

3:30-4:45 Concurrent Session 3

Moderator: Ron Reinighaus, Valencia Community College

Papers: "Ethnic Politics in New York City: The Response of German Socialists to Events in Nazi Germany and the New Deal, 1932-1933," Jeffery G. Strickland, Florida State University
“Banished but not Forsaken: The Salzburger Immigrants in Colonial Georgia,” Kevin E. Mason, Florida State University

3:30-4:45 Concurrent Session 4

Moderator: Robert Taylor, Florida Institute of Technology


“Cocoa Beach and the Dawn of the Space Age,” Lori Walters, University of Central Florida

Saturday, April 1

8:00-8:45 Continental Breakfast and Late Registration

8:45-10:00 Concurrent Session 5

Moderator: Tom Reid, Valencia Community College


“If they observe the least neglect ... you will be assaulted”: Journeying in Apacheria (the American Southwest) circa 1850-1880,” Ben Schwartz, Hillsborough Community College

“Coin-clippers, Counterfeiters, and Councillors: The Elizabethan Privy Council’s Campaign against
8:45-10:00 Concurrent Session 6

Moderator: Paul Edson, Embry Riddle Aeronautical University

Papers: "The 1989 Invasion of Panama as Seen by the American Print Media," John J. McTague, St. Leo College

"The Failed Revolution in Guatemala: Discovering the Missing Link," Paul Labeled, Valencia Community College

10:15-11:30 Concurrent Session 7

Moderator: Irvin D. Solomon, Florida Gulf Coast University

Papers: "Growing Old in a New Profession: The Late 19th Century Reminiscences of Southern Physicians," Marcus Harvey, University of Florida

"Contested Narratives: Myths and Meanings Surrounding the Ocoee Massacre in 1920," Cathleen Armstead, Valencia Community College

"Your Sister is a Thespian: Claude Pepper, George Smathers, and the Speech that Never Was," Jim C. Clark, University of Central Florida

10:15-11:30 Concurrent Session 8

Moderator: Mike Germaine, Valencia Community College

Papers: "Modernization Ideologies: Japan and Ethiopia," Jay Clarke, Jacksonville University
“Aviation and the Italo-Ethiopian War,” Mike Foley, Jacksonville University

“The Use of Gas During the Italo-Ethiopian War,” Frank Salling, Jacksonville University

11:35-12:00 General Session 4

Annual Business Meeting
Announcement of New Officers
Closing Remarks
Florida Conference of Historians
2001 Annual Program

Hosted by
David Porctor
North Florida Community College
Tallahassee, Florida

Thursday, March 1

7:00-10:00 Registration and Reception

Friday, March 2

8:00-9:00 Registration

9:00-10:00 Session 1A--Slavery in the American South

Chair: Mary Louise Ellis, Tallahassee Community College

Papers:
"No Isolated Incident: The Sexual Exploitation of Female Slaves," Jennifer McCarley, Florida State University

"Slave Health in the Deep South in Dollars, Cents, and Sense: The Economic Implications for the Institution," Andrea Howard, Florida State University

Session 1B--Medieval Europe

Chair: Paul Edson, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
Papers: “The Foure Sonnes of Aymon’ as an Introduction to Knightly Culture,” Carol Miller, Tallahassee Community College

“The Decline of the Governing Role of the Church in Agen, 1453-1562,” Frank Williams, Augusta State University

10:30-11:30 Session 2A–Japan: Medieval and Modern

Chair: Blaine T. Brown, Broward Community College


“Japan’s Asuko Period (600-710) Revisited,” Taneo Ishikawa Florida State University

10:30-11:30 Session 2B–U.S. History

Chair: Sean McMahon, Lake City Community College


“Bishop John Henry Hopkins’ Plan for Saving the Union,” Barbara Mattick, Florida Department of State, Bureau of Historic Preservation

2:00-3:00 Session 3A–Florida History

Chair: David Proctor, North Florida Community College

Papers: “Following the Smoke to the Fire: Race Relations in Florida in the Early Twentieth Century,” David Jackson, Florida A&M University
Session 3B–History Education

Chair: Blaine Browne

Papers: “Reinventing History Education for the New Millennium,” Irvin D. Solomon, Florida Gulf Coast University

“Clio Confronts Complexity,” David B. Mock, Tallahassee Community College

Session 4A–American Historical Association Presents: Preparing Future Faculty in Florida: A Round Table Discussion

Chair: Jonathan Grant, Florida State University

Participants: Will Benedicks, Tallahassee Community College
Kyle Eidahl, Florida A&M University
Jeff Strickland, Florida State University
Pamela Robbins, Florida State University

Session 4B–Military History

Chair: John J. McTague, St. Leo University

Papers: “The Politics of Arms Not Given: Japan and Ethiopia in the 1930s,” Jay Clarke, Jacksonville University

“A Fatal Mistake: Hitler’s Decision to Declare War on the United States,” Krista Himmelstrand, Jacksonville University
Saturday, March 3

9:00-10:15  Session 5A—Military History

Chair:  **David B. Mock**, Tallahassee Community College

Papers:  “Military Technology Transfer between Communist States: USSR and the PRC during the Early Cold War,”  **Mark O’Neill**, Florida Department of Health


9:00-10:15  Session 5B—U.S. Women’s History

Chair:  **Elna Green**, Florida State University

Papers:  “Motherhood in Private and Public: Domestic Relations in the Rural South and Maternalism in Memphis Juvenile Court,”  **Jennifer Trost**, St. Leo University

“Occupied New Orleans in the Civil War, Beauty and the Beast: The Women of New Orleans and Benjamin Butler,”  **Kevin Witherspoon**, Tallahassee Community College

10:45-12:00  Session 6A—U.S. Women’s History

Chair:  **Elna Green**, Florida State University

“Black Midwives in Florida and the Intersection of Race, Gender, and Medieval Practices,” Tameka Hobbs, Florida State University

10:45-12:00 Session 6B—Ethnic History

Chair: Monte Finkelstein, Tallahassee Community College

Papers: “The Other Great Migration: Cultural Contact Zones in Florida,” Madeleine Carr, Florida State University

“The German-American Response to Nazi Germany: The 1939 World’s Fair Incident,” Neil Betten, Florida State University
Growing Old in a Young Profession:
The Late-Nineteenth-Century Reminiscences of
Southern Physicians

Marcus Harvey
University of Florida

Through much of the nineteenth-century, southern doctors bound up their professional identity with notions of aging and rhetorically deployed old age in ways that were varied and sometimes conflicting. A simplified schematic of these deployments might be drawn as a Venn diagram with overlapping circles representing concerns with a) Mortality, b) Credibility, c) Stability, and d) Prestige. At any moment, one or more of these concerns could shape a particular evocation of old age; however, issues of mortality tended to predominate early in the century; issues of prestige, later. In their writings, southern physicians also betrayed an undercurrent of age-based tensions within the profession, tensions that must be understood in the context of medicines' rapid development and the general insecurities of medical practitioners.

The nineteenth century witnessed striking developments in medical knowledge and therapies, as well as in medical practitioners' sense of professional identity. Although particularities of section manifested themselves in practice and theory throughout the century, professionalization in the South followed much the same trajectory as in the North. By the 1840s, southern physicians were

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joining medical associations and subscribing to medical journals in unprecedented numbers. Association was practical, and reinforced physicians’ exclusionary claims over the human body. Asserting and defending claims to privileged knowledge, doctors aggressively distinguished themselves from such competitors as the Thomsonians, homeopathists, and eclectics. Orthodox practitioners probably believed, quite genuinely, that they better served the sick than did the sectarians, but self interest assuredly colored their rhetoric. Upon receiving an exchange copy of the rival Journal of Medical Reform: For the People and the Profession, the editor of the New Orleans Medical News and Hospital Gazette recoiled at the "vulgar audacity" and "unscrupulous impudence which is the exclusive characteristic of the groveling miscreants who edit all such iniquitous prints." The machinery of the orthodox profession—journals, medical schools, and associations—legitimated such outbursts by providing physicians with mechanisms for simultaneously commenting on medicine, advancing their economic interests, and affirming their social status and privileges. This was particularly important in the South where those whose lives smacked of intellect often felt marginalized. Like other educated southerners, physicians could find the rural south profoundly isolating. Editing a lecture for


__6__Editorial and Miscellaneous, _New Orleans Medical News and Hospital Gazette_ 2, no. 7 (1855): 335.

public consumption in 1870s Arkansas, Dr. Frank L. James despaired because he had never encountered "a people . . . so absolutely illiterate as this one." James may not have been entirely typical—he was a difficult man who wanted his landlord "rammed head foremost into hell"—however, his alienation does serve to illustrate the intellectual gulf separating many physicians from their charges.  

In the masculine culture of the nineteenth-century South, doctors were particularly imperiled because they typically functioned within domestic spaces—both theirs and their patients. Intruding on the prerogatives of traditional healers and midwives, physicians contested ground that had already been coded feminine. Moreover, the economic insecurity attendant upon medical practice could exacerbate gender anxieties. Not surprisingly, assertions of masculinity appear frequently in the writings of southern physicians, suggesting widespread concern that their manhood be recognized. In an exhortation to students at the Medical College of Georgia, Dr. William Arnold Adams likened the relationship between Medicine and Doctor to that between Bride and Groom: "You are on the threshold of wedding your bride profession, and once wedded, I beg you never be divorced; be true to your profession, and it will be true to you." By gendering the profession female, Adams affirmed the masculinity of his listeners. Significantly, he also addressed the pursuit of wealth in the same speech: "get rich if you can, for nobody has a better right, or a poorer chance, than the 'doctor'." Adams assured his audience that all would be well for the doctor who kept his "morals . . . incorruptible, and . . . faith in a higher life . . . forever fixed.”

Faith in a higher life was probably a good thing for nineteenth-century Southern physicians to cultivate. Other white southerners might retreat to more salubrious climes during fever season, but physicians were obliged to remain behind and battle unseen foes. A number of physicians died early in their careers. Doctors knew their profession was hazardous, and in the obituaries written for colleagues they sometimes revealed their own fears. Alarmed that "Louisiana has been losing some of her most prominent members of the Medical

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10William Arnold Adams, "Valedictory Address by Dr. Adams," *Southern Medical Records* 6, no. 3 (1876): 146-7.


Profession," one doctor lamented that "those of us who are left behind must see our individual warning. A few more years (it may be months, days, or even hours) of toil, and to the same bourne we take our way."  

In 1855, southern doctors read about a disturbing study of professional mortality conducted by a Professor Escherich in Wursburg, Germany. Escherich’s evidence showed "that the mortality is greater amongst medical men than in any other professions," and his conclusions made the rounds through the medical journals in Europe and America.  

The same year that Escherich’s findings burst upon the South, the Atlanta Medical and Surgical Journal published a tribute to forty dead English doctors who had “discharged their duty” against a “fearful pestilence.” Significantly, the notice neglected to mention how many patients died, or even which disease had struck. 

Atlanta’s doctors learned of the sacrifice made by their colleagues, and that was all. Although the slaughter of the Civil War temporarily overshadowed such "sacrifices," the anxiety resulting from professional mortality resurfaced in the medical journals after the war. 

That anxiety was not simply a fear of death, but also incorporated concern for the toll that the profession exacted before death. Practitioners not already slain by their profession were worn and aged prematurely. In the words of Dr. Francis Marion Peterson of Greensboro, Alabama, the "prize" for a physician's labors was "a larger practice, which . . . soon exhausts his remaining vitality." "[H]ow many names of the great and noble of our vocation do we find who have fallen victims to over-work," Peterson asked his audience. Those agreeing with his earlier assertion that "medicine is the stepping-stone to nothing but hard work, self-sacrifice, and martyrdom! [emphases his]," might well have had an answer in mind. 

In attributing cause of death for others, nineteenth-century physicians

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13 Obituary, Southern Journal of the Medical Sciences 2, no. 2 (1867): 388.


17 Francis Marion Peterson, "The Annual Message of the President of the Medical Association of the State of Alabama, Concluded," Alabama Medical and Surgical Journal 1, no. 2 (1886): 90.
seldom, if ever, recorded "over-work." As far as doctors saw it, medicine was uniquely taxing on the energy of life. As quoted in a period medical journal:

> It is a fact almost axiomatic in its truth that the physician in full general practice works harder for his living than any other laborer, either professional or non-professional. It is easily demonstrable that in the long run brain-work is more exhausting and devitalizing in its effects than any kind of manual labor. Statistics show that the expectation of life is less in physicians than in any other of the professional classes. In other words, it is plain that the majority of doctors work themselves to death.

Although such a construction of the aging process perversely privileges medicine above other pursuits, it also suggests professional insecurity. Rather than argue the obvious—that a higher incidence of exposure to disease led physicians to become ill more frequently than others—the author of this "almost axiomatic . . . truth" raises the profession above diseases, diseases that doctors claimed to master. In this construction, it is the process of fighting against diseases, not diseases themselves that kills physicians. Here—on a rhetorical level, at least—doctors could have dominion over the illnesses that so baffled them at the bedside.

Professional concern with mortality was congruent with and borrowed from the general vein of nineteenth-century sentimentality. Dr. Adams' ghastly address at the Medical College of Georgia directed the graduates' attention to their own mortality. Likening old age to the advancing seasons, Adams versified the scene of a doctor's deathbed. Replete with "fading joys," "wasting sorrows," "memory from the garden of the past," "sweet flowers," a "dying pillow," "stillness of the twilight hour," "enrapturing music of angel bands," "the quiet and peace of Heaven's home," and "melody quavering cycles of eternity," his verses read like a parody of romantic excess. Not inappropriately, perhaps, the journal reprinting his address immediately followed it with a lengthy discussion.

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19Vacation for Doctors,” Atlanta Medical and Surgical Journal 3, no. 6 (1886): 388-90.

of rectal examinations.\textsuperscript{21}

Making death seem lifelike may have been the great parlor trick of the nineteenth-century, but in the context of professional aging, the physician who spurned the Choir Invisible to live a long and productive life merited the respect of his peers. Surviving testified to masculine hardiness, fortitude, and strength. In the Necrological pages of the South's medical journals, the profession lauded itself by celebrating its Nestors.\textsuperscript{22} Addressing the Medical Association of the State of Alabama in 1885, Dr. Benjamin Hogan Riggs clearly explained his purposes in eulogizing dead colleagues. It was done, he claimed, "to honor our dead, to honor our profession, to honor and dignify ourselves, that others may honor and respect us."\textsuperscript{23} Only the honorable may bestow honor: implicit in obituaries for fallen comrades lurked testimony to the qualities and worth of the living.\textsuperscript{24}

Honor alone could not suffice in a profession involving technical skills, and eulogists often stressed older physicians' fitness to perform their duties.\textsuperscript{25} Colleagues took note when "Dr. Joseph Stevens ... aged eighty-two years... amputated the thigh of a patient sixty-six years old." Amputation was physically arduous work in the 1870s and the success of the operation made the story all the better. The patient had suffered for "forty years" with his afflictions, but two days after the amputation "sat up in bed and shaved himself, and before the end of a week was able to get out of bed without assistance."\textsuperscript{26} It is not possible to

\textsuperscript{21}Adams, "Valedictory Address," 147; G.A. Baxter, "Pelvic Examinations by the Rectum," \textit{Southern Medical Records} 6, no. 3 (1876): 147-51.

\textsuperscript{22}"Professorial Longevity," \textit{New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal} 5 (July 1877): 163; Dr. John W. Pearce is Dead," \textit{Alabama Medical and Surgical Age} 1, no. 7 (1889): 312-13; Obituaries, \textit{Charleston Medical Journal and Review} 11, no. 4 (1856): 573.


\textsuperscript{25}"In Memory of the Late Professor S.D. Gross," \textit{Alabama Medical and Surgical Journal} 1, no. 5 (1886): 377. Previously appeared in the \textit{American Practitioner and News}; "Miscellaneous," \textit{Richmond and Louisville Medical Journal} 7, no. 2 (1869): 230.

\textsuperscript{26}An Aged Operator and a Tough Patient," \textit{Atlanta Medical and Surgical Journal} 10, no. 4 (1872): 251. Previously appeared in \textit{The Medical Record}.
know whether Stevens brought this feat to the attention of colleagues, or not; however, resisting the debilities of age did become a source of pride for some older physicians. In a letter to the Southern Medical Record, a sixty-three year old North Carolinian confessed to having "been in the harness for forty years," but loving his profession, he "expect[ed] to die in the traces." 27 Given the public respect and affection often enjoyed by such men, younger doctors could ill afford to ignore or dismiss their aged comrades. The very name of an old doctor still "in the traces" could serve a talismanic function. When the editors of the New Orleans Medical News and Hospital Gazette received a review copy of Dr. James Jackson's Letters to a Young Physician, they "express[ed] . . . unqualified approval of the work, and recommend[ed] it to the attention of all young physicians." The old doctor's name as author was "sufficient to entitle it to the highest respect and attention." 28

This respect that elder physicians could command became especially useful to the profession in the aftermath of the Civil War. With many of their patients, and some of their colleagues, harboring hostility and bitterness towards the North, southern doctors with a pan-regional view of their profession often found themselves out of step with their neighbors. In his campaign to reunite southern doctors with their northern brethren in the ranks of the American Medical Association, Dr. William Owen Baldwin took great pains to demonstrate his own southern credentials and to enlist the support of venerable colleagues. Baldwin publicly appealed to well-respected Southern doctors who were known to have suffered in the war, and he emphasized the toll that the war had exacted from him as a father. Among those from whom he solicited support were Dr. Edwin Samuel Gaillard and Dr. Josiah C. Nott. Gaillard, having lost an arm while in service, was a maimed veteran of both profession and Confederacy. Nott, "well known" as "a staunch adherent of the Confederate cause," lost two sons in the war. Moreover, he had proven his mettle when, "at the advanced age of sixty years," he "gave up his professorship in a college . . . relinquished his large and lucrative practice and neglected his then ample fortune to take a commission in the army of the South; serving in hospitals, in camp, on the march, in the front or wherever he was ordered." Baldwin himself knew the anguish of losing a son in service, and stressed that sacrifice in his appeal for sectional reconciliation. 29 Baldwin’s rhetorical strategies— if not his actual argument—seemed to have resonated with the editors of the Richmond and Louisville Medical Journal, as well as those of the New Orleans Journal of Medicine. Both publications commented on Baldwin’s efforts and the Richmond

27 A. Hanks, “Kind Words,” Southern Medical Record 6, no. 3 (March 1876): 186-8.
28 "Letters to a Young Physician," New Orleans Medical News and Hospital Gazette 2, no. 10 (December 1855): 466.
journal reproduced, at some length, the relevant communications between Baldwin and Nott.  

Long after the issue of post-bellum professional unification had been settled and southern physicians returned to the folds of the American Medical Association, the semiotic importance of the old Confederate surgeons remained. “Veterans” of both profession and war, they appeared as flesh-and-blood testimonials to courage and manliness within the profession. During the Spanish-American war, southern physicians could consider with pride the fortitude of Dr. Hunter McGuire, formerly “medical director of Stonewall Jackson’s corps,” who had “accepted a position on the staff of Major-General Fitzhugh Lee.” At sixty-two years of age, one of their own was still fit for “the front.”

Not all depictions of old doctors were so celebratory. Precisely the same insecurity that underlay the lauding of Nestors and veterans could manifest itself as hostility towards old physicians who seemed to threaten professional claims to progress. Old doctors sometimes publicly resisted, and often failed to adopt, the new techniques and technologies that distinguished orthodox medicine from quackery. Moreover, the discursive explosion of medical knowledge in the nineteenth century made obsolescence a function of distance from new developments. Whether that distance stemmed from geographical isolation, personal reluctance to keep abreast of the field, or time away from one’s medical education made little difference within an insecure profession. Those whose professional interests were best served by the appearance of progress and innovation could draw upon any or all of these “distances” in their critiques of others.

Aside from a seeming obsolescence that reflected badly on the profession, old physicians could seriously compromise the efforts of their young peers to get ahead. As one contributor to the Atlanta Clinic put it, “[t]he individual most productive of harm to the young practitioner in the beginning of his work, is the old established and respected practitioner.” Such men “when asked . . . concerning the qualifications of the new comer” will say that “he’ll make a good doctor, but he is young yet and inexperienced.” Information of this sort, the author claimed, invariably “exerts a profound influence on the

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31“Call for a Meeting of the Surgeons of the Confederate Army During the Late War,” Atlanta Medical and Surgical Journal 11 (September and October, 1873): 418; “Death of Dr. John M. Johnson,” Atlanta Medical and Surgical Journal 3, no. 4 (1886): 261.
32“Stonewall Jackson’s Medical Director Again in Service,” Atlanta Medical and Surgical Journal 15, no. 7 (1898): 464. Previously appeared in the North American Medical Review.
The problem of generational tensions could be exacerbated, to the
new-comers disadvantage, by precisely the advancing technologies with which
young doctors armed themselves. As therapeutics changed, older practitioners
sometimes openly challenged the sagacity of their young brethren, presumably
to the latter's economic detriment. Dr. W.F. Barr took an opportunity to gloat at
the expense of the "old fogies" who had vigorously opposed his use of quinine.
When he gave higher doses than were normal for the time, "the 'older' members
of the profession . . . considered me 'a dangerous young doctor,' and an estimable
and intelligent old gentleman replied to me in a meeting of a medical society,
that he would not permit me to practice in his family if I gave such large doses
of quinine!" 34 The economic impact of this challenge to Dr. Barr's methods
cannot now be estimated, but the freshness of Barr's vitriol years later suggests
that he had been more than a little inconvenienced by the criticisms.

At the end of the century, Dr. G.G. Roy—Emeritus Professor of Materia
Medica and Therapeutics in Southern Medical College, Atlanta—recalled his
earliest days in practice, and his competition with older physicians—his own
father included. In Roy's first professional encounter with typhoid, both his
father and another professional elder "forsook" him. Roy desperately wanted
assistance in the case, and finally deferred to his patients' brother—a retired
doctor who had "many years' experience." 35 In another instance, Roy
deliberately neglected to consult his father or "Dr. Wm. Smith" over a difficult
delivery because "[t]hey could have done just what I did, and they would have
gotten all the credit [emphasis his]." 36 One might imagine Roy's frustration,
wrangling with illnesses that he did not understand, imploring experienced
doctors for their assistance with tough diagnosis, while finding them perfectly
willing to swoop down on the easy cases.

In the president's annual message to the Medical Association of
Alabama in 1886, Dr. Peterson explicitly addressed the professional tensions
between youth and the aged under the rubric of institutional growth. "We want
old men . . . Let them come to the front and wear the laurels of their hard earned
fame, and let no one cry 'Old fogey.'" Concomitantly, Peterson encouraged
"young men . . . just entering the profession" to join, but "let no old fogey accuse
them of being 'too forward or too pert.'" 37 In the professional journals, hostility
directed towards the old and obsolete had for years manifested itself in age-
related apppellations like "fogy," and "croaker."

33"He is Young Yet," Atlanta Clinic 4 (September 1895): 10.
34W.F. Barr, "Old and New Remedies," Southern Medical Records 6, no.
7 (1876): 386, 388.
35G.G. Roy, "Medical Reminiscences of Forty Years Age," Atlanta
Medical and Surgical Journal 16, no. 1 (1899): 13, 16.
36Idem., "Early Experiences and Reminiscences of Forty Years of
Practice," Atlanta Medical and Surgical Journal 15, no.5 (1898): 296.
Sometimes, however, older doctors would themselves appropriate such derogatory terms and use their putative age to add weight to their remarks. This was apparently the intention of "Octogenarian" in 1882. 38 A decade earlier, an anonymous writer who simply signed his contributions "SENEX" submitted a series of articles to the Atlanta Medical and Surgical Journal. The editor’s introduction to these papers suggests the age-based tensions that precipitated them: "He [Senex] says, in a private note: 'I feel that we old doctors may perhaps be of use in putting brakes to the machine, so that the youngsters don't run it too fast.' In 1857, a self-styled "old fogy" protested that "[w]ords in medicine are like the locusts of Egypt—they darkened all the land." He had more to offer than words; he had a wealth of experience. "Old fogy as I am—born out of due season—I intend to make the best of my remaining days by following the advice I give to you." 40

Old physicians might take upon themselves responsibility for reaching out to their junior colleagues, but as the century wore on younger physicians exhibited a new-found interest in their own institutional history, an interest that led them back to the aged in their ranks. 41 Undoubtedly much of this new-found interest reflected the growing strength of the profession. With their occupation stable, doctors could concentrate more on their prestige. A sense of history helped them do this in two ways. First, it provided heroes and exemplars of professional qualities. Second, the recollections of old practitioners testified to how far the profession had progressed, essentially making the ineffectual treatments of the past a selling point for newer procedures and medicines.

Reflecting this attention to old physicians, medical journals began singling out professional elders for praise and soliciting from them their recollections. "Mention was made in our last issue of Dr. J.J. Devine, of Texas, as one of our oldest subscribers," noted the editor of the Atlanta Medical and Surgical Journal in 1898. However, Devine was no match—either in longevity or fidelity—for Dr. T.J. Mitchell who "first became a subscriber in 1859, and . . . through all the varying fortunes of the JOURNAL . . . has not forgotten us." After tracing Mitchell's connection with the journal, the editors urged him to

39 Editor, "SENEX," Atlanta Medical and Surgical Journal, 10, no. 4 (1872): 243; Senex made a number of contributions to this journal; see, for example, Senex, "Hints to Young Practitioners—No.1," Atlanta Medical and Surgical Journal 10, no. 4 (1872): 233-35.
submit "some of his professional reminiscences for publication." 42 The following year--after publishing yet another doctor's recollections--the *Atlanta Medical and Surgical Journal* issued a generic request for similar materials: "We wish we could have more of this kind. Can't some of our old physicians, who are readers of THE JOURNAL, give us some of their early experiences?" 43 As demand for such reminiscences increased over the last quarter of the century, older doctors took to delivering their remarks at professional meetings prior to having them published. 44

In a sense, almost all submissions to nineteenth-century medical journals should properly be termed "reminiscences." Conventionally, physicians crafted their medical narratives as personal reminiscences in which the narrating doctor figures at the center of a drama pitting him against illness. 45 Nevertheless, the reminiscences mentioned above represent a decidedly new genre, one distinguished by an explicit awareness of memory and history, a diffuse focus over a number of cases, the absence of pharmacological details, and the manner in which the practitioner's age and experience provide the framework for the unfolding story.

Reflecting age-based tensions within the profession, contemporaries seemed to assume a generational multi-vocality to such recollections. Introducing Roy's reminiscences, the editor of the *Atlanta Medical and Surgical Journal* commented that the work "will prove of interest to all, but especially to the older practitioners"; this, despite the fact that Roy consistently addressed his remarks to his "young brethren," "a young doctor," and "the young physicians of this day." Dr. J.P. Ralls suggested that his own "observations" on "Venesection as Practiced Fifty Years Ago" might be of interest "to the younger members of the profession," as well as "those of us who have long since passed

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42"Medical Items," *Atlanta Medical and Surgical Journal* 15, no. 2 (1898): 119.


the meridian of life and now linger in its ever darkening shades." For young doctors, their relatively new sense of professional security allowed them to enjoy tales of their predecessors' trials and methods without feeling challenged or threatened. Indeed, the young professional could buoy his confidence by measuring his progressiveness against the follies and errors of a bygone age. As never before, physicians could look back and laugh at how far they had come. Introducing "reminiscent medical articles by two of our older physicians," the editor of the Atlanta Medical and Surgical Journal satirically remarked on the "advanced ideas" used in earlier decades. Aged physicians gave the young a chance to celebrate the very professional progress that the old once seemed to imperil.

What entertained the young, could be validating for the old. The authors of several reminiscences went to considerable lengths to justify the practices of their youth, lengths that in all probability added to the amusement of younger readers. In relating past venesection procedures, Ralls advanced the—not unprecedented—but certainly outdated—hypothesis that venesection no longer produced results because "the type of disease had changed." As further evidence, he offered his own body and longevity as proof of the efficacy of blood-letting. Having "had typhoid fever, pleurisy, pneumonia, a pure form of inflammatory fever of one month's continuance; in all of which he was subjected to the loss of blood, by venesection or arteriotomy, with leeches thrown in for good measure, . . . he is not dead yet, but alive and reasonably vigorous." Whether in agreement or out of amusement may be debated, but the editors of the Alabama Medical and Surgical Age thought enough of Rall's article to have it lead off the issue for February, 1891.

Dr. Roy, also pointed to his own survival as proof of the merits of past practices. He too had observed marked changes in therapeutic efficacy over the years. When Roy was young, his physician father had treated him for typhoid with the standard treatments: "small doses of calomel . . . tonic and stimulating doses of quinine. Turpentine emulsions and (what will strike the younger members of the profession with holy horror) fly-blisters to the scalp . . . and over


47 Editorial, Atlanta Medical and Surgical Journal 16, no. 1 (1899): 42. 48 Ralls, "Venesection," 91, 94. Ideas relating to the declining efficacy of bloodletting because of changes in disease had circulated in the southern journals at least two decades earlier; see "Change of Type in Disease—Letter from Sir Thomas Watson," Richmond and Louisville Medical Journal 7, no. 3 (1869): 346-7.
the abdomen as soon as extreme tenderness developed.” The adolescent Roy survived, “a living monument to this plan of treatment.” On his body were the “marks of the scarificator” which, like Ralls, he felt certain had saved him: “Now, the doctors of this age will say, that I must have been a horse or a mule to stand such cruel treatment, but without it, I honestly believe that I would not be living to-day.” Unlike Ralls, however, Roy thought it was the human body, and not diseases, that had undergone the significant transformation. “Typhoid fever of that day, it appears to me, was more severe, but more successfully combated or managed than now. I don't know the reason, unless it is that mankind has physically degenerated, and is thereby the less able to resist and throw off diseases.  

Roy’s speculations on a declining species reflect, of course, on prevailing ideas about the ill effects of “civilization”—the neurasthenic condition—as well as Darwinian ideas then in vogue. However, his efforts also legitimized his own professional actions through the course of a long life. In this way, Roy’s “Reminiscences,” like all the contemporaneous talk of “Nestors” and “Fogies,” demonstrated that southern physicians’ self-reflexive deployments of old age were complex and varied, ranging from assuaging concerns with personal mortality and economic stability to shoring up the credibility and prestige of their beloved profession.

49G.G. Roy, “Medical Reminiscences of Forty Years Ago,” Atlanta Medical and Surgical Journal 15, no. 9 (1898): 582-85.
Banished But Not Forsaken:

Pietism, Philanthropy, and the Salzburger

Immigrants in Colonial Georgia

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Inspired by their Pietist-Lutheran religion and the massive network of philanthropy that had embraced them, the Salzburger immigrants were able to find religious freedom and start a successful settlement in Georgia. This paper will first look at the extent to which the Salzburgers’ Pietist-Lutheran religion influenced their lives. Second, it will examine the main causes and effectiveness of the charitable organizations that supported them. Finally, it will show how the original group of Georgia Salzburgers, who had been the recipients of charity, became donors themselves.

In the early eighteenth century there erupted the major religious crisis of the Holy Roman Empire following the Thirty Years War. In response to oppression, thousands of Lutherans in Salzburg signed a petition addressed to the Evangelical Body at Regensburg.\(^1\) Rumors of 80,000 soldiers from Brandenburg-

\(^{1}\)After a storm of persecutions (in which people who did not attend Catholic church or who possessed Lutheran Bibles were fined and imprisoned, and the right of Lutherans to assembly was greatly restricted), the Archbishop of Salzburg’s anti-Protestant policies were brought to the attention of the German Protestant princes who maintained a caucus called the Evangelical Body (\emph{Corpus Evangelicorum}) at Regensburg. In June 1731, 19,000 Lutherans signed a petition

[\emph{Selected Annual Proceedings of the Florida Conference of Historians, Annual Meetings, 2000-2001}, 27-41], (c)2002 by Florida Conference of Historians: 1076-4585
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Prussia ready to assist the Protestants swept through Salzburg. Austrian troops soon massed along the Salzburg border. Frederick William I of Brandenburg-Prussia sent a threatening letter to the Archbishop warning him of reprisals against Catholics living in Protestant areas. Emperor Charles VI tried to prevent the situation from escalating further. The Holy Roman Empire was locked in a deadly showdown, and another religious war seemed certain.

Remaining firm, the Archbishop ordered the removal of the Lutheran Salzburgers whom he called rebels. The Archbishop issued the Edict of Expulsion in 1731, which unleashed a gigantic emigration of about 21,000 people, one of the largest relocations of people in the Holy Roman Empire up to that time. Most of the displaced Lutheran Salzburgers relocated elsewhere in Europe, particularly East Prussia, but from 1734-1751, a few hundred resettled in Georgia. Their foremost settlement Ebenezer was about twenty-five miles north of Savannah.

This profile of the Salzburger immigrants presents a different perspective from that of other historians, like George Fenwick Jones and Mack Walker, who also wrote about them. It focuses primarily on the Salzburgers' Pietist religion and the massive philanthropy that supported them. In the discussion of the expulsion, this essay agrees with both Walker and Jones that religious tensions

addressed to the Evangelical Body in which they acknowledged their Protestant faith. In July of that same year, over 150 members of the Protestant communities met at Salzburg, where they once again confirmed their allegiance to the Lutheran faith.

³Ibid., 60, 61, 120, 122, 131.
⁴Ibid., 83.
⁵Officially dated October 31, 1731. In German, the Edict is called the Emigrationspatent (Edict of Emigration). However, Protestant sources call it the Edict of Expulsion. Whether it is called an Edict of Emigration or Expulsion, the fact remains that the Lutheran Salzburgers were forced out of the Archbishopric.
⁶The number of Salzburgers expelled varies depending on the source. Under “Firmian” in the New Catholic Encyclopedia, 22,000 Salzburgers are said to have been expelled. If one looks under “Salzburg” in that same New Catholic Encyclopedia, the figure is 21,000. Estimates from the Georgia Salzburger Society and the introduction of General Oglethorpe’s Georgia: Colonial Letters 1734-37, edited by Mills Lane, go as high as 30,000.

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ignited the crisis. Additionally, it concurs with Mack Walker that the winners in aftermath of the crisis were the Protestant powers in Prussia. Since it is focusing on the Georgia Salzburgers, the paper adds Protestant England-Hanover to the list of winners.

Where this research differs from both Walker and Jones is in its emphasis on the religion and philanthropy of the Georgia Salzburgers. Neither the Pietist religion, nor its influence on the Salzburgers are mentioned in Walker’s study. Also, unlike Walker’s work, this one concentrates on those few hundred Salzburgers who came to Georgia and not the majority (approximately 19,000) who settled in East Prussia. Although Walker’s book gives an account of the expulsion, it only covers the European scene. Jones, on the other hand, does discuss the Salzburgers’ religion, the philanthropy that they received and the American connection. Jones believes in the ascendancy of pure facts from primary sources over interpretation, allowing readers to draw their own conclusions. Therefore, none of the previous works on the Salzburger immigrants attempts to relate the Georgia Salzburgers’ religion and philanthropy to their expulsion, character, and settlement in the way this paper will.

The Salzburger immigrants who came to Georgia were not just Lutherans but also Pietists, members of a reform movement within the Lutheran Church that stressed a more personal faith.7 This Pietist-Lutheran religion of the Salzburgers formed the root of their character and brought about their expulsion. But at the same time, it was this same devotion to their religion that compelled their embrace by Protestant charitable institutions, journey to America, and settlement.

Even though there were some political and economic reasons behind the Salzburgers’ expulsion, the primary motive was religious. Although sympathetic towards the Archbishop, Charles VI’s role in the crisis was influenced by his desire to win the support of the Protestant princes for the Pragmatic Sanction and secure Habsburg succession. Nonetheless, the main reason for the expulsion within the Archbishopric remained religious. During the time of the expulsion, Salzburg was not part of Austria; it was an independent Archbishopric within the Holy Roman Empire, in which the Catholic Archbishop of Salzburg maintained complete authority.

After the Thirty Years War, the Holy Roman Empire remained divided between a Catholic majority in the south and Protestant majority in the north. The

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7Pietism was founded in the 17th century by Jacob Spencer. Another key figure of Pietism is August Hermann Francke of the University of Halle, Germany.
Holy Roman Empire was fragmented into hundreds of kingdoms, duchies, free cities, and ecclesiastical lands. The Treaty of Westphalia (1648) maintained the imperial law of *Cuius regio, eius religio* (Whose is the region, his is the religion). Thus, the individual secular rulers decided the faith of their regions and whether or not any people of a different faith could remain. The degree of tolerance differed from region to region. If a ruler chose to recognize only one particular religion, then under imperial law any dissidents had three years to dispose of any property and leave the region.

As a result of paying a sum equivalent to $75,000, the Pope appointed Count Leopold Anton Eleutherius von Firmian as the new Archbishop of Salzburg in 1727. Archbishop Firmian was a zealous Catholic and determined to wipe out any heresy, including Protestantism. Where previous archbishops might have overlooked Protestantism in the distant districts, Firmian, backed by his eager chancellor, von Räll, remained firm in his anti-Protestant policies. Even the *New Catholic Encyclopedia* attests to Firmian’s support of the Jesuit and Counter Reformation movement. According to the *New Catholic Encyclopedia*, “the peak of Counter Reformation efforts” in Salzburg was reached under Firmian.”

Having not traveled much outside his mostly Catholic city of Salzburg, the Archbishop believed that the Protestant rebels were limited to a few troublemakers

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9*Ibid.*, 4. Walker says that the sum of money paid by the Archbishop for his office (which included a douceur of a 1000 Salzburger ducats to the imperial ambassador to Salzburg, 50,000 ducats to his secretary, and 32,000 scudi to Rome, etc.) was probably not usual for that time. Walker, *The Salzburger Transaction*, 34.

10Firmian was not be the first archbishop of Salzburg to issue an expulsion. The Church had expelled the Jews from Salzburg in 1498. In 1683, the Defereger expulsion occurred when 500 Protestants were forced to leave. In 1691, 60-70 Protestants were expelled. However, some later archbishops tended to ignore the Protestants in the outskirts of the Archbishopric. Walker, *The Salzburger Transaction*, 23-27.


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whom he could easily eradicate and was shocked to find out that there were over twenty thousand Protestants living in the rural areas of his dominion. The population of the Archbishopric of Salzburg was 125,000; therefore, about one-fifth of Salzburg was enshrouded with Protestantism.\footnote{Hvidt, \textit{Von Reck's Voyage}, 10-11.}

Firmian saw the Protestants as a growing menace that had to be stopped. Determined to solidify his control over Salzburg and retain religious unity, the Archbishop started restricting the rights of the Protestants, which was met by resistance on the part of the Lutherans. This included such actions as the initial petition and the Oath of Schwarzhach, whereby the Lutherans declared allegiance to their faith by touching a salt block and licking their finger while raising their other hand to God. Firmian responded by carrying out their expulsion in the winter of 1731.

The Archbishop and his supporters might have benefitted from any property left behind by the expelled Salzburgers; however, they did not have enough assets in order to justify the seizure of their property as being the primary reason for their expulsion. The majority of the Lutheran Salzburgers came from the lower end of the social ladder, and most were not from the city of Salzburg but from the rural outskirts of the province. They were mostly peasants, mountain farmers, and salt miners.\footnote{During the Middle Ages, the city of Salzburg became rich because of its numerous salt mines; its name derived from the German words \textit{Saltz} (salt) and \textit{Burg} (fort, city). Later the mining of gold, silver, copper, iron, and other metals added to the city’s wealth. Salzburg maintained its status as an independent Archbishopric until the Napoleonic Wars when Napoleon secularized Salzburg and gave it to his ally, Bavaria. After Napoleon’s defeat, the Congress of Vienna (1815) awarded Salzburg to Austria.}

The Edict of Expulsion did not state that the Lutherans’ property would be confiscated. The Lutherans were allowed to take their belongings with them. They were forced to quickly sell any possessions that they could not take with them, and because the market was suddenly overrun with items for sale, the Catholics were able to cheaply buy Lutheran belongings at a very low cost. The Archbishop never officially confiscated any property—except as punishment for those Lutherans who failed to leave in the allotted time period.

Pope Clement XII supported Firmian’s policies to cleanse his Archbishopric from Protestants, but told Firmian to obey the Triennum (three year
grace period) and conduct the emigration in an orderly manner. The Archbishop, however, considered the Lutherans to be rebellious subjects and not oppressed religious believers, and not protected by the Treaty of Westphalia. He accused the Lutherans of sedition, assembling illegally, solicitation, disturbing the peace, threatening Catholics, conspiring against the Church and the Archbishop himself, planning to erect their own independent state, and plotting to spread disruption in neighboring states in order to cause another religious war. The true motive behind Firmian's actions surfaces in his own words where he himself expressed his elation of riding the Archbishopric of the "nest of hornets" (Lutherans) and finally uniting Salzburg under one faith.

Ironically, the Salzburgers' Pietist religion that led to their expulsion also weighed heavily on the massive support they received. Word of the expulsion spread quickly throughout Europe and was sensationalised by the Protestants. The immense attention that the affair caused soon lent itself to an enormous amount of sympathy and outpouring for the Salzburgers, which culminated in their receiving large numbers of donations and contributions. The Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge and the English Trustees were the most important of the Protestant charitable organizations supporting those Salzburgers who would settle in Georgia.

The main goal of the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge (henceforth called the SPCK) was to spread the Protestant gospel to the English and their colonies. By examining the letters and documents of the English SPCK, the organization's Pro-Protestant attitude becomes clear. Many of the SPCK's letters referred to the Lutheran Salzburgers as their poor, persecuted "Brethren" who must be helped. The SPCK's secretary, Henry Newman, wrote a letter to the Lutheran Reverend Father Samuel Urlsperger dated September 8, 1732, in which he expressed Protestantism as the only true religion and denounced non-

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Christians, like Jews and Muslims (calling for their “utter extirpation”). In another letter to Ulsperger dated July 25, 1732, Newman stated his happiness that God had opened the eyes of the Lutheran Salzburgers “to see the Dangerous Errors and Superstitions of the Popish Persuasion . . . .” According to Newman, all those helping their fellow Protestant Salzburgers were fulfilling and promoting the glory of God. Given the SPCK’s favoritism towards Protestants, it becomes apparent that the Society would not have helped non-Protestants so readily.

Through this Protestant brotherhood, the English and others aided the Salzburgers. England not only allowed, but also funded their settlement in Georgia. The English most likely would not have embraced and financed the Salzburgers had they been Catholic, Jewish, or other exiles. In terms of primary responsibility for their settlement in Georgia, the SPCK and Trustees were the most important people in the lives of the Salzburgers. The religious connection between the Lutheran Salzburgers and the English, to whom the colony of Georgia belonged, remained pivotal in the Salzburgers settling at Ebenezer.

Despite the fact that many of the Salzburgers had doubts about going to Georgia, their steadfast devotion to Pietism inspired them onward. The Salzburgers knew little about the new colony. Most were worried about not being able to speak English, dying on the voyage, living with criminals and debtors whom they heard where being sent to Georgia as punishment, and the fertility of the land. Some also questioned if things were going to be better in Georgia.

A group of Salzburgers interested in venturing to America assembled in Augsburg in August 1733, where they met the Reverend Samuel Ulsperger, himself one of the expelled Salzburgers. Ulsperger contended that the Salzburgers would have prepared themselves well in advance, and unlike the Palatines, their voyage was well planned and sponsored by Trustees. Ulsperger pointed out that things would be different for the Salzburgers because they “had been graciously called and invited to go to Georgia.” The Reverend urged them

19Ibid., 27.
20Ibid., 22.
21Ibid.

on through his motivational sermons and speeches.

Urlisperger compared the Salzburgers' emigration to America to the Israelites' exodus from Egypt. The Reverend himself would stay in Europe, but forty-two Salzburgers decided to embark to Georgia via the port city of Rotterdam (the first of many transports of Salzburgers and other Germans to Georgia). Just like the Puritans, who settled near Boston, the Salzburgers considered themselves religious Pilgrims coming to the New World. In Rotterdam the Salzburgers met their two Pietist ministers, Johann Martin Boltzius and Israel Christian Gronau, who would remain with them throughout their entire journey and settlement. After a brief stop in Dover, where the Salzburgers met the English Trustees, the Salzburgers headed for America. While on the ship to America, Boltzius and Gronau reminded the Salzburgers that their voyage to Georgia was "in accordance with the Will of God." The two ministers who constantly quoted from the Bible became the mentors of the Salzburgers. Through the spiritual guidance and encouragement of their Lutheran ministers, the Salzburgers overcame their initial doubts and prevailed in their long and difficult journey to the New World.

The Pietist religion of the Salzburgers strongly influenced their character and the settlement of Ebenezer, which they founded. The very name that they chose, Ebenezer, had religious meaning and came from Samuel 7:12, which was one of many passages that the ministers read to the Salzburgers. The passage says that Samuel placed a stone where God had saved his people; the stone was called Eben-Ezer, stone of help.

Pietism was the cause of their missionary outlook towards Indians, blacks, and other non-Christians to whom they eagerly wanted to teach the


26 Perry, "Theoretical and Political Roots," 4.
gospel, as well as their anti-slavery feelings. Their devotion to religion caused the Salzburgers to build a Church upon arrival. Pietism also inspired the ministers’ enthusiasm over establishing a school and conducting Sunday School in order to teach the children, because education and religious instruction were considered important. Pietism stressed social work in the community; the Salzburgers would build the first orphanage in Georgia. Influenced by Martin Luther, who had condemned the Peasant Revolts of the 16th century, Pietism taught pacifism, and this is why the Salzburgers refused to help the British fight the Spanish in the War of Jenkin’s Ear. Another Pietist doctrine stated that God is all-powerful and all-loving, and anything God does is good. Therefore, no matter what bad things happened, the Salzburgers remained optimistic and continued to believe in the infinite wisdom and righteousness of God.

The English assistance of the Salzburgers, which was primarily motivated by philanthropy, made their settlement in Georgia possible and differentiated the Salzburgers from other immigrants coming to America. Even before the expulsion of the Salzburgers, England had plans for establishing a new colony south of Carolina, which would be called Georgia in honor of King George II. Coincidentally, England and Hanover were dynastically linked, and George II maintained a strong connection to the Holy Roman Empire and sympathized with the expelled Salzburgers.

James Oglethorpe and other benevolent gentlemen had organized themselves as the Trustees for Establishing a Colony in Georgia. Several of the SPCK members were also Trustees. The Trustees turned towards Parliament and the English people for assistance. Since not all members of the Parliament and the English public were interested in philanthropy, the Trustees emphasized other

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27An account of the Salzburgers’ missionary outlook is given in the diary of the two ministers, listed in the Detailed Reports, and the diary of Philip Georg Friedrich von Reck. Von Reck’s diary, in particular, gives a thorough description of his and the Salzburgers’ encounter with African slaves and Native Americans. See Von Reck’s Voyage, Hvidt, ed.

28Some of the Salzburgers bought slaves, particularly from James Habersham, who was a long-time friend and sponsor of the Salzburgers as well as an important figure in colonial Georgia. Still, the ratio of blacks to whites in Effingham County, which is the modern-day county to which Ebenezer belongs, was one of the lowest in all of Georgia, Jones The Salzburger Saga, 81, 103, 114-15.

29Jones, The Georgia Dutch, 204; Jones, Detailed Reports, I, xiii.

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reasons why the colony of Georgia should be established. The English needed hard working people who would toil and build up their colony. Moreover, the Trustees emphasized to Parliament that besides being a haven for persecuted Protestants, the colony of Georgia would serve as a refuge for the poor, a place of obtaining raw materials, and a buffer zone separating the English from the Spaniards in Florida. Overall, though, the English efforts to help the Salzburgers were based on the enormous outpouring of sympathy over the plight of the Salzburgers.30

Many people in England soon realized the practicality of such a colony, and George II granted Georgia its charter in June of 1732. After hearing about the tragic fate of the Salzburgers, Oglethorpe proposed to his fellow Trustees that they allow some of the Lutheran Salzburgers to settle in Georgia.31 By July 1732, the Trustees had raised a sum of 33,000 English pounds and agreed to pay for the settlement of three hundred Salzburgers.32 Every man was entitled to three lots of land with which to support a family and live comfortably: one for a house and yard, the second for a garden, and the third for tillage.33 The total amount of land given to each family was at least five acres; they were not subject to any years of servitude. Any children that would marry were also entitled to their own land. Moreover, the land given to the Salzburgers was exempt from taxes for the first ten years.34 The Salzburgers received food, building supplies, medicine, clothing, seeds, livestock, tools, other necessities, and funds years after having settled in Georgia.

The initial success of Ebenezer proved the effectiveness of the philanthropic institutions. Ebenezer (New Ebenezer) was in a good location because all commerce between Carolina and Georgia had to pass through


31Robert Wright, Memoir of General James Oglethorpe (London: Chapman and Hall, 1867), 75.

32Church, Oglethorpe: A Study in Philanthropy in England and Georgia, 144.


34Jones, Detailed Reports, I, 190.
Ebenezer. With the Salzburgers settled and Ebenezer prosperous, the assistance of the Trustees and Oglethorpe ended. During the colonial years silk was produced in Ebenezer and subsidized by England. Of the 847 pounds of cocoons raised in Georgia in 1747, half were produced by the Salzburgers. Ebenezer became the Silk Capital of Georgia. Ebenezer also had many sawmills; the lumber industry was profitable as well.

However, during the Revolutionary War, Ebenezer was ravaged by troops and afterwards lost its guaranteed silk market in England, marking the beginning of the end for Ebenezer. With Boltzius, Gronau, Oglethorpe, the SPCK, the Trustees, and the many other people who had given so much to the settlement of Ebenezer gone, many of the inhabitants of Ebenezer left in search of better land and eventually assimilated into mainstream America. Nonetheless, with the help of the charitable organizations, Ebenezer had been successful at first, which proved to a degree the competency of the philanthropic mission. The SPCK, Oglethorpe, the Trustees, George II, and the entire Protestant charitable mission would have failed as well. Fortunately, the people of Ebenezer were productive and prosperous. Its ultimate demise was brought about by uncontrollable events like the Revolutionary War and, consequently, was not the fault of the Salzburgers or the people who had helped them.

The degree to which the Salzburgers received funding and support distinguished them from other immigrants who came to America. The Salzburgers were not the first Protestant German refugees to receive help from England, but the Salzburgers had received more support than any of these previous German immigrants, especially the many Palatines who had settled in Pennsylvania (the so-called Pennsylvania Dutch). During Queen Anne’s reign, 13,000 Germans from the Rhineland Palatinate came to England on their way to America. Out of a group of 4,000 who were destined for New York, 1,700 died either at sea or within months of arriving on land. Because the majority of the Palatines became indentured servants on arrival in Pennsylvania, the word

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35The original site of Ebenezer (Old Ebenezer) lacked fertile land, so the Salzburgers moved the settlement to a better location a few miles away (New Ebenezer).


37Ibid.

38Church, Oglethorpe: A Study in Philanthropy in England and Georgia, 144.
Palatine became synonymous with indentured servant. Still, the Germans in Pennsylvania proved themselves as able workers, which made the English desire more Germans to colonize America. With the Salzburgers, though, the English officials were much more organized and determined not to make the same mistakes as with their forerunners, the “Pennsylvania Dutch”; subsequently, the Salzburgers received beneficial attention.

What was so amazing was the vast amount of support that the Salzburgers received in Europe, ranging from Denmark to Prussia. Everywhere they went, they received donations. The Salzburgers were even invited to England so that the Trustees could see them in person and bestow gifts on them. An overwhelming amount of benevolence was shown not just to the first transport of Salzburgers, but for subsequent ones as well. While conducting the third transport of German immigrants to Georgia, Philip Georg Friedrich von Reck reported in his diary that even though the transport had passed the city of Augsburg two hours ago, a priest from Augsburg had caught up with them in order to give the emigrants his blessings and a present of five Gulden simply because this was “an opportunity he had missed earlier.” Throughout their journey the third group of Protestants were welcomed in towns and offered bread and wine. According to von Reck, “everywhere we got fresh horses and were greeted with great love...”

George Fenwick Jones stated that one benefactor continued to send charity to the Georgia Salzburgers even after a century and a half. Few other immigrants who came to America were treated with such generosity. Most immigrants did not have their complete passage and settlement paid for to such an extent. Considering the horrible accounts of the many Pennsylvania Dutch, Irish, and other European immigrants in America, the help and the support the Salzburgers received was unusual. Remarkably, while many immigrants lived in slums, worked as indentured servants, existed little better than slaves, the Salzburgers avoided any such expense. George Fenwick Jones even said that other envious immigrants in Georgia contended that the only reason the Salzburgers were doing so well was that they were constantly receiving donations. Had the Salzburgers not received such a vast amount of help, they would have most likely ended up as indentured servants like many of the Rhineland Palatines in the

42Ibid.
north—that is, if they had made it to America in the first place.\textsuperscript{43}

The generosity shown by the Protestant missionary organizations encouraged the Salzburgers to act similarly once established. The first group of forty-two Salzburgers did all they could in order to help other German Protestant immigrants settle in Ebenezer and other parts of Georgia. These later transports were also aided by the English SPCK and Trustees like the first one. But as Ebenezer progressed, the first Salzburgers assumed a greater role in the recruiting and settling of the later immigrants. The Salzburgers would write letters to the Trustees and back home to encourage other transports. These later immigrants included not just Salzburgers, but Protestants from throughout the former Holy Roman Empire.

The Salzburgers were followed by hundreds of other German immigrants that changed the physical makeup of the Salzburgers already living in Ebenezer and elsewhere in Georgia. Returning to Augsburg in good health, von Reck, who had been with the first group of Salzburgers, rallied the Salzburgers going on the second transport that left almost a year after the first. On December 28, 1734, the second transport, which contained forty-nine Salzburgers, arrived in Savannah. Pastor Gronau was sent out to receive them, for they, too, would be settled in and around Ebenezer.

Von Reck would also organize and conduct the third transport of immigrants who settled in Georgia in August 1735. The third transport included the English student John Wesley, who befriended the Salzburgers and a large group of Moravians.\textsuperscript{44} The Moravians were also Pietists, but one important difference was that the Salzburgers followed the Pietist doctrine of Lutheranism to the strictest sense while the Moravians were more liberal. As an orthodox minister Boltzius sometimes viewed the Moravians as dangerous innovators of questionable faith.

\textsuperscript{43}Frederick William I's grandfather had re-settled about 15,000 Huguenots in Brandenburg-Prussia in 1685. The Huguenots had been such a great asset to Brandenburg-Prussia, which had always been economically backwards, that Frederick William I hardly hesitated to absorb the displaced Lutheran Salzburgers into his kingdom when he was offered the same opportunity as his grandfather in 1731.

\textsuperscript{44}The Moravians were a Pietist German-speaking group. The Moravians were religious followers of Jan Huss (Hussites) who had originally come from Moravia. They had been expelled, and later their beliefs spread into Saxony and other areas within the Holy Roman Empire.
In March 1739, the Salzburgers wrote both Oglethorpe and Urlsperger expressing their desire for yet another transport of Salzburgers to be settled in Ebenezer. The Salzburgers replied that they were satisfied with their new homeland in hopes that more Salzburgers would come. The many transports that followed included an assortment of German emigrants from Swabia, the Palatinate, Switzerland, and Alsace. Between 1734 and 1751, more than 1,500 German Protestants immigrated into Georgia.

As with the Moravians, there were some minor religious differences between the Pietist-Lutheran Salzburgers and the other German Protestant immigrants. Many of the Swiss were Calvinists. These groups were simply lumped together and referred to as "Salzburgers" by the English colonists, who could not differentiate between them. In fact, the Palatines soon outnumbered the Salzburgers in Ebenezer. However, the Palatines quickly adopted the Pietist ways of the Salzburgers and intermarried with them, eventually making distinctions between them almost impossible.

The Salzburgers showed extreme benevolence to each other and newcomers. The social welfare projects, like the school, church library and orphanage that the Salzburgers had established in Ebenezer enriched the community. Some examples of helping others included the following: The Salzburgers helped build a house for a Palatine woman who was not one of them. They worked the fields of a Swiss immigrant while he was sick and gave bushels of corn to the Silesian carpenter while he was sick as well. The Salzburgers also donated money to build a Lutheran church in Philadelphia and two Lutheran missions in India.

The unusual element in the lives of the Salzburgers was their Pietist

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46 Alsace, which had been settled by the Alemanni and had been part of the Holy Roman Empire for centuries, was incorporated into France at the end of the Thirty Years War. Although under French authority, Alsace was still very much German in culture in the late 1600s and early 1700s. Thus, it is important to note that many of the German immigrants who settled in Pennsylvania and Georgia were Alsatians. See Jones, The Georgia Dutch, 190.

47 Jones, History of Georgia, 214, 374-75.


Lutheran religion and their massive philanthropy which helped make their settlement possible. Later, the generosity bestowed onto them would be returned to others. When Ebenezer declined, some of the Salzburgers moved to nearby cities within Effingham County, Georgia, while others moved out of the state entirely. Many of the Lutherans ended up becoming Southern Baptists or Methodists. As in the case of other great expulsions throughout history, the Salzburger immigrants ended up becoming an important asset to their new adopted-country. The Archbishopric of Salzburg’s loss was Georgia’s gain.

Besides building the first orphanage in Georgia, the Salzburgers built the first grist, rice, saw, and silk mills, as well as the first church in the state of Georgia. The Salzburgers also conducted the first Sunday School in Georgia. John Wesley, the founder of Methodism, was greatly influenced by Pietism. Additionally, John Adam Treutlen, a Salzburger, became the first governor of the state of Georgia, and although his time in office was short, he prevented Georgia from becoming a part of South Carolina. In 1925, the Georgia Salzburger Society was founded and currently has more than 1500 members who regularly meet at the Jerusalem Church. In 1984 the Austrian province of Salzburg donated a monument commemorating the Georgia Salzburgers, which stands on Bay Street in Savannah. Remnants of the Salzburger settlement in Ebenezer can still be seen. They stand as stark testimony to the largess of the early supporters of these hardy pioneers.

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50 Not until 1740, after first studying the orphanage in Ebenezer, did longtime friend and benefactor of the Salzburgers, George Whitefield, establish Bethesda orphanage in Savannah. The first church was built in Ebenezer in 1741, but no longer stands today. Jerusalem Church (built in 1769), which still conducts services to this day, contains the oldest working church bells in the state. Unfortunately, the orphanage in Ebenezer does not exist anymore.

51 Georgia legislature met in Ebenezer in February 18, 1796, and Ebenezer served as the capital of Georgia for two weeks. Ebenezer remained the capital of Effingham County, until the county capital was moved to Springfield in 1799.
Failed Revolution in Guatemala:
Discovering the Missing Links

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After the fall of Fulgencio Batista of Cuba in 1959, a wave of revolutionary movements swept across Central and South America. Bands of guerrilla fighters, following the foco strategy of Che Guevara and Regis Debray, took up arms in an effort to wrestle political control from the elite governing Guatemala, Venezuela, Colombia, and Peru.¹ Yet each of these attempts at replicating the Cuban Revolution ultimately failed. This paper will focus on the guerrilla insurgency of Guatemala from 1962 to the present, to explore why the insurgents failed to obtain control of the government, and to examine what this can tell us about the potential for revolutionary movements in Central and South America.

The paper is divided into five sections. The first section will reviews the literature concerning revolution in the “Third World.” The second section focuses on the Guatemalan guerrilla insurgency of the 1960s and offers an explanation for why it failed. The third section deals with the re-emergence of the guerrilla movement in Guatemala in the late 1970s. The fourth section applies a multivariate approach for explaining the failure of this most recent attempt at acquiring political power. The conclusion summarizes the issues and offers some thoughts on the prospects for revolutionary activity in future years.

Contemporary theories of revolution have focused on a wide range of

¹The foco theory of revolution posits that a small band of guerrilla fighters, located in remote outposts in the countryside, could set off a larger social revolution by demonstrating to the masses the corrupt and oligarchic nature of the ruling regime. The goal of the guerrilla foco was to create the conditions whereby the state would be forced to resort to large-scale military repression, thus driving a wedge between the population at large and the governing elite.

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variables regarding the revolutionary process. Modernization scholars, such as Samuel Huntington, argue that the seeds of revolution lie within a nation’s modernization process and an institutional incapacity to incorporate a nascent middle class into the political arena.\(^2\) When the state is unable to meet the increasing political demands of the middle class, a crisis emerges that lays the groundwork for large-scale revolutionary activity.

Other scholars tend to focus on the internal political struggle for control of the state apparatus. One group within this genre, articulated most clearly in the writings of Charles Tilly, contends that the essential factor in causing modern revolutions is the competition for scarce resources between the state and competing groups. When the governing elite is unable to acquire the necessary resources to satisfy societal demands or defeat contending groups challenging them for control of the polity, revolutions will result.\(^3\)

Robert Dix, Theda Skocpol and Jeff Goodwin, and Thomas Greene all agree with this line of thought, but add that in order for revolutions to occur there must exist a corrupt, personalistic dictator whose despotic rule alienates large segments of the population and thus facilitates the creation of a cross-class alliance whose goal is to overthrow the entrenched regime.\(^4\)

A third school emphasizes the structural causes of revolution. Theda Skocpol, in some of her earlier work, contends that modern revolutions must be understood in the context of a state’s position within the international economic system. Because states must compete with others for scarce international resources, those who fail (either because of the existence of an entrenched landed elite who lie outside the control of the state or as a result of a defeat in war) suffer internal political consequences—-one being the emergence of revolutionary activity.\(^5\) Similarly, John Booth and Thomas Walker stress the importance of international economic factors in


\(^5\)See Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1979).
causing revolutionary activity. Where they differ from Skocpol, however, are in the roles individuals and groups play within the revolutionary process. For Booth and Walker, individuals and groups are mobilized for revolutionary activity when their economic status declines, which generally occurs because of a change in their nation's position within the international political economy and because of blocked avenues for political participation.\(^6\)

In a similar vein, a number of scholars have looked more closely at the impact of the world economy on revolutionary activity within agrarian societies. James Scott and Eric Wolf posit what is known as the "tactical mobility thesis." Both argue the peasants most likely to rebel are those who own some land and are autonomous from the landed elite.\(^7\) Jeffrey Paige, on the other hand, believes that the landless laborers who have no title to the land and must consistently move to different parts of the country for work, are the most prone to rebel. Revolutionary movements arise in these circumstances because the peasants believe they have nothing to lose.\(^8\) All three scholars agree, however, that the introduction of the capitalist economy within the countryside leads to a displacement of large segments of the rural population and their subsequent indoctrination by guerrilla leaders, thus causing revolutionary activity to arise. The difficulty with all of these theoretical approaches is that they tend to focus on specific facet of the revolutionary process. What is needed, instead, is an approach that can combine all of these into a coherent theoretical model.

James DeFronzo offers such a model. In Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements, DeFronzo posits five necessary and sufficient conditions for the success or failure of any revolutionary movement. These include: the existence of mass frustration and popular uprisings; dissident elite political movements; a unifying motivation for revolution; a severe state crisis; and a permissive world context.\(^9\) Each factor by itself cannot adequately explain the result of any given revolution, but when taken together they form a cohesive explanatory unit. Utilizing DeFronzo's model, an

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examination will be made of the failure of the Guatemalan guerrilla movements since 1962.

The origin of the Guatemalan guerrilla movements of the 1960s stemmed largely from the incomplete social revolution of 1944-1954. In an ironic twist of fate, Dwight D. Eisenhower’s 1954 decision to support the overthrow of the popularly elected government of Jacobo Arbenz Guzman contributed to setting the revolutionary tide in motion. Writes George Black: “Memories of the Arbenz period were a powerful basis for the support which the first guerrillas would receive.”10

On July 1, 1944, as a result of urban unrest, middle-class pressure, and dissident military officers, General Jorge Ubico resigned. The following year, national elections gave Dr. Juan Jose Arevalo the presidency. Arevalo had campaigned under a program of “spiritual” socialism, promising to enact major reforms centering on political decentralization and land reform. When his five years in office came to an end, Arevalo could point to a number of successful social and political reforms, but the extreme maldistribution of land remained.11

When Jacobo Arbenz Guzman took office in 1950 he was determined to follow through on his predecessor’s social reforms. Throughout his four years as president, Arbenz legalized a variety of political parties (including the Communist Party) encouraged trade union activity, nationalized foreign land holdings, and implemented drastic land reforms.

The 1952 Agrarian Reform Law redistributed farmland to over 100,000 peasants. The result of these social programs was to antagonize the landed elite and foreign investors, specifically U.S. representatives of the United Fruit Company (UFCO). When a number of Communist Party members were appointed to the cabinet and Arbenz received an arms cache from Czechoslovakia, the Eisenhower administration labeled Guatemala’s government “communist” and proceeded with covert actions to overthrow the regime.

Utilizing financial and diplomatic pressures at the Organization of American States (OAS) and a CIA-backed group of Army dissidents, Arbenz was forced out of office in June 1954. With U.S. backing, Colonel Castillo Armas, at the head of his “National Liberation Army,” took power and immediately began to dismantle many of Arevalo’s and Arbenz’s socialist reforms.12

The larger implications of the Arbenz coup can be broken down into two categories. The first was the general feeling among the population, especially within

the moderate elements of the country who saw Arbenz’s reforms as an avenue for political and economic power, that their revolution had been stolen from them. This feeling would linger on for a number of years before a small group of moderate army officials attempted to take over the reins of power in an effort to reinstate the economic and political reforms abandoned after Arbenz’s fall. The second implication was the formation of a U.S. trained counter-insurgency force, which ultimately led to the formation of a state apparatus based largely on terror.

From 1954 to the first guerrilla activities in 1962, the Guatemalan armed forces were completely restructured by U.S. military advisors. The Guatemalan Army’s mission changed from maintaining law and order to rooting out all “subversive” elements in the country. As Michael McClintock determined: “Castillo Armas presided over a police system almost entirely oriented toward countering subversion, at its core an intelligence system set by the United States.”

Between 1953-1961, the United States provided over $13 million in military and economic assistance, most of which went toward arming the counter-insurgency forces. When Castillo Armas was assassinated in 1957, and Colonel Ydigoras Fuentes took power, the formation of the counter-insurgency state was well on its way to completion.

The Ydigoras administration was racked, however, by internal corruption and soon ran into difficulties. A small group of reformers within the military, led by Captains Luis Augusto Turcios Lima and Marco Antonio Yon Sosa, directed a putsch on November 13, 1960. Although they failed to gain political power, their actions set off a series of anti-government protests that would soon lead to the overthrow of General Ydigoras.

The captains’ grievances stemmed from what they perceived as undue corruption within the upper echelons of the military and government. In addition, they felt that the president’s failure to consult with Army officials regarding the CIA’s training of Cuban exiles on Guatemalan soil for the Bay of Pigs invasion was a personal affront.

When the putsch failed, Turcios Lima and Yon Sosa went into exile in Honduras and later Mexico. Both men returned to Guatemala in 1961 and attempted to gain access to political power by aligning themselves with the country’s reformist politicians and political parties. When these efforts failed, Turcios Lima and Yon Sosa realized that the struggle would have to continue through violent means. In late 1961, both men entered into an alliance with Guatemala’s communist party, then known as

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the Guatemalan Labour Party (PGT). The PGT offered the revolutionaries the ideology and organizational skills that they were lacking.

Deeply influenced by the Cuban Revolution, Turcios and Yon Sosa adopted the foco strategy and set off for Guatemala's eastern mountains determined to set off a large-scale social revolution. It was in the Sierra de las Minas that Guatemala's first guerrilla movement, the November 13 Revolutionary Movement (MR-13), was created.\(^\text{15}\)

Although the MR-13 was initially successful in capturing a number of military posts, subsequent efforts failed, largely because of a lack of clear direction, little local support, and an inadequate organization structure.\(^\text{16}\) Coordinated efforts in the urban areas of the country throughout 1962 were more successful, however. Popular uprisings by anti-government workers and students, along with a combined attack by reformist political parties, created chaos in the country. The PGT also established its own guerrilla front in the eastern half of the country, but was quickly defeated by the Guatemalan Army. By December 1962, the tattered remnants of the PGT, along with the survivors of MR-13 and the student based Movimiento 12 de Abril, combined to form the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR).\(^\text{17}\) Thus, DeFronzo's first two criteria for a successful revolutionary struggle were met: the country was indeed in the throes of a series of popular uprisings and a dissident elite political movement was being led by the FAR.

Although the FAR represented the central coordinating body of three distinct, and often times, autonomous fighting forces, it was the PGT that was the organizational force of the movement. Primarily urban based, their objective was to create the necessary conditions for a Marxist revolution in Guatemala by aligning themselves with the bourgeoisie in an effort to create a modern industrial proletariat, that would then overthrow the capitalist system. Under Yon Sosa, a second group, the MR-13, operated primarily in the department of Izabel, working towards a large-scale insurrection which would result in the immediate installation of a socialist regime. Their strategy was to radicalize the peasantry, so that a revolution could occur in the near future. The third revolutionary group within the FAR was Turcios Lima's Edgar Ibarra Front (FGEI). FGEI operated out of the Sierra de las Minas and pursued a strategy based largely on the foco theory of revolution as laid out by Guevara and Debray.

From 1962-1969, these three groups attempted to implement a Castro-style

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\(^{15}\) Black, Garrison Guatemala, 70-72.
\(^{16}\) Richard Gott, Guerrilla Movements in Latin America (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1971), 55. This is an excellent account of the internal workings of the 1960s guerrilla movement in Guatemala.
\(^{17}\) Black, Garrison Guatemala, 72-73.
revolution in Guatemala. During the first three years of guerrilla activity (1963-1966), the FAR experienced a string of military victories. It appeared that the revolutionaries were on the verge of success. Yet, unlike the case of Cuba, the Guatemalan Army with the backing of the United States was able to stem the revolutionary tide. The reasons for the failure of the 1960s guerrilla movements may be attributed to three factors: first, the lack of a unifying motivation for revolution; second, the absence of a severe state crisis; and third, an unfavorable world context.

Despite the FAR's ultimate goal of political and socio-economic reform in Guatemala, the revolutionary organization was racked with internal dissension. The FAR was unable to agree upon any coherent ideology or overriding strategy that could unite the various factions into a cohesive organization. The PGT focused on the urban struggle, while MR-13 and FGEI pursued diametrically opposed rural strategies. The result was a guerrilla movement torn apart by its own internal contradictions.

These problems were exacerbated by a failure to build a closer relationship with residents in the countryside who traditionally suffered the most- the Ladino peasants and the Indian population. As George Black observed: "Outsiders in their chosen territory of eastern Guatemala, they failed to build any solid ties to the predominantly Ladino population of small and medium-scale peasant proprietors. When working in an Indian area—which was a rarity—they employed organizing techniques that failed to take into account the particularities of indigenous culture." By failing to cater to the needs of the larger population, the guerrilla movements of the 1960s separated themselves from the base of support that was so essential to Castro's victory in Cuba and later to the FSLN triumph in Nicaragua. The cross-class alliance considered so critical for revolutionary success was non-existent.

A second problem was the lack of a state crisis. Throughout the 1960s, the Guatemalan state apparatus was strongly supported by both the army and the landed elite. In most instances, the military was in full control of the state apparatus. Nor did the state suffer from a "Skocpolian" crisis resulting from a failure to compete within the international political economy. Moreover, Guatemala lacked the neo-patrimonial leader which dissident classes could mobilize against in a common cause. In these circumstances, the military was given free rein to suppress the rebel forces. When General Ydigoras was unable to accomplish this task, he was replaced in March 1963.

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18Ibid., 76.

by Colonel Enrique Peralta Azurdia, who immediately stepped up measures to put down the insurrection.

Yet the resources available to the Guatemalan Army at this juncture were insufficient to suppress the FAR. Outside assistance was needed. The United States, refusing to allow another "Castro" to come to power in the Western Hemisphere, provided the necessary means for the Guatemalan Army. First under Colonel Peralta and later under the popularly elected government of Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro (1966-1970), the Guatemalan security apparatus was once again re-tooled to fight a counter-insurgency war. U.S. Green Berets entered the fray and new high tech munitions were supplied to the Guatemalan Army. Utilizing aerial bombardments of guerrilla safe-havens and practicing search and destroy missions, along with the arrival of the first death squads, the army successfully destroyed what little support the FAR had acquired over the past six years. By 1969, writes Saul Landau: "the once proud and successful guerrilla movement of Guatemala was effectively reduced to a handful of ragged troops, desperately seeking refuge in the mountains."

Facing an unfavorable world context, a lack of internal unity, and the absence of a state crisis, the FAR had to accept its losses and wait to fight another day.

It did not take long for the remnants of the FAR to reemerge. Those who had survived the onslaught of the 1960s regrouped in the early 1970s and formed the basis for what became known as the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP). Located in the remote Indian region of Ixcan, this small cadre of fighters, survivors from Turcios’s Edgar Ibarra Front (FGEI), were determined to learn from past mistakes. Their new strategy would be one that rejected *foquismo* in favor of the prolonged guerrilla war that sought the active involvement of the Indian population in the armed struggle and attempted to garner international support for their revolutionary cause.

Over a three-year period this small band of revolutionaries struggled for survival in the remote jungles of the northern Guatemalan highlands, while attempting to cultivate a friendship with the local peasantry. Helping the peasants with their daily activities, the guerrillas slowly gained the confidence of the indigenous population and began to organize them for revolutionary action. Commenting on his experience, Mario Payeras, one of the founding members of the EGP writes: "We were convinced that only by establishing roots among the people could we survive in the long run, and only by stationing ourselves in densely populated areas tied into the market economy

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could we really expand the armed struggle."

By 1975, the EGP believed the time was ripe for action. In a dramatic move, a small group of armed EGP fighters murdered the Tiger of Ixcan, Luis Arenas Barrera, the landowner responsible for the deaths of hundreds of highland peasants over a twenty-year period. This single act propelled the EGP to the forefront of Guatemala’s newly re-emergent guerrilla movement.

The government’s response was to unleash a wave of repression in the highlands reminiscent of an earlier era. Throughout the late 1970s and 1980s there would be over 100,000 political killings and nearly 38,000 “disappearances” by the Army, police forces, and rural death squads.24

In 1976 a massive earthquake destroyed a large part of the western highlands. When the government of General Kjell Laugerud Garcia (1974-1978) pocketed the international relief funds and failed to take efforts to alleviate the massive suffering of over 1 million displaced persons, a series of demonstrations, strikes, and riots broke out, led by political activists, trade unionists, and students. The EGP took advantage of this discontent by trying to organize all of those unhappy with the current regime. By 1979, the EGP created an alliance with the peasant-based organization, the Peasant Unity Committee (CUC), and settled in to organize the indigenous population for a large-scale social revolution.25

Concomitant with these events was the formation of a second guerrilla front, the Organization of People in Arms (ORPA). Located primarily in the Indian highland regions of southern Guatemala, ORPA emerged in 1978, claiming that over ninety percent of its membership consisted of indigenous peasants. Once it had gained peasant support, the ORPA turned its attention to organizing the labor sectors and formed a broad-based alliance with the middle class and urban intellectuals- an effort that would ultimately fail.

The Communist Party of Guatemala (PGT) was less active than in an earlier era and was quite small in comparison with the EGP or ORPA, but nonetheless did maintain a small group of guerrilla cadres who intermittently resorted to attacks on select government targets. Like ORPA in the late 1970s and early 1980s, most of the PGT’s efforts were targeted toward the labor unions and recovering from the repression levied against it by government forces. A small faction within the PGT, the *Nucleo de Direccion*, however, took up the armed struggle in 1979, working

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alongside ORPA in the southern regions of Guatemala.\textsuperscript{26}

By 1982, the guerrilla forces reached their highest level of membership and attained their highest degree of political/military organization. It is estimated that, at this time, the guerrilla forces numbered somewhere between six to eight thousand and maintained the active support of well over half a million people throughout the Guatemalan countryside. In January 1982, the EGP, ORPA, the PGT Nucleo, and the survivors of the FAR established a centralized political/military organization called the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG). Cesar Sereseres writes that after URNG was formed, the guerrillas successfully operated in well over half of the country's departments, established a well developed infrastructure within the northern highland region, operated in armed columns with as many as 200 soldiers, and "systematically attacked, and often occupied and destroyed, government municipalities, police stations, military outposts, and other symbols of public authority."\textsuperscript{27}

Indeed, as Charles Tilly determined, the guerrillas had become a formidable political and military challenger to the ruling elite. Added to this well organized insurgency was a series of popular protests taking place throughout Guatemala in the late 1970s and early 1980s that brought into question the legitimacy of the military regime.\textsuperscript{28} Both factors led to a situation of near internal chaos in Guatemala, not unlike that which had earlier led to the overthrow of the Somoza regime in neighboring Nicaragua. Yet unlike the case of Nicaragua, by late 1983, as figures from the U.S. embassy indicate, there were fewer than 1500 guerrillas operating in Guatemala, a drop of over 75 percent from the previous two years, while support for the guerrillas in the countryside was rapidly diminishing.\textsuperscript{29}

The guerrilla war would continue throughout the remainder of the 1980s and would be an important part of Guatemalan politics until the late 1990s; the threat posed to the governing elite subsided after 1983, and the URNG would never again be able to challenge the power of the landed oligarchy and military. What factors can

\textsuperscript{26}\textit{Ibid.}, 138-39.
\textsuperscript{27}Sereseres, "The Highlands War in Guatemala," 112.
\textsuperscript{28}There was a series of popular uprisings that occurred in Guatemala throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s. The most important of these included the 1976 strike against the Coca Cola bottling franchise, demanding the right to establish labor unions, an indigenous march on Guatemala City in May 1978 to protest land abuses and the killings over 100 Kekchi Indians at Panzos, the October 1978 riot in Guatemala City against proposed bus fare increases, and the occupation of the Spanish embassy in January 1980, which led to the storming of the building and the deaths of over 39 people.
\textsuperscript{29}Simon, \textit{Guatemala: Eternal Spring, Eternal Tyranny}, 158.
account for this dramatic drop in membership and support?

Like the earlier era of revolutionary activity in Guatemala, the second generation of guerrillas was inhibited by the same three factors which foreshadowed their ultimate failure. Although the strategy the guerrillas adopted in the 1970s-1990s differed in fundamental respects from the earlier era (e.g., there was a rejection of fogoismo in favor of a prolonged war strategy, the inclusion of the peasantry in the revolutionary struggle, and attempts made at gaining international support), they still were unable to direct their revolutionary efforts toward a particular goal. What was missing was the hated dictator—a Diaz, Batista, or Somoza—or the legacy of colonial domination or imperialism which could unite the various classes in a common cause. Instead, in Guatemala, what brought a small cohort of middle class intellectuals together with an exploited peasantry was the desire for redistributing wealth and attaining some semblance of political power. These goals were manifested under a socialist ideology that remained anathema to the upper class and military.

In these circumstances the landed elite and key business interests remained firmly in support of a government dominated by the military. As DeFronzo himself states: “Only a minority of the more affluent classes are likely to rally in support of a revolution intended solely to benefit the poor.” The result, was the absence of the cross-class alliance that Thomas Greene posits as a necessary condition for successful revolutions and which had worked so well to bring down the dictatorial regimes in Mexico, Cuba, and Nicaragua.

The URNG guerrillas were also inhibited by the lack of a state crisis. The military remained firmly in control of the government until 1985, when it decided to open the political arena for national elections. Prior to these elections, however, the campaign of terror that the military unleashed against the rebels and their peasant supporters was almost unprecedented in the annals of Latin America history for its level of brutality and complete disregard for the human rights.

The counter-insurgency program launched in the late 1970s was based on three elements. The first was to increase the number of men under arms and deploy troops in areas under guerrilla control. The government troops would enter peasant villages and weed out suspected guerrilla sympathizers. Rigoberta Menchu, an Indian peasant woman who witnessed some of these military actions, attests to the brutality of these campaigns. She notes that the indiscriminate slaughter of hundreds and even thousands of highland peasants in these campaigns was commonplace and that those who were killed often had little or no contact with the guerrillas.

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30 DeFronzo, Revolution and Revolutionary Movements, 16.
32 See Rigoberta Menchu, I, Rigoberta Menchu: An Indian Woman in
The second element of the military campaign was the creation of civic defense forces (CDF) throughout the highland region. Thousands of highland Indians, particularly those within the northern Quiche department, were trained by government forces to defend their villages from guerrilla infiltration. The third element was the establishment of socio-economic assistance plans to provide food and services to those villages most affected by the fighting between government and guerrilla forces. Thus, when combined, the elements of fear, defense, and support were used to create a gap between the guerrillas and their needed base of support. In many respects, these efforts succeeded. The strength of the guerrilla movement, as noted above, declined precipitously in the 1980s and would never attain the level of support gained in 1981-82.

The military’s decision in 1985 to open up the political arena further worked to diminish the power of the armed left. The impact of a transition to democracy was such that it destroyed the URNG’s efforts to create linkages with Guatemala’s popular organizations and political parties. Essentially, this masterful stroke of political maneuvering by the governing elite convinced the center to remain within the legal political arena.

When the 1985 elections were held, the centrists political parties took part, as would the left in 1989. This prevented what Booth and Walker call the “marriage between the center and leftist guerrillas” that worked so effectively in destabilizing the political situation in neighboring Nicaragua and El Salvador. Thus, unable to attain a front within the political sphere, cracks soon began to appear within the URNG itself. By the late 1980s several dissident factions had left the organization in pursuit of their own revolutionary agenda, in effect weakening the ability of the URNG to present a viable option for control of the state. In short, the military’s effective use of a counter-insurgency campaign coupled with the gradual opening of the political arena helped prevent the emergence of a state crisis that would allow the radical left to step up its revolutionary activities and create the necessary broad based alliance needed to gain control of the polity.

The role of international actors, particularly the United States, also diminished the chance of a successful revolutionary movement by the Guatemalan guerrillas. Although the Carter administration did cut off direct military assistance to the Laugerud Garcia regime because of its record of human rights abuse, the U.S. did supply the government with over $20 million in economic assistance. When the Reagan/Bush team entered the White House, both economic and military aid

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33See the Highang War In Guatemala, "113-17.

34Booth and Walker, Understanding Central America, 111.

35Ibid., 177.
skyrocketed. Between 1983-1990, the Guatemalan government received over $222 million of economic and military aid from the United States. More important than these monetary figures was the training that the Guatemalan Army received by U.S. military advisors in the art of counter-insurgent warfare. The words of Saul Landau describe this relationship:

US military advisors constructed the Guatemalan Army that roved the mountains of the north in the 1970s in search of guerrillas. The Americans provided the guidance, if not the actual blueprints, for all the repression that was carried out in the country from the 1960s on. . . . The Pentagon helped the Guatemalans to accomplish what both wanted done: destruction of the left and their source of recruitment, the Indian population.36

By applying its "Vietnam experience" to the Guatemalan civil war, the United States was able to assist the Guatemalan Army in successfully fending off the challenge of the reform forces. Without the U.S. interjection of funding and military training, one can only speculate about the chances of a guerrilla victory. Yet one cannot help thinking that things might have turned out differently.

In considering two generations of guerrilla activity in Guatemala, one is struck with a series of commonalities that can help explain why these revolutionary movements failed to attain control of Guatemala. One factor was the lack of a unifying motivation. In both cases, what was driving the revolutionary process was a sense of social and economic injustice perpetuated by a tyrannical political oligarchy. In the 1960s, the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR), under the leadership of Luis Turcios Lima and Marco Antonio Yon Sosa, believed that their revolutionary actions in the mountains of eastern Guatemala would inspire a quiescent peasantry to take up arms against an unjust political, social, and economic order. Guatemala would be transformed into a new socialist state, completing the failed revolution of 1944-1954. The same logic applied to the guerrilla movements of the 1970s-1990s. The strategy might have been different, but the goals remained the same. However, basing a struggle against an amorphous collective regime makes it extremely difficult to target a particular enemy that most sectors of society can join forces against. Revolutionary movements based on overturning an unjust social order with the goal of redistributing wealth is good for stirring up emotions, but not for waging war.

The second commonality was the lack of a state crisis. In both instances the military was firmly in control of the government. The backing of the country's economic elite solidified their position atop the political pyramid. The inability of both

the FAR and URNG to garner support from the upper classes, or for that matter large segments of the middle class, stifled their efforts to form the cross-class alliance needed to overthrow the military regime. Faced with a governing elite willing to resort to any means necessary to quell internal rebellion, the guerrillas, along with their peasant supporters, became cannon fodder for the Guatemalan Army.

The third commonality was the backing of the United States. Since the CIA supported overthrow of Arbenz in 1954 the United States has been heavily involved in financial backing and military training of the Guatemalan armed forces. By the late 1980s the Guatemalan Army had been fine-tuned by U.S. military advisors into a virtual killing machine.

The lessons of the Guatemalan experience for future revolutionary activity in the “Third World” are intimately linked to the past. Well over thirty years ago a young Argentine doctor named Che Guevara wrote that social revolutions should not be attempted in countries led by elected leaders. Where there are open channels for political participation, Guevara believed, the broad-based support needed for revolutionary victory will not be present.

Does this mean that the age of armed revolutions is at an end? The answer remains uncertain. Conditions of social and economic inequality, which are the seeds from which revolutionary activity grows, persist in much of the underdeveloped world. What is certain, however, is that for revolutions to succeed in the days ahead, multiple conditions must be present. Not only must popular uprisings and elite political dissidents exist, but there also must be a need for a unifying motivation for revolution, a state crisis, and a favorable international environment. This analysis of the guerrilla movements of Guatemala has demonstrated the fate of revolutionary activity when some of these conditions are not met.

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37See Che Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1985).
Competing Narratives, Fragmented Community: Stories of the Ocoee Massacre of 1920

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This study presents a history of racial violence, centering on the troubling events of Election Day 1920 in Ocoee, a rural town in central Florida. The northern section of Ocoee, one of two segregated African-American settlements within the town, was burned to the ground.\(^1\) Twenty-six homes, two churches, a schoolhouse and a community lodge were destroyed. Up to sixty blacks and two white men died. Julius "July" Perry was lynched, and 496 African-Americans fled for their lives. The African-American community of Ocoee never recovered from this event.

Democracy Forum, a small, diverse group of central Florida residents, undertook in 1987 an historical "community research project" on the Ocoee Massacre.\(^2\) Democracy Forum began with a simple task—a goal of conducting historical research through oral interviews, memorializing July Perry and other victims, and presenting this research in a variety of "community dialogues." History tends to be made up of many voices with no single, "true" account. Instead there are usually multiple accounts, each with its own cast of characters and recollections, as the Democracy Forum experience demonstrated.

The concept of "community" is problematic. It resists definition by social scientists and is often used interchangeably with terms for geographic location, gender, race, ethnicity, and class. The concept of community implies a relationship, a group of persons having something significant in common that

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\(^1\)I use the term African-Americans interchangeably with blacks, although there may be certain political, cultural and signifying differences in the broader literature.

\(^2\)Democracy Forum was a multi-racial group, diverse in gender, class, and education, with members ranging in age from eighteen to seventy.

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differentiates them from other groups of persons. As scholars have determined, communities are symbolic constructions in which people invent boundaries and create meaning for themselves. Community members often share symbols, even while constructing different meanings for these symbols.

Democracy Forum undertook its research without first explicating the referents for “the community.” The Democracy Forum “community dialogues” showed that there were multiple communities within Central Florida and significant differences in understanding, knowledge, and perspective between them. When members of conflicting communities confronted each other, they were not arguing with each other over discrepancies within a single narrative; they were actually speaking past each other in different narratives.

The point of this paper is not to examine the specific narratives to find the “truth” or even the closest approximation of a “truth.” Instead, I want to examine how multiple and conflicting “truths” stand for multiple and conflicting identities within communities. If progressive community projects are to succeed, then this kind of narrative struggle needs to be resolved. The purpose of examining narrative frameworks in this context is to establish common connections with our past and thus develop progressive projects for our present. There are three main narrative frameworks that address this issue: a narrative of Accommodation, a narrative of Retribution, and a narrative of Structural. Before examining the workings of each narrative, a brief discussion of the economic, political and cultural milieu of the 1920s in Ocoee is in order.

The record of black history in America is a palimpsest, upon which violence and repression is written, rewritten, and eventually erased from official view. But, like a palimpsest, these erasures are never fully complete and their traces continue to shape thinking. There are numerous difficulties in unearthing a part of history long hidden by the dominant society. Official records such as the voter registration books for the Ocoee precinct have been lost, census data is incomplete, survivors are elderly and few in number, and descendents of survivors are difficult to locate and reluctant to discuss their trauma. If black history is hidden, black women’s history is even more thoroughly erased. One key element of Democracy Forum’s goals was to re-insert black women into the pages of local history.

The violence in Ocoee in this era mirrored the violence in the nation, violence specifically directed towards black citizens during the early part of this century. An understanding of this violence begins with a discussion of Reconstruction. Reconstruction is widely misunderstood, by Southerners and Northerners alike, as a “tragic era” during which Northern militia imposed a punitive martial law upon a defeated South. If Reconstruction was considered a tragic era for white Southerners, it was also a time of hope and possibility for black citizens. Black citizens began to farm their own lands and use their newly earned political and legal power. Blacks were able to file formal complaints in
courts of law, to testify in courts and in some places to serve on juries. In some cities they served as sheriffs and police officers. Along with justice, education ranked as a high priority for black citizens. The Freedman’s Bureau along with various missionary Northern societies and black women’s clubs made schools available, and blacks flocked to them. Moreover, public education in the South was part of Radical Reconstruction, with black legislators playing a prominent role.

The decades following the end of Reconstruction in 1877 were an era of prolonged racial violence, featuring a high rate of lynching of blacks and periodic urban race riots, in many states, including Florida. The violence and the fear it engendered kept blacks disenfranchised and economically vulnerable, reversing many of the economic and political gains achieved during Reconstruction. The frequency and random nature of much of the racial violence not only punished the individual black man or woman who offended the norms of white supremacy, but also sent a message to all blacks. Evidence of success, no matter how it was achieved or displayed, made every black man and woman vulnerable.

The political and economic milieu in 1920s Florida was fraught with such contradictions. Black men had returned from fighting in World War I with heightened expectations and awareness of their legal and civil rights. Having fought to save democracy overseas, many were determined to have democracy in America. However, the sight of armed black men in uniform was threatening for many whites resulting in urban riots throughout 1919 and 1920. Moreover, 1920 was the year in which women were first granted the right to vote. Southern newspapers reported outrage that, “negro washerwomen and cooks” would vote. The Klan held a silent march down the streets of Orlando on the Saturday night before Election Day. No explanation for the march was given, but one Klansman reported, “We are marching 1 million strong tonight,” and other Southern cities reported the same silent march, including Jacksonville, Daytona, and Tampa.

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3 *Jacksonville Metropolis Newspaper*, September 16, 1920.  
There has been a recent explosion of literature documenting separate realities of blacks and whites in the U.S. Nowhere is this more striking than when discussing the Ocoee massacre. Blacks even today know, "to stay away from Ocoee." Conversely, the vast majority of whites, even those who claimed to have lived in or near Ocoee all their lives, claim to have never heard of this massacre. There is very little mention of this event in history textbooks and historical literature.

Today, the violence at Ocoee is virtually invisible in Central Florida. In many ways there still remains a conspiracy of silence surrounding Ocoee, which is arguably the worse incident of racial violence in Central Florida. There are no exhibits in museums or libraries, no memorials marking the location of the black section of Ocoee, nor even a memorial to Perry's death. The newspaper accounts, photographs and documents normally displayed in historical museums are filed away in cupboards and drawers. The Withers-Maguire House, the historical museum of Ocoee collection is kept hidden from public view for fear it will be incendiary to contemporary race-relations. The Orange County Historical Museum files contain an unpublished, unsigned, undated, and non-annotated paper on the event.

The Accommodation model emphasizes reconciliation and is held by descendents of white Ocoee citizens. Some elder black survivors residing in nearby Winter Garden, Mt. Plymouth, and Apopka share a similar narrative of Accommodation. White descendents of Ocoee residents continued to retell how their grandparents protected "our blacks" during the Ocoee "race riot" at the dialogue meetings, to the visible dismay of many blacks. Curiously, there are elderly black survivors of the massacre who share a similar narrative framework of accommodation and reconciliation with these white descendents.

The story starts with two prominent white Orlando attorneys, William O'Neal and Judge Cheney, both Radical Republicans, conducting voter registration among blacks. Julius Perry and Mose Norman, prominent and prosperous black farmers in Ocoee, met with O'Neal and Cheney in an effort to encourage blacks to register and vote within a threatening climate. Perry, described as a "trouble-maker" by white citizens, encouraged other blacks to vote as "first-class" citizens.\(^5\) Perry is the heroic figure in current newspaper accounts, such as the *Orlando Sentinel*\(^6\) and the *Wall Street Journal*.\(^7\) Perry, a prosperous black man, was initially named as the instigator in the first newspaper accounts of the riots on November 3, 1920. Perry was later lynched near Ocoee.

\(^6\) *Orlando Sentinel*, September 7, 1986.
While Perry remains the central figure in both the accommodation and retribution narratives, it is doubtful that Perry was the original man who attempted to vote at the polls. Most of the other accounts in 1920, including the N.A.A.C.P. investigation and the now-famous account by Zora Neale Hurston, show that Mose Norman, another prosperous black farmer, was the initial voter. The confusion of the two men in the newspaper accounts indicates the degree to which the white community was unable (or unwilling) to distinguish between blacks.

Descendants of Ocoee’s white citizens, along with a few elderly blacks survivors and descendants often share a similar narrative of accommodation and reconciliation which describes both Perry and Norman as “trouble-makers.” More importantly, the responsibility for voting is attributed, not to Norman or even to Perry, but to white “outsiders,” Radical Republicans who were using the black vote for their own purpose. According to one survivor, leading white town fathers of Winter Garden met with prominent black men of Winter Garden to urge blacks not to vote in 1920, but to “wait their turn.”8 She argued that the leading white citizens were agreeable to blacks voting, and that it was the “Klan riff raff” and the “black radicals” who contributed to the massacre.

There was a concerted effort on the part of Ocoee citizens to prevent blacks from voting prior to the election. According to former Ocoee Mayor Dabbs, the white political leaders:

had taken the necessary precautions to preclude the possibility of a Negro’s being able to vote ... Justice of the Peace, R.C. Bigelow ... [would] vote early and then conveniently go fishing.9

Mose Norman was refused the right to vote because he had not paid his poll tax, according to public officials as cited in newspapers. At the time, Florida’s poll tax was between $1.00 and $2.00 and due six months prior to the election. It would seem surprising that men of either Perry or Norman’s stature had not paid their poll tax, especially in light of their meetings with Cheney and their efforts to register other blacks to vote.

Walter White’s investigation for the N.A.A.C.P. reported that Norman had indeed paid his tax, according to the local Voters’ Registration Precinct

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8 Mrs. Dixon (no first name given) at Democracy Forum presentation, October 1998.
Book. White even quotes a lawyer (probably Cheney) who said Norman had
paid. Yet these registration books are no longer at the Registrar’ office, nor are
they at the Orlando Historical Museum. The County registrar has the 1920
Registration Books for some of the precincts, including the name of the first
white woman voter in Orlando. The Orlando Historical Museum also has some
Voter Registration Books from this time period. However, the specific 1920
Registration Book for Precinct 10, Ocoee, is missing.

In all events, Norman was refused the right to vote and left the polls
after a dispute or an altercation. Zora Neale Hurston’s account suggests that
Norman drove to Orlando for advice from Mr. Cheney.10 According to Hurston,
Cheney advised him to get the names of the people who weren’t allowed to vote
and the names of those preventing the voting. In retrospect, such advice seems
misguided and naïve. Mose Norman paid dearly.

One of the most contested aspects of the massacre is what happened
when Norman returned to the polls. The white descendants of Ocoee “know”
that a very threatening Mose Norman, with a horde of black people, showed up
at the polls with a “sawed-off” shotgun. The Orlando Morning Sentinel
described how a black man came back with a crowd and threatened those at the
polls, stating, “We will vote, by God.”11 Some white descendents even claim
that Norman actually waved a gun at the crowd. Many white descendants claim
that those who stopped the dangerous Norman were the Klansmen from Winter
Garden, not the citizens from Ocoee. Whatever actually happened, it is clear
that whites believed they were threatened.

After Norman left the polls and disappeared, a posse was deputized to
locate him. The posse went to Perry’s home because, “someone claimed to have
seen Norman there.”12 Some of the white citizens of Ocoee argued that the
posse went to Norman’s house because Norman and Perry planned an armed
uprising13. The Morning Sentinel buttressed the fears of an impending
revolution by reporting that Lucida Watkins, a 17-year-old black man who had
been burned out of a barn, had given the mob the names of thirty-six men in
Perry’s house. Both the Morning Sentinel and the Evening Reporter-Star
augmented their accounts with descriptions of thousands of rounds of
ammunition found in the burned churches and homes. In contrast, Hurston’s
account found that only Perry, along with his wife and daughter, remained in the
house.

11Orlando Morning Sentinel, November 4, 1920.
12Hurston, “The Ocoee Riot.”
The posse led by Colonel Salisbury included John Turner, Elmer McDaniels, and Leo Borgard. McDaniels, the only resident of Winter Garden, was Salisbury’s cousin. Colonel Salisbury was one of the leading citizens of Ocoee, he was an ex-police chief of Orlando and was married to one of the daughters of John Pound, also an ex-police chief of Orlando. Betty Hagar, a current resident of Ocoee, is the daughter of Colonel Salisbury.

When Salisbury and his posse reached Perry’s home, Borgard and McDaniels went to the front, while Turner and Salisbury went to the back. Borgard and McDaniels were shot and died immediately. At the back door, Estelle Perry, the wife of July Perry, shot Salisbury in the shoulder. During the gunfight, Coretha Caldwell (then Coretha Perry, the fourteen-year-old daughter) was also shot in the shoulder.

The posse retreated and sent a call for armed reinforcements to Orlando. According to Betty Hagar, the call for reinforcements was sent to Orlando because most of the men from Ocoee were there, waiting for election results by telegraph. Hagar argues that the white women and children of Ocoee were terrified of the impending black uprising.

The call for, “all able-bodied men to report to police headquarters,” was repeated in the morning and evening newspapers over the following days.14 At nightfall, approximately 250 white men reported to the Orange County sheriff in Orlando. They were issued Army rifles and went to Ocoee. Mrs. Hagar, along with Mrs. Dixon and Mrs. Board (who are prominent blacks, now living in neighboring Winter Garden) all agree with Hurston’s account that these “outsiders” and “agitators” were the ones responsible for the massacre.

At this time, Perry, whose arm was shot away, had left his home and hidden in the cane field. There he was found by armed whites. Perry was turned over to the Sheriff of Orange County and the Chief of Police of Orlando. Some accounts have him taken to Orange General Hospital where a surgeon noted he was going to die before being taken to jail. Other accounts have him taken directly to the jail where he was removed and lynched. Perry’s body was found riddled with bullets early the next morning, and he was buried in an unmarked grave in Greenwood Cemetery in Orlando.

The 250 armed men did not rest after Perry’s body was found, instead they proceeded to burn the black sections of town. Newspaper reports the next morning described a, “gruesome cremation scene.”15 Hagar, along with other white citizens of Ocoee, and also along with some blacks (including Zora Neale Hurston) argues that the “riff raff” and “Klan members” were responsible for the massacre. Upstanding Ocoee citizens hid and protected “their blacks” from the

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14 Ibid.
15 Orlando Morning Sentinel, November 4, 1920.
marauding outsiders. In a few days this, “gruesome cremation scene,” was re-written as a quiet town where, “order has been restored by the right-thinking citizens of Ocoee.”

In contrast, white and black activists have a different understanding of what happened in Ocoee in 1920, and who was to blame. White liberals and black conspiracy theorists share a narrative of retribution that identifies the Florida Klan and the Orlando law enforcement establishment as the guilty parties. They operated within a sense of a “white conspiracy” against blacks in America, and argued for reparations, apology, and a memorial. White liberals attracted to the community dialogues also shared the narrative of retribution, focusing on white power and privilege.

Blacks and white liberals who share a narrative of retribution focus on the personalities and prosperity of both farmers. Within this narrative, both July Perry and Mose Norman were prosperous blacks (in an era when this was rare), who would not be intimidated by the silent Klan. Perry’s family had migrated from North Carolina shortly after Reconstruction. They arrived in Ocoee between 1890 and 1900, according to the U.S. Census, along with other black families such as the Purtees, the Franks, the Lynches, and the Hightowers. Tracing their names throughout the census of 1890, 1900, 1910 and 1920, one finds the inter-connections of families and friends. One also notes the inconsistencies that plagued the census, especially in counting blacks. Perry is, indeed, listed as a farm-owner in 1910, but in 1920 he is counted as a laborer. Perry, his wife, and six children lived in a two-story house built on the north shore of Starke Lake, the only house there at the time.

Perry’s prosperity is the first of many issues in doubt, especially among the whites. The burning of Perry’s house and barn is evidence enough for most blacks to assert that Perry was a farm owner. However, Walter White described Perry as the manager of an orange grove. Readers in 1920 disputed Walter White’s claim that Perry was even a manager, writing to White that:

Perry was boss of a grove gang, quite a different thing from being overseer of a grove or a manager. It is quite the custom

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17 In 1920, Walter White was an assistant field secretary for the N.A.A.C.P; he later became the director of that organization. White often used his blue eyes and light coloring to obtain information about racial violence. White arrived in Ocoee within three days of the massacre and published his findings on its causes in *The Crisis* and the *New Republic*. 64
about here to have a colored man the head of boss of a gang of colored men as they work better that way.\(^\text{18}\)

Mose Norman was also considered to be prosperous. He is listed in the 1920 census as a farmer and was described as such in the N.A.A.C.P. report to the Justice Department. Walter White argued in an article written for *The New Republic*, "He [Norman] owned an orange grove for which he had refused offers of $10,000 several times."\(^\text{19}\) According to local legend, Norman was the first farmer in Florida to sell commercially grown cucumbers.\(^\text{20}\) Walter White’s readers also challenged the issue of Norman’s prosperity, one man who wrote that the price per acre must be mistaken: "Someone out there is trying to sell land, better than Norman’s at a thousand dollars an acre."\(^\text{21}\)

Still, White remained firm:

As to the price of Norman’s land, I accepted as true, the statement of two lawyers, both of whom are white, who knew personally of offers that had been made for Norman’s grove.\(^\text{22}\)

According to blacks, Norman’s prosperity had cost him prior to Election Day. Norman owned one of the few automobiles in Ocoee at the time, which made him a target of white resentment. The segregation laws mandated that blacks could not pass whites on the road, a gross indignity for all blacks, but particularly impossible to observe in an automobile. As a result, Norman was often stopped and harassed while driving. Accommodation emphasizes the threatening aspect of Norman and his “sawed-off” shotgun, along with the shifting of responsibility to outsiders. In contrast, the narrative of Retribution emphasizes the threatening aspect of whites forming a mob to beat Norman. This narrative argues that Norman’s gun

\(^\text{18}\) "Lynching–Ocoee, Florida,” Part 7, Series A, Reel 9, Group 1, Series C, Administration Files, Box C-353, *Papers of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People*, microfilm edition.

\(^\text{19}\) See Walter White, “Election by Terror in Florida,” *New Republic*, January 12, 1921.

\(^\text{20}\) The Orange County Historical Museum records note that Ocoee had the first commercially grown cucumbers in Orange County. However, there is no documentation that this refers to Norman’s cucumber farm.

\(^\text{21}\) "Lynching–Ocoee, Florida,” Part 7, Series A, Reel 9, Group 1, Series C, Administration Files, Box C-353, *Papers of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People*, microfilm edition.

\(^\text{22}\) *Ibid.*
was only found in the back of his car after he had been beaten. Norman managed to escape with his life, with the help of Rev. Edward Franks (minister of the A.M.E. church in Ocoee and related to July Perry through marriage). Norman then disappeared and days later headlines from as far away as Savannah Georgia claimed that, “Negro [Norman] Still Not Found.” Neither Norman nor his daughter has surfaced in the documentary trail or in any of the oral histories. Many blacks remain convinced that Norman’s body, along with other black citizens of Ocoee, is at the bottom of Starke Lake.

The language of principals used to describe the Ocoee Massacre begins to differ more strikingly at this point in the narrative. In a narrative of Retribution, the disappearance of Norman after the polls closed precipitated the gathering of a wild, angry and drunken mob of whites determined to destroy any and all blacks. Blacks and some liberal whites also believe that Norman had returned to Perry’s home for a planned uprising against an unfair white political machine. Within a narrative of retribution, the mob included Colonel Salisbury, John Turner, Elmer McDaniels, and Leo Borgard, as well as other members of the Ocoee Klavern. For blacks, the distinction between law enforcement and Klansmen is a spurious one. A Mr. Charleton, one of the survivors, has stated that, “All the law was the Klan, in those days.” He paused before noting, “Still is as far as I can see.” Salisbury unwittingly agreed when he said in an interview, “The Klan was a respectable organization back then, all of law enforcement officials belonged.”23

The mob approached Perry’s home and was met with gunshots. Leo Borgard and Elmer McDaniels died in the front yard, Salisbury was shot in the shoulder at the back door, and a call for reinforcements was sent to all the whites of Orlando and surrounding areas. There was a lull in the fight as some white men chased those blacks who had hidden in barns and nearby swamps, while others went for reinforcement. The call for, “all able-bodied men to report to police headquarters,” was repeated in the morning and evening newspapers in the following days.24 Approximately 250 white men reported to the Orange County sheriff at the Orlando police station. As noted, they were issued Army rifles and went to Ocoee. Perry, whose arm was shot away, was attempting to escape with the help of his wife, when he was found by hunting dogs and the invading mob. Within this narrative, thousands of armed men, some from as far away as Tampa, then proceeded to burn the town, beginning in the Northern Quarters, then moving to Southern Quarters during the next few days.

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24Orlando Morning Sentinel, November 3 and 4, 1920.
The narrative of Retribution discusses wholesale looting and burning that lasted for several days and describes the massacre in lurid detail. After Perry was taken away, his wife and daughter escaped into the swamps and walked or hitchhiked to Tampa. One woman with her two week-old baby and her mother who refused to leave her, was found cremated under one of the houses. Perry's barn was burned with almost three dozen women and children hiding there. Lucida Watkins, a 17-year-old boy, was tortured and forced to give testimony that implicated all of the men as armed and dangerous, before dying of third degree burns. Several men who returned to their homes and farms the next day were castrated and left to die, with only a Mr. Langmade surviving.\(^{25}\)

A small group of feminist-intellectuals within Democracy Forum constructed a social-structural understanding of the massacre, but they focused on different symbols from those other groups. Although the feminist-intellectuals were instrumental in organizing the group, beginning the research, obtaining funds and publicizing the events; they were also the most "marginalized" members of the group. Black feminist-intellectuals were accused of being too "white" by other black members; and were greeted with suspicion and termed "difficult" by whites, in part because of their education and ability to articulate their opinions. White feminist-intellectuals were also marginalized, but with less bitterness, perhaps because they were perceived as irrelevant.

From the structural perspective, the feminist-intellectuals looked for ways to account for the loss of community. Their version of the massacre is an attempt to recover the missing pieces of the picture, to re-insert the experiences and voices of women into the historical account. What is omitted from a narrative is just as important as what is debated. Missing from contemporary newspaper accounts and both the Accommodation and Retribution narratives is the participation of women. Knowledge of the Massacre at Ocoee is not only racialized but also gendered and focuses on the bravery of Perry and/or Norman. Both Perry and Norman are portrayed as political activists working in conjunction with Cheney and O'Neal, but women are absent from most contemporary accounts of the incident.

Yet, 1920 was a particularly important election, a year when women, both white and black, were constitutionally granted their previously denied right to vote. Black women and white women had been equally active in their segregated organizations for suffrage. There was an active Colored Women's Association in the Orlando area. This organization was prosperous enough to

\(^{25}\)Remembered by Mr. Charleton (no first name given), Oral History interview conducted for Democracy Forum.
buy a piece of property and establish a community lodge in Maitland. Feminist-intellectuals constructing a Structural narrative of the massacre do not have much to offer on the incident at the polls. Precise identification of the brave men defying white authority at the polling place is not an essential part of the narrative. 26 It is enough to note that central Florida was well within the Southern norm of legal discouragement, intimidation and terror to deprive blacks of their right to participate in the democratic community.

For both narratives of Accommodation and Retribution, the central figures remain July Perry and Norman Moses, variously described as "troublemakers" or "race men." It is Perry's lynching that receives the most media attention, and it is Perry's death that is memorialized. At the memorial service sponsored by Democracy Forum in 1998, the presiding minister spoke of Julius Perry and Moses Norman, stating that, "there is still unfinished work to be done in Ocoee." Estelle Perry (who shot Colonel Salisbury, escaped to Tampa, and was later subpoenaed by a grand jury for instigating a riot), and Coretha Perry (wounded in the gun battle) were reduced to nameless wives and children. For feminist-intellectuals, the controversies surrounding the location of Perry's lynching are not important, and the heroism of Perry and Norman was greeted with suspicion. 27 What was important to feminist-intellectuals and their Structural narrative was the destroyed community and the heroism of the unheard female voices.

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26 Perry's connection with Cheney and voter registration activism was made through his niece, who was interested in politics and worked as a maid for the Cheney household.

27 Blacks argued that the exact location of Perry's lynching is at an old oak tree near the old courthouse in Orlando; others insisted Perry was lynched in Ocoee.

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The following table offers a synthetic view of the competing narratives on the Ocoee massacre.

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The table identifies differences across the three main narratives. Looking at each narrative for a sense of resolution (what should be done now about the Ocoee massacre), each group offers a way to bring out the implications of narrative differences for community action.

It is perhaps not surprising that the white descendants of Ocoee citizens want to diminish or deny their ancestors’ role in the massacre. There is also some support for “forgiving and forgetting” among the black descendants. A primary belief that makes this conclusion possible is that the former white citizens of Ocoee had not participated in the massacre. Clearly the need to survive and to continue to live near the site of such destruction makes possible, or even necessary, this selective amnesia. In 1920, and for years afterwards, black men and women, though no longer in Ocoee, still continued to live and work in neighboring areas. Working for those who had the power and the will to destroy the entire black section of a town would explain a willingness to pin responsibility on anyone other than your neighbors, employers, and local law enforcement.
The dominant narrative among blacks and liberal whites is the narrative of Retribution. Within seventy-two hours after the massacre, the still-new N.A.A.C.P. sent Walter White to investigate. When reporting on the Massacre of Ocoee, he quoted an unnamed white citizen of Ocoee, "I know fifty-six niggers were dead, I shot seventeen of them myself." The N.A.A.C.P.'s final report to the Justice Department argued that between thirty and sixty Negroes died in the massacre. The N.A.A.C.P. called for a federal investigation into the denial of voting rights for blacks; a call denied by the U.S. Justice Department.

What happened to blacks' property is as disputed as what happened to blacks themselves. Descendants of survivors maintain that there was no financial remuneration. Charleton recalls that a Mr. Langmade was castrated because he returned to regain possession of his land. In this atmosphere it was unlikely that blacks would be assertive about their property rights. Furthermore, it would seem impossible to reimburse those who were missing, such as Mose Norman. Democracy Forum has had extraordinary difficulty in locating any of the property deeds. Both blacks and white liberals argue that this is proof in-and-of-itself that the white power structure had stolen the land.

The narrative of Retribution has a compelling attraction for some principals. It features two communities: one symbolized by brave and noble black men who struggled through hard work to farm successfully and exercise their citizenship rights. The other community features an overtly racist Klan bent on destroying economic and political independence of blacks. The narrative of Retribution presents a clear resolution: an apology, a memorial, and fair compensation for the land and livelihoods lost.

The image of a white community under siege by troublemaking, radical interlopers (such as Cheney and Perry) is an unchallenged assumption of the Accommodation narrative. It is an assumption that allowed white members of other geographic communities (Orlando, Winter Garden, Tampa) to have participated in the massacre. In some ways, Mrs. Hagar is correct to identify the call from whites in Ocoee to whites in Orlando as a call for help to protect their communities. But it was not a community bounded by geography as in Ocoee, it was a racial community that she refers to.

The Structural narrative sees that the massacre at Ocoee had a function beyond its immediate victims, it served as an example to all of the blacks of central Florida. This is what happens to blacks who rise above their place, who own a farm, purchase an automobile, and insist on civil rights. The citizens of Ocoee did the visible work of overt racism by denying Norman the right to vote, by invading Perry's land and taking him to the County jail. Ocoee citizens may

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have begun the incident, but it is not simply the white citizens of Ocoee nor the Klan who are solely responsible. There is direct evidence linking Orange County officials, including the Sheriff, the County Coroner, and the Chief of Orlando Police, along with those who volunteered to "patrol" the streets of Ocoee. According to all accounts Perry was ultimately left to mob justice. Those officials and citizens who participated as a white community defended white supremacy. Those white citizens who did not take part still benefited from this defense of white supremacy.

The reductive approach of the Retribution narrative reinscribes a bifurcated world of separate white and black communities. The imagery of a lone heroic black man (Perry) overshadows the role of women and simplifies the historical context of the period. Furthermore, the Retribution narrative reduces the importance of community solutions to contemporary problems by focusing on reparations for survivors and descendants. The Structural narrative of the feminist-intellectuals emphasizes the need to re-imagine an inclusive political and economic community in central Florida. Feminist-intellectuals see that Retribution has broad appeal and may eventually win the day, but at the cost of addressing the deeper structures of inequity. Florida’s experience with retributive justice in the celebrated Rosewood case indicates that as long as it is not too expensive reparations are politically expedient. For feminists-intellectuals, the goal of memorializing the dead and making economic reparations, while beneficial, is not enough. The democratic community as a whole was damaged by its separation into divisions of blacks and whites. A legacy of unequal opportunities, exploited labor and stolen land remains visible today in the unequal education and occupational opportunities in central Florida.

Democracy Forum was an attempt to bring together the analytical methods of academia with the process of community dialogue. Our goals included bringing the need for greater fairness to all citizens of central Florida into a discussion and eventually onto the local political agenda. The vehicle to begin this process was historical research on the Ocoee massacre of 1920. What we found was that five distinct social groups had adopted three separate and somewhat incommensurate narratives. We have not resolved the differences of perspective and politics embedded in these narratives. It is clear that to re-imagine central Florida in terms of a single political community will require some resolution of these narrative conflicts. Such a common narrative has not yet been constructed for the Ocoee Massacre.
The 1989 Invasion of Panama as Seen by the American Print Media

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Near the end of the 20th century, the United States handed over control of the Panama Canal to its host country, completing a process that had begun with treaties negotiated in 1977. That time was also the tenth anniversary of the event that had last put Panama in the international spotlight, the American invasion resulting in the overthrow and capture of General Manuel Noriega. That event, mostly forgotten until the celebrations involving the handover, can be viewed as either a highlight of George Bush’s presidency or as a blatant misuse of power by the United States. The purpose of this paper is to explore how the invasion was portrayed in the U.S. print media at the time of the action. The natural reaction of most journalists covering their own nation’s wars (although tempered by the Vietnam experience) was to be supportive of Bush, but the peculiar nature of this adventure caused numerous questions to be raised. How the U.S.’s two most influential daily newspapers and its major news magazines responded will be the particular focus of this study.

The first critique of the U.S. press was an article in The Nation, by Marc Cooper, on “The Press and the Panama Invasion”,1, and the second was a book, State Crime, the Media and the Invasion of Panama, by Christina Jacqueline

Neither gives the press any credit for independent analysis, accusing them of serving as mouthpieces for the Bush Administration. The research done for this paper indicates, however, that the situation is far more complex and nuanced than portrayed in either of these indictments.

Noriega, a Panamanian military officer, had been in the employ of the CIA since the early 1970s, and his services had become particularly useful to the CIA by the 1980s, because of the Reagan Administration’s obsession with fighting “communism” in Nicaragua and El Salvador. He had risen through the ranks during the regime of dictator Omar Torrijos (1968-81), after whose death Noriega outmaneuvered other officers to become the de facto ruler of the country. His success seemed to mesh well with American interests until 1987 when he was accused of murdering a political opponent and rigging the most recent elections. This accusation instigated a gradual downward spiral in his relations with the U.S. that culminated in the invasion two years later.

In the summer of 1987, the U.S. Senate called on Noriega to step down, and in response the Embassy in Panama City was attacked by pro-Noriega demonstrators. Reagan then ordered all economic and military aid to Panama suspended. The situation became more serious the following February, when grand juries in Miami and Tampa indicted the Panamanian leader for international drug trafficking. The puppet president of Panama then attempted to remove Noriega but instead was himself removed by Noriega and replaced by another frontman. At that point, Reagan decided to force Noriega out via an economic boycott, but as usual for these situations, the result was increased suffering for average Panamanian citizens with little impact on the intended target.

By 1989 George Bush was president and the situation had escalated. In May, an internationally observed set of elections resulted in a landslide victory for an anti-Noriega ticket, led by Guillermo Endara, but the dictator nullified them. Bush then began to actively encourage the Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) to overthrow him, but an attempt to do so was thwarted in October. With the failure of both the elections and a military coup, it appeared that the U.S. would either have to accept Noriega as a fact of life or remove him by direct intervention.


\[\text{3}\text{See John Dinges, }\text{Our Man in Panama (New York, Random House, 1990), and Frederick Kempe, }\text{Divorcing the Dictator (New York, G.P. Putman’s}\]
This set the stage for the events of December 1989. The de facto leader now had himself declared head of government and announced a "state of war" with the U.S. An American soldier was shot and killed in a confrontation with the PDF and several others were arrested and harassed in the ensuing days. Bush then ordered an invasion, "Operation Just Cause," which began in the early morning hours of December 20. As it got underway, Endara was sworn in as president on an American military base in Panama. Despite resistance that was stronger than expected, the PDF was overwhelmed by 27,000 American troops in less than two days. Noriega himself initially eluded capture and it took five days before he was found at the home of the Papal Nuncio in Panama City. U.S. forces surrounded the building, bombarded it with recorded rock music, and waited until the Nuncio persuaded the dictator to give up, which he did on January 5. He was immediately put on a plane to Miami, where he was imprisoned without bail until trial. Two years later, he was convicted on eight counts of drug trafficking.\(^4\)

The controversy over this series of events can be broken down into three specific questions that the press had to examine: 1) was the invasion of Panama justified?; 2) was the capture and deportation of Noriega legal?; and 3) was the search of the Nicaraguan embassy in Panama City (which took place during the invasion) excusable? We will look at these questions in terms of how each paper or magazine presented them.

Bush had given four reasons to justify the invasion (officially referred to as an intervention): 1) to safeguard the lives of Americans, 2) to defend democracy in Panama, 3) to combat drug trafficking, and 4) to protect the integrity of the Canal.\(^5\) The capture of Noriega was explained away by the fact that he was under indictment and that the Panamanians didn’t want him. Later, Bush admitted that the violation of the Sandinista Embassy was a "screwup" but did not apologize for it, probably due to his antagonism toward their government.\(^6\)

The New York Times displayed a variety of opinions on its editorial and op-ed pages. The editorial board cautiously supported the invasion itself but had doubts about the Embassy affair and the arrest of Noriega. Its first editorial

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backed the assault, arguing that "the President acted in response to real risks" but worried about "what kind of precedent does the invasion set for potential Soviet action in Eastern Europe?" The following day the paper was less ambiguous, accepting two of Bush's arguments: the need to protect Americans and to defend the Canal. On the question of what to do with Noriega, the paper argued that the decision should rest with Panama, and on the Embassy issue it unequivocally stated that, "in the interest of protecting our own diplomats, he [Bush] needs to make an unambiguous apology that acknowledges the gravity of the incident."

The Times' columnists offered a variety of opinions. The paper's two conservatives, William Safire and A.M. Rosenthal, gave Bush their full support. Safire argued that, "the U.S. knocked itself out to operate within the rule of law" and then offered a tortuous justification for the invasion: "The use of force to deny the people's expressed will is wrong; its use to carry out a democratic decision, lawfully justified by violent provocation, is right." And Rosenthal, while acknowledging that there were strong legal arguments against the President's action, concluded that, "I am glad that Mr. Bush made the decision not to be a good lawyer." Several others defended the capture of Noriega. Both Richard Berke and Senator Al D'Amato (R., NY) argued that American courts take little interest in how a defendant is brought to justice unless blatant mistreatment is involved, thus dismissing the Panamanian's charge that he was taken illegally.

But there was ample criticism of the administration in the pages of the Times as well. Tom Wicker wrote two columns in which he questioned Bush's arguments. In the first, he asked what kind of example the invasion set and noted how it could be used by the Soviets in the Baltic republics, since "Mr. Gorbachev probably would seem to the world more justified than.... the U.S. was in invading a sovereign nation." In a second column he listed five mistakes he felt Bush had made: invading Panama; installing a puppet (Endara) government; showing little interest in civilian casualties; holding a weak case against Noriega; and violating

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7 Ibid., December 21, 1989, A30.
8 Ibid., December 22, 1989, A38.
9 Ibid., December 26, 1989, A26; December 27, 1989, A22.
the sanctity of the Nicaraguan Embassy.\textsuperscript{14}

Wicker was far from being the only dissenter. Two days after the attack, Saul Landau pointed out that the charters of the U.N. and the Organization of American States (OAS) declare that, “no state, or group of states, shall intervene directly or indirectly in the internal or external affairs of any other state.” He went on to reject the administration’s justifications, claiming that, “it’s perfectly obvious that its only real concern was the image of Gen. Noriega in power, thumbing his nose at the U.S. That alone was seen as sufficient provocation for intervention.”\textsuperscript{15}

Russell Baker add a question: “what entitles the U.S. to indict Latin leaders, then send armies to carry them off to North American courts?” Flora Lewis noted that it was bad enough that the U.S. had to send more than 25,000 troops to get rid of “that obscene little man,” but “it was downright demeaning that American forces went on to childish tricks of harassing Mr. Noriega by hard-rock bombardment in his Vatican refuge, and then raiding the home of the Nicaraguan Ambassador.”\textsuperscript{16}

The editorials in the \textit{Post} took a similar stance to those in the \textit{Times}. They expressed support for the invasion itself but questioned other aspects of the operation. A day before the attack the paper was urging action on the basis that Noriega’s behavior “demonstrably threatens the lives and welfare of Americans and possibly threatens not simply the continued safe operations of the canal but the integrity of the treaties.”\textsuperscript{17} Once the invasion was underway, an editorial claimed that “Pres. Bush did the right thing in ordering American forces into Panama,” even arguing that he was doing what Latin Americans wanted.\textsuperscript{18}

But on the issue of capturing Noriega the paper was less supportive. It called the capture “a bad idea” and feared it would be viewed around the world as “an act of kidnapping”; instead, it urged Bush to let Panamanians decide what to do with their former dictator.\textsuperscript{19} And like the \textit{Times}, it roundly criticized the intrusion into the Nicaraguan Embassy, since it could “only have weakened the

\textsuperscript{15}Ibid., December 22, 1989, A39.
\textsuperscript{17}WP, December 19, 1989, A22.
\textsuperscript{18}Ibid., December 21, 1989, A28.
\textsuperscript{19}Ibid., December 22, 1989, A18; December 27, 1989, A18; December 29, 1989, A18.

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principle of diplomatic immunity, which the U.S. government...has an immense interest in strengthening."²² Its final commentary expressed concern about the entire operation because of, "the example this sets for other countries that may have U.S. citizens in their sights."²¹

The op-ed pages likewise mixed praise with criticism. Predictably, support came from right-wingers like George Will and Evans and Novak and, not so predictably, from liberals like David Broder. True to form, Will described the invasion as "an act of neighborliness," while Evans and Novak called it "long overdue" and boasted that it would buttress Bush’s image (which had been characterized by the word "wimp").²² Broder, generally regarded as a liberal, wrote after the operation had concluded that it met all the tests of a military intervention that makes sense, which was why it garnered such strong support.²³

But there were many voices in opposition. Surprisingly, conservative Charles Krauthammer was one of them. He described the operation as "a little war that should never have happened" and feared that the "long-term consequences of having done it this way will be damaging."²⁴ In a similar vein, liberal Haynes Johnson pointed out the contradiction surrounding our overthrow of a leader whom we had partially created and the fact that Noriega was only one of a long list of dictators who had operated with American support.²⁵

Jim Hoagland wrote two highly critical columns, the first one arguing that the invasion "smashed what precious little order did exist in Panama, killed hundreds, made 9,000 people homeless, and refurbished an image of America as a hemispheric bully." The second one, sent from Paris, described the action as "the sledgehammering of an ant" and noted that the French considered our behavior outside the nuncio’s embassy to be in poor taste.²⁶

But the severest attacks came from Richard Cohen and Coleman McCarthy. Considering that 1989 had been a year when Eastern European countries had started breaking away from the USSR, Cohen noted that "behavior that would have brought condemnation had the Soviets done it or, maybe war had

²¹Ibid., January 5, 1990, A18.
the Nicaraguans done it, gets airily dismissed." McCarty caustically wrote that "the operation was not just, nor was it a cause. An accurate name would have been Operation Unjust Pique." He went on to ask why Congress had been so passive in light of Bush’s unilateral action.  

The three major news magazines, as weeklies rather than dailies, had far fewer pieces on Panama than did the newspapers, but each had one editorial/essay devoted to the topic that was at least in part critical. In Time, Michael Kinsley demolished most of the administration’s arguments. He rejected the justifications for the invasion: there was no threat to the Canal, only one American had been killed, removing Noriega wasn’t going to reduce drug trafficking, and our defense of democracy was terribly selective. He blasted the Bush team, and the media, for their lack of concern about Panamanian casualties, and called the dictator’s deportation, “a mockery of the notions of justice it is intended to celebrate,” since his crimes against his own people were far worse than anything he had done to the U.S. Kinsley’s conclusion was that “if Panamanians didn’t want him [Noriega], he should have been allowed to rot in the resort of his choice, like other former American friends.”

Commentaries in Newsweek and U.S. News and World Report, while not as caustic as that of Time, were certainly critical. In the former, Jonathan Alter echoed Kinsley (although his essay appeared three weeks earlier) in claiming that “his [Bush’s] official justifications rang hollow.” He pointed out the hypocrisy of arguing that the invasion was intended to defend democracy, given the recent photo of National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft toasting Chinese leaders in Beijing, a mere six months after the Tiananmen Square massacre. And in U.S. News, David Gergen, while accepting some of Bush’s arguments, considered Panama an exception. He concluded that “just as Gorbachev has renounced the use of Soviet force to dictate affairs in Eastern Europe, the U.S. in the 1990s must no longer dictate to Latin America...U.S. troops should never go in again unless invited and unless others take the lead.”

Journals on the left predictably found nothing to support in the invasion policy. Articles in The Nation compared it to turn-of-the-century gunboat

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29Time, January 22, 1990, 74.
diplomacy, referred to it as "Bush's Splendid Little War" (mocking Teddy Roosevelt's description of the Spanish-American War), and argued that "the notion that it is entirely proper for the U.S. to breach all international treaties and covenants has been firmly established." Guest columnist Carlos Fuentes, the famous Mexican novelist, called the invasion a "disaster," which continues the traditions of spheres of influence and military intervention. In his eyes, "the U.S. was assuming the right to intervene where it pleases, to establish or remove rulers and to trample all laws..." In a similar vein, an editorial in Progressive argued that "no single action of the Bush Administration so disgraces the United States as the December invasion of Panama." It went on to indict Congress and the media for their acquiescence.

The Catholic magazine Commonweal was almost indistinguishable from those on the left in its scathing attacks. Its editorials called Bush "a frustrated gringo president," accused the U.S. of a double standard on intervention, and claimed that our policy in Latin America was still based on "Manifest Destiny, geostrategic Darwinism and the white man's burden." While these three magazines were unrelenting in their criticism, their audiences were far smaller than those of the three major news magazines.

The New Republic, usually liberal, lined up in support of the administration for the most part. Its editorials contained statements such as, "the United States acted later than it should have," "in a sense it was our duty to overthrow Noriega," and "the invasion was a creditable and in the end unavoidable undertaking." In a comment reminiscent of one made by Safire, they argued that "the U.S. used its military power on behalf of human rights and democracy, not against those principles...The Panama invasion was justified because of the special circumstances and because the invasion has restored legitimate democratic government." But it did criticize the lack of attention paid to civilian casualties and felt that the arrest of foreigners on their own soil was in violation of international law.

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32 Ibid., February 12, 1990, 202-203.

33 See Progressive, February 1990, 6-7.


In his article, “The Press and the Panama Invasion” (see note #1), Marc Cooper made five specific criticisms of the print media’s coverage of the incident. He claimed that they failed to highlight the breach of international law that took place; they did not examine Bush’s real motives for launching the attack; they wrote little about “the political, social and racial composition of the new Panamanian government”; they ignored the long connection between Noriega and the CIA; and they parroted Bush’s weak justifications for the invasion.

Few columnists and op-ed writers made reference to violations of international law. The only major pieces on the subject came from Saul Landau in the Times, Richard Cohen in the Post, and an editorial in The New Republic. Similarly, on Bush’s “real” motives (an assumption on Cooper’s part), the only discussion was found in Landau, an essay in the Post by Coleman McCarthy, and an editorial in Commonweal.

The third accusation is largely an unreasonable one. Cooper finds fault with the media for not pointing out that Noriega was a mestizo (mixed race) while Endara and his two vice-presidents were all from the white minority, which had generally ruled Panama throughout the twentieth century. Perhaps in Cooper’s mind, this fact detracted from Endara’s fitness for office (which was in question for other reasons36), but he had been the clear winner of an internationally supervised election just seven months earlier. No other Panamanian could have legitimately been put into the presidency in his stead. Cooper was correct in claiming that few commentators devoted much space to exploring Noriega’s history with the CIA. While many of them mentioned it, only Haynes Johnson in the Post dwelled on it to any extent.

But the final accusation, that the media served as mouthpieces for the administration, does not stand up to scrutiny. Bush’s arguments justifying the invasion were dissected by numerous columnists: Landau, Tom Wicker, Russell Baker and even Abe Rosenthal in the Times, Cohen in the Post, Michael Kinsley in Time, and Jonathan Alter in Newsweek. Examples given earlier in this paper demonstrate some of the withering criticism aimed at the President’s explanations. While Bush certainly had his share of supporters among the fourth estate, by no means was he given unrestricted support. The print media fulfilled their duty, although the invasion was over so quickly, it is doubtful that they had much chance to reverse the public support that it had garnered. Unlike Vietnam, but

36His main credibility problem resulted from his being sworn in on a U.S. military base in Panama, making him appear to be an American puppet.
similar to the later 1991 Gulf War, this was a short, successful conflict that caused few American casualties, giving the American people little reason or opportunity to oppose it. Even so, the U.S. press seems to have presented a balanced coverage of Bush's invasion of Panama, if not a deep, analytical coverage of its implications and consequences.
Mutual Interests: Japan and Ethiopia

Before the Italo-Ethiopian War, 1935-36

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Largely ignored today are the justifications in the 1930s for Italy’s aggression against Ethiopia based on the former’s fear of a growing Japanese hegemony in Ethiopia and Northern Africa.¹ The purpose of this study is to explore the odd geopolitical nexus which led to this historical event, and to re-acquaint readers with this significant international scenario.


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Despite tenuous contacts with Africa for some time, only after the Meiji Restoration of 1868, did the Japanese particularly focus on Ethiopia. While the Japanese generally regarded Africa as a single entity, the Gaimusho [foreign office] did distinguish North Africa geographically from Black Africa by emphasizing its racial, historical, religious, cultural, and linguistic differences. Tokyo officially classified North Africa as part of the Middle East.\(^2\)

With its victories in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894 and 1895, and the Russo-Japanese War a decade later, plus Korea’s annexation in 1910, Japan embarked on building an Asian empire. Asserting mastery over Taiwan and Korea, Japan joined the imperialist world, dominated by the Western powers, and looked to Europe’s African imperialism for the model of how to conquer and control colonies. Many Japanese intellectuals discussed Europe’s colonial systems, publishing and translating books on their administrations in Africa.\(^3\) The government particularly attended to Ethiopia’s colonial dispute with Italy and its implications for Japanese policies in Asia and Africa itself.\(^4\)

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\(^4\) In 1888, when a dispute broke out over the question of extraterritoriality in Mas’uwa, the *Japan Weekly Mail* pointed out its relevance for Japan. The editor wrote that before Italy’s arrival Mas’uwa had been under nominal Ottoman rule and the citizens of “Christian” powers had enjoyed extraterritorial privileges there. The newspaper asked the question: When a Christian power takes complete control of a territory so that the former government ceases to exist—unlike the case of Britain in Egypt or France in Tunis—are the treaty rights of foreign powers obtained with the former government automatically nullified? The editor answered that if the territory comes under the full sovereignty of a Christian power and thus “Christian” law prevails, then the need for extraterritoriality ceases. As Francesco Crispi had explained, the paper expanded, when the circumstances which had given rise to the need for extraterritoriality disappears, the natural order should return. The *Japan Weekly Mail* also ran another article, “Mr. Crispi as Japan’s Advocate,” which declared that the controversy over treaty revision in Japan was peaking. Explaining
Ethiopia first appeared in the *Gaimusho’s* documents shortly after the Ethiopians had defeated the Italians at Adwa on March 1, 1896. In the glow of Japan’s own recent victory over China on April 5, 1896, the army minister informed the foreign minister that he intended to send an officer, a doctor, and an accountant to follow Italy’s expeditionary force. Given that Italy did not sign a peace treaty with Ethiopia until October 26, Tokyo probably had assumed that the war was going to continue. The *Gaimusho* instructed its chargé d’affaires to ask the Italians for their cooperation, but Rome declined.⁵

Many Japanese wished to join the West in Africa’s exploitation, and some saw Ethiopia as a potential gateway. In 1899, Dr. Tomizu Hirondo, a professor of law at Tokyo Imperial University, published a short pamphlet, *Afrika no Zento* [The Future of Africa]. Admiring Cecil Rhodes and Harry Johnson, he concluded that Japan had to expand its influence and profit in Africa before Europeans completely controlled the continent.⁶ During the First World War, some Japanese, recalling Tomizu, wanted to send troops to occupy Germany’s African territories.⁷

The Japan Mail Steamship Company inaugurated regular service to Europe via the Suez Canal when the *Tosa Maru* left Japan in March 1896 and arrived in London in May. Stopping at Port Said, Japanese merchantmen established direct commercial connections with Africa for the first time. Tokyo got first-hand information on Africa by sending official economic missions, establishing consular offices, and by using the information networks established by shipping companies and trading houses. Japan designed its

that extraterritoriality is only justified in cases where laws are “part and parcel of a theological system” such as Islam’s which distinguishes between believers and non-believers, the paper pointedly asked whether there was anything in Japan’s laws that were “irreconcilable with Occidental principles.” The Japan Weekly Mail emphatically insisted that there was not, and, in keeping with Crispi’s logic, argued that the natural order should be reestablished. Italy had provided Japan with ammunition for its legal battles against the “unequal treaties” which discriminated against Japan until 1911. Bradshaw, “Japan and European Colonialism,” 293-95.


⁶Bradshaw, “Japan and European Colonialism,” 297-98.

economic penetration to secure a cheap and stable supply of raw materials, especially cotton, as well as to capture markets. By 1899, silk thread from Japan was entering Ethiopia through Harare. By 1918, Japanese cloth had superseded American unbleached muslin, which had dominated Ethiopia’s imports. European colonialism in Africa, however, blocked Japan’s military and political penetration and confined Japan’s African relations to trade and commerce. Not necessarily by choice, Japan could and did claim “clean hands in Africa.”

As its political and economic power increased, world conditions became less favorable for Japan’s expansion. Citing the “Yellow Peril,” competing Western states criticized Japan. Many Japanese, in turn, thought that they should block the West’s colonial penetration into Asia and they should lead all “colored” peoples—including Ethiopians—against “white” domination.

Young, educated Ethiopians responded. One of them, the future foreign minister Herui Wolde Sellassie, published in 1932 *Dai Nihon* [Great Japan] in which he explained that, “Ethiopia was not knowledgeable of the situation in the East until the [Russo-Japanese] war. Because of the war, we

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learned tremendous amount about Japan from Russians living in Ethiopia, and our Ethiopian people started to admire courageous Japan."

Blatta Gabra Egziabher, an Eritrean intellectual, shortly before 1900 published the first Amharic newspaper, a weekly with a circulation of about fifty handwritten sheets. A keen Ethiopian patriot, he also wrote verses extolling modernization:

Let us learn from the Europeans; let us become strong
So that the enemy may not vanquish us, on the first encounter.
Let us examine our history; let us read the newspaper.
Let us learn languages; let us look at maps.
This is what opens people's eyes.
Darkness has gone; dawn has come.
It is a disgrace to sleep by day.\(^\text{12}\)

Modernization, for the sake of national strength, found expression in another of his poems, which declared,

He who accepts it, fears no one.
He will become like Japan, strong in everything.\(^\text{13}\)


\(^{13}\) See Pankhurst, "History of Education, Printing and Literacy in Ethiopia." As another example of an early admirer, Haji Abdulahi Sadiq, reputed to be the "head of the Muslims" in Harar during the last year of Menelik’s rule, visited Japan in 1905 and 1906. Haji Abdulahi Sadiq was also one of only two Ethiopians to visit the United States during Menelik’s reign. In 1908, he informed an Italian correspondent for La Tribuna of his visit. Bradshaw, "Japan and European Colonialism," 298; Chris Prouty, Empress Taytu and Menelik II of Ethiopia 1883-1910 (Trenton: Red Sea Press, 1986), 272-73.
Blatta Gabra Egziabher was one of many young Ethiopians who saw Japan as a living example for Ethiopia in liquidating feudalism and developing capitalism through the agency of the modern state and revolution from above.14 Called “Progressive Intellectuals,” “Young Ethiopians,” or simply “Japanizers,” these foreign educated, young intellectuals stressed the similarities bonding the two non-Western nations. These included myths of eternal dynasties and similar histories in overcoming European powers. Japan’s dramatic and rapid transformation from a feudal society—like Ethiopia’s—into an industrial power by the end of the nineteenth century attracted Ethiopians. Further, Japan’s military victories convinced these “Japanizers” that they too could master Western scientific and technological skills and turn them against Europeans.15 The appearance of the Japanizers created contradictions within the feudal ruling classes, enlightening some while hardening others. Hence arose the conflict between what one Marxist scholar has called the “liberal,” “enlightened feudalists” on the one hand and “ultra feudalists” on the other.16

Gebre Heywat Baykedagn well-represents the ideas of the Japanizers. Born in 1886, he had studied in Germany and Austria, and returned to Ethiopia in 1905. Exiled in 1909, he returned in 1911, to become palace treasurer and head of customs for Menelik’s grandson and heir, Lidj Iyasu. Convinced of the need for sweeping administrative and fiscal measures by 1914, Gebre Heywet had become a confidant of Tafari Makonnen—the future Emperor Haile Selassie.17

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Sounding like the young, reform-minded samurai in Japan on the eve of the Meiji Restoration, Gebre Heywet warned in his famous treatise on "Government and Public Administration":

The task awaiting the present Ethiopian king is not like that of his predecessors. In the old days, ignorance held sway. Today, however, a strong and unassailable enemy called the European mind has risen against her. Whoever opens his door to her prospers. Whoever closes his door will be destroyed. If our Ethiopia accepts the European mind, no one would dare attack her. If not, she will disintegrate and be enslaved. Hence, let us hope that His Highness Menelik’s heir will examine and follow the example of the Japanese government.\(^{18}\)

Its productive forces poorly developed, Ethiopia was only just emerging from feudal anarchy, and feudal barons remained entrenched in the provinces. The Japanizers passionately advocated capitalist reforms. But it was not capitalism in general that they envisaged. They sought, rather, to develop an industrialized economy by using state power. Here they drew upon the experience of the Meiji Revolution in Japan. Ethiopia’s backward commercial bourgeoisie could not, however, accumulate sufficient capital to move the country forward. At the same time, the imperial powers would not allow Ethiopia’s commercial bourgeoisie to develop to the point that it could win the home market for itself. For these reasons and more, the state itself had to accumulate capital while actively supporting the commercial bourgeoisie. This state guidance was the essence of Japanization. Because of greater social and technological backwardness, however, Ethiopia had to implement an even more drastic and rigorous policy than had been needed in Japan.\(^{19}\)


\(^{19}\) Addis Hiwet, Ethiopia, 70. For another perspective on the problems of development and the need for state direction, see J. Calvitt Clarke, Russia and Italy Against Hitler: The Bolshevik-Fascist Rapprochement of the 1930s (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1991), Chapter 4.
Japan’s victory over Russia impressed Prince Tafari, an ardent student of military matters, and his trusted adviser, Herui. Tafari, whose original interest in Japan probably had been inspired by his father, Ras Makonnen, understood that Japan and the United States were the new centers of the world economy. By 1906, when Ras Makonnen died, the thirteen year-old Tafari apparently had developed his goal, an essential part of which was to draw upon the Japanese model. Japan had proved that a non-European nation could embrace modernization and stand as a cultural and technical equal to Europe.\(^\text{20}\)

After Zawditu’s coronation in 1917, Tafari Makonnen was named Prince-Regent. Tafari, however, had to share power with other powerful figures at Zawditu’s court, and he was unable to impose Japanizer-inspired reforms for another decade. Even so, he did take some limited measures. By importing equipment from Germany, for example, Tafari established a printing press on his own grounds in 1923. That same year he founded a weekly newspaper, *Berhanena Salam [Light and Peace]*, that by 1929 had built a circulation of about 500.\(^\text{21}\)

The radical intellectuals used its pages to condemn the parasitic, feudal oligarchy as the stumbling block to progress—Marxist verbiage certainly dramatized the point.\(^\text{22}\) The young writers stressed education’s role in Japan’s advance, and “education” became their motto. As one explained:

> The speedy modernization of Japan was achieved through nothing but the concerted efforts of the Japanese people. . . . They were unstinting in their money. They sent their daughters to school. Wealthy Japanese helped the state. Others contributed funds for the opening of schools. And because they gave all their attention to education they were able to modernize fast.\(^\text{23}\)


\(^{22}\) Addis Hiwet, *Ethiopia*, 60-70.

\(^{23}\) Bradshaw, “Japan and European Colonialism,” 302-03, quote 303.
A song composed in 1926 encapsulates their attitude. It included a phrase, "Je Japan Suraiya Marennie." [We Proceed Following Japan].

At the death of the Empress Zawditu, Crown Prince and Regent Tafari became the new emperor. The Japanese minister in Turkey, Yoshida Isaburo, attended the grand coronation ceremony of November 2, 1930. Yoshida and Herui met and signed a friendship treaty on November 15. The treaty was ratified in Paris on August 26 of the following year.

As emperor, Tafari imitated the Japanese Emperor in his "attitude of exclusiveness," because he thought it would help create "an imperial dignity lacking in Ethiopia." Later as the Italo-Ethiopian war was brewing, the British Minister to Ethiopia, Sir Sidney Barton, explained:

the Emperor has always been interested in the achievements of Japan and his imagination sees similarities between the two countries which—however incredible it may seem to foreign observers—lead him to dream of Ethiopia as the Japan of Africa.

Wolde Georgis (Wolde-Yohannes)—then the Emperor's private secretary, and later a dominant political figure, told Ladislas Farago, the peripatetic journalist:

At last we have reached the point when we have officials who have the ability to govern the country in the European method, instead of oligarchies. I am convinced that we shall now develop more rapidly, but, we must be left alone, for all our efforts would be wasted if we fell back on the old ways, even if it were in defense of our very life and independence. On that day our evolution would stop, and a bloody revolution would take place. And the men who take it upon themselves to make a European country out of this backward African Empire, will be the first martyrs in the revolution, for the Conservatives rule the country, and conservative here means backward and pitiless. We of the

26 Bradshaw, "Japan and European Colonialism," 300; Furukawa, "Japan's Political Relations"; *ibid.*, "Japanese-Ethiopian Relations."
27 Bradshaw, "Japan and European Colonialism," 299.
younger generation are the friends of progress and humanism, while they are its enemies! And we do not want to work in vain.\textsuperscript{28}

Farago concluded that this statement referred to the Japanizers and helped explain Ethiopia’s determination to resist Italy in the 1930s, to protect their work begun less than ten years before.\textsuperscript{29}

Another proof of Japanese influence in Ethiopia can be found in Japan’s Constitution of 1931. Modeled on the Meiji Constitution of 1889, the new Constitution concentrated and made more emphatic imperial power than did the Japanese. A Russian-educated intellectual and “Japanizer,” Takle-Hawaryat Takla-Maryam, wrote the draft of the Ethiopian Constitution, and the Emperor with his advisers Herui and Ras Kasa modified it.\textsuperscript{30}

Even more dramatically, Foreign Minister Belatin Getta Herui, special envoy of the Ethiopian emperor, left Addis Ababa on September 30, 1931, bound for Japan. Officially, his party was visiting to repay the Japanese Emperor for Japan’s representation at the recent coronation in Addis Ababa.\textsuperscript{31} In cultivating mutual relations, Herui also wanted to see if Ethiopia’s plan for modernization along Japanese lines could be carried out. Herui and his mission were grandly treated. He later wrote:

Upon our arrival in Japan, I heard people’s joyful cries. Many Japanese citizens awaited us at the port waving Ethiopian and Japanese flags. The route to the hotel was

\textsuperscript{28}Quoted in Ladislas Farago, \textit{Abyssinia on the Eve} (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1935), 70-71.

\textsuperscript{29}\textit{Ibid.}, 71. The Marxist Addis Hiwet has suggested that this same statement demonstrates that the ideas advanced by the Japanizers were too radical for the other educated elements in Ethiopia. Addis Hiwet, \textit{Ethiopia}, 70.


\textsuperscript{31}One of the party, Araya-Ababa, would later become involved in the engagement scandal with Kuroda Masako. See Clarke, “Japan and Ethiopia: Two Imperiums United by Marriage?”.
flooded with people acclaiming us. Everywhere we went, it was the same phenomenon.32

Received in audience at the Phoenix Hall, Herui saluted Emperor Hirohito in Amharic and presented the emperor with a royal letter and the Grand Cordon of Solomon with Paulownia Flower, the highest order of the Ethiopian Empire. In turn, he received the First Order of Merit and the Grand Cordon of the Rising Sun from the Japanese emperor. Herui praised Ethiopia's choice of Japan as the model for modernization:

Our Ethiopian Emperor is deeply impressed with Japanese Empire's remarkable and great progress of the last sixty years, and is moved with surprise at the fact that the Japanese Empire accomplished such a great deed in such a short time, and is determined to advocate to his whole nation to take the Great Japanese Empire as the best model.33

Herui visited the Gaimusho on November 7 to offer formal greetings to Foreign Minister Shidehara Kijuro, who offered a toast in English:

The Ethiopian emperor invited Japanese representatives for the coronation last year. As we sent Minister Yoshida for this honorable mission with great satisfaction, this time it is our great pleasure to meet Your Excellency who was sent as a return mission to the Japanese emperor by your head of state. I wish to toast for the prosperity of the Ethiopian Empire.

32Herui, Dai Nippon, 1-15, describes Herui's voyage to Japan. The Osaka Mainichi & Tokyo Nichi Nichi. November 1, 6, 7, 1931, followed the trip. See, also Taura, "Nihon-Echiopia kankei ni miru 1930," 149, and Bradshaw, "Japan and European Colonization," 308.

33See Shoji Yunosuke, Echiopia Kekkon Mondai wa Donaru, Kaisho ka? Ina!!!: Kekkon Mondai o Shudai to shite Echiopia no Shinso o Katari Kokumin no Saikakumin o Yobo su [What Will Happen to the Ethiopian Marriage Issue, Cancellation? or Not!!!: I Request the Re-recognition of the (Japanese) Nation by Narrating the Truth of Ethiopia with the Marriage Issue as the Central Theme] (Tokyo: Seikyo Sha, 1934). For Herui's visit to Kobe and Osaka, see Herui, Dai Nippon, 16-19. For his meeting with the emperor, see ibid., 19-30. Also see Furukawa, "Japan's Political Relations," 6-7.
Forever for the friendship of both countries! Ethiopian emperor, Banzai!  

During his grand tour of Japan, Herui saw many factories and business enterprises. He observed military maneuvers, visited several important religious shrines, tarried at several newspaper offices, and attended many social functions, some hosted by government functionaries and some by chambers of commerce and business associations. Admiring well-disciplined Japanese soldiers, Herui apparently decided to “Japanize” Ethiopia’s troops by adopting Japanese-style military uniforms.

With Herui’s arrival, Japanese merchants, particularly those in Osaka, began turning their eyes toward Ethiopia as a bright market prospect. The National Cotton Cloth Exporters’ Association, with its office in Osaka, sought to encourage exports of cotton cloth to Ethiopia and to drive away foreign goods, although already more than 80 percent of cotton cloth consumed there was Japanese. There was also a remarkable increase of the exports of celluloid goods, mosquito sticks and insect powder, rubber boots, enameled ware, knitted goods, aluminum manufactures, and caps and hats. Soap, towels, woolen blankets, glass manufactures, and other piece goods, not hitherto exported to Ethiopia would find new markets in Ethiopia.

The Japanese welcome had impressed Herui. After returning to Ethiopia in 1932, he published a book to introduce Japan to his countrymen. Entitled Mahdara Berhan Hagara Japan [Japan: The Source of Light], it was probably the first book by an African to make a serious attempt to introduce Japan to Africans. It was translated into Japanese as Dai Nippon [Great Japan] and published with a preface by the former foreign minister Sidehara in Tokyo in 1934.

A couple of years later Ladislas Farago asked Herui about his visit and its implications:

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34 Okakura and Kitagawa, Nihon-Afrika Koryu-shi, 32-33, quote 33.
We had no ulterior motive, and what we wanted was no mystery. Japan has been growing into one of the most influential great powers, and while all the other important nations had their representatives in Addis Ababa, Japan was not represented at His Majesty's court by so much as an Honorary Consul. It meant a great deal to us to open up diplomatic connections with Japan, and that was the primary reason for my journey.

The second reason was purely economic. Our people are poor, and our export trade has shrunk during the last few years owing to the depression. We had to find a source for cheap everyday goods, and Japan is famous the world over as the country that sells the cheapest goods, especially cotton, which our country now imports in great quantities. We used to get most of the cotton that we required from the United States, but as Japan can supply the same thing eighty per cent cheaper, we naturally buy our requirements from her. The hackneyed term "Japanese invasion" has a real meaning in this country, for half of our imports are comprised of cotton.38

Beyond these, it would seem that another reason for Herui's journey to Japan in 1931 was to request arms and munitions from the Japanese government. But at that time, Japan was dealing with the Manchurian Incident and had priorities other than supplying arms and munitions to Ethiopia.39

Herui's admiration for Japan as a model alarmed the Western powers that had no desire to see a second Japan—this one in Africa.40 One European wrote in 1935 that during the previous four years Ethiopia had "embarked, with the close cooperation of Japan, on a life and death struggle with the white race, the consequences of which are incalculable."41 He added that Italy was fighting the battle for the sake of all colonial powers in Africa. The Young Ethiopian movement, aided and abetted by the government, he explained, was systematically "fostering hatred of the white peoples. . . .":

The application of European methods of education to the coloured peoples is bearing tragic and dangerous fruits, more particularly in the cases in which the natives are not under the rule and control of white people but have a free hand to conceive and follow up any fatal policy to which their position as a sovereign native state entitles them.\textsuperscript{42}

This account continues that the final aim of the Japanizers’ policy of antagonism toward the white races was “nothing less than to act as the champions of all the coloured peoples of Africa.”\textsuperscript{43} Europe must take a stand, “before a movement takes final shape under the leadership of pseudo-emancipated coloured people with the aim of attacking and destroying western culture and civilization in its entirety!”\textsuperscript{44}

While Herui’s visit spawned talk of racial unity and hopes for extensive commercial exchanges, military assistance, and even a marriage proposal, its raised expectations only dramatized grand disappointments.\textsuperscript{45} Daba Birrou, the interpreter for Herui’s mission, personifies those frustrations. In September 1935, on the eve of Italy’s invasion the next month, he headed his own mission that triumphantly toured Japan. He received excited vocal support especially from Japanese nationalists. For example, on September 21, 1935, Echiopia Mondai Kondan kai [A Roundtable to Discuss Ethiopian Issues] welcomed the Ethiopian party. Attending were some 251 people, including Mitsuru Toyama, a founder of Genyo sha [Genyo sha Association], a well-known nationalist group. Afterward, Daba Birrou wrote thanking the group:

[I as a representative of all Ethiopian people deeply thank the friendship and favor that the Japanese people have voluntarily shown to us. Especially I am grateful to your roundtable for publicly expressing your opinions.]\textsuperscript{46}

Despite the fervent adulation by Japanese civilians, in the end Herui got none
of the tangible aid he had hoped to get. Japan’s government ultimately accommodated itself to Italy’s conquest of the Ethiopian Empire by exchanging recognitions with Italy—Ethiopia for Manchukuo. This led in turn to the Anti-Comintern Pact, a wartime alliance, and, ultimately, to mutual devastation and defeat for Italy and Japan. Ethiopia, on the other hand, in 1941 became the first Axis-occupied country to be liberated.


48Sugimura to Arita, 177-2, 10/29/36: A461 ET/I1 Vol. 8; Sugimura to Arita, 87-1, 5/12/13/36; Mushanokoji (Berlin) to Arita, 107, 5/15-16/36; Sugimura to Arita, 87-2, 5/12/13/3; Gaimusho Gaiko Shiryo Kan [Record Office, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Tokyo)] A461 ET/I1-7 vol. 7.
The Other Great Migration:

Cultural Contact Zones

in Early Twentieth-Century Florida

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Academic inquiries into public nightlife in the United States have focused on two aspects: the beginning of new styles of social interaction and the rise of entertainers—musicians, vocalists, and dancers—who found work in an emerging urban world. This has included an almost exclusive focus on large cities such as New York, New Orleans, or Chicago. The body of this work suggests that such entertainment had its base in African American culture.¹ Most of the scholarship on this subject describes the transition from a genteel culture to a popular, mass culture with a voracious appetite for public display. Some of these studies advance the idea that emerging cities embraced public dancing. The resulting dance halls and cabarets were large venues able to cater to large crowds. Other studies explore why contemporary culture was marginalized. The focus of this study is on small, intimate spaces, called jook joints, in small towns and rural areas in Florida.²


²Erenberg, Steppin’ Out, xiii.

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From the few existing structures that are or were jook joints, and even fewer historic photographs, it becomes apparent that these gathering places offered little more than rudimentary amenities for clientele. Unlike ballrooms or dance halls, jooks offered no mirrors, parquet floors, or bandstands. The jook joints most often were windowless, and would have been out of place had they been more than that in a rural, frontier environment. Yet the shabby structures emerge as the signs of cultural resistance as well as change, of places where everybody was his or her own ‘performing self,’ which contrasted with the waning, genteel culture of the 1910s. Florida’s jooks offer a picture of how different ethnic groups adjusted to legal and climatic extremes and provide a look at black and white working class leisure hours. The contrast began to surface gradually after World War I, when large population shifts brought more people to an underpopulated Sunshine State.3

At the same time that New York’s evening pleasures began acting as a transit terminal for new trends before and after the turn of the twentieth century, Miami barely existed. Florida’s future “Magic City” and exciting Miami Beach were destined to lure the top entertainers of the Jazz Age to their winter tourist seasons. But for the time period, 1896, John Sewell focused on clearing the wilderness, north of the Miami River for his employer, Standard Oil magnate John Morrison Flagler. Flagler had instructed Sewell, a future mayor of Miami, to travel there in March 1896 from Lakeland. He was to supervise the land clearing for Flagler’s Royal Palm Hotel, which was to loom prominently on Biscayne Bay north of the densely vegetated Miami River. Sewell also had worked to extend Flagler’s railroad southward from West Palm Beach. Railroad service to the Miami River started in 1895.4

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3The term jook will be used throughout this paper, although many white turpentine workers and North Floridians referred to the same places as “tunk” and non-Floridians preferred the “juke” spelling. Warren I. Susman, “‘Personality’ and the Making of Twentieth-Century Culture,” New Directions in American Intellectual History, John Higham and Paul K. Conkin, eds. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979), 212-26.

Sewell was not a social reformer. He was a young entrepreneur who had left Central Florida’s town of Lakeland with African Americans he had known growing up in rural Polk County. “The negroes that I picked to go with me were: A.W. Brown, Philip Bowman, Jim Hawkins, Warren Merridy, Richard Mangrom, Romeo Fashaw, Scipio Coleman, Sim Anderson, Dave Heartley, J.B. Brown, William Collier, and Joe Thompson. Miami was all woods,” Sewell remembered of his trip to Miami, which also included his brother, known only as E.G.⁵

Of course, Sewell was not the first to have arrived there. Communities existed north and south of the Miami River, called Lemon City and Coconut Grove, respectively. These were lush tropical settlements of mostly Bahamian settlers who had moved across the Florida Straits to Key West, the Upper Keys, and Biscayne Bay during the nineteenth century. A handful of white pioneers and Seminole Indians were also present. When Sewell was part of the group that incorporated Miami in July 1896, three months after the U.S. Supreme Court had affirmed the separate but equal ruling in Plessy v. Ferguson, he was among the white minority. Sewell arranged for blacks to vote “to insure that his side won the election for the purpose of getting members of the Flagler system elected as officers.”⁶

He also realized that if Flagler’s hotel was to be constructed he would need outside workers. Most of these workers arrived from other states, plucked from the hordes of European immigrants that were processed through New York. The problems of securing an inexpensive, unskilled labor force, that was also dependable, created a chronic flow of complaints. Since “native whites simply would not take the more menial, dangerous positions offered by the road,” historian George E. Pozetta found that company officials went to the urban centers of the northeast searching for workers. There, from among the thousands of arriving immigrants, the railroad men hoped to attract foreign laborers through the help of a labor boss or “padrone.” A variety of Florida businesses were willing to utilize such services as the labor boss could provide. Those workers who arrived in Florida—Italians for instance—were hired “even by Florida businesses which allegedly harbored deep reservations about using foreign labor.”⁷

⁵Parks, Miami Memoirs, 10.
⁷George E. Pozetta, “A Padrone Looks at Florida: Labor Recruiting and the Florida East Coast Railway,” Florida Historical Quarterly, 54 (July 1975), 74-
When Miami incorporated in 1896, there were only a few hundred residents. But the town’s population “grew to 29,571 in 1920,” and this influx “resulted in a boom in construction of housing developments and apartment buildings.” Workers had no housing, living instead in palmetto-covered A-frames, tents or simple shacks. In these shanty towns, the large crowd of mostly unmarried men formed cultural coalitions, especially after hours when a variety of workers met at the hundreds of that offered alcohol, gambling, and other forms of entertainment on the northern perimeter of “decent society.”

Sewell remembered that the city limits “had all the vices . . . that were ever in the worst frontier town.” Vaudeville shows, silent movies, and “traveling Negro companies” brightened the balmy winter evenings. Indeed, if Miami’s pre-boom days were any indication, everyone had fun “night after night.” Black ragtime players may have provided music for Saturday evening dances at the Odd Fellows Temple located in the business district on Avenue G in Colored Town. But working-class black and white patrons heard those same piano players who “were regularly employed across the tracks in ‘sporting houses’,” which, as anthropologist Zora Neale Hurston had described, were known to African Americans as jook joints.9

Miami’s “decent society” initially was confined to one hundred acres belonging to settler and hotelier Julia Tuttle north of the Miami River along Biscayne Bay. Nineteen years after its incorporation, Miami’s City Council established a community along the color line when it condemned one and a half city blocks along Avenue I in “Disputed Territory” in 1915. To the east were Flagler’s hotels and railway corridors, squeezed between the azure blue Biscayne Bay, the murky Miami River to the south, and the railroad to the northwest which abutted the Everglades before its great sheet of flowing water was channeled. Flagler had agreed to Tuttle’s stipulation “that anti-liquor clauses must appear in the deeds to each lot sold.” Landowners were prohibited from “buying, selling,

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or manufacturing” alcoholic drink at the risk of having their land revert to the original owners. Flagler had permission to offer guests at the Royal Palm Hotel drinks “during the tourist season,” and Tuttle also served alcoholic drinks at her Miami Hotel.10

The young city of Miami had a bumsque saloon business, especially after Tuttle’s death in 1898. In keeping with the Victorian image of white gentility, it was perceived that the joints could only ruin the newly emerging opportunities for tourism. Local chapters of the Women’s Christian Temperance Union (WCTU) supported calls from the clergy and the city’s newspaper, The Miami Metropolis, for additional laws against the lewd and drunken behavior at these joints. Soon, taverns in residential sections were forbidden, liquor licenses became prohibitively expensive, and the hours were limited during which a bar could serve alcohol. At the urging of the local WCTU, an aging Carrie Nation arrived in Miami in 1908 after visiting several other Florida cities, “To warn saloon men of their peril.” The Miami area jooks were located “less than twenty feet north of the city limits” and were Mrs. Nation’s last stop. She had witnessed “gambling, as well as men and women drinking, and women lounging around in loose attire, smoking and using profane and vulgar language.”11 Carrie Nation’s flamboyant appearance, as it had done in Kansas City eight years earlier, left a significant impression on Miami’s officials. They began to bend toward the cultural biases of the growing white population which, nevertheless, was in the minority.

Carrie Nation’s sensibilities about the use (or abuse) of alcohol reflected a growing evangelical trend. More than 2,000 people of all nationalities had attended her warm-up speeches in the Gospel Tent. Her impressions may have reflected myth rather than what really happened, and “even the Miami Metropolis questioned the accuracy of some of her information.” By projecting lewdness and laziness on those who frequent the jock, she provided the lawmakers reasons that were steeped in Victorian morals. Never mind that the workers never did have or would have access to the kind of accommodations or amenities that represented decent society. The press furthered that myth rather than asking whether the proposed laws were masking attempts to halt emerging social or cultural tensions that are found in areas such as south Florida where multiple cultures collided. Instead, for the first time in anyone’s memory, local and county officials were

10Ibid.
arresting numerous violators of the newly established Sunday liquor laws. In spite of these changes and the call in 1908 to “clean up vice and bad saloons,” Miami gained a reputation as a wide open city even before prohibition and became known as a “wicked city.” Gangsters “anxious to exploit the opportunities for great wealth through illicit traffic in liquor,” had an opportunity in South Florida, delivering alcohol from the Bahamas long before temperance laws were enacted nationally.12

As people with a broad variety of cultural backgrounds streamed into a frontier Florida, the balance toward a white majority did not change immediately. In Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, or North Florida, the southern way of life centered on a decided agricultural life with antebellum roots, and an evangelism centered on tent revivals. But the workers in southern Florida encountered a Caribbean-based lifestyle with cultural beginnings firmly rooted in Spain, France, Africa, The Netherlands, or England.

While exotic to newcomers, the lifestyle was black Miami’s society, especially in Colored Town, which arose as a segregated Miami community adjacent to White Town. It was destined, nevertheless, to clash in the 1920s with the arriving white middle class that became increasingly concerned about social tensions engendered by multiculturalism. Historians Raymond Mohl and George Pozetta claimed that there was a growing awareness of cultural differences because “one-quarter of Miami’s population was foreign born and the vast majority were blacks from the West Indies.” With the exception of New York, Miami had a larger black immigrant population than any other city in the U.S.13

Thousands of workers with different backgrounds came together to work under Sewell’s supervision to complete the Royal Palm Hotel. “By the summer of 1896, Miami contained nearly 3,000 persons,” including carpenters, plasterers, masons, painters, glaziers, plumbers, roofers, and landscapers. Referred to as “mechanics,” most had worked at a feverish pace to complete the six-story Royal Palm that would accommodate 600 guests. “Most of them took their meals in the ‘mechanics’ dining room of the Miami Hotel,” which was one of Tuttle’s establishments and also was the site of a celebration ball given by the mechanics

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in December 1896 "the like of which South Florida had never seen."14 The workers’ booming shack town on the Miami River served and supported the yellow-and-white Royal Palm, whose opening was pushed back to January 15, 1896. The rush to provide guest amenities included finishing a road paved with gleaming, crushed oolite so tourists could enjoy carriage rides along Biscayne Bay to the city limits one mile north, not far from the brothels and jooks.15

For the migrant workers from the North, contact with Bahamians and their music, especially during Goombay parades in Lemon City or Coconut Grove near Miami, was an added attraction to life in south Florida. The festivities became a unique blend of African and European cultures in south Florida. Even in the remote, flat expanses of the Everglades, black American workers from Georgia and North Florida had heard the unfamiliar Caribbean goat-skin covered drums that reverberated from the sugar cane fields where mysterious fires glowed at night.16

Those who had not arrived in southern Florida before World War I found plenty of work after the Great War. The unimaginable transformation from a naturally swampy environment had only just begun. Snakes and swarming mosquitoes may have driven the meek back North on the next ship, but for those who stayed, Biscayne Bay became a fantasy dominated by beach and water-front hotels where the best entertainers of the Jazz Age performed for white vacationers.17

Against great odds laborers lowered the water level in Lake Okeechobee,

14Thelma Peters, “Pomp and Circumstance--The Royal Palm Hotel,” Update, April 1975, 4-5; George, “Passage to the New Eden,” 440-63.

15Marvin Dunn, Black Miami in the Twentieth Century (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1997), 18; Laurie Kay Sommers, “Càribbean Music in South Florida,” South Florida History, 3 (Summer 1990), 5-10; George, “Passage to the New Eden,” 440-63.


17Parks, Miami Memoirs, 44-45. Florida received more then twenty million acres as a result of the Swamp Land Act of 1850. After disposing of over four million in one sale at 25 cents an acre, sixteen million acres were given to railroad, canal, and drainage companies. “Though many of these companies never did a spadeful of work, their domains stayed in private hands,” wrote Richard G. Lillard, The Great Forest (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1947), 177-78.
and drained and transformed the Florida Everglades swampland through a series of canals to create farmland. Even before all of the canals were built, workers arrived to buy the rich but cheap land at costs of $20 to $50 per acre and then ended up working as truck farmers. While the Everglades had not yet dried up, the market for swampland did, ending that particular land sales boom in 1912. The drainage projects did not begin again in earnest until the early 1920s, and included the straightening and containment of the Miami River.

Workers who prepared the regal ambience, where the wealthy could escape harsh northern winters, had themselves escaped to the area. Sailing from New York, Charleston, Savannah, or Jacksonville in steerage or third class, or riding the train as far south as West Palm Beach before 1895, they were joined by those who had sailed east across the Gulf of Mexico. Instead of leaving North Florida for Chicago or New York during the period of great outmigration from the South after the boll weevil infestation ruined cotton harvests, some North Floridians chose the ports at Pensacola, Apalachicola, and St. Marks to journey south, disembarking maybe in Tampa or Charlotte Harbor. All had one thing in common: They were largely poor and faced austerity, inequality, and social disintegration. But during weekends and on evenings after work the migrants’ cultural dislocation and class conflicts were drowned in home brew at jooks throughout the Everglades. The migrants danced to the sounds of ragtime, the blues, Caribbean drum rhythms, or boogie woogie played on rickety pianos, banjos, fiddles, guitars, and later on mechanical phonographs.18

Central and North Florida had provided not only the lumber for the building of the new railroads, bridges, houses, hotels, and fruit and vegetable crates, but also the idea for jook joints. The sawmills employed thousands of African Americans. Floridians who grew tired of North Florida’s hard life in the piney woods, or for whom the forests simply had vanished because of the giant lumbering operations, followed the calling of the buzz saw, trailing off southward through the last remaining stands of virgin lumber to new sawmills and lumber camps near the Everglades. Lake Okeechobee had emerged as the major vegetable growing center, and seasonal pickers arrived from farther north to work in this winter garden.19

19 Elisabeth Smith, “Other People, Other Places, Other Tragedies.” Magnolia Monthly, 8, no. 2 (February 1970), 5-8.
Zora Neale Hurston arrived in the Everglades in the late 1920s for one of her first anthropological field trips under the guidance of Franz Boas. She observed, "Everything... was big and new. Big Lake Okeechobee, big beans, big cane, big weeds, big everything. Wild cane on either side of the road hiding the rest of the world. People wild too." During the day, workers picked beans, and at night men picked their box (guitar) and rolled dice. "Between the beans and the dice," she noted that the men could not lose. "Every now and then they'd run across a party of Indians in their long, narrow dug-outs calmly winning their living in the trackless ways of the 'Glades," but the workers came in wagons from "way up in Georgia and they came in truck loads from east, west, north and south." She described a colorful trek of "permanent transients with no attachments," whose ancient cars house "a hopeful humanity on the inside," while skillets, beds, patched up spare inner tubes dangled on the outside. Between September and March the jooks in the quarters "clanged and clamored all night" while blues was "made and used right on the spot. Dancing, fighting, singing, crying, laughing, winning and losing love every hour." During the off-season, when the bean season had closed, she heard the "subtle but compelling rhythms of the Bahaman [sic] drummers." She’d walk over and watch the dances. Referring to the workers as "Saws," Hurston said that she began to like the drumming and went to listen every night.\(^{20}\)

The sawmill camps that preceded agricultural workers and tourist normally had their own jooks. It was customary in North Florida's movable mill towns to include a jook as a place for the men to relax. South Florida was no different. Many worker camps in the Lake Okeechobee region, for instance, may have been perceived as hovels without sanitation or running water that resulted in smelly streets. But there were plenty of these places for the workers to relax. While the agricultural wage earners "were beholden to employers for shelter as well as employment," and in that sense were like sharecroppers, they gathered to drink and gamble at jook joints.\(^{21}\) South Florida was far removed from a rigid set of rules before World War I in spite of Mrs. Nation’s attempts to impose an evangelist-based morality on its emerging society.

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\(^{20}\) Hurston, Their Eyes Were Watching God, 123, 125, 133.

The jooks continued to provide places for companionship, and after 1920, broadcast radio and Victrolas represented an extension of an old world of oral transmission that permeated the nearby Caribbean. South Florida’s society emerged segmented, having missed an opportunity to transcend the incipient heterogeneous and fragmentary sentiments which introduced the Ku Klux Klan to the area soon after 1920.

The dances should, or could, have helped feed a feeling of connectedness. As events were shaping up that made it difficult to maintain a dispassionate attitude toward social change, black and white workers danced steps that migrated North and became fads in New York. Colored Town, Miami, and Miami Beach entertained with rhythms that evolved in the Caribbean. The dances that influenced the Jazz Age in New York were instrumental in the 1920s creation of the modern resort environment at south Florida’s white-only destinations. Colored Town also began gaining a reputation as a “second Broadway.”

The new rhythms in the 1920s were part of the increasingly segregated worlds. When David Merrick planned the grand opening festivities for his city adjacent to Miami called Coral Gables, he engaged Paul Whiteman, the self-proclaimed King of Jazz, and his band to inaugurate not only a new city, but a new lifestyle where jazz replaced the daily concerts that had been played at the Royal Palm and other hotels. Gradually, the cakewalk (for which there were plenty of classes in Colored Town before World War I) also gave way to the buzzard lope, and the black bottom replaced the waltz while dancers at jook joints did the slow drag or the shimmy to the blues. The restrictions of late Victorian culture had been dislodged from the fashionable Miami and south Florida area in general, while “decent society,” black and white, continued to hold on to the myth of a genteel lifestyle.22

The cultural independence in the segregated community evolved into nightclubs and cabarets in Colored Town, far away from the tourist resorts that embraced jazz dances during the 1920s. South Florida’s jook joints provided a series of emerging subcultures with their own private spaces and non-European aesthetics. Newly arriving migrants contributed to attitudes which became part of the chaotic American life. Scented with pine resin, the North Florida jooks remained untouched for several decades. The changes to card games, drinking and dancing at the jooks arrived with the installation of Victrolas and mechanical

phonographs in the 1930s, which long before the white population called them juke boxes were referred to as “picolos” in the African American communities. These unusual “cultural contest zones” of the jooks remain a fertile ground for future studies of Florida’s multicultural past.
Bishop John Henry Hopkins' Plan

For Saving the Union and Its Possible Impact on

Abraham Lincoln

Barbara E. Mattick
Florida Bureau of Historic Preservation

By the mid-nineteenth century, the United States was caught in a battle between two ways of life: the North's industrialism and the South's agriculturalism. A major aspect of the South's culture was slavery. Although most people of the South did not own slaves, by 1850 the "peculiar institution" had become a defining element of the South's consciousness. In the North, radicals who saw slavery as a sin called for its immediate abolition, regardless of the repercussions such actions might have on the South.

At issue was the vexing problem of slavery—whether to limit it, if not abolish it, as many in the North proposed, or whether to allow it to spread to new territories, as many in the South desired. The tensions between the Northern and Southern ways of life had strained the United States since its inception, and by the mid-nineteenth century the union was nearly at the point of rupture. Henry Clay, the "Great Compromiser," rose once again to propose a series of laws that would address the needs and grievances of both the North and South, and throughout much of 1850 the halls of Congress rang with great debates over Clay's bills and the nature of the Union.

Daniel Webster, a senator from Massachusetts, spoke eloquently for the Union in his address on March 7, 1850. Near the end of his speech he raised the question of the best way to eliminate slavery from the land. He did not feel qualified to propose a plan but offered, "if any gentleman from the South shall

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propose a scheme, to be carried on by this government upon a large scale, for
the transportation of free colored people to any colony or any place in the world,
I should be quite disposed to incur almost any degree of expense to accomplish
that object." 1 He then proposed using money gained from the South's session of
public land to the federal government to assist them in settling the free colored
population of the South elsewhere: "I would return to Virginia, and through her
to the whole south [sic], the money received from the lands and territories ceded
by her to this government, for any such purpose as to remove, in whole or in
part, or in any way to diminish or deal beneficially with the free colored
population of the Southern States."2 He estimated the value of the land to be
eighty million dollars, with the possibility of reaching more than 200 million. If
Virginia and the rest of the South would do this, Webster felt the federal
government should pay whatever was necessary to accomplish the removal of
the former slaves.

William H. Seward felt that Webster's proposal to spend eighty million
dollars to remove the free colored population from the South would serve to
strengthen slavery. He said, "there is no reasonable limit to which I am not
willing to go in applying the national treasures to effect the peaceful, voluntary
removal of slavery itself."3 On July 2, 1850, Seward spoke against Clay's
omnibus bill, saying compromise could not settle the conflict over slavery:
"Slavery and Freedom are conflicting systems brought together by the Union of
the States, not neutralized, nor even harmonized. Their antagonism is radical,
and therefore perpetual. Compromise continues conflict ...."4

In Burlington, Vermont, the Bishop of the Diocese of Vermont in the
Protestant Episcopal Church, was a keen follower of these debates in Congress,
and he agreed with Seward that a compromise concerning slavery could not long
hold the Union together. He wrote his son after the passage of the Compromise
of 1850: "You must be convinced if you read the doings of congress [sic]
thoughtfully, that the agitation has not at all subsided. Nor can it subside, until
the South either adopts some scheme of abolition, or the Union is dissolved."5

1Daniel Webster, The Works of Daniel Webster (Boston: Little,
2Ibid.
3See William H. Seward, The Life of William H. Seward, Including His
Most Famous Speeches (Boston: Thayer & Eldridge, 1860).
4Ibid., 85.
5John Henry Hopkins, Jr., The Life of the Late Right Reverend John
Henry Hopkins, First Bishop of Vermont, and Seventh Presiding Bishop, By One
of His Sons (New York: F.J. Huntington and Co., 1873), 282 (hereafter cited as
Life of Hopkins).

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The Right Reverend John Henry Hopkins was born in Ireland in 1792, and migrated with his parents to the Philadelphia area in 1800. As an adult he entered the iron manufacturing business which took him to Pittsburgh. When his business failed, he turned to law and became one of the leading lawyers in Pittsburgh. He joined the Episcopal Church there, and became a member of the vestry and a lay reader. He soon felt the call to the ministry and gave up his lucrative legal practice to become a priest. He was ordained in 1824. Although he had never attended seminary, his own reading made him competent for the job. The Episcopal Church grew rapidly in Pittsburgh under Hopkins' leadership. His legal background made him an influential force at church conventions and he was almost elected Bishop of Pennsylvania, the irony of which will become apparent. He went to Boston briefly in 1831, and thereafter became the First Bishop of Vermont in 1832.6

Although from New England, Bishop Hopkins had developed a warm relationship with the South. In 1841, his son-in-law went to the Diocese of Georgia where he worked under Bishop Stephen Elliott. Later, his son-in-law went to the Diocese of Louisiana where he worked under Bishop Leonidas Polk. In 1843, Hopkins' eldest son served as the personal secretary to Elliott while the Georgia prelate was recovering from an illness. In the two years the younger Hopkins was there, he developed a father-son relationship with Elliott. In 1859, in order to raise money for his Vermont Episcopal Institute, Bishop Hopkins accepted an invitation from Bishops Elliott and Polk to assist them in designing the campus for The University of the South in Sewanee, Tennessee. They offered him $1,500 to spend six months working on the project. He spent Christmas with them "atop the Mountain" at Sewanee. Through these relationships, particularly with Bishop Elliott, who was soon to become the Presiding Bishop of the Protestant Episcopal Church of the Confederate States of America, and with Bishop Polk, who was soon to serve as General Leonidas Polk in the Army of the Confederacy, the New England bishop gained a deep appreciation for and sensitivity to the needs of the South.7

Perhaps spurred by the debates in Congress, Hopkins set his mind to developing a workable plan for the abolition of slavery. Beginning in 1850, the bishop had initiated a series of public lectures to supplement his income.8 On January 10 and 13, 1851, he presented a lecture to the Young Men's Associations in Buffalo and Lockport, New York. It was entitled "Slavery: Its Religious Sanction, Its Political Dangers, and The Best Mode of Doing It

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7Ibid., 62; Life of Hopkins, 312-15.
8Life of Hopkins, 281.
Away." Although some, including Hopkins' son, objected to a cleric's entering the realm of politics, the bishop defended his actions by stating it was his Episcopal duty to address the religious aspects of slavery, since both the pro-slavery and abolitionist camps claimed biblical grounds for their arguments. Besides that, he felt it was his duty as a citizen, "to think and speak, as an adviser, on any great topic of general interest, under the full conviction that he holds a personal share in the common welfare," clergyman or not.10

Hopkins was careful to make it clear that he was "no friend or advocate of Slavery [sic]" and had no ties to slavery. His main concern was that the institution might be abolished without taking into account the needs of the South, the best interests of the African race, and the welfare of the country. Comparing the North-South relationship to a marriage, he urged the two sides to settle their differences "in the spirit of love and wisdom," for they were linked "for better, or worse, till death us do part."11

The bishop's plan for preventing a "death us do part" situation was based on three premises: 1) the practice of enslaving the African race was not a sin (quite a stunning statement coming from a New England bishop), 2) slavery was an evil and a danger to the country and must be abolished, and 3) to abolish it in a way that would not harm the South was possible.

The first premise, that African slavery was not a sin was based on the assumption that to be a sin an action must be in violation of the law of God. This was in accordance with the New Testament (I John 3:4). Hopkins argued that as long as Southerners treated their heathen African slaves with kindness and justice, in accordance with the Gospel, they broke no biblical laws, and, in fact, the Bible expressly permitted such slavery. He cited Noah's pronouncement against the descendants of Ham (Genesis 9:25-27), and the passages concerning the slaves owned by Abraham, Isaac, and Joseph as examples of legal slavery in the Old Testament. According to the Bible, although the Israelites could enslave each other for up to seven years, heathens, such as Africans, could be held as slaves forever, from one generation to the next. Hebrew law did restrict the actions of masters to prevent abuse and oppression, but God sanctioned slavery itself.12 Slavery was well established by

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10Ibid., 3.

11Ibid., 4.

12Ibid., 7.
Jesus' time and His teachings did not even address the question. Hopkins cited the New Testament epistles of Paul to show that slavery was accepted, as demonstrated by his admonitions concerning the proper relationships of slaves to masters (1 Corinthians 7:20, Ephesians 6:5, 1 Timothy 6:1-2, and Philemon). The Bible and duly enacted state and federal constitutions provided the true "higher law." Hopkins also argued that church history upheld the lawful use of slavery, and the morality of it had not been questioned until the abolitionists had used it as a political issue.

His second premise was that the practice of enslaving the heathen, though legal and not a sin, was an evil and danger to the welfare of the nation. Because slavery was not a sin, the North had no right to require Southerners to abandon their property and change a basic part of their social structure merely to be in agreement with Northern views. Hopkins maintained that the argument for abolition must be made out of a concern for the welfare of the entire country, including the slave states, and for the well being and improvement of the African race. He pointed out that the idea that slavery was evil yet was not new, as espoused by Thomas Jefferson, John Randolph, and members of the Virginia Convention of 1832 that met after Nat Turner's insurrection of 1831. Hopkins also said that slavery was evil because it discouraged industry among slaveholders, made labor dishonorable, rendered white males vulnerable to immorality, encouraged self indulgence, and retarded social advancement.

Using data supplied by William B. Shepherd in an address to the North Carolina legislature, Hopkins showed how the slave population was rapidly increasing, and was expected to reach nine million by 1890. How could the slaveholders afford to care for so many slaves? Slavery also exhausted the soil, yet slavery was only profitable when raising cotton, rice, and sugar. If the numbers of slaves continued to increase, all blacks and whites would be forced to work on worn out land. Eventually both slave and master would be impoverished and the owners would have to let their slaves go free. Furthermore, slavery was dangerous because it always posed the imminent threat of slave insurrection. If limited to the South, that region, "in the very heart of the republic," would then have "millions of degraded and ignorant human beings with unexpected and unvalued freedom, and prepared for anything that revenge or ambition may propose." Eventually, the former slaves would have to spread over to the free states or "Negro kingdoms" like Santo Domingo would occupy the South.

13Ibid.
14Ibid., 8.
15Ibid., 11.
16Ibid., 16.
There was a need, therefore, for concessions on the part of both the North and the South: let the North concede that slavery was not a sin, but was, indeed, sanctioned by the Bible; and let the South concede that slavery was a dangerous and growing evil that threatened ruin for their own land. In short, slavery was the enemy of both the North and the South and must be eliminated.

Given acceptance of both of these concessions, how could abolition be accomplished considering first the needs of the South, second the needs of the slaves, and third the needs of Africa? Hopkins proposed a detailed plan that would meet all these requirements. The slave population in 1850 was approximately three million. Figuring the average cost of a slave to be three hundred dollars, the total cost to buy each slave's freedom would be 900 million dollars. Such a cost made immediate abolition impossible. In addition, all slaves would not be good workers if suddenly freed. Hopkins proposed the sale of public lands to raise twelve million dollars to buy the slaves who would then be sent as free men to Liberia. Under this plan 1) owners would be compensated for rather than impoverished by the loss of their slaves, 2) the growth of the free black population would not be "annoying" to whites, 3) the Negroes would be returned to Africa where God intended them to be, 4) Africa would be evangelized by the influx of former slaves who had become Christians while in bondage, and 5) blacks would not be at a disadvantage by having to live and work next to superior whites. The former slaves would be grateful and proud of their new circumstances.

With the availability of twelve million dollars a year, 40,000 slaves could be freed and sent to Liberia annually. At that rate, it would take seventy-five years to send the then three million slaves to Africa. What of the natural growth of the slave population during that time? Hopkins claimed that one and a half million would naturally die in thirty or forty years. In order to take care of the children born to slaves, he proposed that the Southern states pass a law that all slave children under the age of seven could be freed at age twenty-five, and all born after passage of the law be free at birth. Those born free to enslaved parents would be raised by the state in special schools until they could be apprenticed at age fourteen, just as pauper children were wards of the government in the Free States.17

Hopkins felt the great expense of this enterprise could be easily met by using public funds raised from the annual interest gained from the sale of public lands, as proposed by Webster and Seward. With the additional public lands gained as a result of the Mexican War, the availability of public funds was increased dramatically.18 Hopkins listed nine distinct advantages of this plan:

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17 Ibid., 12-13.
18 Ibid., 17.
1) the Southerners would be paid a fair price for their slaves, providing capital for improving their lands; they would enjoy a cessation of abolitionist badgering and the constant threat of slave revolts; and they would be assured of the prospect of prosperity, 2) the change would be gradual, 3) the real prospect of freedom would give the slaves a motive to behave well, 4) slave character would steadily improve, spurred on by hope and a desire for education, 5) the freed slaves would go to Africa where they would not be an annoyance to their former masters and where they would not fall short in comparison to whites, 6) Africa would gain free Colored States, which along with Liberia, could evangelize the whole continent, 7) those countries would provide markets for American trade, 8) relations between the North and South would be improved, and 9) the United States would be admired by the rest of the world for "so splendid and beneficent an enterprise," all at a cost that would be small compared to the expense of waging a civil war.19 Thus, Bishop Hopkins' plan would lead to a gradual emancipation, providing safety for the South, peace to the Union, freedom to the slave, and regeneration to Africa.

The day after the lecture in Lockport, six men from Buffalo wrote Hopkins asking permission to publish his lecture. Hopkins readily assented, for they indicated they hoped the pamphlet could be used to quiet the turmoil over slavery that was wrenching the nation.20 The bishop sent his published lecture to Henry Clay. According to Hopkins, Clay strongly supported his ideas and "wished that it could be read by every intelligent man throughout the country."21 Hopkins' son says his father received letters of support from Daniel Webster and Henry Clay, though according to him, they doubted "the practicability of the mode suggested for removing the evil."22 The Henry Clay Papers confirm that the "Great Compromiser" did, indeed, respond to a letter from the bishop to "express [his] great satisfaction with [Hopkins'] admirable lecture,"23 though he did go on to say:

19Ibid., 22-23.

20Ibid., 2.

21John Henry Hopkins, A Scriptural, Ecclesiastical, and Historical View of Slavery, from the Days of the Patriarch Abraham, to the Nineteenth Century, 52 (New York: W.E. Pooley & Co., 1864), 52 (hereafter cited as A Scriptural, Ecclesiastical, and Historical View of Slavery).

22Life of Hopkins, 281.

In the present excited state of the public mind, it is very difficult to say anything that would be satisfactory both at the South and at the North... I did not intend to express any opinion of my own on the power of Congress to appropriate the public domain to the purchase and emancipation of slaves. My purpose was to advert to the doubt, I might have stated the denial, of the power by others. I forbear now to examine the question, because we both agree that, if the power were uncontested, it could not be exercised in the existing state of the public mind. And, if hereafter a better condition of public feeling should arise, the power may not be controverted, or the Constitution may be amended. In the meantime what you have said on the subject may do good and can do no harm.24

Hopkins had requested permission to publish Clay's original letter to him concerning the lecture. Clay said he doubted that publishing his letter would do much good except to perhaps increase the circulation of Hopkins' lecture. Whether Hopkins published Clay's letter is not known, but it is interesting to note Clay's comments in light of what Lincoln proposed in his 1862 Message to Congress, discussed later in this study.

Bishop Hopkins gave his lecture at various places across the country. In 1857, he wrote The American Citizen: His Rights and Duties According to the Spirit of the Constitution of the United States. In this he discussed many aspects of a citizen's responsibilities in daily life, but dwelt especially on the issue of slavery. The tenth chapter was devoted to the mode of eliminating slavery. By 1857, he estimated the value of slaves to have increased to one billion dollars and introduced an elaborate scheme to pay for emancipation by direct taxation, though he still believed using money from public lands was the best source of funding.

In December 1860, some men from New York City asked Hopkins for his opinions concerning the scriptural authority for slavery and the constitutionality of secession. Unknown to him, the men were Democrats who intended to use the pamphlet for political purposes. The following January, Letter from the Right Rev. John H. Hopkins, D.D., LL.D., Bishop of Vermont on the Bible View of Slavery was published. This pamphlet left out his plan for emancipation and covered only his scriptural defenses of slavery and the question of the legality of secession. The latter opinion he left up to the Supreme Court. His views were again published, minus the emancipation plan and his discussion of secession, as The Bible View of Slavery by the American

24Ibid.
Society for Promoting National Unity in April 1861, but it was too late to avert the beginning of the Civil War. In April 1863, six Episcopal laymen from Philadelphia asked to reissue it. They had seen the pamphlet that was issued by the New York group shortly before the war and told Hopkins they felt its republication would help to correct the false teachings about slavery that had led to the war. As before, Hopkins gave his assent. This time, his work was used by Democrats who were campaigning for Judge George Washington Woodward, who was running against Andrew Gregg Curtin for the governor's seat in Pennsylvania. The election came at a critical point of the war, and would be "indicative of the bearing of the State [of Pennsylvania] toward the general government."25

Although Hopkins claimed he did not know the motives behind the request to republish his pamphlet, many other clergy in the Episcopal Church considered his apparent complicity in the use of his writings for political ends inappropriate. Furthermore, it implied that his ideas represented the views of the entire Protestant Episcopal Church.

Republicans saw a chance to take advantage of the situation, and urged the Right Reverend Alonzo Potter, the Bishop of Pennsylvania to issue a "Protest" against Hopkins. Although only 160 words long, Potter's "Protest," issued in July 1863, asserted that Hopkins' defense of slavery as it was conducted in the South was "unworthy of any servant of Jesus Christ." This rebuke from a fellow bishop was quite hurtful, and he responded to it in an 1864 A Scriptural, Ecclesiastical, and Historical View of Slavery from the Days of the Patriarch Abraham, to the Nineteenth Century addressed to the Right Rev. Alonzo Potter, D.D., Bishop of the Prot. Episcopal Church, in the Diocese of Pennsylvania. In its 353 pages covering forty-eight chapters plus seventy-nine notes in an appendix, Hopkins reprinted the text of the "Protest" and then restated his argument in defense of slavery, justifying it not only based on scripture but also on many works and commentaries from throughout church history. It was his final salvo. Bishop Potter did not reply.

Conspicuously missing from this tome was Hopkins' plan for emancipation. The question of the morality of slavery had become the main issue, and Hopkins' plan for peacefully achieving its gradual and complete abolition as outlined in 1851 and 1857 was overlooked, or perhaps once again purposely cast aside by the political forces who wanted to use his work for their own ends. By all appearances, the plan had been lost in the morass of political machinations. But had it been?

Hopkins pointed out that President Lincoln's Message to Congress in 1862 included a plan very much like his own, and that others had given lectures similar to his. Hopkins said:

I do not know that either the President or Mr. [Elihu] Burritt derived their views from me, but I believe that I was the first writer who published them, although I have since seen it stated that Mr. [Rufus] King, of New York, and General Harrison had proposed a similar scheme. My own conclusions, however, were derived from a combination of the act of the British Parliament, when they emancipated the slaves in Jamaica, with principles of the American Colonization Society. The main difficulty was to show that the measure was practicable as well as expedient. And certain it is, that if our leading states men had been willing, it might have been successfully inaugurated and ultimately accomplished at less than half the sum which our mournful war has already cost the nation.  

A review of Lincoln's speeches and papers reveals that the "Great Emancipator" had long been a supporter of the idea of colonization of free blacks. In his eulogy for Henry Clay, delivered on July 6, 1852, he spoke approvingly of Clay's involvement with the American Colonization Society, which had been founded in 1816.  

On June 26, 1857, in a speech given in Springfield, Illinois, Lincoln again discussed the merits of colonization, contrasting the Republican view against slavery with that of the proslavery Democrats. In his first debate with Stephen A. Douglas in Ottawa, Illinois, a year later, he discussed the benefits of gradual emancipation, putting the responsibility for initiating it on the South.  

Once Lincoln became president, he was able to do far more toward actually implementing a colonization plan. In his Annual Message to Congress on December 3, 1861, he recommended that colonization be used to deal with slaves who were taken from their owners under "An Act to Confiscate Property Used for Insurrectionary Purposes." These freed slaves were to be dependent on the United States government. States could also enact such a law and become

26 A Scriptural, Ecclesiastical, and Historical View of Slavery, 52.
28 Ibid., III, 15.
caretakers of the freed slaves. He proposed that Congress provide for colonizing free Negroes somewhere where the climate would be suitable for them. He also suggested allowing those who were already free to colonize too. Such a plan could require the expenditure of funds to obtain a territory to be settled, thus raising the possibility of federal funds being used.29

Lincoln invited the representatives and senators of the Border States to the White House on July 12, 1862 to appeal to them to reconsider a plea he had made for gradual emancipation the previous March. This was another idea he had raised in 1858 during the Lincoln-Douglas debates. He now fervently supported gradual emancipation as one of the best means of bringing the Civil War to a close. Emancipating the slaves in the Border States, he felt, would dash any hopes the Confederates may still have that those states would join the Confederacy. Maintaining slavery would merely prolong the war, one the South was bound to lose eventually. With that loss, the Border States, too, would lose their slaves. Would not a much better course be to adopt gradual emancipation with compensation, thus ending the war rather than to lose all at the end of a long, expensive war? On July 14, a majority response opposed the idea of compensated emancipated, saying the plan would be too expensive and that any type of emancipation would solidify the spirit of rebellion in the Confederacy, would encourage the border states to secede, and would not lessen the pressure for emancipation by proclamation.30

Turning back to the colonization as a way to solve the "Negro problem," Lincoln invited a group of leading free blacks to the White House to advise them that Congress had appropriated money to assist in colonization. He was blunt, pointing out the supposed differences between whites and blacks, saying it would be better for both races if the blacks lived elsewhere. He mentioned Liberia as a possible place for settlement, but pointed out the advantages a colony in Central America could offer: a suitable climate, abundant natural resources, proximity to the United States, and great possibilities for work and trade. He asked them to seriously consider the proposal but refrained from pressuring them to decide quickly. A few did respond favorably, and a colony of 500 was prepared to go to the Isthmus of Chiriqui [Panama]. The idea was abandoned, however, when Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica protested and hinted at armed resistance to the colonists if they tried to settle there.31 In addition to foreign opposition, the plan would have been stymied by the lack of enthusiasm for colonization held

29 Ibid., V, 28.
30 Ibid., 319
31 Ibid., 370-75.
by most blacks. Despite their state of bondage, their years in the United States had made them Americans, and they did not want to live elsewhere.  

In his preliminary emancipation proclamation, Lincoln again offered to all slave states, if no longer in rebellion, compensation for the immediate or gradual abolition of slavery to be followed by colonization. Lincoln's annual Message to Congress on December 1, 1862, however, was the most detailed presentation of all these proposals. He suggested three amendments to the Constitution. Broadly stated, they were: 1) Every state where slavery existed, which abolished slavery before January 1, 1900, would receive compensation based on interest bearing bonds of the United States for each slave shown to have been in the state according to the eighth (1860) census; the bonds were to be delivered to the state either in installments or all at once at the time of abolishment, 2) all slaves who had gained freedom during the war would remain forever free, and their owners, if they had not been disloyal, would be compensated, and 3) Congress would be authorized to appropriate money for colonization of free colored persons.

Lincoln clearly believed that slavery was the major cause of the Civil War and the reason for its continuance. His efforts, therefore, were focused on a way to end slavery peaceably. His thoughts on how to achieve this were remarkably similar to those of Bishop Hopkins. In elaborating on the reasoning behind the proposed articles, he pointed out that, because of the great diversity in views concerning slavery, compromise was necessary, but it should be a compromise among friends not enemies: "By mutual concession we should harmonize." The length of time, thirty-seven years (until January 1, 1900), was to allow for a gradual, rather than sudden change. It would allow the older generations, those most ingrained with the old ideas about slavery, to die and not have to be concerned with the changes. Its delay would also save the slaves from being suddenly thrust into a state of destitution. The plan allowed each state to choose whether to abolish slavery immediately or at any time up to 1900. It also provided for compensation to slaveholders for the loss of their property, for as others, including Hopkins, had pointed out, the South was not any more responsible for the introduction of slavery than the North, and all shared the responsibility of perpetuating it by their use of cotton and sugar propagated using slave labor. The cost of compensation and restoration of the Union would be much less than the cost of war. Although the expense of compensating emancipation would be huge, it would be gradual, and by 1900

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33Basler, V, 434
34Ibid., 530.
the population of the country would have increased three fold to 100 million, thus reducing the burden for each person as there would be more to share the cost.

In summing up his address, Lincoln said, "The plan would, I am confident, secure peace more speedily, and maintain it more permanently, than can be done by force alone; while all it would cost, considering amounts, and manner of payment, and times of payment, would be easier paid than will be the additional cost of war, if we rely solely upon force. It is much—very much—that it would cost not blood at all."\textsuperscript{35} By adopting these measures as constitutional amendments, this would require the acceptance of three-fourths of the states (necessarily including seven of the then Slave States). Their acceptance would "end the struggle now, and save the Union forever."\textsuperscript{36} Lincoln concluded by saying "In giving freedom to the slave, we assure freedom to the free. . . . We shall nobly save, or meanly lose, the last best hope of earth. Other means may succeed; this could not fail. The way is plain, peaceful, generous, just—a way which, if followed, the world will forever applaud, and God must forever bless."\textsuperscript{37}

These stirring words closely follow the ideas put forth by Bishop Hopkins in his lecture in Buffalo on January 10, 1851, nearly thought for thought.\textsuperscript{38} Although Lincoln may have read Hopkins' pamphlet, \textit{The American Citizen}, in 1857, he was not yet in a position to implement its ideas. By 1862, when as President he gave his Message to Congress, the war was well underway; blood had been spilled. One can only speculate that if the entire scope of Bishop Hopkins' ideas for resolving the problem of slavery had been considered as strenuously as were his biblical arguments in defense of the "peculiar institution," the tragic Civil War could have been averted. As a bishop, he was more successful. Given the early date of Hopkins' lecture, the availability of his later publications, and the great similarity of his words to those of Lincoln, it seems likely that the Great Emancipator adopted many of his ideas from the comparatively obscure prelate from Vermont.

John Henry Hopkins became the Presiding Bishop of the Protestant Episcopal Church of America in 1865. Although his plan to prevent the dissolution of the Union never came to fruition, his Southern sympathies enabled him to bring the Protestant Episcopal Church of the Confederate States of America back into the fold after the Civil War and restore unity to the Episcopal Church of the United States of America.

\textsuperscript{35}Ibid., 536.
\textsuperscript{36}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{37}Ibid., 536-37.
\textsuperscript{38}Slavery, 22-23.
Earl Warren and the Internment of

Japanese Americans in the World War II Era

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Earl Warren expresses in his 1977 memoirs that he deeply regrets the removal order against the Japanese Americans in 1942 and his own actions advocating it. He says: "Whenever I thought of the innocent little children who were torn from their homes, school friends, and congenial surroundings, I was conscience-stricken." Today, reflecting his own thoughts on this subject, few people dispute that what happened to the Japanese Americans on the West Coast in 1942 was a mistake and regrettable. Indeed, such repentance became official in 1988, when the federal government enacted the Civil Liberties Act of 1988, which constituted a national apology and offered the surviving Japanese Americans financial compensation. Despite such symbolic gesture by the U.S. government, the issue remains unsettled.

Most historians agree that the internment of the Japanese Americans was primarily the outcome of racial hatred, prejudice, and fear, all of which peaked in early 1941 with Japan's naval assault on Pearl Harbor. Racism, one of the key factors, seems to provide the most convincing explanation for what happened. However, an integrated understanding of the economic, political, and social conditions in California in 1942, make it possible to reach a broader conclusion: that the politics and economics of California, not racism, were the root causes of the incident.

The purpose of this paper is to explore this possibility with a particular focus on Earl Warren and his role in this incident. Although Warren was one of the key figures in the incident, and probably the most influential, his role has not been fully

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examined in this issue. Considering his status as the attorney general of California in 1942, and later as governor of California and the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, his role must be understood if there is to be a proper examination of this issue.

In February 1942, about 110,000 Japanese Americans were forced to leave their homes to live in the internment camps. This was carried out under Executive Order No. 9066. Military necessity was the official justification for that order. Was there really such a military necessity existing in California? The answer was "yes" to Earl Warren. In his testimony in the Congressional Hearing on the issue of National Defense Migration, held on February 21, 1942, Warren expressed why he thought the internment was a military necessity. According to Warren, it was necessary because the fifth column activities on the West Coast by the Japanese-Americans were imminent, "ticking like a time bomb."

Warren raised two circumstantial evidences to support his assertion. First, he pointed out that there were always some Japanese Americans living in the vicinity of every military and transporation facility in California, whether it was the landing beach, air field, railroad, highway, powerhouse, power-line, oil field, or gas pipeline operations. Although Warren admitted that some of the Japanese-Americans happened to live near those facilities, it was too much for him to believe it was a coincidence alone. Second, there was the cohesive nature of the Japanese Americans. This was reflected for women through a large number of Japanese organizations in California. Warren argued that every Japanese American in California, in one way or another, belonged to Japanese-oriented organizations. Under these organizations, the Japanese-Americans in California functioned as one closely united body. He felt that their lifestyle had been controlled not by the organizations in California but by the Japanese government, which had a close linkage to these organizations. According to Warren, such linkage provided for an ideal circumstance for those organizations to be used for the fifth column activities for Japan.

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5The fifth column activities are defined as the following: The secret deployment of local (native) military or paramilitary formations for the purpose of overthrowing the government, or a group of revolutionaries seeking to abolish the government in power with outside assistance (e.g., rendered by another state). See Walter J. Raymond, Dictionary of Politics (Lawrenceville, VA: Brunswick Publishing Company, 1978), 219.

6U.S. Select Committee Investigation on National Defense Migration, 10974.
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In order to support this argument, Warren cited incidents in which the Japanese organizations helped the war effort of the Japanese government in Southeast Asia in the late 1930s and early 1940s. Warren quoted one article from a local Japanese newspaper in California, which read, “July 6, 1941, the Japanese Veterans Association of America, in its sixty sixth meeting, reported the collection of $5,968.60, making a total of -829,440.34 collected and transmitted to Japan for use of the military services.”

Despite the circumstantial evidence raised by Warren, there had not been any sign of sabotage or espionage carried out by Japanese Americans. A few cases were reported, but only by white Americans who worked as spies for the Japanese government. Warren was not, however, set back. Instead, he came up with an erroneous rational. He argued that the lack of such a sign was, indeed, a strong indication that the fifth column activities were “timed” just like Pearl Harbor. If there is anything which indicates how little bi-cultural understanding existed between the ethnic minorities and white Americans in California in 1942, perhaps nothing does this more than Warren’s past statement.

Most of Warren’s anti-Japanese-American arguments were based on mere speculations. For example, Warren failed to provide any evidence in support of his claim that it was a sign of potential sabotage that the Japanese were living in the vicinity of important military facilities. In many cases, Japanese Americans who lived near those facilities had moved there years before the United States-Japan relationship deteriorated. Also, they had moved to those locations for economic reasons. For example, the Japanese fishing and canny workers lived near the waterfront and the canneries out of necessity. Furthermore, as Sandra Takahata points out in her study, “The Case of Korematsu v. United States: Could it be Justified Today?,” the Italians on the West Coast were heavily concentrated in the fishing industry and lived in strategically more important coastal areas than the Japanese, particularly in the San Francisco Bay area. One has to wonder why Warren did not make the same charge against the Italians.

Another claim by Warren, that the “cohesive nature” of the Japanese Americans was a sign of fifth-column activity, was also based on speculation. His rationale for the claim was that, confining themselves in their own community, the Japanese-Americans were incapable of assimilating into the U.S. society; therefore, their loyalty to United States was questionable. Warren admitted that not all Japanese Americans were disloyal to the United States. He pointed out, however, that it was

7Ibid.
impossible to determine who were loyal, or disloyal because of the cohesive and secluded nature of the Japanese culture. Concerning the question of incarcerating the Japanese-Americans without giving them a chance to prove their loyalty or disloyalty, Warren also argued that the war situation required whatever action necessary to secure the West Coast. There simply was not enough time to conduct loyalty tests. The answer to this problem had to be mass internment.

Warren’s arguments can be easily refuted. First, like the Japanese-Americans, the Italians also showed the “cohesive nature” of their ethnicity. In many cases they exceeded the Japanese-Americans in numbers. Just like Japanese children who were sent back to Japan to be educated, Italian children made trips to Italy. Being active and important members of the community, Italian consuls engaged in Fascist propaganda to support Mussolini’s domestic and foreign policies. Unlike the Japanese who were born in the United States and became American citizens—almost all of them—more than half of the Italians did not become American citizens, indicating a lower degree of Americanization than the Japanese. Why then did Warren single out the Japanese?

If, as Warren said, promptness was essential in dealing with the internment, why was the internment process conducted in such a slow manner? Considering that most private law firms in 1942 in California were still open, loyalty tests, if they had been held, would have taken only a few months to complete. Deciding where the camps were to be, and building those camp facilities, was time consuming; when the settlement of the internees ended, it was already a year in the works.

Among these discrepancies and contradictions in Warren’s reasoning, the most troubling aspect was his suggestion that “ethnicity” ultimately determined loyalty. If Warren was correct, then we have to ask: “Which ethnic group does one have to belong to in order to be loyal to the United States?” Is it English, Italian, or German? More fundamentally, what does it mean to be Americanized? Warren seems to have forgotten that all these questions do not make much sense in a country like the United States where ethnicity is not supposed to be a factor in deciding who is an American.

Furthermore, it is wrong to assume that a person disloyal to his or her nation is likely to take an offensive action against it. Disloyalty is not a crime against a nation. Loyalty is a matter of personal choice and expression about how one feels toward his or her nation. The Constitution does not say that one has to be loyal to

\[10\text{Ibid., 162} \]
\[11\text{Ibid.} \]

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America in order to be a citizen. This aspect of constitutionality, however, was ignored by Warren and his generation.

It is hard to understand why Warren, Attorney General of California and later Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, failed to foresee the constitutional ramification of the incarceration of the Japanese-Americans. In his 1966 article, “The Bill of Rights and the Military,” Warren says: “The consequence of the limitation under which the Court must sometimes operate in this area [taking an action because of military necessity without clear constitutional justification] is that other agencies of government bear the primary responsibility for determining whether the specific actions they are taking are consonant with our Constitution.”13 Here, Warren clearly concludes that even action taken for legitimate military reasons must be done within a constitutional framework.

In 1942, Warren did not exhibit the same belief. Instead, he asserted that the military had the right, morally, and legally, to take protective measures—even if they were unconstitutional—that were necessary to ensure the security of a nation.14 The Constitution does allow the military to function under martial law, allowing it to take a necessary action which might be unconstitutional in wartime, but such action must be supported by specific and concrete evidences. Warren seemed to ignore this principle in 1941.

One has to ask: Did Warren and the people in California advocate the internment of the Japanese-Americans because they believed that the circumstantial evidence against them required military action? Or, did they have other motivations which compelled them to do what they did? The answer to the latter question seems to be “yes.” Incarcerating the Japanese-Americans for military reasons did not make sense when the Italians should have been considered to be a larger threat to the nation. Furthermore, as Warren insisted, a justification for the internment of the Japanese Americans was a military necessity because there was “no other way.” It now becomes possible to infer that the internment might have occurred for other than military reasons.

It is also questionable that the advocacy of the internment of Japanese-Americans for military reasons by General John J. DeWitt represented the view of the Army in general. Prior to Executive Order No. 9066, Army staff officers assessed the West Coast situation and recommended not to incarcerate the Japanese because they thought it was constitutionally unjustifiable. Their recommendation was ignored.

14 U.S. Select Committee Investigation on National Defense Migration, 11019.
Although DeWitt, as one of the strongest advocate for the incarceration of the Japanese-Americans, had strong influence on President Roosevelt’s decision to issue such an order, it is possible to conclude that Executive Order No. 9066 was actually issued without reflecting the thoughts of the military advisors on internment.

Most historians agree that the incarceration of the Japanese-Americans took place primarily because of racism. The high level of anti-Japanese feeling in 1942 in California drove the most powerful group (the white Americans) in California to the edge of reality and deprived them of their sense of rationality and constitutionality. This paranoia produced racial bigotry and misconduct against the Japanese-Americans. Racism as a cause of the incarceration now becomes plausible. However, a closer examination of the political and economic situations of California in 1942 makes racism only one of a number of reasons for this historical event.

In examining the political background of the internment, the demography of California in the early 1940s is revealing. In 1940, the number of Japanese-Americans living in the United States (mostly in California, 120,000) was far less than that of the German or the Italians.\(^\text{15}\) What this indicates is that the Germans and the Italians had far greater political influence than the Japanese, particularly in those areas where they had considerable voting power.\(^\text{16}\) Attempts to take any actions against the Germans or the Italians by politicians would have resulted in a loss of those groups’ political support. This aspect alone may explain why the Japanese-Americans were singled out for internment. By targeting Japanese-Americans, politicians could keep the political support from Germans and Italians intact, and at the same time enlarge their political constituency by playing on the anti-Japanese mood in California. As such, California politicians seem to be the group that most strongly supported the internment of Japanese Americans.

Where precisely does Earl Warren fit into this picture? In a March 1942 article in *Fortune*, Warren was described as a leading candidate for the California governor’s election.\(^\text{17}\) Although some historians still debate Warren’s motivation to run for governor, Warren himself seemed to have been strongly interested in the position. According to his close friend, Richard Graves, Warren had been an active candidate as early as 1939.\(^\text{18}\) As expected, Warren was elected governor in 1942, but it was a small step for him. Many historians today agree that Warren’s ultimate career goal was not becoming the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court, but rather becoming President of the United States. Warren was once quoted as saying,

\[^{15}\text{Takahata, “The Case of Korematsu v. United States,” 154.}\]
\[^{16}\text{Ibid.}\]
\[^{17}\text{“West Coast Politics,” Fortune 21, no. 3 (1940): 140.}\]
\[^{18}\text{G. Edward White, Earl Warren: A Public Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 79.}\]
“Far from dreaming of the Court, I have never considered it [becoming Chief Justice]. If anything, I have dreamed of being President.”¹⁹ In 1953, when Eisenhower nominated him to be Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Warren accepted the nomination, not because of his desire to be Chief Justice but because of his realization that, if Eisenhower ran for reelection in 1956, he would not have a chance at the nomination.²⁰ In this context, it is difficult to dispute Warren’s political ambition and also difficult to argue that Warren was politically motivated for his advocacy for the internment. Warren’s political ambition certainly explains some of his actions concerning the internment.

By 1944, the United States was dominating the war. The initial reason for the internment, to prevent the enemy from sabotaging the West Coast, was becoming moot, eliminating excuses to keep the Japanese-Americans in the camps. Liberal voices demanding the release of Japanese-Americans from the camps began to be heard. Warren, however, stood against these voices of reason. He argued that any release of Japanese-Americans during the war could create fifth-column activities by Japanese Americans.

Warren was persistent in his ill treatment of the Japanese Americans. If Warren truly thought that the internment of the Japanese-Americans was a militarily necessity, how would he explain his persistence to keep the Japanese-Americans from the West Coast when it was no longer a military necessity? Despite Warren’s persistence, the number of the Japanese Americans in the camps actually decreased as the war ended. The number peaked in the winter of 1943, and thereafter gradually declined.²¹ It took, however, more than four years before all the internees were allowed to leave the camps, an outcome of the political pressure to oppose the early release movement by people like Earl Warren.

The political setting and the economy of California in 1942 also suggest that the internment was not solely racially motivated. In his article, “The Japanese American Cases--A Disaster,” Eugene V. Rostow points out that, after the expulsion of the Japanese-Americans from the West Coast, vested interests (particularly in an economic sense) were empowered at the expense of the Japanese Americans.²² As Rostow’s article indicates, by 1942 in California the Japanese Americans had become successful in the economic arena, particularly in agriculture. There was much to be gained by their removal.

Unlike most of the other immigrant groups, mostly concentrated in the cities, Japanese immigrants were concentrated more in the rural area of the West Coast.

²⁰Ibid.
²¹Daniels, *Prisoners Without Trial*, 72.
More than half of all the employed Japanese males worked in agriculture, forestry, or fishing.\textsuperscript{23} The United States census of 1940 counted more than 6,000 Japanese-operated farms on the Pacific Coast; Issei farmers (immigrants from Japan) tilled more than 250,000 acres and owned real property to a much greater degree than the general American population.\textsuperscript{24} Their high yield agriculture sharply contrasted with the resource-intensive, low-yield American agriculture. Their success in agriculture, particularly in growing fruits and vegetables, was notable and made measurable contributions to the increase of the population on the Pacific Coast (from 2.4 million in 1900 to 9.7 million in 1940).\textsuperscript{25}

On the West Coast, where agriculture was still the dominant industry in the early 1940s, the success of the Japanese-Americans in agriculture contributed to the economic growth of the area but at the same time created racial tension. It was rather natural, then, that the white farmers felt threatened by such competition from the “outsiders.”

Considering this economic situation in California in 1942, it is possible to understand why Californians supported the internment of Japanese-Americans, resisted their return, and hoped to keep them out of the West Coast permanently. The internment allowed locals to profit from the farms, businesses, and professional capital left by the Japanese-Americans.

In \textit{Prisoners Without Trial}, Roger Daniels makes a convincing argument to refute military necessity for the incarceration of the Japanese-Americans. He points out that the Japanese-Americans in Hawaii did not experience the same fate as the Japanese-Americans of California. According to Daniels, one third of the Hawaiian population in 1942 was of Japanese ethnicity compared to the Japanese Americans in California, which constituted only two percent of the population. Furthermore, Hawaii, already weakened by Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor, was far more vulnerable to future attack than California because of its vicinity to Japan.\textsuperscript{26} One wonders, then, why only a fraction of Japanese-Americans in Hawaii were incarcerated while almost all Japanese-American in California was displaced.

This discrepancy is simple to explain in economic and political frameworks. While possible to make up the loss of two percent of the work force caused by the incarceration of the Japanese-Americans in California with local residents or cheap Mexican laborers, it would have been impossible and devastating to the Hawaiian economy and politically foolish to cut off and replace one third of Hawaii’s work

\textsuperscript{23}Daniels, \textit{Prisoners Without Trial}, 16.
\textsuperscript{24}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{25}Ibid., 17.
\textsuperscript{26}Ibid., 47-48.
force. Two different economic and political settings in Hawaii and California produced two different outcomes involving the fate of a single ethnic group.

This economic dispute concerning Asian ethnic groups was not a phenomenon seen only in the early 1940s. From the beginning of the history of immigration from East Asia, there has been antagonism against Asian ethnic groups. Starting with the Chinese immigrants in the mid-19th century, and followed by Japanese immigrants in the late 19th century and early 20th century, the immigrants from East Asia were portrayed as a threat to the local economy. Along with providing cheap labor, they quickly adjusted themselves into the new environment, became competitive in a relatively short time, and even dominated certain industries as seen in the case of the Japanese success in agriculture. There was a term used by Nativists to describe economic competition from the East Asian immigrants—Yellow Peril.

Yellow Peril expressed antagonism and racism against particular ethnic groups: the Chinese and Japanese. It was not, however, the outcome of racism but rather the fear of economic competition which led to the enactment of racist policies against East Asians. What happened in California in 1942 was not the result of racial hatred, but the result of an accumulated ill feeling of the people of California against the Japanese successful immigrants. When the Pacific War began, it provided the residents of California with a long-awaited opportunity to get rid of the economic competition, the Yellow Peril.27 Along with many others, Earl Warren supported this cause to facilitate a fulfillment of his political ambitions by going along with the general mood of the white, voting public.

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\text{27} \text{Ibid., 23.}
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La Guardia’s 1937 Criticism of Nazi Germany:

An International Issue and a Domestic Uproar

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One of the many letters that New York’s mayor Fiorello La Guardia received in March 1937 stated in part, “There are thousands of German-Americans in New York that are damnside better citizens than you and your communistic Jew friends. You and your anti-Nazi and anti-Fascist affiliations are a menace to loyal Christian Americans.” It was signed “A Real American."

American historians who deal with Jewish history generally consider the 1930s and the early 1940s the worst period of anti-Semitism in U.S. history. Evidence supports this analysis. Numerous surveys done in the 1930s indicated the extremely high degree of anti-Semitism compared to surveys done in other years. Media attacks on Jews varied from the subtle, in such places as Time Magazine, to the obviously vitriolic assertions of Father Coughlin’s radio presentations and publications. In addition, quotas limiting the number of Jews attending prestigious universities became common in the 1930s. Hostility to Jewish immigration was conveyed through the U.S. Congress, which refused to adjust procedures to save Jews fleeing Nazi Germany, and through the State Department, which also carried out an overt policy of hindering and preventing Jewish immigration throughout the Nazi years. Other indications of anti-Semitism during these years included restrictions preventing Jews from living in

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1Office of the Mayor, Subject Files, Hitler, 1933-1945, Box 3546, File 7 (hereafter referred to as the La Guardia Papers). The author wishes to thank Madeline Carr and Kevin Shirley for their research assistance.

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certain residential neighborhoods, staying at specific hotels, being appointed to
certain corporate boards, serving on many university faculties, and joining
numerous business associations.²

One explanation for the increase of American anti-Semitism in the 1930s
was that unemployment and other problems related to the depression increased
insecurities, and frustrated vulnerable groups. This may not have been the whole
story. Germany’s adoption of anti-Semitism as a government policy significantly
impacted Europe. The example of a great power, the utility of blaming problems
on the Jewish scapegoat, the enrichment of officials who could plunder vulnerable
Jews, the desire to placate the aggressive German dictator, and the massive
German Anti-Semitic propaganda targeting Europe all stimulated the growth of
anti-Jewish policies in the United States.

Although the U.S. was geographically removed and ideologically
resistant to Nazi threats and influence, Germany nevertheless spread its anti-
Semitic invective to American shores. The increased American hostility toward
Jews in the 1930s may, in part, be explained by the impact Nazi propaganda had
on parts of American society. One Nazi attempt to influence Americans can be
seen in an incident that grew out of Fiorello La Guardia’s impromptu remark
criticizing Nazi Germany and Chancellor Adolf Hitler. What followed was a
German propaganda initiative directed ostensibly against La Guardia, but which
included considerable overt, anti-Semitic rhetoric. Before the incident ended, the
American press had taken various positions, German-Americans became involved,
and the U. S. State Department formally apologized to Nazi Germany.

The initial incident, which stimulated an American anti-Semitic
campaign under the auspices of German Minister of Propaganda Paul Joseph
Goeibels, occurred on March 3, 1937. The women’s division of the American
Jewish Congress was holding its second annual luncheon at the Astor Hotel in
New York City. Michael Williams, editor of The Commonweal, a Roman Catholic
weekly, and Mayor La Guardia addressed the luncheon. As Commonweal later
explained, when Williams rose to speak, he decided to appeal to New York’s
mayor to support a pavilion dedicated to “illustrating the struggle for freedom of
thought and action through the centuries” to be housed at the 1939 New York
World’s Fair. Mayor La Guardia endorsed the pavilion, but stated that he would

²Of the considerable literature dealing with anti-Semitism in the U.S., the
definitive historical work is Leonard Dinnerstein, Antisemitism in America (New
add a "chamber of horrors" and would "have in it a figure of that brown-shirted fanatic who is menacing the peace of the world." La Guardia also referred to Germany under Adolf Hitler as morally bankrupt and declared, "it is time for America to call attention of it to the world."  

This impromptu statement would have largely gone unnoticed except for the vitriolic response of the Nazi government and the official German media. Both used La Guardia's remark to unleash a torrent of anti-Semitic abuse and attacks on him. Hans Thomsen, Counselor of the German Embassy in Washington, D.C., filed an official protest with the State Department. While Thomsen protested in Washington, the German government-controlled press lashed out at La Guardia. Der Angriff, the official publication of the Nazi Labor Front, edited by Goebbels himself, led the attack. It accused the Protestant La Guardia, whom it described as "a Jewish ruffian," of protecting gangsters who were "able to pillage and kidnap with more impunity than ever before." Der Angriff concluded, "We are downright sorry for New York, which is punished not only with 3,000,000 Jews, but also with a La Guardia." Thus, from the beginning of the incident, Goebbels falsely described the mayor as Jewish and then attacked Jews in general.

The Boersen Zeitung, a leading German financial publication, lectured the American government, "what does it intend to do to preserve... the primitive rules of international courtesy?" The Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung complained that "this stupid abuse of a foreign head of state cannot be ignored by Washington. Therefore, we expect a suitable reprimand." The Lokal Anzeiger stated that it "is obvious that the German nation cannot tolerate this insult to the Fuhrer by a man placed in so prominent a position." Der Angriff later threatened, we "could take an interest in America that would not necessarily be pleasant... La Guardia's racial comrades had better be on watch against us." Nazi ideologist Alfred Rosenberg, in the publication he edited, Voelkischer Beobachter, wrote an article,

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4 N.Y. Times, March 5, 1937, 9; New York Herald Tribune, March 5, 1937, 10; The Literary Digest, March 20, 1937, 3.  
5 Newsweek, March 13, 1937, 16.  
“Dirty Talmud Jew Becomes Impudent.” In it, he asserted, “One thing is certain: in the well-governed United States, such a criminal as La Guardia should be made harmless—either placed in an insane asylum or in prison.” Rosenberg claimed that “Jews in Moscow... butchers of untold millions and traders in death, who speculate to gain billions... are behind this.”

The Literary Digest listed some of the names the Nazi press had called La Guardia “in one brief week”: Dirty Talmud Jew, Procurer, Master of New York gangsters, underworld character, blackmailer, Jewish lout, filthy character, well poisoner, war profiteer, impudent Jew, Jewish ruffian, lummox, pimp, King Kong, whiteslaver, boob, swamp-flower, and criminal.

Cordell Hull, U.S. Secretary of State, initially reacted to the event cautiously. Upon first hearing of La Guardia’s remarks, Hull expressed “informal regret” and promised to investigate the matter. He also announced his intention to issue a formal apology, if warranted. Hull issued an official “expression of regret” on March 5. After pointing out that “the right of freedom of speech is guaranteed by the Constitution,” Secretary Hull added that this “does not lessen the regret of the government when utterances... give offense to a government with which we have official relations.” He concluded, “I very earnestly deprecate the utterances which have thus given offense to the German government. They do not represent the attitude of this government toward the German government.”

The mayor’s office received numerous letters and telegrams reacting to La Guardia’s remarks. Fritz Kuhn, American Nazi, and National Chairman of the German American Bund, protested “against the accusations made by you at yesterday’s luncheon.” Another letter writer, who clearly accepted the Nazi interpretation of events, claimed that as “a Jew, you have a perfect right to hold your own opinion; as mayor of the largest city in this country you are abusing the office.” The National Gentile League informed the mayor that because of his “favoritism of Semites, this organization and affiliations thereof have declared a boycott against the N.Y. World’s Fair.”

There were other Americans who, while agreeing with the mayor’s

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8N.Y. Times, March 5, 1937, 9.
9Literary Digest, March 20, 1937, 3.
10N.Y. Times, March 5, 1937, 1.
11La Guardia Papers, Box 3546, File 7.
12Ibid., Box 3546, File 8.
13Ibid., Box 3546, File 7.
repugnance toward Hitler, criticized La Guardia because he was not equally hostile to Mussolini: “Why not suggest your friend Mussolini as an added attraction to the Horror’s,” one correspondent stated.14 Predominantly African-American groups, remembering the Italian invasion of Ethiopia, took a similar position: “Benito Mussolini is a greater menace to civilization than the German madman. We, the black citizens of Harlem, must brand you a hypocrite if you do not be as outspoken in the denunciation of the Italian Blackshirted butcher as you have been in your diatribe against the German Fuhrer.”15 Another put it even more succinctly, “I fully approve of what you said, but may I suggest that you failed to include another murderer, Mussolini, the rapist of the Ethiopians.”16 The Socialist leader, Norman Thomas, took the same position. He especially criticized La Guardia because the mayor had ignored Thomas’s insistence that the mayor reject an invitation to attend a benefit for the Italian Red Cross.17 Murray Baron, speaking for the Socialist Party, USA, chastised La Guardia for his failure “to express similar sentiments of opposition to Mussolini and the equally monstrous Fascist regime of Italy.”18 The Socialist Party of Hammond, Indiana, on the other hand, did not have similar reservations as it gave its unanimous support to La Guardia.19

Some main stream American elements also questioned La Guardia’s actions. The New York Herald Tribune stated that there “is no excuse for Mayor La Guardia to descend even partially to Nazi levels of taste in international intercourse.” The Herald Tribune believed that the mayor had committed, “a lapse scarcely to be condoned in an American public official.”20 Others, in letters to newspapers, criticized the mayor for comments that did nothing to “aid Neutrality.”

While such criticisms made themselves felt in the New York press, the vast majority of public response supported the mayor in his duel with the Nazis. In fact, Jewish organizations, local unions, anti-Nazi associations, African

14Ibid., Box 3546, File 7.
15Ibid., Letter from the Committee for the Restoration of Ethiopian Independence, Box 3548, File 1.
16Ibid., from James Walnut, Box 3546, File 7.
17Socialist Call, March 20, 1937 5.
18Ibid., from Murray Baron, Box 3546, File 3.
19Ibid., Box 3518, File 1.
20New York Herald Tribune, March 5, 1937.
American associations, and a German American organization communicated their support to the mayor.\(^{21}\)

By the evening of March 8, over 700 letters had arrived at Mayor La Guardia’s office. Of the 671 tabulated, 556 supported La Guardia and his remarks. La Guardia received support not only from those agreeing with his attack on Hitler, but from those who opposed Hull’s apology.\(^{22}\)

Despite this support, there was political backlash. Both Jacob A. Livingston, Republican member of the Board of Elections, and Warren B. Ashmead, Queens Republican leader, criticized La Guardia, their fellow Republican, for his remarks and called for a mayoral candidate “true” to Republican principles. In his address to the Twentyieth Assembly District Republican Club, Livingston accused La Guardia of making his “fanatic” remark in “a cheap bid for racial support and the mayor was putting the Jewish people of our city on the spot.” Livingston also guaranteed his audience that a “real 100 percent Republican” ticket would be available around which all “true” Republicans could gather. Ashmead commented, “I am for endorsing only candidates in sympathy with the Republican party.” Although Republican challenges to La Guardia’s party loyalty had been frequent throughout the mayor’s career, these had a special impact given the context and timing of the criticism.\(^ {23}\)

In the midst of the dispute, La Guardia went about the business of running his city. To the news of German protest over his remarks, La Guardia sniped, “They are absolutely right. They ought to protest. I know of no artist or designer who can adequately build, paint or carve anything that will adequately depict either the personalities of the Nazi government, Hitler himself or the type

\(^{21}\) Examples of letters and telegrams from the La Guardia Papers: from Harvey O’Connor, Vice Chairman, Anti-Nazi Federation of Pittsburgh, Box 3546, File 9; from Jacob David, President, American Palestine Jewish Legion, Box 3548, File 11; from William Pickens, Director of Branches, NAACP, Box 3549, File 2; from Ben Gold, President, Jewish People Committee for United Action Against Fascism and Anti-Semitism, Box 5548, File 4; from Otto Sattler, President of the National Committee of the German American League for Culture, Box 3548, File 2; from Eugene Grigat, Executive Secretary, Friends of Democracy, Association of Americans of German Origin, Box 3546, File 14.


\(^{23}\) *N.Y. Times*, March 11, 1937, 1.
of government he is giving.”

The Germans meanwhile broadened and intensified their attacks on La Guardia and American Jews. Julius Streicher’s Frankische Tageszeitung of Nuremberg, charged, “La Guardia apparently has said to himself, ‘I might as well go in for really big business.’ This big business is war. American armament Jews such as Morgenthau and Baruch cannot forget the period of the World War when they earned millions from the blood of 8,000,000 human beings who fell on the battlefields.” Goebbels’ Angriff continued its attacks on La Guardia while expanding its assault to the United States in general: If the United States did not control anti-Nazi rhetoric, “we will not check ourselves. American coarseness and adolescence offer enough opportunities. . . . We Germans demand that in dealing with us courtesy be employed, to which we have been accustomed for 2,000 years. This may seem strange and incomprehensible to a people who have the habit of putting their feet on the table and keeping their hats on in the room while spitting chewing gum against the opposite wall.”

Goebbels’ publication depicted the United States as a land of “gangsters and kidnappers,” which accepted the “shameless slavery of 59-cent taxi girls.” It faked a photograph of La Guardia among a group of gangsters; another of the mayor with chorus girls “assembled by the master white slaver”—actually the man in the picture was theatrical producer Billy Rose at a rehearsal; and New York State Governor Lehman pardoning a Jewish criminal. Goebbels’ newspaper described the Jewish women whom La Guardia had addressed in the speech that had begun the incident as, “women of the streets fetched in to be entertained by the procurer La Guardia.”

By the middle of March, the bitterness of German press statements and editorials drove Cordell Hull onto the offensive. Hull ordered the U.S. ambassador to Germany, William E. Dodd, to make an “emphatic comment” to the German authorities in Berlin. A “comment” as opposed to a “protest” relieved Germany from the obligation of replying to the objection. In his “comment” Dodd told the German Foreign Minister that the United States government was wholly unable

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24 Ibid., March 5, 1937; New York Herald Tribune, March 5, 1937, 1.
25 March 7, 1937, 1.
to account for such sweeping, vituperative and unfounded statements and attacks on American womanhood and institutions as those which have appeared in German newspapers. He added that the language employed was probably unparalleled in its coarse and indecent character.  

At the same time, this issue of German press attacks found its way into congressional debate. During discussion on the Neutrality Bill in the House, Edith Nourse Rogers, Representative from Massachusetts entered copies of the Angriff into the Congressional Record and argued that there existed “certain insults the United States cannot stand.”

Cordell Hull’s “emphatic comment” had some effect on the German government-controlled press. When La Guardia lashed out again at Hitler on March 15, referring to Hitler as not personally or diplomatically satisfechfachig (worthy of meeting of the field of honor), the German press remained silent. Hull had managed to curb the German press, but not the mayor from New York. Once again Germany filed a formal protest and once again Hull apologized for LaGuardia’s words. But both sides seemed weary of the battle. One final volley did occur in May 1937, but what began as an unplanned remark and had grown to international proportions, died of exhaustion. Adolph Hitler went on to justify La Guardia’s characterizations, and Fiorello La Guardia went on to another term as the mayor of New York.

Nineteen thirty-seven was an election year in the city of New York. The possibility exists that La Guardia had made his remarks in an attempt to garner the Jewish vote, as Jacob Livingston had accused. Several other prominent New York Democrats, as well as Socialist Party leaders, also made this contention as they saw La Guardia becoming stronger with every Nazi attack. The Review of Reviews speculated that La Guardia’s comments on Hitler garnered him a hundred thousand prospective Jewish votes. Time magazine questioned whether or not La Guardia’s remarks constituted an “opening campaign gun.” Time concluded that in “New York City, as any political nose-counter knows, the hooked far outnumbered the Aryan noses.” Jeremiah Mahoney, Democratic candidate for mayor in 1937 tried desperately to garner the Jewish vote. He met with the same kind of success at that endeavor as he did with the election overall: none

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31 Review of Reviews, April, 1937, 24.
32 Time, March 15, 1937, 18.
whatsoever. As Charles Burlingham so aptly put it when advising La Guardia early on in the campaign: "Jews are yours for this election."  

This was certainly not true of New York's German American population. German American organizations, with rare exceptions, vehemently attacked the mayor for his criticism of the Nazi regime. Moreover, neither the German-American press, nor German-American associations criticized any Nazi policies during their campaign against the mayor. German-American newspapers, both locally and nationally, were guarded in their official sentiments on Nazi Germany in general.

None of these newspapers in 1937 and 1938, during and shortly after the La Guardia incident, could be described as critical of Nazi Germany. The papers continued a cautious defense of Germany within the context of its news stories. The St. Louis Westliche Post editorialized that "the public can censor the [English language] press by not purchasing goods that are not advertised in the German-American press."  

The St. Paul Tagliche Volkszeitung reported on American press distortions of Nazi Germany. It editorially criticized American history textbooks as anti-German and maintained that "Germany and France are not democracies, but rather plutocracies, like the United States."  

La Guardia faced more explicit criticism from the vast majority of New York area German-American organizations than from German-American newspapers. The United German Associations (VDG) sent a telegram to the mayor insisting "that the mayor of this city ought to be the first to observe the most basic rules of international etiquette." The VDG found it "unbelievable that the mayor of an American city...should think it right to insult the top servant of a friendly nation." The organization informed the mayor its members were "outraged by your words" which "represent a serious insult to the citizens of German descent...which we are unwilling to accept." Likewise the German-American Chamber of Commerce protested to Grover A. Whalen, President of the World's Fair. The Chamber implied La Guardia's membership on the World's

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34 Ibid.

35 St. Paul Tagliche Volkszeitung, July 9, 1938, 1.

36 New Yorker Staats-Zeitung und Herold, March 5, 1937, 1; Home News, March 5, 1937, 3.
Fair executive committee endangered the success of the Fair.\textsuperscript{37} The New York division of the Steuben Society denounced La Guardia's anti-Hitler statement as "an unpardonable disservice to the country as a whole."\textsuperscript{38} It found the mayor's views "extraordinarily unpatriotic."\textsuperscript{39}

On March 6, three days after the La Guardia statement, the German-American Conference of New York announced its intention to organize a German-American political alliance to remove the mayor from political office.\textsuperscript{40} The New York \textit{Home News} claimed the Conference spoke for practically all local German-American groups. It quoted the Conference as attacking the mayor's views as "unwarranted and uncalled for" and stated that "all those affiliated with the New York German-American Conference have taken steps to present a united front in the coming election."\textsuperscript{41} The official statement of the New York German-American Conference, published in the \textit{New Yorker Staats-Zeitung und Herold}, attacked La Guardia, for "such a speech is intended to sow the seeds of racial and ethnic hatred among German-Americans and all of our German descendants."\textsuperscript{42} Numerous New York regional German-American associations, representing various interests, endorsed the attack on La Guardia. These included German-American Berugemein Schaf, German-American Sportgemeinschaft, German-American Wirtschaftsverband, New York Turnbezir, Plattdeutscher Volksfestival von New York, Verband Bayerisches Vereine of Greater New York, United German Association of New York, the United Bowlers of New York, German-American War Veterans Association of New York, and the New York Gymnastics Club.\textsuperscript{43}

La Guardia's attack on Hitler crystallized conflicting attitudes and leads to several implications and conclusions: First, it cannot be justifiably concluded that German-Americans, in general, supported Nazi Germany during the 1930s. The clientele of German-American associations and German-American newspapers constituted only a portion of the German-American population. According to a study in \textit{Fortune} magazine, the German-American press was read

\textsuperscript{38} \textit{Home News}, March 6, 1937, 5.
\textsuperscript{39} \textit{New Yorker Staats-Zeitung und Herold}, March 6, 1937, 1.
\textsuperscript{40} \textit{Ibid.}, March 6, 1937, 1.
\textsuperscript{41} \textit{Home News}, March 7, 1937, 4.
\textsuperscript{42} \textit{New Yorker Staats-Zeitung und Herold}, March 8, 1937, 1.
\textsuperscript{43} \textit{Ibid.}, March 7, 1937, 1, March 8, 1937, 1.
by one-fourth of the seven million first and second generation German-Americans in the United States. The same article concluded that about 20 percent of the German-American press, "while not exactly crusaders, are against Hitler." This appeared, however, in November of 1940 after crucial events such as Kristallnacht and the invasion of Poland had taken place.44 It also does not provide much substantial evidence for its conclusions.

It is also likely that most of the German-American association members were first and second generation Americans. In the 1920s, approximately 400,000 German immigrants entered the United States.45 These refugees from the Weimar Republic had left a country with a failing democracy, economic chaos, and organized political violence emanating from both ends of the political spectrum. To generalize from these limited groups to German-Americans nationally would be irresponsible. Judging from the La Guardia incident, many German-American institutions, however, clearly supported Nazi Germany. This support was in addition to the German American Bund, which was sometimes presented as the sole advocate for Nazi Germany among German-Americans.46

The second general conclusion is that the American press fostered the anti-Semitic, Nazi message. American English language newspapers served as enablers for hate literature communicators. The press apparently found it irresistible to avoid providing a platform for the colorful, anti-Semitic rhetoric the German media produced following La Guardia's speech. This is not to suggest an anti-Semitic intent on the part of the mainstream American media. Reproducing Nazi invective was simply good business. Although American anti-Semitism sometimes slipped in, such as Time's hooked-nose remark, German, anti-Semitic quotations usually served to highlight an article. In contrast the German-American newspapers generally reprinted all, or almost all, of the Nazi attacks on La Guardia and related issues. Usually they did not include any commentary. Overall, both the American English language press and the German-American press inadvertently provided a platform for Nazi, anti-Semitic propaganda.

The third conclusion involves the role of the U.S. State Department. In response to Nazi attacks on La Guardia, the State Department appeared weak and

apologetic. Its unusual reticence in reacting to the crude anti-American insults perpetuated by the German government-controlled press went beyond diplomatic niceties. When factoring into this scene the State Department’s opposition to Jewish immigration from Nazi Germany and Austria, which could have been included within the parameters of existing U.S. immigration quotas, the State Department’s posture toward La Guardia’s attack on “a morally bankrupt” Germany gives credence to critics who accuse the State Department of anti-Semitism during the 1930s and 1940s.

For the last conclusion, La Guardia emerged from this incident unscathed. There is no solid evidence that he created this issue to increase his Jewish political support. La Guardia held very strong beliefs regarding Nazism, which manifested themselves throughout his political career. To cite just a few examples, in 1933 he lashed out at Hitler, referring to him as a “perverted maniac.” In 1934, he called on the State Department to abrogate its Treaty of Friendship with Germany. In 1937 the mayor became vice president of the American League for the Defense of Jewish Rights, which organized an American boycott of German products imported to the United States. In 1939 La Guardia had Fritz Kuhn and the German American Bund investigated. In 1943, La Guardia actively campaigned on behalf of a plan to rescue European Jews from the death camps. 47

Fiorello La Guardia, despite pressure from various constituencies, remained loyal to his inner moral compass regarding the Hitler debate. His criticism of Hitler was not a mechanism to add a few more Jewish votes in his bid for re-election, but rather a harsh reaction to the Nazi atrocities of his era.

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Reinventing History Education

for the New Millennium

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As is the case with many states, lawmakers in Florida have been tightening their internal control over public institutions. This trend toward increased legislative oversight of school curricular measures manifested itself in a new "market-oriented" rhetoric and Mission Statement for Florida Gulf Coast University, Florida's and the nation's newest state university campus. Thus, FGCU's core values were based as much on emerging political debates as on proven pedagogy.

I created from scratch FGCU's history curriculum when I taught at the University of South Florida's Ft. Myers Campus; this experience places me in a rather unique situation to comment on the direction and quality of "future-looking" curricula. My experiences and lessons in crafting the "new millennium" history curriculum for FGCU grew initially from my reading of and response to the new school's Mission Statement. The following excerpts from the Mission Statement reflect the legislatively stimulated "forward model," which focused on

- Undergraduate education (as opposed to FGCU becoming a graduate/research institution).
- Alternative learning and teaching systems, and forward pedagogy based on television courses, computer-assisted instruction, and competency-based exams.
- Alternative teaching systems and technology designed to draw students from beyond the five-county service area and even Florida.

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Herein lay lesson number one for those of us involved in the nascent curriculum: Our task would be guided perhaps to new degrees by both political and pedagogical concepts of what new curricula and instructional delivery systems should look like.

As our work towards crafting the prototypical curriculum for the new era progressed, the University’s founding executive staff (the president, vice presidents, and the deans’ council) issued a statement of eight “Guiding Principles” to anchor the University’s development. These administratively promulgated principles (created in the absence of a faculty yet to be hired) closely reflected the legislative model and underscored the values that would come to define and link the academic units and programs to the traditional areas of the curriculum. The most significant of these “Guiding Principles” included:

- Student success is at the center of all . . . endeavors.
- Technology is a fundamental tool in achieving educational quality, efficiency and distribution.
- Connected knowing and collaborative learning (interdisciplinarity) are basic to being well-educated.

As I mused on the defining aspects of the Mission and Guiding Principles, I began to think critically about ways that the new curriculum might be enhanced and limited by these overarching charges. The paramount issue I had to contemplate was how to evaluate the extent to which students actually learn through the use of new tools and delivery methods (i.e., technology and distance-learning). In short, I had to determine the merit and utility of the “new millennium mission” within the framework of creating an entirely new, yet effective, curriculum.

Creating the prototypical History curriculum became an even greater challenge when the University elected to offer only Bachelor of Arts in Liberal Studies degrees, which required a 24-hour integrated core of interdisciplinary studies (IDS) courses in an effort to enact a new model of “connected knowing and collaborative learning.” All traditional majors like History were then reconfigured as “concentrations,” subsumed under the College’s mandatory IDS program. Given such requirements, if I were to make History (now neither a traditional major nor minor) a substantial part of the school’s curriculum, a strong case needed to be established to “connect” History to the other disciplines and to include History courses in the General Education and College of Education’s Social Studies programs.

I have long argued that the study of history is linked to all disciplines that
comprise the traditional academy. This dictum underscored much of my work as I explored ways to include History throughout the University's curricula and its distance-learning and technology-oriented courses. I developed an early agenda for inclusion of History based on the premise that rigorous lessons in historical methodology and the communicating and justifying of interpretations and conclusions would stimulate and complement the other disciplines (including the mandatory IDS track in the College of Arts and Sciences). Also, I emphasized the usefulness of diversity awareness, which would provide significant bridges to other disciplines and programmatic missions in an effort to ensure a demand for the now "non-major" of History in a broad spectrum of studies and tracks.

The use of new instructional technology and its support have sparked ongoing instructional and contractual concerns for the faculty. Some of the most common technology challenges and issues involved the mastery and implementation of computer learning, Power Point lectures, slide, map, and speeches delivery off CD ROM, email, chat groups, listserver demands, webboard groups, Internet-based research and courses, student submission of an electronic portfolio of cumulative work as a senior project, electronic syllabi, creating individual and program home pages, and the receiving of bona fide research papers and tests (i.e., academic honesty). Because it is difficult to determine authorship of papers and ownership of tests over an electronic bridge, the latter issue involved ethical as well as instructional concerns.

My experiences in creating the prototypical curriculum for the 21st century rendered even more contemplative issues regarding the use of technology for distance learning. It quickly became apparent to me that the legislative/administrative charge for a technological/distance-learning revolution at FGCU would also require new approaches to teaching itself. History teachers would now have to "retool" and become masters of ever-changing technologies. How would these teachers stay in sync with the latest technology and computer trends, especially regarding effective instruction? Would teaching in cyberspace also require instructors to develop delayed time and critical interface skills not honed in the traditional classroom? I harbored major concerns about the classroom active participation and "inspiration factor" being transformed or lost through cyber-linkages. Moreover, how would teachers deal with sensitive issues like race, gender, and multiculturalism over an electronic chasm? Even with the best intentions, were we embarking prematurely on a "grand experiment" that might not culminate as expected?

A number of other questions arose when considering the implications of my curricular experiment. For example, the question of equitable work loads
quickly surfaced. Indeed, faculty members across the curriculum expressed concerns about the demanding nature of Internet and other electronic-based courses because of the potential for exponential preparation time and teacher-student contact hours. Early in the developmental process, faculty also became aware of the ownership issue of faculty-generated videotaped and online courses. Would the person who created the course and its instructional support materials or the institution own the rights to new distance-learning courses? Was it possible that the institution would appropriate ownership and replace the professor who developed the course with another instructor (perhaps an adjunct) who would serve as the "teacher of record"? These issues carried significant implications regarding quality of instruction and contractual expectations.

A final concern has been the persistent debate over whether or not distance learning itself is resulting in measurable student learning in social studies disciplines like History. As I perused the existing literature and explored relevant Internet sites for the latest studies on distance learning, it became apparent to me that many critics of technology and distance learning warned of the limitations and drawbacks of offering "virtual" classes to distant populations through telecommunications technology. Indeed, my research suggested that it would be foolhardy to neglect the issue of how distance learning might reshape both the students' and educators' expectations for quality instruction. With the lack of longitudinal studies to provide data on these emerging modes of education, was it possible that distance learning would not meet academic needs in a truly effective fashion? Simply stated, would it be possible to assume falsely that all students were prepared for and eager to use distance-learning courses. Just as the faculty had limited input into the Guiding Principles, I now wondered whether the lack of student input into the distance-learning mandate would later prove a critical error.

In sum, the argument that distance learning courses do, indeed, deliver the desired learning goals for complex disciplines like those in the social studies has proved to be problematic. Frequently, technology glitches impede the learning process, but just as frequently students and professors suffer a sort of instructional dissonance because of the absence of spontaneous and group interaction. An even thornier issue is whether or not all disciplines even lend themselves to distance learning. How would History teachers, for example, address the development of research and writing skills over distance? How would teachers train students and conduct apprenticeships in the precise methodology of History via electronic delivery methods of instruction and evaluation? How would History teachers ensure that their standards for distance-learning classes would be universally accepted by other institutions, graduate schools, and accrediting agencies? Conversely, would
distance learning suppress student individuality and the traditional professor/student mentoring relationship outside the course, deemed by dedicated teachers as so essential to the production of gifted graduates? Obviously, learning can, and does, take place over time and space, but is that learning universal and is it qualitative and interactive enough for a rigorous discipline like History? How, then, would the increased demands for and use of distance technology in higher education affect the quality of instruction? How, then, would I address these concerns given my political and pedagogical charge to implement the curriculum whether or not I agreed with its premise? These are the root issues I had to address as I created and later implemented FGCU's distance-learning curriculum in History.

Concluding Remarks

My background with the development of the new History Program at FGCU suggest that educators should carefully consider the aforementioned issues in this paper. In particular, critically exploring the following issues may be a felicitous exercise for colleagues at all levels of instruction who are either considering implementing or facing directives to reshape their own curricula: 1) recognizing that technology and distance learning will be an inevitable growth sector of our profession, 2) recognizing that technology and distance learning have both potential benefits and limits regarding effective education, 3) recognizing that orthodox modes of instruction are now under attack as never before and that dedicated teachers must now “retool” in sometimes disturbing ways, 4) recognizing that the political and administrative demands of the new millennium will require that History teachers “sell” their discipline to other curricula and programs in unprecedented ways, 5) recognizing that the goals of the new History curriculum must demonstrate “connectedness” (relevance) to other courses and curricula, 6) recognizing that History as an integral part of the social sciences must be seen as a cornerstone to cultural diversity awareness and of community linkages, and, finally, 7) implementing all of these changes while ensuring the intellectual integrity of the program within the imperatives of the larger political, academic, and student-consumer constituencies.

There is little doubt that higher education is now aggressively embracing distance technology, but there are yet many issues regarding its development and use that remain to be settled. How teachers of History resolve these issues may not be the question; rather, the question may actually be: How do teachers resolve their philosophical compunctions regarding the use of distance technology given their ironclad mandate to implement it?
References


