Selected Proceedings of the Florida Conference of Historians

Annual Meeting
March 3-5, 1994
Panama City, Florida

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Selected Annual Proceedings of the

Florida Conference of Historians
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FLORIDA CONFERENCE OF HISTORIANS

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LETTER FROM THE PAST PRESIDENT

This year's meeting of the Florida Conference of Historians was a very successful one. Most of the credit goes to the local arrangements made by Virginia York and Herb McGuire of Gulf Coast Community College. All of our members are grateful for their hard work.

Clearly the highlight of the meeting was Professor George Brown Tindall's presentation, "Natives and Newcomers: Ethnic Southerners and Southern Ethiics." His insight into southern immigrants and his sly humor by themselves made attending the conference worthwhile.

I would also like to express our organization's gratitude to J. Clarke of Jacksonville University for undertaking the thankless task of editing our Selected Annual Proceedings.

Finally, a sad note: the announcement at the conference of the death of Professor Tom Campbell of Florida State University. Dr. Campbell was one of the founding fathers of the Florida Conference of Historians. His enthusiasm and dedication to the organization will be sorely missed.

Wayne Watters  
St. Johns River Community College

LETTER FROM THE EDITOR

It is with great pleasure that the Florida Conference of Historians offers the second volume of our Selected Annual Proceedings. I believe this year's fare demonstrates the wide-ranging interests of the FCH's membership. We fully anticipate that in the coming years we will increase the number, variety, and quality of included articles.

I would like to add that two fine presentations, one by Thomas Dye, "Rosewood, A Testimony of Surviving Witnesses" and the other by John Dunn, "Polish Cavalry 1939, Fact and Fiction From the September Campaign" are not included in the present volume. The two authors have molded their oral presentations into articles which have been accepted for publication in other journals. Our loss is their gain.

Any project such as putting together this volume would be impossible to complete without the cooperation of many. I would like to thank Eric Thomas, Craig Buettger, Mariko Clarke, Jack Tyner, Kay Jones, and Joe Walter for their able assistance. Jacksonville University is also to be thanked for the generous offer of its facilities in producing this volume.

We are looking forward to meeting next year at St. Petersburg Community College in Clearwater, Florida.

J. Clarke  
Jacksonville University
FLORIDA CONFERENCE OF HISTORIANS
1994 ANNUAL PROGRAM
GULF COAST COMMUNITY COLLEGE
PANAMA CITY, FLORIDA

HOSTED BY
VIRGINIA YORK AND HERB McGUIRE
GULF COAST COMMUNITY COLLEGE

THURSDAY March 3
7:30-8:00 pm Registration
8:00-9:00 pm Hospitality Hour
Ramada Inn, Panama City, FL

FRIDAY March 4
7:45-8:15 am Continental breakfast and late registration
8:15 am Welcome
Dr. Robert L. McSpadden
President, Gulf Coast Community College

SESSION ONE
8:30-9:45 am

ISRAEL AND THE THIRD WORLD: RELATIONS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
CHAIR: Carrie Nelle Moye, Gulf Coast Community College

1. "Israel and Ethiopia: From the Cold War to Eritrea's Independence"
   Michael B. Bishku, University of North Florida
2. "Israel and China's Road to Rapprochement"
   Jacob Abadi, Pace University

AFRICAN AMERICANS: VICTORIES AND RESPONSE TO DEFEAT
CHAIR: Mark Goldman, Tallahassee Community College

1. "African American Newspaper Reaction to Italy's Invasion of Ethiopia"
   Abel Bartley, Florida State University

PLENARY SESSION
10:00-10:50 am

"Natives and Newcomers: Ethnic Southerners and Southern Ethnics"
George Tindall, Professor Emeritus, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

SESSION TWO
11:00 am-12:30 pm

IMPACT OF WOMEN OVER THE CENTURIES
CHAIR: Will Benedicks, Tallahassee Community College

1. "Women in Monasticism in the Early Middle Ages"
   Jennifer Linn Hamilton, Florida State University
2. "Henry Howard vs. the Misogynists: The Issue of Female Sovereignty in the Sixteenth Century England"
   David Mock, Tallahassee Community College
3. "World War II: Military Women Photographers and Their Photographs"
   Pat Mathews, Florida State University

CIVIL WAR AND FLORIDA
CHAIR: Neil Betten, Florida State University

1. "The Governor and the Gun Boat, a Civil War Incident"
   Peter Doherty, Florida State University
2. "Everybody is Tired of This War, Desertion Among Confederate Troops in Florida"
   Jessica Slavin, Florida State University
3. "Black Mobility in Florida in the Decades Following the Civil War"
   Christopher E. Linsin, Florida State University

LUNCH
12:30-1:30 pm

SESSION THREE
1:30 - 3:30 pm

WORLD WAR II
CHAIR: Paul Strait, Florida State University
1. "Italy and Plan Barbarossa"
   J. Clarke, Jacksonville University
2. "Polish Cavalry 1939, Fact and Fiction From the September Campaign"
   John Dunn, Florida State University
3. "The SS Economic Administration and the German War Economy 1939 to 1945"
   Boyd Murphee, Florida State University
4. "Zone of Destiny: German Strategy Against Allied Convoys in the Arctic Theater, 1942-1943"
   Stanley Carpenter, Florida State University
5. "Uniqueness of the Liberty Ships"
   Peggy Pelt, Gulf Coast Community College

IDEOLOGY AND SETTLEMENT
CHAIR: Edward Keuchel, Florida State University
1. "The Cross Florida Barge Canal, a long History of Controversy"
   Adam Ritchin, Florida State University
   Erik Gross, Florida State University

PLENARY - STUDENT UNION AUDITORIUM
3:45 - 4:45

"Russia Today: An American Professor Teaching in Voronezh and Gorlovka"
   Owen Farley, Pensacola Junior College

BANQUET
5:00
Presidential Remarks and Business Meeting

SATURDAY, March 5
8:00 - 8:30    Continental Breakfast

SESSION FOUR
8:30 - 10:00

VIOLENCE AND CONFLICT IN THE SUNSHINE
CHAIR: Neil Betten, Florida State University
1. "Rosewood, A Testimony of Surviving Witnesses"
   Thomas Dye, Florida State University
2. "The 1968 Teacher's Strike in Florida Revisited"
   Mike Makowski, Florida State University

SESSION FIVE
10:15 - 11:30

CUBAN MIGRATIONS TO THE UNITED STATES
CHAIR: Owen Farley, Pensacola Junior College
1. "Cuban Migration to the United States, 1899-1910"
   by Melissa Soldani, Florida State University
2. "The Cuban Children's Migration"
   by Alisha Otero, Florida State University
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
CHAIR: Herb McGuire, Gulf Coast Community College
1. "Beauty and Science: Aesthetic Impulse in Scientific Progress"
   Richard Baldwin Gulf Coast Community College and Florida State University
2. "The Engineer in Medieval Siege Warfare: The Case for the Common Man"
   Jason Maddox, Central Florida University

SELECTED PAPERS

KEYNOTE ADDRESS
Natives and Newcomers: Ethnic Southerners and Southern Ethnicities
   by George B. Tindall, Kenan Professor Emeritus, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
   p. 1

Women in Monasticism in the Early Middle Ages
   by Jennifer Linn Hamilton, Florida State University
   p. 18

Henry Howard vs. the Misogynists: The Issue of Female Sovereignty in the Sixteenth Century England
   by David Mock, Tallahassee Community College
   p. 34

The Governor and the Gun Boat: A Civil War Incident
   by Peter Doherty, Florida State University
   p. 45

Black Mobility in Florida in the Decades Following the Civil War
   by Christopher E. Linsin, Florida State University
   p. 58

Italy and Plan Barbarossa
   by J. Clarke, Jacksonville University
   p. 81

The SS Economic Administration and the German War Economy 1939 to 1945
   by Boyd Murphree, Florida State University
   p. 104
KEYNOTE ADDRESS

NATIVES AND NEWCOMERS:
ETHNIC SOUTHERNERS AND SOUTHERN ETHNICS

George B. Tindall
Kenan Professor Emeritus
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

Stephen Potter, the British humorist, the guru of "gamesmanship and "one-upmanship," once set forth an easy way to confound almost any general statement. The beauty of the formula, he said, was its "deadly simplicity." Whenever somebody utters a broad pronouncement, you pause for effect and then respond thoughtfully, "Yes, but not in the South." It happens that when he wrote that, he had reference to Italy, not to America. Still whether you are talking about the Mezzogiorno, the Midi, or the American Sunbelt, you can count on the South to be different, more often than not.1

One of the many ways in which the American South has differed has been in the homogeneity of its population. Southerners of whatever color were and still are native Americans. Not that it was always so. One of the ways in which the colonial South differed was that it had a polyglot mixture of American Indians of many tribes and tongues, whites from many parts of western Europe, and blacks from many parts of western Africa.

As late as 1809, David Ramsay could write in his History of South Carolina:
So many and so various have been the sources from which Carolina has derived her population, that a

considerable period must elapse, before the people amalgamate into a mass possessing an uniform national character.2

Now, however, a considerable period has elapsed during which, for two centuries after the American Revolution, few immigrants were drawn to the South, and native Southerners evolved into what amounted to a new ethnic group. There were proportionately about as many foreign-born in Southern cities as in Northern, but the rural South had few—the Texas Germans being the largest rural group. After the Civil War southern states actively promoted immigration, but with only spotty results. And in the twentieth century, Southerners more and more shared the opinions of other Americans that the time had come to close the gates.

Ethnicity, therefore, long seemed an unlikely topic for historians of the South. I approached the subject by the back door, so to speak. Twenty years ago, casting about for a timely topic for a presidential address to the Southern Historical Association, I hit upon the fashion of the "new ethnicity" in the 1970s, a rediscovery of "roots," as Alex Haley was soon to put it in his epic of black Southerners. The new ethnicity celebrated diversity in reaction to pressures for conformity in American life.3

It slowly dawned on me that Southerners, white and black, were outsiders in ways similar to later immigrant groups. Sociologists Lewis Killin and John Reed in recent books had made the analogy to ethnic groups, and back in 1938 journalist Jonathan Daniels had written that "being a Southerner is like being a Jew."4 And, indeed, perhaps more needs to be written about the similarity of the minds and emotions of the Jew, the Irishman, the Southerner, and, perhaps, the Pole, as a basis for the better understanding of each of them and of them all.5

If there had been any place where the American melting pot worked, I suggested in my address, it was in the South where two melting pots, white and black, bubbled away side by side. "However surprising it may sound at first," I said, "the function of melting pots is to create new ethnic groups. Everybody has a melting pot in his past."

As yet, however, it was much less apparent that, even in the South, the 1970s were becoming The Decade of the Ethnics in ways unforeseen. While old ethnic groups renewed self-awareness, new ethnic groups were rising from floods of newcomers, mainly Asian or Hispanic in origin.

It now seems likely that the twentieth century, which began with a record decade of immigration, 1901-1910, will end with another record decade in 1991-2000. In fact, if one could count undocumented immigrants, a new record may have been sent in the 1980s. During the decade 1981-1990,

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legal immigrants numbered 7.3 million, not far short of the 8.7 million who came in 1901-1910. It is not unthinkable that enough illegals arrived in the 1980s to make up the difference.6

In the 1920s the National Origins Laws closed the Golden Door to America to all but a trickle. The quotas set then favored the oldest European stock, but still left the gates open to newcomers from the Americas.7

In the late 1930s, the exclusionary laws remained unchanged. The plight of refugees from dictatorship and war was acknowledged chiefly in President Roosevelt’s directive that the consular service grant them “the most humane and favorable treatment under the law.” But the story since World War II has been the gradual reopening of the gates. It would be tedious to detail all the changes in legislation since then, so I won’t take time on that here.8

The newest immigrants are coming from different origins than before, mainly Asia and Latin America, and they are going to different destinations than before, more than ever to

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the West and the South, changing a pattern that had prevailed for nearly two centuries after the 1770s.

Like most others, I gathered what was happening only slowly, from observation more than systematic evidence. Universities in the Raleigh-Durham-Chapel Hill Triangle have long harbored a more diverse community than most of the surrounding region, so the changes there were less startling than in other places.

As one frequent visitor from Japan described it, (I’m quoting here from Yoshimitsu Ide, who holds a degree from the University of Florida at Gainesville):

The Raleigh-Durham-Chapel Hill area is a microcosm of American politics. In the political arena, very liberal Democrats compete with very conservative Republicans. . . . The area offers a startling contrast between traditional and post-industrial America. Vestiges of the ante-bellum Southern aristocracy exist beside high-technology industries. Here the foreigner can observe ‘rednecks’ as well as ‘Yuppies.’ Here is a window into both America’s past and its future.9

The first sign of a new and fruitful relationship came in the fall of 1968 when I returned from a Fulbright Professorship in Vienna to find a Japanese professor of American History in my seminar. Six years later another appeared, and since 1974 there has been almost a yearly visit of one or more Japanese professors or students pursuing Southern history or literature.

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9Hajimu Sasaki to Eric J. Gangloff, July 31, 1987. Letter from a professor of English at Tohoku University, Sendai, Japan, to the associate executive director of the Japan-United States Friendship Commission, Tokyo, restating opinions expressed by Yoshimitsu Ide, professor of history at Tokyo Women’s University. Copy in possession of author.
The population has become more diverse with the growth of the Research Triangle Park (founded 1955)—the name signifying the three major universities in the area.\(^{10}\) The park has not been the only destination of immigrants to North Carolina. So many Vietnamese refugees gravitated to the site of Fort Bragg and Pope Air Force base that the nearby town of Fayetteville got the new name of "Fayettenam." One Mexican student in Chapel Hill recently engaged in a research project of interviewing Mexican women in Montgomery County of North Carolina where numbers of Mexicans (many of them illegal immigrants) have been recruited to work in hosiery mills—in the "rent-a-slave" program, as some locals called it.\(^{11}\) And many of the immigrants, of course, have been farm laborers.

Not everybody found the population growth in the Triangle an unmixed blessing. It ran prices up, brought crowding, traffic jams, a noisier airport. But the growing population also brought a new diversity to the culture and cuisine of the Triangle. One can easily find restaurants specializing in Chinese, Japanese, Vietnamese, French, Italian, Indian, Eastern European, Moroccan, Mexican, and other cuisines. Down-home cooking did not vanish, however. It flourished, to some degree, as an exotic treat for newcomers. One Chapel Hill restaurant invited them to "Put a little South in your mouth."

Foreign investment is all over the Southeast, not just in the Triangle. Kirkpatrick Sale's book, Power Shift (1975), which popularized the term Sunbelt, was quickly translated into Japanese and seems to explain Japanese interest in the region for investment in recent years.\(^ {12}\) Much of the foreign investment is also European: British, German, French, Dutch, Italian, Swiss. Conspicuous examples may be found along the route between my home in North Carolina and my birthplace in upstate South Carolina.

This is the belt which newsman Jonathan Daniels, in his book A Southerner Discovers the South (1938), called "Gold Avenue" because of the wealth derived from the textile mills which had sprung up along the route of the Southern Railway. The same belt is now traversed by I-85, sometimes called the "Strassenbahn," and is seeing "a collision of cultures that economists say is one version of the future."\(^ {13}\) They might better have said of the present.

A BMW assembly plant at Greer, South Carolina, will be the next and probably the biggest along that stretch. Michelin’s North American headquarters is already there, along with industries which make "everything from soccer balls (Umbro) to toner for fax machines (Mita) to ballpoint pens (Bic) to fibers (Hoechst)."\(^ {14}\) Greenville, South Carolina, my old home town, has a private French-language school. Spartanburg used to have one of the best German delicatessens


around. It has now been replaced by a Mexican restaurant, maybe some kind of sign of the times.

The new distribution of newcomers has been dramatic. The Southern states as defined by the Census included in their 1940 population less the 5.5 percent of all foreign born in the United States, approximately the same as in 1900. As late as 1960, the South accounted for only 9 percent of the total foreign born, but by 1990 the South’s share had risen to 23.2 percent. The share of foreign born, however, still did not equal the region’s 34.4 percent of total population. And the foreign born still accounted for only 5 percent of the regional population, well short of their 7.9 percent of national population. And that, in turn, is little more than half the 14.6 percent of foreign born in 1910, on the eve of World War I.¹⁵

Not all new ethnics come from abroad. The South, long a seedbed of population for the nation, has seen a reversal also in that pattern. More people, both native and foreign, have moved into the region than out of it in the last three decades.

One of the fast growing new ethnic groups, in fact, is Yankees. During the 1970s and 1980s, the South gained 4 million and the West 2.3 million domestic migrants, while the Northeast and Midwest were losing ground.¹⁶ Since the mid-1960s, moreover, the South has had a net gain in the migration of blacks, more entering or reentering the South than leaving.¹⁷

Of course, the newcomers have had more impact in some places than in others. The heaviest concentrations of Hispanic population within the South are along the southernmost rim. In 1990 Texas numbered 3.5 million and Florida 1.5, but six more states numbered at least 100,000 each: Louisiana, Alabama, Georgia, North Carolina, Virginia, and Maryland.

And so it goes also with Asians. A number of Vietnamese were drawn to Versailles, Louisiana, which became maybe the most intensely Vietnamese community in the country, if not the largest. These formed a portion of about 12,000 Vietnamese who had settled around greater New Orleans, drawn to a congenial climate not unlike Southeast Asia’s.¹⁸ Versailles residents in effect combined into one the three fishing villages southeast of Saigon from which most of them came. About 40 percent of them in 1988 already owned their own homes, but the newcomers had trouble with biased neighbors. Several got death threats amid rumors that missing pets had gone into Vietnamese stews. Another complaint, more likely based on fact, was about the pungent fish they hung out to dry.

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There is a fast growing literature on the newest immigration to the South. Most of it is in scattered articles, but some has been gathered in books. In 1988 one group of historians published a collection of essays which surveyed important aspects of the new developments, with useful footnotes and a bibliographic essay which make it an essential starting place for study of the subject. Edited by Randall M. Miller and George E. Pozzetta, the volume has an inspired title, *Shades of the Sunbelt*, linked to a more pedestrian subtitle, *Essays on Ethnicity, Race, and the Urban South.*

One limitation of the book, or maybe its strength, is the emphasis on Florida. At least it avoids obsession with Miami, although it includes an excellent piece by Raymond Mohl on the "ethnic caldron" of the city's politics. Not that Miami is unimportant, but that it is a special case. The city, in fact, much of South Florida, used to be "America's Last Frontier," before Alaska claimed that title, and was built and settled in this century by Yankees and was never really part of either the Old or the New South. Over fifty years ago, when Jona-

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21Daniels, *A Southerner Discovers the South*, 313.

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an versions of French and such rarities as Finnish and Romanian. Asians numbered only a little over 3 percent of the foreign-born in 1990, but they were mostly among the very recently arrived.

One cannot easily generalize about the Latino population at large. It includes numbers of Puerto Ricans, who as citizens do not get counted as immigrants. It includes Tejanos whose roots in the land go deeper than those of the "Anglos," an established population that, in San Antonio especially, exercised political clout before the turn of the century and now does once again.23 "We never crossed a border," they say, "the border crossed us."24

Cuban migrants (along with Asians) have tended to be more middle class and educated than Mexicans, in fact more so than the native population. Mexican newcomers have been more commonly unskilled. More recently they have been joined by refugees from civil war and poverty in Central America: Salvadoran, Nicaraguan, and so forth. Migrants from the Caribbean add to the mix.25

Obviously, then, one new frontier for Southern historians now is the role of ethnic diversity in the region—more than just that represented by black and white. The ethnic have been here all along, if in limited numbers until recently, as I noted in 1973:

a few reminders of forgotten Spaniards and Frenchmen, some Mexican-Americans renamed Chicanos, some Cuban cigar-makers in Tampa and Ybor City and the more recent Cuban refugees, some German counties out in Texas, Cajuns up the bayous, Italians in New Orleans, Hungarians over in Tangipahoa Parish, a scattering of Czechs, Dutch, Ukrainians, and in Mississippi, even Chinese. Jews are visible, if scarce, in most localities; politicians in Charleston used to reckon with Irish and Germans; and there are those enclaves of mixed-blood Lumbees, Tuscaroras, 'Brass Ankles,' Melungeons, and Turks, not to mention remnants of Cherokees, Catawbas, Creeks, and Seminoles.26

What, then, might history suggest we expect from the growing numbers and variety of domestic and foreign newcomers? Reactions to migration have a strong tendency to repeat themselves.

Foremost among them is the fear and suspicion of strangers in the land. The dread of cultural conquest seems ingrained, no matter how ill founded. And, to be sure, one early Southerner, at least, did get it right. Chief Powhatan told Captain John Smith of the many "who do informe me


your coming is not for trade, but to invade my people and possess my country." 27

But John Smith's successors kept getting it wrong. Benjamin Franklin, for instance, wanted to know: "Why should Pennsylvania, founded by the English, become a colony of Aliens, who will shortly be so numerous as to Germanize us instead of our Anglifying them. . . ?" 28 The outsiders may be domestic migrants too. On cars around the Triangle area one sees imitation state licenses inscribed "Native" and bumper stickers that say: "We don't care how they do it in New York." Any day we may see graffiti that say: "Yankee Go Home."

In some cases black and white natives have united in their fear of losing jobs and business to newcomers, although others argue that immigrants have added more than they have taken from the economy. It does seem reasonable to assume that those who have shown the initiative and know-how to make the move are likely on average to be bright and ambitious. By common repute Asian immigrants have been the highest achievers in both enterprise and education. Which makes them all the more hateful to some people. A study of Vietnamese refugees in North Carolina, for instance, shows that employers invariably praise their habits of diligence. This may be the result of an ingrained work ethic, more Confucian than Protestant in its roots.

While there is a high degree of xenophobia among blacks, on occasion black leaders have made common cause politically with Latinos rather than fight over the crumbs from the table. For the most part, in the South and elsewhere, the foreign-born follow a time-honored habit of voting for the traditional party of "outsiders," the Democrats. Cuban newcomers, however, and refugees from Marxist movements elsewhere have been the great exceptions. They have tended toward the Republicans, whom they have perceived as tougher on Communists.

It has been interesting to see black leaders who have finally made it politically then being forced to cope with an ethnic politics such as Northern cities have had for years. Not long ago, then Mayor Andrew Young of Atlanta described the poor veterinary service at the Atlanta Zoo as being like Korean medicine—only to face a storm of protest from a Korean community of about 15,000. It took quick footwork to explain that he had in mind the kind of handicaps American surgeons worked under in the television program M*A*S*H. 29

Demands for English as an official language parallel the campaign which occurred over a century ago to forbid German-language schools in the Middle West. Miami was the birthplace in the early 1970s of the latter-day English Only effort. When the North Carolina Legislature took up the subject, one of my colleagues put the matter in perspective. He wanted to know: "What's the matter with the way we been talkin'?"

The most likely outcome will be an old pattern described years ago by historian Marcus Lee Hansen: second-generation


29 Ronald H. Bayor, "Race, Ethnicity, and Political Change in the Urban South," in Miller and Pozzetta, Shades of the Sunbelt, 131.
Americans reject the old language and culture in order to be accepted as American, then the third generation desperately tries to recover its heritage. Hansen called it "the almost universal phenomenon that what the son wishes to forget the grandson wishes to remember." But language is not so easily reclaimed as, say, folk dancing. Hansen even cited Gone With the Wind as an example of the third-generation phenomenon, written by a grand-daughter of the Confederacy.\textsuperscript{30}

American experience so far has been to keep chucking out the rich feast of languages that immigrants bring in, along with those the earliest inhabitants invented here. The problem is just the opposite of what the English-only people fear. We risk not losing English; we risk losing all those other languages.

A study by the Hispanic Policy Development Project showed that in 1986 already 42.7 percent of the Hispanics were bilingual and preferred English, but 55.9 percent of those under twenty years old preferred English. In fact English was already the mother tongue—the first language learned—of 30 percent of the Hispanics.\textsuperscript{31}

My colleague, anthropologist James L. Peacock, III, has remarked on how quickly quite diverse ethnic groups have assimilated not only English but Southern accents. Students from Korea and India, for instance, who spent their teen-age years in small North Carolina towns and talk like natives of the same places. The phenomenon of assimilation to regional patterns has long been noted on the part of ethnic groups with deeper roots in the South. Moreover, to change is not necessarily to lose a distinctive identity, but often to enrich it through syncretic combinations, as with Jewish Southerners whose roots go back into the colonial era, or Afro-Catholics, or Japanese war brides whose worldview has been found to combine Southern evangelical and Japanese Buddhist themes.\textsuperscript{32} Living cultures do not resist change forever.

All along a few historians have been paying attention to the elements of ethnic diversity in the South. In recent years there has been a growing interest. It may be an accident rather than evidence of a trend, but The Journal of American Ethnic History, published by the Immigration History Society, is edited in the South at Georgia Institute of Technology by Ronald H. Bayor, who himself has pursued research on ethnic groups in Atlanta and other Southern cities.

Historians of immigration and ethnicity have led the way, but historians of the South can no longer assume, as most have done, that the subject is outside their purview. Now, just over 200 years after the birth of the Cotton Belt and 100 years after the birth of the New South, the conviction grows that the region is at a new conjuncture in its history. One thing seems already clear about the post-New South. The shades of the Sunbelt will no longer be a simple matter of black and white. They will span a much broader spectrum of color.

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\textsuperscript{32}James L. Peacock, III, "Multiple Cultures in the South," typescript draft proposal for a symposium on The Multicultural South, which took place at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Apr. 8, 1989. Typescript, 1989, in possession of the author.
IDEAL VS. REALITY
THE ROLE OF WOMEN IN
EARLY MEDIEVAL MONASTICISM

Jennifer Linn Hamilton
Gulf Coast Community College

When Saint Augustine of Hippo concluded that the Church as a whole could not meet the call of perfection because of its constant dealings with the sinful world, he placed that burden of perfection on the monastic community. He did so with the understanding that monasteries, as the bastions for those holy persons called to be the representatives on earth of God's perfect family in heaven, would be separate from the carnal world. Although, to a certain extent, monastic communities in the early Middle Ages followed this ideal of separation, even the earliest rules written for monasteries provided for dealings with the outside world. For example, Benedict of Nursia reminded monks to perform the Opus Dei even when far from the confines of the monastery.¹ The lives of various female saints indicate that these women also spent time away from the cloister.² Apparently, the ideal, as espoused by early Church Fathers like Augustine, differed from the reality of the early Middle Ages, which found nuns and monks entangled in the workings of the world.


For the most part, the reality of the lives of nuns and monks rested in their emulation of Christ: feeding the multitudes, healing the sick, and performing miracles. The imitatio Christi, coupled with the notion that nuns and monks were God's representatives on earth, compelled monastics to take on the role of intercessor, and this was primarily how and why they interacted with the world. In these interactions, nuns and monks performed similar duties: they went into neighboring communities to heal the sick; they sought relief for their communities from kings; and they housed guests within their monastic communities and provided food for their visitors. Ties of kinship and secular endowments to monasteries also served to draw the cloistered into contact with the outside world.

And yet, monastic rules vividly reveal differing expectations between the ways nuns and monks were to relate to the world beyond the monastery's walls. Primarily it was the degree to which these rules expected holy persons to be separate from the world that created this difference; for the most part, they required nuns to stay inside the cloister, while monks, after taking a few necessary precautions, could leave their communities.

The strict cloistering of nuns grew out of women's struggles in the first Christian centuries to find their niche within an increasingly institutionalized Christianity, dominated by a male hierarchy that patterned itself after Roman social customs. Effectively cut off from positions of importance and authority in the newly formed Church because of their gender, many women chose a celibate life and claimed specialness through their virginity that, at once, fueled both admiration and fear in the male clergy. If women were going to set themselves apart through their virginity and the powers it entailed, Church Fathers reasoned that they should be separated from a society which could harm that virginity. Nuns were
precious to the Church as conduits of salvation, because their virginity allowed them to function as mediators between sinful man and God. The Church Father turned heretic, Tertullian, was the first to propose that virgins were, indeed, the brides of Christ, a notion that would find great support from both women and men in the centuries to come.\(^3\) In this relationship to Christ which guided her connection with the world, the nun found both confining and liberating: confining because she was bound by the monastic strictures of cloistering and liberating because she found a unique way to express her spirituality through a closeness with Christ.

The dichotomy between the sexes, illustrated in their respective monastic rules, was most fully depicted in the simple image of a room with a door. Caesarius of Arles expected his nuns to shun rooms with doors leading to the outside world. He wrote that a nun "must never, up to the time of her death, go out of the monastery, nor into the basilica, where there is a door."\(^4\) He did not mince words. The door, whether opened or closed, presented a threat to the nun’s sanctity. Although St. Augustine allowed his nuns to open the door to the world, he issued a warning:

When you go abroad, walk together, when you have arrived at the place to which you were going, stop together. In walking, in standing, in your costume, in all your movements, let there be nothing that could rouse passion in anyone, but let all accord with your sacred character. If your eyes glance at anyone, let them rest upon no one, for you are not forbidden to


look at men when you go out, but to desire them or to wish to be desired by them. \(\ldots\) Do not claim to have chaste minds if you have unchaste eyes, because the unchaste eye is the messenger of the unchaste heart. \(\ldots\)\(^5\)

For Augustine, the danger was present within the nun and also in the outside world. The Church Father expected his nuns to travel in groups, ostensibly to support each other from falling prey to the delights of the sinful world. Additionally, he expected them to avoid inflaming the passions of those they met.

Compare Augustine’s command with Benedict’s rule governing monks sent on a journey:

Let brethren who are to be sent on a journey commend themselves to the prayers of all the brethren and of the abbot; and always at the last prayer of the Work of God let there be a commemoration of all absent brethren. When brethren return from a journey, let them on the day they return, at the end of each canonical hour of the Work of God, lie prostrate on the floor of the oratory and ask the prayers of all on account of any faults that may have surprised them on the road. \(\ldots\)\(^6\)

Benedict’s rule holds no mandate for monks to travel in groups or for monks to watch their movements to avoid arousing passion. The oblique reference to faults the monks might succumb to on their journey could refer to anything from eating meat to cursing a stubbed toe, or, perhaps, to


feelings of lust. The point is that Benedict’s rule does not warn that chastity could be lost through the concupiscence of the eyes, nor that the monk’s mere appearance might inflame a woman.

Most rules for women, not just Caesarius’ and Augustine’s, provide a stark contrast to Benedict’s mild cautions. Donatus of Besancon, for example, expressed concern about the lusty stares of nuns who might come into contact with men. Leander of Seville, too, advocated strict cloistering for nuns and warned of the concupiscence of the eyes. Monastic rules indicate that the nun’s power, her virginity, could be placed in danger through the weakness of her womanly, and therefore sensual, nature coming into contact with the outside world.

In essence, the differing expectations for nuns and monks were based on how the early Church viewed women. For the most part, churchmen either saw women as the Virgin Mary in need of protection, or as Eve, the temptress who lays in wait to seduce the unsuspecting man. For most churchmen, there was a greater concern with the latter; therefore, they wanted to press for tight cloistering of nuns because of the damage that women could do to the devout man. Gregory the Great’s “Life of St. Benedict” depicts how the author of the Benedictine rule barely escaped defeat by desire, when he recalled the vision of a woman he once had seen:

before he realized it his emotions were carrying him away. Almost overcome in the struggle, he was on the point of abandoning the lonely wilderness when suddenly with the help of God’s grace he came to himself. He then noticed a thick patch of nettles and briars next to him. Throwing his garment aside he flung himself into the sharp thorns and stinging nettles. There he rolled and tossed until his whole body was in pain and covered with blood. Yet, once he had conquered pleasure through suffering, his torn and bleeding skin served to drain the poison of temptation from his body.

If the mere memory of a woman from long ago could nearly bring down a spiritual giant, a lesser holy man must have lived in dread of coming face-to-face with a living, breathing female.

The monastic warnings against nuns and monks meeting together usually contained the message that such meetings could lead to the spiritual downfall of either of the holy persons. The fault, of course, was the nun’s, because, despite her attempts at perfection, she could not rid herself of Eve’s taint. Fructuosus of Braga wrote:

It was through a woman that a serpent, that is, the devil, trapped our first parent... we must watch

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7Donatus of Besancon’s “Rule for Nuns” was composed by piecing together existing rules, such as those of Benedict, Caesarius, and Augustine. His rule, therefore, has many familiar commandments, including one dealing with lusty stares. In Chapter Fifty he wrote:

Let none of that concupiscence of the eyes arise in you by the devil’s instigation of men lest you be said to have a shameful mind since you have shameless eyes. For shameless eyes are the messengers of a shameless mind.

See McNamara and Halborg, Ordeal of Community: The Rule of Donatus of Besancon (unpublished manuscript, used with permission of Halborg).


and constantly pray . . . to avoid allowing our senses to be captivated by such enticements. Fructuosus commanded his monks to avoid meetings with nuns. Such a meeting would cause the "arrow of death" to penetrate the heart, and paradise would be lost. The seriousness of this rule is revealed in the earthly punishment that Fructuosus meted out to transgressors: the first offense brought public flogging with one hundred blows; the second carried the added weight of prison; and the third offense meant dismissal from the community.

Because the nun's nature as Eve always lurked inside, she presented a threat to herself and others; therefore, the nun must be contained within the convent's walls. On the one hand, then, women, even nuns, were lusty objects who could bring down the best of holy men. On the other hand, however, they were the Church's treasures, the brides of Christ.

Virginity was something a nun could possess, therefore it was something she could lose. Jerome, in the late fourth century wrote a letter to Eustochium detailing how carefully she must preserve her virginity from a number of different "thieves." In the letter, he cautioned that, although God can do all things, He cannot raise up a virgin after she has fallen. He has power, indeed, to free her from the penalty, but He has no power to crown one who has been corrupted.

Jerome even warned that virginity might be lost merely by thinking unchaste thoughts. But the greatest threat, Jerome indicated, was the physical loss of virginity through contact with the world. These sentiments were echoed in the monastic rules for nuns which followed in later centuries. Caesarius forbade his nuns from leaving the cloister; he wanted, in Jerome's words, no "foolish virgins." Cloistering was, in part then, an outgrowth of the perceived dangers of society. If a nun could lose her virginity, as Jerome indicated, through impure thoughts, then she must be kept from those things which could inspire such reflections.

Clearly, thus, nuns were expected to lead a different life. Their status as conduits to Heaven made them prized possessions of the Church in need of safeguarding behind convent walls. But, the earthly nature of woman caused much concern for the Church Fathers, too. And so, these two seemingly incompatible natures merged into one cry: cloistering. Yet, despite the confining nature of their rules, nuns managed to work out a reality of service in the name of Christ that satisfied their need to be useful.

Medieval communities frequently called on the holy persons in their midst for aid or protection. Just as virgins in Late Antiquity ostensibly had brought God's mercy to the communities in which they lived, nuns and monks of the early Middle Ages, through divine aid, protected crops and villages.
from disease and the ravages of war. Gregory of Tours, in his Life of the Fathers, provided an example of an abbot who delved into the affairs of temporal powers as an intercessor for the people living in the village surrounding the monastic community. St. Portianus, an abbot in the Auvergne, went before the warrior-king Theuderic, who was "exterminating and laying waste everything," to plead for the safety of the people in the region. Through a miracle performed at Theuderic's encampment, the abbot was able to persuade the king to cease his raids on the countryside and to free those captured in the fighting. Gregory made clear that it was the spiritual power of the holy man that had caused the king to do his bidding. Needless to say, such powers of divine intercession often brought kings and villagers alike to monastics for aid.

The most popular form of succor that monastics performed was the laying on of hands to remove an illness and to restore health. Monegundis, who left her husband to take up the religious life, was much sought after by villagers for her healing powers. The nuns who followed Monegundis recognized, even at her death, the great need that people had for her holy intercessory powers. They asked Monegundis to bless some oil and salt to give to the sick after she had died. The nuns soon discovered that Monegundis' powers had not been diminished by her death. Indeed, her relics generally magnified her powers. For example, oil, she had blessed before her death, was rubbed onto the swollen foot of a deacon; his foot was immediately healed. So, even in death, Monegundis carried on a relationship with the world.

During the Merovingian period, nuns, like monks, as intercessors provided comfort and divine protection for the villages and villagers around their communities, as well as aid for travelers and the needy. At the same time, it was easy for them to become enmeshed in the political intrigues, partly because of the aristocratic bloodlines of monastics, but also because of the dependence of secular leaders upon their intercessory powers.

So, despite the desire to keep holy persons separate from the world, reality often came knocking on the monastery door. And in the reality of the Merovingian world, the ways in which nuns interacted with the world did not always meet expectations. Queen Radegund, founder of a convent, St. Croix, at Poitiers in 561 after a daring escape from her captor-husband, provides an example of the expectations placed on women monastics and the reality of how these expectations were met. Early on, Radegund had requested a
copy of the Rule of St. Caesarius of Arles for her nuns to follow. Caesarius' rule carried commands of such severe cloistering that it might be expected that Radegund, who had longed to establish a monastery and then sought out this strict rule to govern it, to retreat into the cloister, never to be heard from or seen again. Radegund, however, proved not to be the retiring sort. Instead, the former queen kept abreast of the activities of her earthly relatives and had dinners and visitors in her convent, despite the prohibition of banqueting in Caesarius' rule. For example, Radegund and her foster-daughter, Agnes, frequently entertained a romantic poet/priest, Venantius Fortunatus, with lavish dinners in the convent.

Where her nuns were concerned, however, Radegund seemed to support the spirit of Caesarius' rule. Gregory of Tours recounts that at one point the nun Basina refused to leave the monastery even though her father, King Chilperic, had ordered her to do so in order to marry. Radegund supported Basina's decision: "It is not seemly, she said, for a nun dedicated to Christ to turn back once more to the sensuous pleasures of this world." For Basina's part, it is unclear whether she refused her father because of the conventual vow of cloistering, or, perhaps, she just did not want to marry.

Radegund's personal decision to ignore aspects of Caesarius' rule may have stemmed from her reasons for accepting it in the first place. As foundress of her newly established monastery, Radegund did not get along with the local bishop, Maroveus, who was trying to bring St. Croix under his sway.

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25Lina Eckenstein, *Woman Under Monasticism: Chapters on Saint-Lore and Convent Life Between A.D. 500 and A.D. 1500* (New York: Russell and Russell Inc., reprint, 1963), 57; Eckenstein notes: "Radegund's adoption of the religious profession in no way diminished her intercourse with the outside world or the influence she had had as queen."

26Caesarius, *The Rule for Nuns*, Chapt. 39. "You shall never provide meals either in the monastery or out of it for these persons, that is: bishops, abbots, monks, clerics, laymen, women in lay attire, nor the relatives of the abbess or of any of the nuns."

27Gregory of Tours, *History of the Franks*, Chapt. 6.34. Basina's father was attempting to use her to solidify an alliance. That she was a nun meant little to him but did give her a way out.

28Ibid.

29Part and parcel of the writings on the blessedness of the virginal state were graphic descriptions of the pain and sorrow which accompanied the marital state: pain of childbirth and death of husband or children. See Leander of Seville, "The Training of Nuns and the Contempt of the World," 191-193. See also "The Life of Eustadiola, Widow of Bourges," trans. Jo Ann McNamara, and John Halborg, with Gordon Whately, in their *Sainted Women*, 108.

The anonymous author of Eustadiola's life states that after the death of her first husband, Eustadiola refused to bind herself to another earthly husband.

But she preferred to join with God in spiritual marriage, which begins with grief and leads to eternal joy, rather than subject herself to a carnal marriage which always begins with gaiety and leads to a tearful end. *Ibid.*

Also, the vita of Monegundis by Gregory of Tours in his *Life of the Fathers* states:

She had been married according to her parents' wishes, and had two daughters, which brought her a profound joy, so that she used to say *God has made me fertile so that two daughters might be born to me* [my emphasis]. But the bitterness of this world soon dissipated this earthly joy, for both were brought to their death by a light fever. From that time the mother was desolate; mourning and lamenting for the death of her children she did not stop weeping, day and night, and neither her husband nor her friends nor any of her relations could console her. Chapt. 19.1.

Monegundis eventually found the consolation she was looking for in the conventual life.
In an attempt to break away from this acrimonious relationship, Radegund chose to place her convent under the rule of Caesarius of Arles, which, in turn, placed the convent under the protection of the king, her kinsman, rather than under the bishop.\textsuperscript{30}

Overall, it seems that Radegund adopted Caesarius’ rule more as a convenience to avoid having to deal with the bellicose Maroveus than with any desire to retreat permanently behind the walls of a monastic community. And Radegund’s decision to turn to her family rather than the Church represents how family connections often were used to obtain whatever the monastery needed.\textsuperscript{31} Because it was the abbess or abbot who provided for the material and spiritual welfare of the monastery, she or he needed to maintain ties with the outside world through the resources of kin.

Radegund’s relationship with the world, particularly with its rulers, demonstrates the intercessory role that kings and other nobles often desired of holy persons. Because monaster-

\textsuperscript{30}Caesarius of Arles, \textit{Rule for Nuns}, 159. The translator of this work, Maria Caritas McCarthy notes that Radegund and Agnes saw in Caesarius’ rule the answer to pressing problems created by the consistently inimical attitude of their bishop, Maroveus of Poitiers. They sought the rule as a substitute for the spiritual direction usually given . . . by a bishop to a monastery, especially a monastery of women. \textit{Ibid.}

Both McCarthy and Eckenstein in \textit{Woman Under Monasticism}, 50, make the same point that Radegund hoped to secure independence from episcopal authority just as Caesarius had done through a papal proclamation. Raymond Van Dam, in \textit{Gregory of Tours, Glory of the Confessors}, trans. Raymond Van Dam (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1988), 106, also notes that Radegund was concerned that Maroveus would interfere with her convent.


ies were nearly the only places of learning during this period, those inhabiting these communities were often the most educated and, thus, best able to give advice. Secular leaders assumed that these nuns and monks had available to them all of God’s wisdom, and as His earth-bound representatives of the heavenly family, they surely could bring His divine aid to earth. Hilda of Whitby, according to Bede, counseled kings of Anglo-Saxon England: "So great was her prudence that not only ordinary folk, but kings and princes used to come and ask her advice in their difficulties and take it."\textsuperscript{32} Gregory of Tours provides the example of Nicetius, bishop of Trier, who, as a monk, earned the favor of a Frankish king and was then promoted to his bishopric by the king.\textsuperscript{33}

In addition to advice, monastics were sought after for their intercession. In return for prayers from the holy community, the wealthy bestowed gifts upon the monastery. This is why Radegund, who fled from her husband, Lothar, later received his aid to establish the convent at Poitiers.\textsuperscript{34}


\textsuperscript{31}Gregory of Tours, \textit{Life of the Fathers}, 17.1.

\textsuperscript{32}Gregory of Tours, \textit{History of the Franks}, Chapt. 9.42. Gregory quoted in full a letter from Radegund to the bishops of Francis. In it Radegund states: "Here in the town of Poitiers I founded a convent for nuns. Lothar, my lord and King of glorious memory, instituted this and was its benefactor."
No doubt, the Frankish king hoped for spiritual rewards in return.\textsuperscript{35}

For her own part, Radegund involved herself and the convent in the temporal affairs of the kingdom, praying for peace in the land. Baudonia, who wrote a vita of Radegund, presents the clearest picture of the former queen's connection with the outside world:

She was always solicitous for peace and worked diligently for the welfare of the fatherland. Whenever the different kingdoms made war on one another, she prayed for the lives of all the kings, for she loved them all. And she taught us also to pray incessantly for their stability. Whenever she heard of bitterness arising among them, trembling, she sent such letters to one and then to the other pleading that they should not make war among themselves nor take up arms lest they should perish. And, likewise, she sent to their noble followers to give the high kings salutary counsel so that their power might work to the welfare of the people of the land. She imposed assiduous vigils on her flock tearfully teaching them to pray incessantly for the kings. And who can tell what agonies she inflicted on herself? So, through her intercession, there was peace among the kings.\textsuperscript{36}

Baudonia’s words reveal the intercessory role played by Radegund and her flock. The convent was financially tied to the aristocratic families of Francia and attempted to embrace that obligation through their prayers to Heaven.

Throughout this period, nuns and monks both responded to the earthly cry for intercessors in a confusing world of demons and feuding families. The realities of their respective lives proved to be marked by few differences; nuns and monks interacted with the world as healers, hosts, advisors, and conduits to heavenly reward. Both could suffer hardship through these earthly ties. Where favor and disfavor were concerned, villagers and kings, alike, seemed to make no distinction in the holy person’s gender. But Church Fathers, with a penchant for calling devout females "little women," created those distinctions of gender which were manifested only in the ideal of monastic rules and Patristic writings.\textsuperscript{37}

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\textsuperscript{35}Lawrence, Medieval Monasticism, 61. Lawrence states:

As with all monastic benefaction, the primary motive was that of safeguarding the soul of the benefactor and the souls of his relatives. . . . To found and endow a community of monks [or nuns] was to ensure for the donor an unceasing fund of intercession and sacrifice which would avail him and his relatives both in life and after death.

\textsuperscript{36}Baudonia, "Book II., Life of St. Radegund," in McNamara and Halborg, Sainted Women, 93.

\textsuperscript{37}Robert A. Markus, The End of Ancient Christianity, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 40, notes that Jerome labeled as "little women" the Roman circles of devout "aristocratic women, ascetics, virgins and widows."
HENRY HOWARD VS. THE MISOGYNISTS: THE ISSUE OF FEMALE SOVEREIGNTY IN SIXTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND

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The last half of the sixteenth century saw an unprecedented number of women sitting on European thrones or serving as regents. Their numbers included Mary (1553-58) and Elizabeth Tudor (1558-1603), Catherine de Medici (1560-63), Mary Stuart (1542-67), Mary of Hungary (1531-55), Mary of Lorraine (1554-60), and Margaret of Parma (1559-67). The presence of such a large number of prominent female rulers encouraged a proliferation of political treatises concerning the issue of female regent, that is, government by women. Among the sixteenth-century proponents of female rulers were John Aylmer, John Jewel, Richard Bertie, David Clapham, Sir Thomas Elyot, and Henry Howard, later Earl of Northampton. Their opponents included Sir David Lyndsay, Thomas Becon, John Ponet, Christopher Goodman, Anthony Gilby, and, arguably the best known, John Knox.¹

¹For a good discussion of the gynocracy debate in the sixteenth century, see Paula Louise Scalingi, "The Scepter or the Distaff: The Question of Female Sovereignty, 1516-1607," The Historian 41 (Nov. 1978): 59-75. See Sir David Lyndsay [Lindsay], The Monarchie (1522); Thomas Becon, An Humble Supplication unto God, for the Restoringe of Hys Holy Woorde, Vnto the Churche of Englande (1554); John Ponet [or Poynt], A Shorte Treatise of Politike Power and of the True Obediencie (1556); Christopher Goodman, How Superior Powers Oght to Be Obeyed of Their Subjects (1558); Anthony Gilby, An Admonition to England and Scotland, to Call Them to Repentance (1558); Sir Thomas Elyot, The Defence of Good Women (1540); John Aylmer, An Harborowe for Faithfull and True Subjects against the Late Blowne Blaste (1559); and John Jewel, The Defence of the Apologie of the Churche of Eng-lande (1567).

The principal purpose of this paper is to compare the key arguments of John Knox, who wrote what was probably the most vitriolic attack on women, with those of Henry Howard, who wrote what was arguably the most scholarly defense of female regent of its time.

Although numerous sixteenth-century treatises were rigorous in their denunciation of women rulers, perhaps none was more vicious than Knox's The First Blast of the Trumpet Against the Monstruous Regiment of Women. Knox published this treatise only a few months before Mary Tudor's death in 1558. It was the first of three works that he planned, and the only one that he actually finished, to undermine the political authority of the English queen. Knox's treatise openly attacked Mary's government, which he described as that of "a wicked woman, yea of a traitoress and bastard."² It also questioned whether any woman had the right to govern—a sentiment Knox expressed at least twice elsewhere. Knox suggested that female regent was a "monstrous" situation that was contrary to both God's will and natural law. He explained that: "It is more than a mostre in nature, that a woman shall reigne and have empire above men."³ He lamented, "how abominable, odious and detestable."⁴

In the early 1570s, Elizabeth faced a number of challenges to her authority: the Rising of the Northern Earls in 1569, the publication of Regnans in Excelsis in 1570, and the Ridolfi


³Knox, First Blast, ff. A3v-A4r.

⁴Ibid. See also Greaves, Theology, 162-63, for a discussion of the influence of Heinrich Bullinger and Christopher Goodman on Knox.
Plot in 1571. In light of the turbulence of the age Elizabeth directed William Cecil, who would soon become Lord Burghley, to ask Henry Howard to write a learned rebuttal to Knox’s 1558 work. She probably hoped that Howard’s response would help bolster her against the attacks on the throne.

Howard was seemingly well-qualified for the task. He had earned his Master of Arts degree from King’s College, Cambridge in 1564 and had received a second Master’s from Oxford in 1568. Furthermore, he was extremely well-read in law, philosophy, history, and religion. He had also recently completed treatises on the issue of Elizabeth’s marriage, on the denial of the accuracy of prophecies, and on the foreign policy implications of the inheritance of Charles V.

Howard began in earnest to work on a project that he would not complete until 1589. The delay was due not only to the extensive scholarship of a work that he modestly but accurately described as “tedious and able to discourage,” but also to a number of unfortunate circumstances. He had perpetual problems with his creditors and was frequently evicted; he was periodically arrested and interrogated about his alleged role in conspiracies; and he had his notes destroyed or stolen during six separate robberies. He even lost an early draft of the manuscript, only to have it returned to him by a stranger who found it on a street in St. Albans. Howard also claimed that he was temporarily blinded. Finally, after years of tedious scholarship and countless diversions and interruptions, he finished his manuscript. Understanding Howard’s scholarly objections to Knox’s arguments gives a better appreciation of the sixteenth-century gynecocracy controversy.\(^5\)

Howard organized his scholarly treatise, entitled *A Deutifull Defence of the Lawfull Regiment of Weomen*, into three books, focusing respectively on natural law, civil law, and divine law arguments. Within each book Howard answered various objections to female sovereignty. Consulting over 200 authors and some 400 books, Howard’s 234 folio-page manuscript included references to theologians, historians, statesmen, philosophers, and political theorists. Surprisingly, Howard did not directly mention any of the contemporary treatises that dealt with the gynecocracy issue, and he made only a handful of indirect references to Knox’s work.

Howard answered some thirteen specific objections that he found in Knox’s *First Blast*. Most interesting were Howard’s responses to Knox’s two principal complaints against female regiment: first, that God denied woman the scepter, because a woman, Eve, was responsible for man’s Fall from Grace; and second, that women cannot govern, because they are subject to the rule of their husbands.\(^7\)

In brief, Knox had explained that women had demonstrated their inability to govern as early as Eve. He argued that proof against female sovereignty was Eve’s disobedience and her responsibility for Original Sin and man’s Fall from Grace. Furthermore, from the time of Eve’s creation, woman had failed to be man’s equal. Adam had been, after all, created

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\(^{5}\)Calendar of State Papers Domestic Elizabeth I. v. 5 n.83; v. 149 n. 69; Henry Howard, Earl of Northampton, *A Deutifull Defence of the Lawfull Regiment of Weomen* (unpublished, 1589), Lansdowne Manuscript 813, f. 28v; British Library Additional Manuscripts 12: 453, 513, 515; Dictionary of National Biography, s.v. Northampton’s treatises were: *A Defensive against the Poyson of Supposed Prophesies* (1583); *A Defense of the Ecclesiastical Regiment in England* (1574); and a reply to William Stubbes’ *Discovery of a Gaping Gulp*.

\(^{6}\)Howard, Deutifull Defence, f. 28r; Dictionary of National Biography.

\(^{7}\)Howard, Deutifull Defence, ff. 25v-125v.
first, suggesting that the order of creation established an order of social and political precedence. Moreover, Eve’s creation from Adam’s rib was another sign of woman’s subservience. Knox argued:

God, by his sentence, hath dejected all woman frome empire and dominion aboue man. For two punishmentes are laid vpon her, to witte, a dolor, anguishe, and payn, as oft as euer she shal be mother; and a subjection of her selfe, her appetites and will to her husbande, and to his will. Moreover, Knox proposed, women are unsuited by their very nature to govern, and their government is not grounded in Scripture. Consequently, he advised women to serve men who would govern and establish justice, equity, and good order.

In examining woman’s responsibility for Original Sin and man’s Fall from Grace, Howard countered Knox’s position by suggesting that prior to the Fall Eve had not been, in fact, subordinate to Adam. In Genesis there were two stories concerning the creation of Eve. In Chapter One, which described the first creation, God created both Adam and Eve in His image and gave them dominion over the Earth. Howard argued that at this time Eve was, in fact, not subject to Adam; rather she was his “helpmeet” or helpmate. God showered His gifts equally upon both man and woman; He gave them both dominion over all. They were, as Howard explained, “happie free pure virgines and fitt gheastes for Paradise.” Befittingly, God beheld all that he had created and declared it to be good.

The relationship between Adam and Eve changed, however, in the second creation. In the second chapter of Genesis, God placed Adam under a deep sleep to remove a rib and create Eve. The misogynists argued that here was a sure sign of man’s superiority. Woman came from under man’s arm, implying that she required man’s protection. Howard denied such allegations, citing the arguments of St. Ambrose and St. Gregory of Nazianzus who had claimed that woman was in fact made of better material than was Adam. Eve was, after all, made from Adam’s rib, while Adam was made from dust. Because woman was made of a superior substance than man, Howard asked, does this then not indicate the superiority of woman rather than her inferiority? He believed so and further claimed that there was no reason to believe that man had dominion over woman.

Neither was there a reason to blame Eve more than Adam for the Fall from Grace. Both were guilty. If either was more guilty than the other, it was Adam. Howard reminded his readers that God spoke directly to Adam—but not to Eve. Adam—not God—told Eve not to eat of the Tree of Life. Although God punished Eve in the Fall, she was not singled out for punishment. Howard noted that both Adam and Eve lost dominion over the earth. Furthermore, Eve was “not abated any iote or maymed in her qualitites.”

In pursuing this issue further, Howard suggested that the Law of Nature was clearer before the formation of society and

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*Knox, First Blast, f. D3r.

*Ibid., f. B6r.

*Howard, Deutifull Defence, f. 34r.


*Ibid., f. 30v.
government. In this earlier time, people had possessed complete freedom, living free from the control of civil magistrates. Then the "government" was the family, where both parents ruled. After destroying the world by the great flood, God renewed man's dominion over the Earth but still failed to give him predominance over woman. Northampton suggested, therefore, that opposition to female regiment was invalid, if it were based upon these biblical events.\textsuperscript{13}

Knox's second key argument against female regiment was that women are subject to their husbands and consequently should not have authority over others due to their subservient positions within the household. Knox explained: "For he that taketh from woma[n] the least part of authoritie, dominion or rule, will not permit vnto her that whiche is greatest."\textsuperscript{14} Because a woman is subservient to her husband, she has no right either to teach, witness, judge, or rule.\textsuperscript{15} If a woman cannot teach or serve as a judge, Knox asked, how then could she expect to perform the higher function of governing?

In examining the issue of a woman's subservience to her husband, Howard suggested that although she is under her husband's power, the relationship should not suggest that all women are subordinated to men's authority. He added that the guidelines concerning familial relationships were established during biblical times, when women traditionally did not govern. But, Howard explained, a woman does not come under her husband's control until after the wedding ceremony.

The dominion of the husband is "onelie of the frute of wedlock."\textsuperscript{16} He added: "[N]othing ys more famlyer and ordenary among the fathers of the Churche then that wemen whch Dispose themselves are as free from all obedience to men as from paines in Childe bearynge."\textsuperscript{17} Howard cited Moses, Peter Martyr, St. Paul, Jerome, John Chrysostom, and Tertullian as examples of those who endorsed this position. Moreover, virgins and widows were two special categories of women who were not bound or subject to men. Listing Ambrose, Basil, Chrysostom, and St. Cyprian as supporters of this point, Howard explained that virgins "notable sett forthe the fredome of a virgins pure estate when no predominance of a man nor contradiction by commandement is able to ympeache or to Disturbe her holie resulucon."\textsuperscript{18} Thus, he concluded, a husband's dominion in the household should not be seen as implying that men are superior to women.

Neither was Howard willing to concede the issue of a wife's unquestioning subservience to her husband. He suggested that the relationship of husband and wife "ys not soe servile as the pasquelles prate."\textsuperscript{19} Augustine had, after all, suggested that the title of wife was one of honor and not one of servitude. The marital relationship, Howard explained, is one of "predominance in place though not predominance in regiment."\textsuperscript{20} Husbands are to be obeyed, but not if they are immoral and lead their wives away from God. In fact, wives

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{13}Ibid., ff. 30v-33v.
  \item \textsuperscript{14}Knox, First Blast, f. B8v.
  \item \textsuperscript{15}Ibid., f. C4r.
  \item \textsuperscript{16}Howard, Dutifull Defence, f. 186v.
  \item \textsuperscript{17}Ibid., f. 197v.
  \item \textsuperscript{18}Ibid., ff. 188r, 198v.
  \item \textsuperscript{19}Ibid., f. 189v.
  \item \textsuperscript{20}Ibid., f. 190r.
\end{itemize}
even possess some control over their husbands. Using the argument in Chrysostom's *Commentary on Corinthians*, Howard elucidated that the wife and not the husband controls his body and stated that "a woman is both her husbands servant and his governour" as far as corporal matters are concerned.21 A husband's authority is, therefore, conditional. Howard explained:

Thus we perceave in what sence the Commandement of obedience ought to be understood that the state of wives ys onelie punished without exception eyther to widowes or to maydes that the Condicion of wives ys not soe base and servile as it is made and that the Curse which was pronouncd at the first vpnon transgression hath synce bene greatlie qualledie upon amendment.22

The question of the subservience of wives was also due, Howard reasoned, to a misunderstanding of the dictates of St. Paul. The citation in question was the analogy of the comparison of the dominion of a husband over his wife with that of Christ's dominion in the Church. Howard, questioning whether Paul made a direct comparison in his analogy, claimed that women are "coessentiall with men" and that the distance between Christ and the Church is greater than that which exists between the sexes.23

Howard also suggested that despite the nature of the marital relationship, it has little to do with political sovereignty. "[T]hough wives cannot be heads in matrymonie yet in pollicie they may and where the greatest dutie comes in place a less avayleth not."24 Furthermore, the actions of other women have overturned women's subservience and restored their right to wield scepters. The Virgin Mary canceled Eve's guilt for the Fall of Man, while Mary Magdalene "redeem womankind from malediction."25 Howard proposed, therefore, that there is now no difference between man and woman, "becawse we are all one in Christ Jesus."26

When Howard refuted Knox's *First Blast*, he used the full weight of biblical, historical, and philosophical authority. His arguments were both rational and comprehensive. The ultimate irony is that, while Howard's manuscript was circulated in influential circles, it was never published. By the time Howard had completed it in 1589, many of the peculiar circumstances which had encouraged the initiation of the project had been resolved. Elizabeth I had executed Mary Queen of Scots, had defeated the Spanish Armada, and had successfully governed England for over three decades. Although opposition to female regiment would continue into the seventeenth century, the issue had neither the currency nor the emotion that it had had previously. England's virgin queen, by ruling ably and judiciously, refuted the arguments of the misogynists more clearly and completely than could any theologian or historian.

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21Ibid., f. 191v.

22Ibid., f. 192v.

23Ibid., f. 198v.

24Ibid., f. 201r.

25Ibid., f. 191v.

26Ibid., f. 192r.
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**THE GOVERNOR AND THE GUNBOAT**
**AN INCIDENT IN CIVIL WAR PALATKA,**
**FLORIDA**

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Florida’s first Governor elected under statehood, William Dunn Moseley, enjoyed a life punctuated by affairs in which the differences between winning and losing, between success and failure, between living his last days as a free man or in a prison cell, were slight.

The most famous of these episodes took place when he was thirty-nine. Born to privilege in North Carolina in 1795, Moseley had, by 1834, built a lucrative law practice in Wilmington and was a member of the North Carolina State Senate. In this year he offered himself as a candidate for the Democratic nomination for governor but lost by only three votes. Within a year of this defeat, Moseley permanently removed himself to Florida.¹

The most obscure incident took place twenty-eight years later in Palatka, where Moseley, by now a former governor of Florida, resided in retirement. This lesser known affair is intriguing, as it took place against the backdrop of war and the closely-decided question it involved was, for Moseley, literally one of life and death.

The time was 1862, late in the month of June. Over a year had passed since the fall of Fort Sumter, and the St. John’s River in northeast Florida was effectively a no man’s

land. Although it flowed through territory belonging to a Confederate state, through land largely controlled by Confederate forces and citizens loyal to them, since the federal evacuation of Jacksonville in April of 1862, the river had been open to any who had the strength to enforce passage. Confederate and Union ships, as well as the vessels of private freebooters, plied the waterway mostly without incident, even though the Union Navy busied itself from time to time by carrying out campaigns to halt the flow of Rebel supplies. The majority of this traffic was river borne, although some commerce in cash crops did flow between Florida and the offshore islands in the Atlantic. Given, however, the state’s small population and lack of good ports, this traffic was minimal as was the job of interdiction.²

Of all the prizes of the upper St. Johns, none was more important to both sides than was Palatka, situated as it is on a small plain below high ground at a place where the river bends so sharply as to nearly turn back on itself.³ Like the river, Palatka was under the nominal control of the Confederates, but their presence in the summer of 1862 was limited to a small, poorly trained and equipped force under First Lieutenant J. J. Dickison.⁴ Dickison’s ragtag band was encamped across the river from Palatka at a place on the east bank described as “the Heights at the head of the White Water Branch.”⁵ In theory, this position gave Dickison the opportunity to mount a defense of Palatka, but to turn theory into practice in June 1862 would have taken much more in the way of resources than he had at his disposal.

Both the Federal forces and the townsfolk of Palatka knew well the Rebel commander’s situation. His lack of strength had led the civilian residents to virtually evacuate the town, when Jacksonville and the upper St. Johns came under Union control in March 1862. According to eyewitness accounts, the Palatka residents believed that their city would surely be attacked and sacked by marauding units of armed negroes the Federals were attempting to muster in Jacksonville. One resident described the evacuation of the town’s less than one thousand residents by saying, as soon as war was declared all the stores and business places were closed and goods removed. . . . Families who could move away, left as soon as possible [until] only a few [residents] remained in their homes, [and] food for [them] had to come in from the country.⁶

For the Union, Lieutenant Dickison’s lack of men and firepower meant that so long as the navy undertook more-or-less regular sorties up the river, it could effectively neutralize


³During this period, the spelling of “Palatka,” as known today, was not a settled thing. As often as not in dispatches and reports from both the Union and Confederate sides, the town is referred to as “Filatka.” Mary Elizabeth Dickison, Dickison and His Men: Reminiscences of the War in Florida (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1962; reprint ed., 1890), 9-46.

⁴Dickison had resigned from Captain John M. Martin’s Marion Light Artillery at the end of May 1862 in order to raise his own cavalry command. In August 1862, he would be appointed as Captain of Company H, Second Florida Cavalry. The group he brought together near Palatka in June formed the nucleus of this unit. Ibid.

⁵Palatka News (FL), Apr. 27, 1917.

⁶Ibid.
Palatka without any great expenditure of either men or material. 7

While the gunboat patrols served the Federal cause by effectively keeping Palatka out of the Confederate war inventory, Southern loyalists remained frightened and convinced that any appearance of a Union boat might be a prelude to the all-out attack that rumors had so long predicted. One resident later remarked, "No one felt safe, and no one knew what would come next; for months we slept in our day clothes, changing only for a bath and fresh clothing." Rumors moving upriver with various boats were the major source of fresh war news, low in reliability and high in urgency. Hence, rather than informing the populace, the rumors simply fed their fears.

For others in the area, however, specifically blacks and unionist whites, the sightings, while no less emotional, were very differently viewed. Many used the opportunity afforded by a boat on patrol to escape: the blacks to freedom and to join the Union forces; the whites to a more congenial political atmosphere where they were less likely to lose their lives as a result of the raid they, too, believed to be imminent. 9

During one of these comings of a boat to Palatka, former Governor Moseley experienced what would become the closest of his close calls. He would face an election of sorts, one in which the personal stakes were high indeed, and in which the holder of the franchise would be his enemy.

The month of June, 1862, found W. D. Moseley, sixty-seven years of age, fully retired from business and public life, and in poor health. He made his home about a half mile outside of Palatka on a modest plantation he had purchased in 1851, two years after leaving the governor's chair. 10 After a brief return to the public stage in 1855 when he served as a member of the Florida House of Representatives, 11 he rarely came into town and his neighbors saw little of him. However, the arrival at Palatka of the Federal armed tugboat, Hale, provided the governor with sufficient reason to undertake the journey. 12

The Hale's nominal reason for calling at Palatka was to evacuate a family of Northern sympathizers who had appealed for passage when the Federals evacuated Jacksonville. Few local citizens believed this story. So, as she was to be moored on the riverfront for at least a day while the crew saw to the loading of supplies and the evacuate family's effects, the

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7 Porter, Naval History, 84-85, 672-676; Dickison, Dickison and His Men, 9-46; T. Frederick Davis, History of Jacksonville, Florida and Vicinity, 1513 to 1924 (Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press, Floridianas Facsimile & Reprint Series, 1964; reprint ed., 1925), 116-137.

8 Palatka News (FL), Apr. 27, 1917.

9 Ibid.


11 Moseley's signal contribution to the 1855 Session of the Legislature was his proposal to move the State Capital from Tallahassee to a more centrally located place. The move went nowhere, but, interestingly, the idea of doing so—an idea which has cropped up again and again—was first advanced by a former chief executive of the state just a decade after Florida had been admitted to the Union. Florida House of Representatives, Journal of the Florida House of Representatives, 1855.

12 In contemporary accounts and correspondence—all from the Southern viewpoint—the Hale is always referred to by the menacing term "gunboat." According to Civil War naval historian, Admiral David D. Porter, however, it was in fact a small steam-powered, shallow draft, tugboat which boasted a small cannon designed for defensive use. Porter, Naval History, 84-85, 672-676.
former governor, at the request of his neighbors, went into town to pay his respects to her acting master, Lieutenant Foster. He was to attempt to determine whether the Yankees had any nefarious schemes in mind.13

Moseley arrived on the docks during the forenoon watch, and Lieutenant Foster received him warmly. He assured the former governor that his boat was not the vanguard of an invasion force and that he had no orders or intent to sack the village. The Hale would be content simply to get what she had come for and leave. Lieutenant Foster, however, also allowed that his crew was nervous. Runaway blacks who had boarded the tug in search of asylum had alleged that a "Confederate Lieutenant"14 had threatened to set up a sniper's nest behind the nearby Presbyterian Church from where sharpshooters could "pick [men] from the gunboat."15 The acting master warned, "should a single gun be fired by accident or otherwise," the crew would not hesitate to "burn the town."16 Moseley told Foster that, to the best of his knowledge, there were no Confederate troops on the Palatka side of the river. The "threat," he said, must be a rumor repeated or invented by the runaways. Rebel soldiers, he further explained, did come to town from time to time, but he was sure that any who had been around had crossed the river before the Hale reached the pier. In all probability, the governor said, they would not return until the tug departed as usually happened when any Federals were spotted making in the direction of the village.17 Unfortunately, as events of the next hour-and-a-half or so would show, the Master took his prominent visitor's opinion as something much more definite.

Moseley stayed perhaps an hour aboard the Hale and departed on cordial terms. But before he could even manage to leave the town's center, firing began. A jittery Union lookout spotted horsemen on the hilltops above the town, and the tug began firing in their direction. The Hale's gun was, like as not, a tiny, brass boarding cannon meant for close range defense and not for long range bombardment. To be sure, the Hale's gun was inadequate to the task, but her gunners were lusty sorts who kept the barrel hot.18

With shot whizzing over their heads and thudding, however ineffectually, into the lower slopes of the hills, panic set in among the Palatkans. Many were sure that the bombardment was the start of the long-anticipated sacking. "Men, women, and children were running and screaming,"19

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13Ibid.

14The "Confederate Lieutenant" was most probably Dickison himself, as it appears that there were then no other commissioned Confederate officers in the area. Palatka News (FL), Apr. 27, 1917; Dickison, Dickison and His Men, 9-46; Clement A. Evans, Confederate Military History, ext. ed., vol. 16: Florida (Wilmington, NC: Broadfoot Publishing Co., 1989; reprint ed., Confederate Publishing Co., 1899), 42-55, 252-253.

15Taken in context, the crew of the Hale had ample cause for worry. Not only were they deep in enemy territory, but vessels of her sort boasted a complement of only 8 to 10 men, about half of whom (the doctor, a cook or two, and the engineers) were usually not considered to be "combatants." Further, tugs of any sort were neither a plum command nor a coveted posting, so the men aboard the Hale were probably not the most skilled or experienced, whatever their specific shipboard assignment, combatant or non-combatant. Finally, as tugs are service vessels, it is highly probable that its able-bodied seamen, if they had any experience at all, it was in the harbor-related or freight transport tasks associated with tugboats. Palatka News (FL), Apr. 27, 1917; Porter, Naval History, 84-85, 672-676.

16Palatka News (FL), Apr. 27, 1917.

17Ibid.

18Ibid.; Porter, Naval History, 84-85, 672-676.

19Palatka News (FL), Apr. 27, 1917.
one witness recalled, and most assumed that the men on the hilltops were only the first targets of the bloodthirsty Federals. They and their homes would be next.

As for the men on the hill, both the townsfolk and the sailors assumed they were under the active command of Lieutenant Dickison. What most did not know was that he and the bulk of his men had gone, and the soldiers they saw were men from his unit who had chosen, on their own, to remain behind. So long as the town and their families appeared safe, they meant the sailors no harm. They had crossed the river during the night just to be nearby should the Yankees take any threatening actions. What, if anything, the almost unarmed and barely trained rebels could have done in the face of a real attack is uncertain at best.20

It is not clear how long the "bombardment" continued, but however long it was, the boom of the little shipboard gun sufficiently fed the fear that general ignorance made seem so plausible. At last, in the face of growing hysteria, the only two people near at hand who knew what was really going on vis-à-vis the Confederate forces decided they must step forward. Mrs. Mary Emily Boyd and her friend, Mrs. Lynch, had learned the night before that Dickison and his men would be pulling back and that no sniper nest would be established. For their own reasons, they had initially kept this information to themselves, but with shot flying and their neighbors cowering in terror, they concluded that revealing it might be the only way to stop the disaster which seemed to be looming.21

With their decision made, the women tried to enlist the help of some gentleman to deliver their news of the Rebel withdrawal to the Hale, but all refused. After expressions of sympathy and regret, the ladies were told again and again, "that any man who would go there would be arrested."22 Finally, quite by chance, they encountered Governor Moseley. He listened and consented to accompany them, if they would agree to relay the story themselves. Given the situation, they accepted his offer, and the trio set off in search of the leader of the group of Union sailors who had come ashore to gather the belongings of the evacuate family.

Within a few minutes, the two young women and the former chief executive of the State of Florida found the detail's commander who, without waiting to be asked, reiterated that orders were orders and if any Rebels started shooting the crew had instructions to finish the matter by leveling the place. Mrs. Boyd did her best to make clear to him that the offending officer and his men had left the area the night before and that the men on the hill were merely concerned about their families.23

At first her words seemed wasted. The Yankee, who was as overexcited and nervous as everyone else, seemed not to hear or understand. Finally, though, her persistence paid off, and the sailor reluctantly consented to request Foster to come ashore and hear her out. The lieutenant soon appeared. Despite the continued booming of the cannon, he listened politely as Mrs. Boyd repeated what she knew. Foster seemed

20Ibid.

21Ibid.

22There is no record of how many men the ladies actually spoke with, however, the number could not have been large, because this entire episode occurred so quickly. Yet, to them time must have seemed greatly elongated as time will during a crisis. Ibid.

23Ibid.
inclined to believe her, but he still expressed doubts by restating his own position: "It is not our wish to needlessly destroy life or property, but anything that becomes an obstacle to us in the use of this river will be put out of our way."\textsuperscript{24}

The acting master of the Hale then turned toward Governor Moseley, stared the old man straight in the face and minced no words in saying that he felt his trust had been betrayed: "Why did you tell me," he demanded of his recent guest that,

there were no Confederate soldiers on this side of the river when you visited the gunboat this morning? Did you hope to get us in ambush? What was your object? [If you had hoped to trap us, you failed, because even as] you were telling us there were no soldiers here our watch saw them with a glass, and our guns were turned to them.\textsuperscript{25}

Moseley was taken aback. He knew what Foster was suggesting. Given his association with the ladies and his prominence as a former governor, Foster believed that he knew more—much more—than he was letting on and that the Yankee lieutenant suspected treachery. If the acting master’s suspicions were not quashed, he would be arrested as a spy, and two possible fates awaited spies—the firing squad or prison. At the same time, and to make matters worse, Moseley knew that to prove his innocence he would need a good explanation, and he simply did not have one. Telling the truth by pleading ignorance would do nothing except make him look either an old fool or a spectacularly inept liar, especially given his earlier comments which the master had taken as "assurances." So, with his back against the wall, Moseley did the only thing he could think of which might stave off—if for only a moment—his being clapped in irons. Turning to Mrs. Boyd, who seemed to have had some success in gaining a measure of the Union officer’s trust, he blurted: "For God’s sake, Madam,—Explain!"\textsuperscript{26}

With this act the future of Florida’s first governor under statehood became dependent upon the enemy commander’s acceptance of what was said by a young woman both had met but minutes earlier. Mrs. Boyd rose to the task. She told the Yankee that, because the retired governor lived quietly outside of town, he was not likely to have heard of the sniping threat, of the Confederate unit’s departure, or of the small contingent of concerned, but basically harmless, Rebel soldiers who had crossed the river the previous night. She reiterated that she and Mrs. Lynch were, as far as she knew, the only people then in Palatka who knew for certain that the Southern commander had decided to withdraw. Virtually no one else the acting master might question, including Moseley, would be able to say with any confidence that the threat to him, his men, and his boat no longer existed, because none but they had heard it from the rebel leader himself. Moseley, she said, could not have lied, because, like virtually everyone else in town, he knew nothing. "I feel sure," she told him, "Governor Moseley did not intend to deceive you."\textsuperscript{27}

With the argument thus put, all fell silent as Lieutenant Foster paused to consider his options. He turned to the anxious Governor. "I accept Mrs. Boyd’s explanation," he said, "and I want to tell you that it has saved you from being

\textsuperscript{24}Considering the size of his tiny command and his isolation, this oath of Lt. Foster seems a bit on the boastful side. \textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{25}\textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{26}\textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{27}\textit{Ibid.}
taken prisoner." Then he complimented Mrs. Boyd, telling her that she should take pride in what she had accomplished:
You have done well. Should you live a hundred years you can look back on this as the best day's work you have ever done. You have saved lives and property and also saved an old man from being taken prisoner of war.\textsuperscript{28}

Following the lieutenant's verdict, the delegations parted, and shortly thereafter, as a kind of seal on the mission's success, the cannon ceased firing, thereby returning to the hamlet its peace and quiet.\textsuperscript{29} The adventure was over.

During the balance of the afternoon, the \textit{Hale} concluded her business and steamed north toward Jacksonville never to return. Life, the war, and the river moved on.

By January 1863, Governor William D. Moseley was dead, but he had died a free man in his own home.\textsuperscript{30} Yet the possibility remains stark that the situation could have been much different. The efforts of Mrs. Boyd on his behalf on that day in late June, barely six months before he entered the grave, had, like as not, saved him from breathing his last as a Yankee prisoner. Due to her help, he had prevailed by a single vote in what became his final, most closely decided, and possibly most important, contest.

\textsuperscript{28}\textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{29}\textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{30}\textit{Morris, Florida Handbook}, 319.

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TO BE A GOOD ALL-ROUND MAN:  
BLACK MOBILITY IN FLORIDA 
IN THE DECADES FOLLOWING THE CIVIL WAR

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As in the rest of the South, black slaves in Florida in 1865 confronted the realization of their long-held dream of freedom. Liberated from plantation confinement and their masters' control, Florida's freedmen exercised the right of apparently unrestricted movement as the first manifestation of freedom. Initially pursuing the dream of forty acres and a mule, black Floridians in the decades following the Civil War sought land ownership, tenancy, and itinerancy. Ultimately, their quest to improve their economic, social, and political conditions led to urbanization.¹ Mobility remained central to this quest.

In the 1910s, large numbers of southern blacks began desiring the South. Seeking economic opportunities in the Midwestern and Northeastern urban centers of the industrial heartland, southern blacks began what historians have identified as the Great Migration. Not all of this out-migration stemmed from economic motives. Southern blacks also fled the terrors of lynching and the agony of social oppression. But economic "pull" has outweighed the social "push" in motivating the Great Migration of the 1910s. This migratory wave of southern blacks into the North continued throughout most of the twentieth century.²

In 1923, Charles S. Johnson, editor of the National Urban League's Opportunity and future president of Fisk University, helped set the tone for what would become historical canon in black migration studies: "Negroes, like all others with a spark of ambition and self-interest, have been deserting [southern] soil which cannot yield returns in proportion to their population increase."³ Johnson maintained that black in-migration, the movement of southern blacks from rural to urban areas within the South, reflected essentially economic—not racial—motives. Otherwise, the "direction of Negroes . . . would have been North instead of further South." Johnson concluded that

[h]ere, of course, is the economic factor at work hand in hand, with greater mobility, increased transportation, restlessness and the monotony and uncertainty of agricultural life ever against the allurements of the city.⁴

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¹For the purpose of this study, the terms "urban" and "city" reflect the determination of the Bureau of the Census that qualifies anything in excess of 2500 individuals concentrated in a definite area as "urban." Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Negro Population, 1790-1915 (Washington, DC, 1918), 90.

²Maliaka Adero, Up South: Stories, Studies, and Letters of this Century's African-American Migrations (New York, 1993), viii. Beginning in the early 1980s, blacks have started a return migration. This movement South reflects similar trends of Sunbelt migration within the white community—trends that have melded economic opportunity with social enhancement. See Randall M. Miller and George E. Pozzetta, eds., Shades of the Sunbelt: Essays on Ethnicity, Race, and the Urban South (Boca Raton, FL, 1989). C. Vann Woodward has recently argued that this late 20th-century movement into the South by blacks may stem more from social concerns than from economic ones. See C. Vann Woodward, "Look Away, Look Away," Journal of Southern History 59 (Aug. 1993): 487-504.


⁴Ibid., 273.
Although an astute analyst of black America, Johnson, as well as contemporary migration historians, have failed to understand fully the function of this precipitant movement.\(^5\) Black in-migration of the late nineteenth century prepared southern blacks for the move North—both during the Great Migration of the 1910s and in subsequent migratory waves. Moving in concentric rings and gradually extending their spheres of influence, increasingly mobile southern blacks built upon earlier migration experiences. Moving within the South, to the West, and ultimately North, each succeeding movement was rooted in earlier experiences.

In 1860, the estimated black population of the United States stood at about four and a half million. By 1890, this figure had grown to about seven and a half million, approxi-

\(^{3}\) Clarence Walker’s revisionist analyses of black history promote the primacy of race over class as the correct interpretive framework for studying black history. See Clarence E. Walker, "How Many Niggers Did Karl Marx Know? Or, A Peculiarity of the Americans," in Deromanticizing Black History: Critical Essays and Reappraisals (Knoxville, TN, 1991), 1-33.


Few works have examined in-migration within the South. For two outstanding examples of scholarship that have, see Joe W. Trotter, Jr., ed., The Great Migration in Historical Perspective: New Dimensions of Race, Class, and Gender (Bloomington, IN, 1991) and William Cohen, At Freedom's Edge: Black Mobility and the Southern White Quest for Racial Control, 1861-1915 (Baton Rouge, LA, 1991).

\(^{4}\) The 1885 state census estimated Florida’s black population at about 203,000. The federal census of 1890, reflecting a dramatic increase, ranked Florida eleventh in total black population in the South with approximately 309,000. Between the years of 1860 and 1910, black population increased in Florida by about 268,000.\(^7\) Granted, some of this can be attributed to natural increase. But because Florida had one of the highest rates of infant mortality in the South, coupled with dwindling rates of longevity, some of this increase reflected the rising rural and urban in-migration of southern blacks moving into Florida.\(^8\) While not approaching the figures of either Georgia, Mississippi, Alabama, South Carolina, or Louisiana—the top five states in black population between 1870 and 1910—about 46 percent of Florida’s population was black.

While Florida would retain a large indigenous black population, some of Florida’s blacks already had begun the incipient trek North.\(^9\) But blacks from other southern states—particularly from Georgia and South Carolina—began moving

\(^{6}\) Negro Population, 25. The 1890 census, much like the earlier 1870 census, reflected an under count of the black population. See Cohen, At Freedom's Edge, 300, 302.

\(^{7}\) Negro Population, 37.

\(^{8}\) Ibid., 306-311.

\(^{9}\) A significant number of blacks in Jacksonville would migrate to cities like Philadelphia around the turn of the century. See, Robert Gregg, Sparks From the Anvil of Oppression: Philadelphia’s African Methodists and Southern Migrants, 1890-1940 (Philadelphia, 1993), esp. chapt. 8.
into Florida. By 1910, nearly one third of the approximately 300,000 blacks residing in the state had migrated into Florida, most coming from states of the Lower South and some from the Upper South. Virginia contributed 2200, North Carolina 9700, South Carolina 27,500, and Georgia 45,700. This migration, begun after the Civil War, continued until the 1910s when the path of movement shifted North. The increasing black population in Florida between 1870 and 1900 reflected an aggregate increase of 34.6 percent. The traditional slave counties of Middle Florida, however, showed limited growth, well below the state’s average. By 1910, Florida’s four largest black counties were Duval, Alachua, Marion, and Escambia. Other Florida counties also demonstrated significant growth rates. Clearly blacks were moving—both into and within Florida.

White Floridians in 1865, were shocked and worried by the sudden departure from the farms and plantations of their black folks. Susan Bradford Eppes, recalling conditions on her father’s Leon County plantation at the end of the Civil War, wrote that

[]he Negro loves to roam; and his attachments are not strong; new scenes lure him on; the more he travels the better he likes it, and he is ready at any time to drop anything he is doing to hunt green fields and pastures anew.

Eppes reflected the patronizing view of many white southerners—a view stemming from a misguided belief that most blacks lacked responsibility. Octavia Bryant-Stephens in Thomasville, Georgia, similarly lamented over what she saw as the irresponsible flight of ex-slaves into Tallahassee in the summer of 1865. She wrote in her diary that "most of the Negroes went to town having a holiday, cannons fired, the town full of Negroes, about 3000." By implying that the freedmen’s

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11Negro Population, 75.

12Edward Ayers has determined that both in- and out-migration in the decades following the Civil War did not affect Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida nearly as much as other states of the former Confederacy. The reasons behind this phenomenon demand further inquiry. See Edward Ayers, The Promise of the New South: Life After Reconstruction (New York, 1992), 151.

13Leon County showed a decrease of 3.9%, Madison a .9% increase, Jefferson a 1.25% increase, Jackson a 17.9% increase, and Gadsden with an increase of 25.6% between 1880 and 1910. Negro Population, 802.

14Citrus grew by 767.4% between 1880 and 1900, Polk grew 542.6% between 1880 and 1890, Taylor grew 513.9% between 1900 and 1910, Manatee grew 412.2% between 1900 and 1910, Lee grew 398.4% between 1900 and 1910, Volusia grew 357.6% between 1880 and 1890, and Dade grew 224.4% between 1900 and 1910. Ibid., 778.

15Susan Bradford Eppes, The Negro of the Old South (Chicago, 1925), 165.


need for mobility was irresponsibly rooted Eppes, Bryant-Stephens, and other white commentators revealed their racism. Such tendencies, deeply rooted in the slavery experience and exacerbated during Reconstruction, emerged as an unfortunately characteristic element of the New South ethos.

The dream of acquiring land catalyzed black in-migration. As Michael L. Lanza has identified, the Southern Homestead Act of 1866 that promised free land to the landless played an important, stimulating role in Florida. It opened millions of acres of public land—land many of the freedmen were eager to occupy. Lacking the needed capital, much of this land remained out of reach for most freedmen. Furthermore, white planters were generally not inclined to rent their land to blacks, for it was believed by some that such a responsibility would "ruin the negro."19

The freedmen's desire for land reflected more than a longing for material improvement. Land ownership implied independence and responsibility, the twin ideals of citizenship. For Florida's freedmen such notions fused with their efforts "to enjoy America" while negating the symbolic images of slavery: dependency, stifled opportunity, and restricted mobility. Nell Irvin Painter in her examination of the 1879 Exodus to Kansas declared that poor black freedmen believed that land ownership held the key not only to material prosperity but to equal opportunity and happiness as well.20

Journalistic assertions notwithstanding, public lands in Florida failed to become what one Florida newspaper editor called "an asylum for the oppressed."21 Public lands were still available in Florida by the mid-1870s, and not only in the southern part of the state, but in counties like Orange, which saw a significant increase in black population in the 1880s.22 The promotion of these public lands, however, reflected the racist climate of the late nineteenth-century United States and not the professed aims of the Southern Homestead Act of 1866.23 Consequently, few freedmen in Florida or elsewhere throughout the South succeeded in acquiring rural land.24 Initially frustrated in their attempts to obtain land, itinerant tenancy initially offered blacks a relatively secure alternative. But, if a better situation came along, black tenant

New York, (1992), 123.
21Tallahassee Sentinel, Aug. 14, 1875.
22Negro Population, 778.
23The New South, Jan. 9, 1875. Michael L. Lanza maintains that the distinguishing feature of the Southern Homestead Act of 1866 was that it provided free land for the expressed purpose of homesteading. The act aimed at thwarting the efforts of speculators by prohibiting the outright purchase of federal land in those public land states open to homesteading. Lanza argued that this intent sprang from three federal assumptions regarding land use: the Jeffersonian ideal of supporting the interests of small yeoman farmers over the desires of speculators; the Republican Party's advocacy of a "homestead-only" restriction of public land use that reflected the free-soil, free-labor ideology the Republicans had formulated in the 1850s; and the more radical aim of some Republicans in Congress who favored a policy designed to punish the former plantation owners. See Lanza, Agrarianism and Reconstruction Politics, 1-2.
farmers were prepared to move. One ex-slave, Charles Coates, having suffered slavery in Georgia, migrated to Florida after working as a tenant farmer and in a series of odd jobs throughout the southeast. He finally came to Florida on the wave of urban migration into Jacksonville during the last quarter of the nineteenth century. His story was not unique. Other blacks migrating into and within Florida shared similar itinerant experiences. The urge to move, to be "good and gone," prompted southern blacks to seek not only economic aggrandizement but the simple benefits enjoyed by white Americans. The promise of land ownership fused with this initial phase of black migration and melded with the American myths of individualism and independence. By seeking land blacks presumably sought safety, better education for their children, independence, responsibility, and maintenance of community—in addition to economic improvement.

White southerners, facing the task of rebuilding the South, sought to manipulate black labor. Throughout the latter part of the nineteenth century, the disposition of black labor in Florida commanded the attention of Florida's elites. The acute labor shortage in Florida following emancipation prompted one foreign observer to wonder:

Negro labor seems abundant, yet we understand there is difficulty in securing it. But there are reasons why this is so. They dislike, as a rule, to do any labor for their old masters, since that would seem to them very much like the old system which they now have such a horror of.

Time validated this observation. Blacks, exercising free geographic mobility, did the same with their labor. Even though some southern whites remained divided over the role blacks were to play, the importance of their labor persisted for decades as a central concern. Freedom ostensibly liberated economically oppressed blacks whose labor had been appropriated in slavery. Mobility emerged as a critical part of this economic liberation by offering blacks the chance to migrate

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24Ibid., 53, 98, 103, 119, 121-23, 143, 169, 221, 246.

27Carol Marks, Farewell, We're Good and Gone (Bloomington, IN, 1989), 1.

28Such a notion, long a part of the mythology of US history, emerged with significance in the 18th century. No doubt black bondsmen became imbued with such notions. See Kenneth A. Lockridge, A New England Town: The First Hundred Years (New York, 1985) and Robert A. Gross, The Minutemen and Their World (New York, 1976).


3Ledyard Bill, A Winter in Florida (New York, 1869), 217.

to those places where their opportunities were greatest. In areas where the plantation economy and its elites still held sway, black labor was highly prized and efforts to thwart black mobility were evident in the black codes and vagrancy laws. Where black labor threatened to impede the ability of working-class whites to secure employment, black labor was clearly less valued. Restrictions on black labor, cast within the context of the Mississippi Plan, persisted in the New South era.

Ironically, the planter elites initially found an ally in the Freedmen’s Bureau. Ostensibly designed to aid the freed-


35The "Mississippi Plan" stemmed from Mississippi's state constitutional convention of 1890—a convention called to disfranchise legally the state's 120,000 black citizens. To this end, the convention adopted a two dollar poll tax and education requirements. Not only blacks were disfranchised. In Mississippi some 11,000 poor whites also lost voting rights. The plan added a list of crimes—burglary, theft, arson, perjury, murder, and bigamy—that, upon conviction, eliminated voting privileges. Other southern states soon followed suit, transforming the Mississippi Plan into what C. Vann Woodward identified as "the American Way." Woodward, Origins, 321. See also 321-49 and John Hope Franklin and Alfred A. Moss, Jr., From Slavery to Freedom: A History of African Americans, 7th ed. (New York, 1994), 259-63.


men and to prevent their return to slave-like conditions, the Freedmen's Bureau also served as an employment agency. The Bureau aimed at land distribution, but at relocation of black labor to where it was in greatest demand—invariably in rural areas. Bureau officials, convinced that an improved economy would also contribute to the security of the freedmen, rationalized the need to stimulate the southern economy by relocating black labor. Many of the same conditions prevailed in Florida, and the Bureau's actions in Florida encouraged in-migration.

Cases exist whereby the planter elites continued to exercise significant control over the freedmen, in some instances denying them the reality of their rapidly approaching freedom. These elites were repulsed by the very thought of emancipation and their blacks leaving the plantations.

37Cohen, Freedom's Edge, 54.

38Davis, Civil War and Reconstruction in Florida, 370-71; Eppes, Some Eventful Years, 345; and Cohen, Freedom's Edge, 71. By enforcing both labor contracts and vagrancy laws, the Bureau clearly served the interests of the planter elites. See Richardson, "Freedmen's Bureau in Florida," 167-74.

William W. Davis, betraying his Dunningesque training, suggested that the Bureau's prime function was the protection of the freedmen, failing to note that the planter elites probably benefitted more from Bureau activities than did the freedmen. While noting southern white support for the Bureau, the question of "why" fails to emerge. See Davis, Civil War and Reconstruction in Florida, 382-83, 399. Davis was one of an array of talented young historians of the South, Ulrich Bonnell Phillips being another, who had studied under Reconstruction historian William A. Dunning at Columbia. Around 1900 Columbia had eclipsed Johns Hopkins as the best place to study the southern history—primarily because of Dunning. Condensing Reconstruction as an evil, corrupt institution imposed upon a prostrate land, Dunning emerged as an apologist for the South.

Matilda Brooks, a North Carolina slave who eventually migrated to Monticello, Florida, recalled of how, near the end of the war, slaves remained ignorant of the war and its progress. But when the federals were sighted near Brooks's plantation, news of impending freedom spread throughout the slave community “just like dry grass burning up a hill.”

Other slaveholders, in outright defiance of the Emancipation Proclamation and the surrender of all southern armies, held onto their slaves—in some instances up to the arrival of federal troops. Sarah Ross, a Mississippi slave, lost little time in leaving her liberated plantation when her former owner, forced by federal soldiers, reluctantly granted Sarah’s freedom. Leaving the unpleasant memories of the plantation behind, Sarah headed for Florida, ultimately marrying and settling in Live Oak. Rebecca Hooks, held in slavery in Georgia, was “hastily told” of her freedom as Union forces approached in search of planters who were still holding their slaves after the war had ended.

Even though warned of the dangers of freedom by her master, Rebecca and her husband fled the plantation—two of the first to leave. Not knowing their destination, blacks like Rebecca Hooks, Sarah Ross, and Matilda Brooks did not hesitate to sever their ties with the plantation system and to jettison at least the realities, if not the memories, of slavery. All that mattered was to be “gone.” The ultimate destination for these three ex-slaves, as for many others, was Florida. Ambrose Douglass, a North Carolina slave, reflected on his migration into Florida after freedom came:

I was 21 when freedom finally came, and that time I didn’t take no chances on ’em taking it back . . . I lit out for Florida and wound up in Madison County. I had a nice time there; I got married, got plenty of work, and made me a little money.

Douglass’s experience mirrored that of many Florida migrants. Moving from job to job, always seeking to improve their material and social conditions, freedmen failed to obtain any high degree of material security. They did, however, exhibit independence through mobility. Even though the Southern Homestead Act guaranteed free land, it failed, because it did not provide the ex-slaves with anything beyond land. For the Act to have realized its purpose of aiding the establishment of small yeoman farms, capital was needed in addition to land—capital for stock, tools, and the initial means of subsistence required of new settlers.

With the dream of land ownership outrusting the realities involved, many blacks recognized that a small portion of independence and autonomy in the city surpassed a life of itinerancy or tenancy. Itinerancy reflected the economic oppression blacks faced in their attempts to secure just terms with their often temporary employers. Tenancy emerged too reminiscent of slavery, because it attempted to tie blacks to the plantation. Frustrated by these modes of existence, blacks were often forced to move. It is not surprising then, that black in-migration both within and into Florida increasingly turned toward cities like Jacksonville.

In Florida and other southern states where a planter elite struggled for control of the South, whites encouraged blacks

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^Rawick, Florida Narratives, 49.

^Ibid., 169.

^Ibid., 177.

^-Ibid., 103.

^Cohen, Freedom’s Edge, 52.
to stay either in rural areas or to migrate where rural labor was in demand. But cities and towns beckoned, and freedmen responded. "The streets of Tallahassee were clustered with these jubilant [black] people going here and there," ex-slave Louis Napoleon observed, and "it was a joyous and unforgettable occasion."45

More than just the "allurements of the city," and the promise of greater autonomy and community security that drew freedmen to Florida.46 Seeking employment in Florida's timber, turpentine, phosphate, and railroad industries, blacks moving into and within Florida would, in growing numbers, seek the accoutrements that such employment promised. Blacks also secured urban employment in Florida as blacksmiths, carpenters, cooks, and domestic servants. By 1910, about 50 percent of Florida's employed black work force labored in urban-oriented jobs.47

Not all such urban activity was seen in a positive light. Newspapers, reflecting concern over urban growth and its attendant problems, characterized Florida's cities as "nurseries of vice, corruption, crime, and consequent pauperism."48 To serve best the interests of the state, the steady stream of black emigration into Florida's cities and towns demanded control,49 and, with freedmen "flocking" into the state's cities and towns, southerners feared that crops would be neglected.50 White Floridians feared the costs—both social and economic—of uncontrolled black mobility.

Blacks encountered resistance to urbanization—even after Reconstruction. Planter elites did not want their blacks to pursue the aims of the New South boosters by becoming industrial workers, and Redeemers wanted blacks tied to rural-based industry. All three feared the idea of black/white working-class solidarity that might arise in the liberal climate of urbanity.51

Furthermore, major sources of employment in Florida ran counter to both the notion of land ownership and urbanization among black migrants. Both the timber and the turpentine industries, the phosphate industry, and the railroad boom of the late nineteenth century, kept blacks forever on the move toward new stands of yellow pine for turpentine and lumber,

45Rawick, Florida Narratives, 246.

46One slavery historian has suggested that the social void experienced by whites when freedom came had profound repercussions within the white southern community. No doubt blacks experienced a similar void in community. See Eugene D. Genovese, Roll, Jordan, Roll: The World the Slaves Made (New York, 1972), 97-112.

47This work force was estimated to be 107,000. Negro Population, 517.

48Tallahassee Sentinel, Oct. 2, 1865.


51For a cogent analysis of southern concerns over organized labor, see W. J. Cash, The Mind of the South (1941; reprint, New York, 1991), 345-57. Ironically, this fear found justification in the Populist movement of the 1890s, a rural- and not an urban-based movement. For an examination of the fears aroused by Populism, see Ayers, Promise, 249-82; and Woodward, Origins, 235-63.
new phosphate deposits, and the construction of new railroad mileage.25

Southern cities encouraged black urbanization. Despite the initial efforts of the Freedmen’s Bureau to keep blacks tied to the land; despite the subsequent efforts of New South boosters to channel the flow of black labor into itinerancy; despite legislative efforts to keep blacks locked into rural labor through vagrancy laws; and despite the promise of acquiring land of their own, freedom encouraged a significant minority of blacks to migrate to the city.26 By 1910, nearly two million blacks lived in southern cities, 21 percent of the entire estimated black population of the South.

Almost 30 percent of Florida’s black population lived in urban areas by 1910.24 In the decades following the Civil War, Jacksonville led the way in black urbanization, showing an increase in black population of 80 percent in the first decade of the twentieth century alone.25 By 1910, Jacksonville’s black population of 29,300 represented nearly 51 percent of the city’s population. Following Jacksonville were Pensacola with over 10,000 blacks in residence, Tampa with nearly 9,000, and Key West with 5,500.27

The most rapid increase of southern and Florida blacks moving into Florida counties came where blacks made up from 25 percent to 49.9 percent of the total population.28 This initially suggests that blacks moved into white-dominated counties to secure work. While this seems probable, an equally valid assumption suggests that blacks moving into such counties sought improved conditions in the realm of education and community services—services absent in predominantly black counties that actually saw a decrease in black population. Dense populated black counties lacked the tax base needed to support the community services enjoyed in predominantly white counties. James B. Crooks has argued persuasively that the community services offered the citizens of Jacksonville helped to draw both whites and blacks into that city.29

Urban centers like Jacksonville satisfied the desire of blacks to secure the education seriously deficient in rural areas. For many of the ex-slaves, freedom and its responsibilities merged with a “lust” to secure an education for their children, as one European observer noted. He continued, “[N]egroes show a laudable zeal for education.”30

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25This trend of itinerant black labor reflects similar patterns found throughout the South as it sought to fulfill the aims of Henry W. Grady and other New South boosters. See, Ayers, Promise, 154; Howard N. Rabinowitz, Race Relations in the Urban South, 1865-1890 (Urbana, 1980), 24-25; Woodward, Origins, 207-8; and Doyle, New Cities, 263.

26Vagrancy laws, ostensibly designed to secure a reliable work force while maintaining public morals, also aimed obliquely at controlling rampant black mobility. Among the planter elite, such laws enjoyed wide support. See, Laws of Florida, 1868 (Tallahassee, FL, 1868), 99; Tallahassee Sentinel, Sept. 9, 1876; De Bow’s Review 35 (1866): 579; 2 (1866): 490.

27Negro Population, 91. Much the same can be said for the white population in Florida, with approximately 30% living in Florida’s urban areas. Clearly, Florida would remain predominantly rural until after the Second World War.

28Ibid., 96.

29Ibid., 130.

30Crooks, Jacksonville After the Fire, 5-6.

31George Campbell, White And Black: The Outcome of a Visit to the United States (New York, 1879), 120. This “lust” for education among the freedmen has garnered wide attention. See Doyle, New Cities, 271; Davis, Civil War and Reconstruction in Florida, 385-86; Du Bois, Black Recon
In the decades following the Civil War, Florida remained essentially rural for both whites and blacks. But the trend of black urbanization had taken root, primarily in the city of Jacksonville. Jacksonville displayed a distinctively northern character because of its close connections with northern investors and tourists and because of the presence of Union troops occupying the city almost at will during the Civil War. Such a social climate, endowed with improved educational opportunities, promoted the idea that urbanization could provide security for blacks. Much like the promise of free land with the Southern Homestead Act of 1866, urban life promised blacks increased freedom and autonomy—long feared by whites in the South.

Florida blacks demonstrated an urban affinity even before the Civil War had ended. Drawn to the South's cities and towns by the protection assured them by the Union troops stationed there, blacks found a measure of safety. They believed, and with good reason, that the federal government had assumed the role of caretaker of those blacks arriving in cities and towns throughout the South. Augmenting such a belief, the Freedmen's Bureau moved quickly to provide the freedmen with food, clothing, and protection. According to Howard N. Rabinowitz:

There were many reasons for this flow of freedmen to the cities; and despite unsatisfactory living conditions the migration continued and even intensified. Many former slaves were simply influenced by the headiness of freedom which removed their bonds to the land and permitted them to flee the control of their old masters. . . . The cities served as sanctuaries housing the federal troops and later the headquarters of the Reconstruction governments; there too was safety in numbers.

This "headiness of freedom" points squarely at the idea that migration, especially urban in-migration, reflected more than just economic drives. As William Cohen has indicated:

Central to slavery had been the ability of the masters to control black movement; central to freedom was the right of former bondsmen to pick up and move when they wished . . . [and] when emancipation came, blacks all over the South decided that if

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For a analysis of black community formation in Jacksonville see, Patricia Drozd Kenney, "LaVilla, Florida, 1866-1887: Reconstruction Dreams and the Formation of a Black Community," (Unpublished Master's Thesis, University of Florida, 1990). Kenney convincingly argued that black community formation in Jacksonville reflected five basic components in community development: (1) group identity, (2) "nodal points" that aided in group cohesion via black institutions, (3) physical geography, (4) a social hierarchy to organize the community, and (5) what Kenney identifies as "observable networks" of kin and kin.


freedom meant anything, it meant the right to reject slavery.66
In short, "freedom" meant the right to move.

With emancipation, Florida’s freedmen and those of the Lower South migrating to Florida began their movement unplanned, following the labor market while exercising their newly-won freedom to move. Moving at will with the itinerant labor flow, mobile blacks in Florida gained the experience and confidence that would serve them well in their increasingly urban orientation.

A large number of freedmen moving into Florida after the Civil War came from Georgia. One of these migrants, Willis Dukes, stated that while he was too young and isolated to understand fully the meaning of freedom, he knew he wanted to get away. More than anything else, Dukes wanted to get away "to some place where [I] could earn enough money to buy [my] mother a real silk dress."66 Dukes did get away when freedom came, migrating to Florida and settling in Titusville. Clayborn Gantling, born into slavery in Georgia, worked on four different plantations in Florida before moving to Jacksonville.67 After trying itinerancy, and after a brief stint as a tenant farmer, Gantling followed the increasingly well-trod path to the city.

Ex-slaves throughout the South—men and women like Sarah Ross, Ambrose Douglass, Clayborn Gantling, Matilda Brooks, Rebecca Hooks, and Willis Dukes—migrated to and within Florida after the Civil War.68 Demonstrating similar patterns of concentric movement, black mobility in Florida eventually assumed an urban cast. For black Americans, no less than for many white Americans, the city symbolized a sense of hope in an age of urbanization and modernization.

At bottom, southern black in-migration in Florida reflected more than just economic motives. Black migrants came into Florida after freedom because of complex reasons, most of them rooted in the notion of unrestricted mobility as the initial manifestation of freedom. This in-migration prepared the freedmen, in both pragmatic and emotional ways, for their move North in the 1910s. By moving, by testing their abilities in a free-labor system, blacks gained both the skills and the confidence needed for the Great Migration. Mobility liberated them. Virginia slave Philip Coleman succinctly described this liberating function of southern in-migration:

While I was at liberty to go where I pleased, I stayed down South until I got to be what I considered myself to be a good all-round man; then I came North.69

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66Cohen, Freedom’s Edge, 3, 14.
66Rawick, Florida Narratives, 121-22.
67Ibid., 143.
68Rawick, Florida Narratives, 47, 101, 120, 139, 169, 172.
Although bound by treaty and common effort in war, Italy and Germany in the first half of 1941 often held conflicting interests. Neither trusting the other, in the last weeks, those tense weeks in June before the Nazis launched their invasion of Soviet Russia, rumors, the normal confusion of incoming diplomatic and intelligence information, and intentional German dissembling, all left Italy’s leaders foundering as to the exact meaning of the events unfolding around them.¹

Divining, however, that a war against Soviet Russia was in the offing, and flippantly willing to participate in it,² Benito Mussolini and Galeazzo Ciano, the Duce’s son-in-law and foreign minister, met Adolf Hitler and Joachim von Ribbentrop at the Brenner Pass on June 2. The Führer mentioned not one word about his plans for his coming Soviet campaign,
only three weeks away, and Foreign Minister Ribbentrop mendaciously assured Ciano that rumors of operations against the Soviet Union were "devoid of any foundation or at least [were] excessively premature."4

Several days later, Mussolini reacted with his typical ambivalence. On the one hand, he ranted against the small amounts of coal, oil, and scrap iron coming to Italy from and through the Reich, amounts so small that Italy would be forced to fight, in his words, an "ersatz war." On the other hand, and despite having hitched his star to Hitler’s wagon, the Duke remarked that he would not be sorry if Germany "lost many feathers" in a war against the USSR, and he offered that this just might happen. The only question, thought the Duke, was whether or not twenty years of Soviet propaganda had been enough to create in the Russian masses a sufficient sense of "heroic mysticism."5

Dissatisfied with having to rely on Germany for economic supplies, Italy in the first half of June was seriously negotiating the details of a significant economic exchange with Moscow.6 Reflecting wishful thinking and no doubt buoyed by these negotiations, on June 14 the Soviet news agency TASS denied the very existence of the very real tensions dividing the USSR and Germany.7 Although some of his colleagues thought that the TASS communiqué meant a relaxation of the crisis, Augusto Rosso, Italy’s ambassador in Moscow, correctly argued that if this were so, then Berlin would be saying something similar. While Moscow was anxiously working to avoid a conflict, Germany’s intentions remained unclear, and Rosso suggested that Berlin perhaps was waging only a war of nerves rather than truly intending to attack the Soviet Union.8 After Friedrich Werner von der Schulenburg, the German ambassador to the Kremlin, suggest-

3DGFP, D, 12: no. 584.


5Ciano, Diaries, June 6, 1941. See also Bova Scopa to Ciano, 6/2/41: MAE (Rome) AP URSS b38 f8.

6Rosso to Ciano, 6/8/41; Under-Secretary for Military Production, circular, 6/11/41: MAE (Rome) AP URSS b38 f5; DAC 2, circular, 6/14/41: ibid., b38 f7; DDI, 9th, 6: no. 952; 7: no. 260.

7DGFP, D, 12: no. 629; FRUS, 1941, 1: 148-49. For more signs of Soviet-German tensions, see DGFP, D, 12: nos. 548, 550, 573, 591, 593, 604, 639, 640, 645, 646, 649, 654, 655, 658.

8DDI, 9th, 7: no. 256. At the end of May, Rosso had reported on "diffuse" and "contradictory" rumors that Berlin wanted concrete guarantees on the supply of raw materials for a determined number of years and the right to send troops through the USSR to Iraq or Turkey. Ibid., no. 187. The Italian Embassy in Berlin likewise reported that the Germans were telling the Soviets that the choice was either armed conflict or substantial economic and territorial concessions, which would include Germany’s administration of the Ukraine for an unspecified number of years and its control of all Soviet railroads. Zamboni to Ciano, telegram 4974R/878, 5/21/41; Zamboni to Ciano, 5/29/41: MAE (Rome) AP URSS b38 f1. For similar contentions, see The Times (London), May 14, June 12, 14, 18, 20, 21, 1941. For more on the view from Berlin, see Leonardo Simoni (pseud. Michele Lanza), Berlin: Ambasciata d'Italia (1939-1943) (Rome, 1946), 216-42.
ed that Italy might even remain aloof from a Soviet-German war, Rosso begged Rome for information and instructions.9

As TASS was making its announcement, Ciano was meeting with Ribbentrop in Venice. In a gondola on the way to dinner, he asked about the many rumors of the impending attack. Despite Ribbentrop’s protestations of ignorance, Mussolini on June 15 directed the Italian military attaché in Berlin to offer Hitler an army corps if war should break out, and three days later the Italian high command issued orders for constituting the Italian Expeditionary Corps in Russia.10

Everything, after all, pointed to war.11 For example, when the nervous German representatives in Moscow sent their wives and children back to the Reich, Rosso urged that the Italian wives and female embassy employees likewise be sent home. They finally were on the 19th, two days after the last German dependents had left.12

That same day, Schulenburg asked Rosso what Italy would do in case of a Soviet-German war. And if Rome and Moscow did sever relations, under whose protection would Italy place its interests? Still without instructions or even information from Rome, Rosso suggested that the only real choice lay between Switzerland and Japan. In his report, he promised Ciano that he was prepared to destroy his cipher materials as needed.13

On the 20th, Schulenburg informed Rosso that, according to his information, Italy would not join a Soviet-German conflict. He thought that the Royal Embassy would remain in Moscow, and he even asked the Italian ambassador to take care of his personal affairs. Rosso asked his bosses what he should do. The Embassy, he again assured Rome, would be ready for any eventuality.14

Merely one day before the final reckoning, Ciano acknowledged to his diary that the signs pointed to war. What

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9**DDI**, 9th, 7: no. 252.


11Cicconardi to Ciano, 6/6/41, 6/12/41, 6/19/41: MAE (Rome) AP URSS b38 ff; **DDI**, 9th, 7: nos. 257, 258.

12**DDI**, 9th, 7: no. 251; Rosso to Ciano, 6/17/41: MAE (Rome) AP URSS b38 ff; Rosso to Ciano, 6/21/41: *ibid.*, b38 ff; Rosso to Ciano, 6/23/41: *ibid.*, b38 ff. For Laurence Steinhardt, the American ambassador in Moscow, more telling than the recall of the German and Italian wives was that the counsellor of the German ambassador had sent his dog, his "inseparable" companion, back to Berlin. Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History* (New York, 1948), 299; Lyman B. Kirkpatrick Jr., *Captains Without Eyes: Intelligence Failures in World War II* (London, 1969), 65. The

Japanese general staff insisted that in case of a Soviet-German war, Japan would be at the side of its Tripartite allies. Indelli to Ciano, 6/20/41: MAE (Rome) AP URSS b38 ff.


14**DDI**, 9th, 7: no. 282. See also Rosso to Ciano, 6/20/41: MAE (Rome) AP URSS b38 ff. Dino Alferi, Italy’s ambassador in Berlin and former ambassador to the Kremlin, predicted that action against the USSR would begin sometime between the end of June and the beginning of July. He opined that Germany’s military task would not be overly difficult—the problem lay in how to usefully organize the vast Soviet territory to be captured. Alferi continued that for the moment, Berlin seemed exclusively interested in economic matters. Any pact with Moscow, however, had to be backed by sufficient military forces. After his victory, Hitler could then turn to the decisive campaign against England. **DDI**, 9th, 7: no. 285.
should Italy do? "The [abstract] idea of a war against Russia," he wrote, "is in itself popular, inasmuch as the date of the fall of Bolshevism would be counted among the most important in civilization," but, he added, Italians did not like the idea of this particular war which would be fought for no "obvious" or "convincing" reason. Ciano finished, noting that Berlin believed that the war would be over in eight weeks, "and this is possible," he continued, because "military calculations in Berlin have always been better than political" ones.

But what if this should not be the case? If the Soviet armies should show... a power of resistance superior to that the bourgeois countries have shown, what results would this have on the proletarian masses of the world?\footnote{Ciano, Diaries, June 21, 1941.}

Perspicacious questions. Unfortunately, neither he nor Mussolini particularly shared their hopes, fears, or even basic information with their ambassadors. They thus did not have to examine their policies drifting fatalistically toward the vortex of an expanded war, where the inevitable risks were many and the potential rewards few. Italy, after all, was the tail to the German wolf, and Berlin had established a ranked priority for dealing with its allies on the forthcoming invasion: Finland, Hungary, and Romania, all stood higher than did Italy—the cofounder of the Axis.\footnote{DGFP, D, 12: nos. 431, 614; Barton Whaley, Codeword Barbarossa (Cambridge, MA, 1973), 142-47; Aleksandr Moiseevich Nekrich, 22nd June 1941: Soviet Historians and the German Invasion, ed. Vladimir Petrov (Columbia, SC, 1968), 86, 91-95; Kirkpatrick, Captains Without Eyes, 43-44. See also Georgii Semenovich Filatov, Vostochnyi pokhod Mussolini (Moscow, 1963), 12, and The Times (London), June 16, 1941. Soviet propagandists had long disparaged Italy for falling completely under German influence. See, e.g., Rosso to Ciano, 5/6/41: MAE (Rome) AP URSS b38 fl.}

Italy’s inferior position is clearly witnessed by the way in which Hitler belatedly informed his ally of his move. At 3:00 a.m. on June 22, the German chargé saw Ciano in his private apartment and gave him the Führer’s long, ritual letter, addressed to the Duce, who was out of town.\footnote{DGFP, D, 12: no. 666; Raymond James Sontag and James Stuart Beddie, eds., Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941: Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Office (Washington, DC, 1948), 347-49.} After thanking Mussolini for the uninvited offer of Italian soldiers, Hitler insisted that there was no need to rush them to the front "for in this immense theater of war the troops cannot be assembled at all points at the same time anyway." Hitler, who lumpy justified himself for having kept the Duce in the dark about his plans, was more interested that Mussolini focus his attentions elsewhere to protect Germany’s flanks. He wrote:

You, Duce, can give the decisive aid... by strengthening your forces in North Africa;... by [building]... a group which... can march into France in case of a... violation of the treaty; and... by carrying the air... and... submarine war... into the Mediterranean.\footnote{DGFP, D, 12: no. 660; DDI, 9th, 7: no. 288; Filatov, Vostochnyi pokhod, 13-14; Georgii Semenovich Filatov, et. al., Istoriia Itali, 3 vols. (Moscow, 1971), 3: 165. Soon after informing the Soviet ambassador in Berlin of the state of war (DGFP, D, 12: no. 664), at 4:10 am Ribbentrop gave Alfieri Berlin’s justifications for the attack. Alfieri to Ciano, 6/22/41: MAE (Rome) AP URSS b38 fl; Alfieri to Ciano, 6/22/41: ibid., b38 fl; DDI, 9th, 7: nos. 290, 296; DGFP, D, 12: no. 665; Dino Alfieri, Due distatori di fronte (Milan, 1948), 197-99. From Moscow, Rosso reported that Schulenburg had told Molotov at 6:30 am that as of 4:00 am Germany considered itself to be at war. Molotov, Rosso added, had expressed sadness at the unjustified attack. Rosso to Ciano, 6/22/41: MAE (Rome) AP URSS b38 f6; DDI, 9th, 7: no. 291; DGFP, D, 12: nos. 659, 662. For Molotov’s June 22 broadcast speech acknowledging the state of war without mention of Italy, see Izvestia, June 24, 1941; Prawda, June 23, 1941; and New York Times, July 23, 1941. For more on Hitler’s preference that the Duce concentrate on North Africa and Mussolini’s unwill-}
With the chargé, Ciano phoned the Duce to relay the news. Mussolini’s wife, Rachele, after the war remembered:
We were staying at Riccione when the telephone rang. . . . To avoid waking Benito, I suggested that the caller phone back later, but he refused . . .: "I have to tell the Duce that Germany has just declared war on Russia." I ran to Benito’s room and woke him, but when he came to the phone it was not to listen; he spoke long and irritably in German. When he had hung up, he said furiously, "It’s madness. It’s our ruin. They should never have attacked Russia." 19
Later the Duce peevishly ranted, "Not even I disturb my servants at night, but the Germans make me jump out of bed at any hour without the least consideration." 20

In the end, however, nothing could be done except to express understanding and approval—and to join in on the kill. Italy declared itself to be at war as of 5:30 on the morning of June 22, and, ignoring the Führer’s druthers, Mussolini again offered Italian troops for the Russian Front. 21

The German attack apparently surprised the Soviet Embassy in Rome no less than it had the Duce. Although the staff had been aware that something was brewing, they had not seemed preoccupied, nor had they made any preparations to leave the country. In fact, June 22 caught virtually all of them spending a languid Sunday morning at Fregene, one of the seaside resorts near Rome. Ciano tried to contact the Soviet ambassador, Nikolai Gorelkin, but could not see him until 12:15 pm, after he had been located and had returned to Rome. According to Ciano, Gorelkin received the news of war with his typical "lackadaisical indifference." The anticlimactic conversation at Palazzo Chigi lasted but two minutes. 22

Because no newspapers were published on Sunday, the Italian government at noon publicly declared war in an official communiqué read over the radio. An unusually hot and sultry day, the announcement caught most of Rome, just as it had the Soviet Embassy, by surprise and at seashore. The people’s reaction was muted, showing neither enthusiasm, dismay, nor, as one observer put it, "the slightest change in daily life."

Rachele Guidi Mussolini, *Mussolini: An Intimate Biography by His Widow, as told to Albert Zarca* (New York, 1974), 286. She mistakenly identified the German caller as the German military attaché. See Whaley, *Codeword Barbarossa*, 295 n.56.

Ciano, *Diaries*, June 30, 1941.

Alfieri, *Due dittatori*, p. 199; DGFP, D, 12: no. 666. Pavel Ovsianin, *Konets rezhima Mussolini* (Moscow, 1965), 4. For the Bulgarian reaction to the invasion and Italy’s declaration of war, see DDI, 9th, 7: nos. 293, 298. For Slovakia’s declaration of war, see ibid., no. 297. Iran, suspicious of both


Ciano, *Diaries*, June 22, 1941; Note for cabinet proceedings, 6/22/41: MAE (Rome) AP URSS b38 f6. Apparently, up to 10:00 am Gorelkin did not know that Italy had declared war. *New York Times*, June 23, 1941. See also Filatov, *Vostochnyi pokhozd*, 8 and *The Times* (London), June 23, 1941. Only six days later did Rome declare war in Albania’s name. David J. Dalin, *Soviet Russia’s Foreign Policy, 1929-1942* (New York: Yale University Press, 1942), 278. Later Gorelkin returned to Ciano to say that he had not been able to transmit Italy’s declaration of war to his government. Ciano courteously replied that the foreign ministry was willing to send his messages, but the ambassador, saying that all his people were at the Embassy and in good condition, refused Ciano’s offer. Ciano to Indelli, 6/27/41: MAE (Rome) AP URSS b38 f6.
The lesson learned seemed to be that the end of the war was far away—for Italians, unhappy news indeed.\textsuperscript{23}

Italy's declaration of war clearly concerned Rosso, who only found out about it from Soviet radio. Without official instructions from Rome and deprived even of information, he eventually managed to meet with Deputy Foreign Commissar Andrei Vyshinskii to ask if the radio's information had been correct. An embarrassed Rosso had to ask the deputy commissar why Italy had declared war.\textsuperscript{24}

Just what had possessed Mussolini to declare war on Soviet Russia?\textsuperscript{25} And what possessed him to back up that
declaration with an active military presence? Mussolini wrote Hitler on June 23 suggesting several benefits deriving from the attack: it deprived Britain of its last hope on the continent; it brought the Axis back to its true anti-bolshevik doctrine, temporarily abandoned for tactical reasons; it brought back to the Axis fold disillusioned anti-bolshevik elements throughout the world; and, finally, it would bring to economic cooperation with Europe a "new Russia, diminished in territory and liberated from Bolshevism," a Russia which would supply the raw materials necessary for Germany and Italy to thrive. The Duce rejoiced at Hitler's decision "to take Russia by the throat."\textsuperscript{26}

Giving the Axis too much credit for planning and cooperation, many observers incorrectly assumed that Hitler and Mussolini had plotted the campaign and Italy's role in detail during their Brenner meeting of June 2. Presumably, the first step had been completed; only a few days before June 22, Italy had sent troops to garrison the Greek territories occupied by Germany, thereby releasing soldiers and equipment to the Soviet Front. Italy presumably would convey German troops, materials, and foodstuffs through the Adriatic to the Aegean, thereby lightening the burden on the railroad system straining to supply the German advance.\textsuperscript{27} At same time Italy would

\textsuperscript{23}\textit{New York Times}, June 23, 24, 1941. Speakers at a conference of propagandists held in Moscow in early May had declared that capitalists, fearing the social consequences of a long war, wanted to end it as quickly as possible. Italy, in particular, already was war weary, and Berlin was pressuring Rome to take a more active military role, even though the Italians had long been unsuccessful on both land and sea. Rosso to Ciano, 5/8/41: MAE (Rome) AP URSS b38 f15. The Soviet press in June occasionally and gingerly pointed out some of Italy's economic problems, generally by repeating information from Italy's Stefani News Agency or Italian papers. \textit{Izvestia}, June 19, 1941; \textit{Pravda}, June 2, 8, 15, 22, 23, 1941. \textit{The Times} (London), June 3, 1941, picked up on the theme of Italy's economic dislocations.


\textsuperscript{25}\textit{DGFP}, D, 13: no. 7; \textit{DDI}, 9th, 7: no. 290. For Hitler's response in which he also invited the Duce to meet him at the front, see \textit{DGFP}, D, 13: no. 50.

\textsuperscript{26}Many were skeptical of the utility of having Italian troops on the Eastern Front. In his memoirs Field Marshal Keitel later wrote:

Naturally, Mussolini had no desire to lag behind Hungary and Romania and had offered the Führer an Italian light (semi-mobile) Corps, in return for Rommel's armoured corps' being in Africa. The War Office was furious at this offer, which they valued anything but highly, as it was not a reasonable burden to place on our strained railway system that summer, for the Italians could be transported to the front only at the expense of indispensable war
patrol the entrance to the Dardanelles, while the Luftwaffe in Crete, reinforced by the contingents which had left Italy only a few days before, would be kept ready to stave off any possible a2tion by the British fleet in the Eastern Mitterranean and to prevent its joining with the Soviet fleet. Foreign press reports continued that the Germans saw their attack as part of a plan to exclude Britain from the Eastern Mediterranean. They expected to reach the Soviet-Turkish border on the eastern shore of the Black Sea in a few weeks. They then would move against Britain in Middle East.39

The day following Italy’s declaration of war, propagandists shrilly shouted Rome’s purposes to the foreign press:
1. This conflict is along the constructive lines of Europe’s renovation undertaken by the Axis powers;
2. The war is not directed against the Russian people but against bolshevism (and looks also to liberate its subject peoples . . . ); 3. The history of Soviet diplomacy is nothing but one of contradictions and double dealings; 4. [Germany has] . . . irrefutably established the aggressive intentions of Russia; 5. The British Empire has tried to include the USSR among its allies in its effort to carry on the war.39

Soviet historians have accused Mussolini of leading a "Christian Crusade" against bolshevik Russia.30 Not a specious charge. Civiltà Cattolica, for example, exhorted: "In their prayers Catholics should not forget to add this urgent wish: the salvation of 180 million souls lorded over by a few militant atheists."31 Clearly many of the religiously oriented rejoiced at the attack against what the Catholic Avvenire called "the anticipation of the anti-Christ." A fascist, non-Vatican paper specializing in religious news, Avvenire continued:

Two years of intimate suffering between idealistic imperatives and the compromises of reality have finally ended. We are above all believers. We believe and hope that the anti-Bolshevist drive is the inevitable idealistic crusade which had returned fascism to its origins. Il Piccolo declared that

It is not necessary to ask Fascists what they think of an anti-Soviet war because Fascism was the first, twenty-three years ago, to enter the lists against the Red barbarians. We were awaiting this memorable event which, after the expulsion of the English from the Continent makes us protagonists in a similar drive against Bolshevism.

New York Times, June 24, 1941.

The fascist propagandist Virginio Gayda gave three reasons for the move: to prevent Russia from becoming an English base of operations; to free Europe and the World from communist propaganda; and to organize Europe against England and America. A two-front war would be avoided, he was sure, because Germany would finish off Russia before Britain and United States could do anything about it. Ibid. See Mack Smith, Mussolini's Roman Empire, 243-44.

3See, e.g., Filatov, Vostochny pokhod, 9-11.

3F. Pellegrino, "Sopravvivenza religiosa nella Russia sovietica," La Civiltà Cattolica 4 (Sept. 25, 1941): 34; see also 25-34 and his "L'attacco a fondo" dell'ateismo sovietico," La Civiltà Cattolica 3 (July 23, 1941): 169-81 for more attacks on militant atheism. See also Inzenga, "Russia e campagna di Russia," 35-38. The Vatican itself claimed fore-knowledge of the conflict and did see it as part of a Christian war against communism. DDI, 5th, 7: no. 304.
sign of predestination . . . . England and the United States can no longer make man believe in the good faith of those who fight for Russia.32

Italian propagandists accused the United States of entering an "unholy alliance" by pledging its aid to the communist state. Hoping for support from US Catholics, the sometimes sleazy fascist propagandist, Virginio Gayda, wrote:
This open association of the Anglo-Saxon world with Sovietism can only deepen its moral isolation from the many free peoples who have respect for civilization and the realization of the danger that threatens it from the plot of Moscow.33

Italian propagandists further declared that the Soviets had merely modified Marxism to meet Russia's Asiatic needs, and the solidarity between bourgeois plutocracy and Soviet communism was not founded alone on the anti-European and anti-Japanese interests of the English and Slavs, but also upon the Hebraic, bolshevik experiment.34 These forces had mobilized to annihilate the real revolution, the one in Italy and Germany resolve to liberate Europe's workers from their oppression at the hands of English capitalism and Russian imperialism.35

Mussolini made his decision to join the fighting in the East rather casually, in part because he often seemed convinced that the Russians were so racially inferior that they could put up no great resistance.36 One fascist in the early winter of 1941 intoned that "half-breed Slavo-Mongols" were racially degenerate, and Russians did "not possess the offensive spirit and sense of initiative that constitutes the true military spirit," because they, unlike fascist soldiers, had for centuries been forced to obey as slaves.37 Further, the Duce thought poorly of the Soviet army, which fascist propaganda

All of Europe is on its feet against Anglo-Saxon and Soviet Judaism. It would be absurd for the Span of Franco to remain absent in the hour when her enemies are being crushed in the grip of inexorable justice.

*New York Times*, June 27, 1941. Praising the morality of the war against bolshevism, Spain already had promised to send volunteers to fight, but was still unprepared to fully join the war. *DDI*, 9th, 7: no. 301.

33Camillo Pellizzi, *Flutrocrizia e bolscevismo* (Rome, 1942), 17-19, 22. For the complex and ambivalent ideological lens through which Mussolini himself and Italian fascism in general saw bolshevism, see my *Russia and Italy against Hitler: The Bolshevik-Fascist Rapprochement of the 1930s* (Westport, CT, 1991), 77-91. See also Francesco di Preter, *Fascismo e bolscevismo nell'Europa e nel mondo* (Florence, 1940), esp. 41-43; Tomaso Napolitano, "Razzismo Sovietico," *Nuova Antologia* 74 (May 16, 1939): 154-68; and L'Illustrazione Italiana (June 29, 1941): 1008.

34For the famous Italian philosopher and fascist supporter, Giovanni Gentile, in "Giappone Guerriero," *Civiltà Cattolica* (Jan. 21, 1942): 12, called for racial solidarity between Italians, Germans, and Japanese "to save Europe from the double threat of stateless communists and false democrats, Hebrew or not." One of Italy's leading naval officers, Admiral Gino Ducci, similarly urged Japan to enter the war against USSR, and Roberto Farinacci prodded Spain to do likewise:


had criticized for being too politicized and even too mechanized. Mussolini thus occasionally could persuade himself that the war would be won in a few months, and he feared that if he remained outside of it, Italy would lose its place in the sun, and he would lose his reputation as one of the chief prophets of anti-communism. He pugnaciously had to show himself and the world that he was as much in charge of the war as was Hitler.

Avarice also intruded into Rome’s calculations. Despite already being stretched in the Balkans and North Africa, to gain his share of the spoils, Mussolini had to have troops fighting, conquering, and dying on the Eastern Front before the war’s imminent end. Rome presumptuously lusted after the economic benefits to be had from the breakup of the Soviet empire, and the foreign ministry’s documents brim with extensive reports on the various nationality regions, especially the Ukraine and Transcaucasia, and their diverse separatist movements.

One long report, for example, confidently concluded that the Ukraine, with its natural outlets to the Black Sea, geographically should be part of the Mediterranean’s economic system, and the Italian and Ukrainian economies were "absolutely complementary." The report called for building "a truly European Ukrainian State" and accused the USSR of trying, in the name of autarky, "to subtract the Ukraine from the new Europe." Arguing that the Ukraine could not survive economically without the help of a great power, these documents suggested that Ukrainians would welcome Italy’s

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38For this specific criticism, plus others, see Eugenio Chiodi, “Il militarismo bolchevico e la capacità combattiva dell’esercito Russo,” Rassegna di Politica Internazionale (Sept. 1938): 496-503. See also Ovsianiin, Konets, 5; Revkah Averbukh, Itaila v pervoi i vtoroi mirovykh voinakh (Moscow, 1946), 123-26; Isselatian and Kutasov, Diplomatia agressorov, 186-189; and Filatov, Vostochnyi pokhod, 14-18. The Italians had good cause to know something about the Soviet military based on significant exchanges in the first half of the 1930s. See my Russia and Italy, pp. 145-62.

39Ciano, Diaries, July 15, 1941; Giuseppe Gorla, L’italia nella seconda guerra mondiale: Diario di un milanes, ministro del re nel governo di Mussolini (Milan, 1959), July 5, 1941; Mack Smith, Mussolini, 269.

40In commenting on Italy’s successes and less than successes in the war, throughout June Pravda and Izvestia limited themselves to Stefani dispatches without comment.

41Frederick William Dampier Deakin, The Brutal Friendship: Mussolini, Hitler, and the Fall of Italian Fascism (Garden City, NY, 1966), 16-18; Filippo Anfuso, Roma Berlino Salò: 1936-1945 (Cermusco, 1950), 239; Mack Smith, Mussolini’s Roman Empire, 243-44.

42Ciucci promemorial, 6/23/41: MAE (Rome) AP URSS b38 f1. In addition to this file, see the numerous documents in: b37 f1, 2, 4, 5, 5 and b38 f4. Virginio Gayda in an editorial printed before the attack echoed these ideas.

A vast process of clarification is in progress to hasten the reorganization of Europe. The question is to insure, with European resources, the living of the European people. The United States intends to isolate and to starve all of Europe—both occupied and unoccupied by the Axis forces—hoping to exhaust, with such means, the means of enemy resistance. One must therefore create once and for all vast zones in Europe for food self-sufficiency.

The problem is also one of insuring raw materials and oil necessary for the work of millions of laborers and industries, for traffic among people, for the needs of war production. Europe must find her means of production as a defense against attacks which are today being attempted through England, now subservient to a great non-European power fostering ambitious designs of bankers and speculators of a greedy and sectarian world hegemony.

New York Times, June 23, 24, 1941. See as well Lauro Mainardi, U.R.S.S., prigione di popoli (Rome, 1941), which compares panaslovism and bolshevism and then details the plight of the various nationalities in the Caucasus, Ukraine, Crimea, Turkestan, etc. For related propaganda, see Mainardi’s Nazionalità e spazi vitali (Rome, 1941), this time with little mention of the USSR.
presence to balance Germany’s influence. Rome clearly believed that the Ukraine especially, but other areas as well, were worth detaching, and, with unbecoming hubris, Italians thought that they were the ones to do it.

Actually, Mussolini’s true views about bolshevik Russia are surprisingly hard to sort out. In the years before the war, he occasionally hoped to make common cause one day with Stalin against the democracies, and some fascists had welcomed this prospect. After the war began, contradictions arose from his trying both to justify the war in Soviet Russia and ultimately to exculpate himself from its failure. Sometimes he pretended always to have known how strong the Soviet Union was; sometimes he admitted its strength had

43 **Ukraine, June 1941**: MAE (Rome) AP URSS h37 f4.


45 Quite early Mussolini had doubts about the ultimate success of the attack on the USSR as reported by Ciano, Diaries, July 16, 1941: The Duce is not convinced as to the course of affairs in Russia. The tone of his conversation today was distinctly pessimistic, particularly as the Anglo-Russian alliance makes Stalin the head of Nationalist Russia. He is afraid that Germany is facing a task that is too much for her, and will not reach a complete solution of the whole problem before winter, which reveals a lot of unknown factors. He surely was reacting to what Italian journalists on the Eastern Front were reporting. See New York Times, July 11, 1941. For later comments, see Giovanni Dolfi, Con Mussolini nella tragedia: Diario del capo della segreteria particolare del Duce 1943-1944 (Rome, 1949), Nov. 5, 28, 1943.

surprised him. To some he repeated that the war against Red Russia had been inevitable and perfectly timed; to others he maintained that the Germans had attacked against his advice; and to others yet he insisted that he had urged Hitler to come to a compromise peace with Stalin.

Hardly more than one week after his declaration of war, Mussolini expressed this fundamental ambivalence to Ciano:

I hope for only one thing, that in this war in the East the Germans will lose a lot of feathers. It is false to speak of an anti-Bolshevik struggle. Hitler knows that Bolshevism has been non-existent for some time. No code protects private property like the Russian Civil Code. Let him say rather that he wants to vanquish a great continental power with tanks of

46 Mussolini wrote to Hitler on July 2: "I was aware that the military organization of the Soviet Union had made remarkable progress in these past years, but what you tell me is a surprise to me also. It appears clear that this mighty military organization, not being able to be with us, would have been against us..." He closed this letter not entirely confidently: "The task of beating Russia in order to extirpate Bolshevism is truly epic, and to have dared to do this will be the imperishable glory of your armies and the Axis revolution." DGFP, D, 13: no. 62.

47 Carlo Scottoza, La notte del gran consiglio (Milan, 1968), 70.

fifty-two tons which was getting greedy to settle accounts.40

Hence, ignoring German reluctance, Ciano’s misgivings, and his own doubts, Mussolini dispatched an expeditionary force under the command of General Giovanni Messe, to whom he explained,

We cannot count less than Slovakia and the other minor states. I have to be at Hitler’s side in Russia as he was at mine in the war against Greece and now in Africa. Italy’s destiny is intimately bound up with Germany’s.50

Here Mussolini had cut to the core, where lay pride and subservience, fatalism and tragedy.51

Although Mussolini in August told Hitler that he preferred deploying his troops in the Ukraine, where, as he explained, the average temperature generally “does not go lower than six degrees below zero [centigrade],”52 he fantasized that the Italians were superior to the Germans, “both in men and equipment.” Lamenting that Germany’s military attaché judged the situation differently, Ciano mused:

Now the Duce hopes for two things: either that the war will end in a compromise which will save the balance of Europe, or that it will last a long time, permitting us by force of arms to regain our lost prestige. Oh, his eternal illusions!53

As Mussolini began to transport his troops to the southern part of the front,54 he ignored Hitler’s pleas that there was no hurry. Speed seemed vital to the Duce, and the expeditionary force was equipped negligently. Planes were sent without deicing equipment. The motorized divisions were still largely without transport, and some of these troops had to cover a thousand miles on foot. In fact, the term “motorized division” had been a publicity gimmick, and later Mussolini audaciously blamed the Germans for not providing trucks to save these men from destruction.55

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40Ciano, Diaries, July 1, 1941. Mussolini often claimed that Stalin had rejected communism and had turned to fascism. See, e.g., Mussolini, Memoirs, 220. The fascist apologists Luigi Villari with his typical orpundness echoed Mussolini. See his Italian Foreign Policy Under Mussolini (New York, 1956), 283-84.

50Messe, La guerra al fronte russo, 177-78.

51Whaley, Operation Barbarossa, 16-17.

52DGFP, D, 13: no. 242.

53Ciano, Diaries, June 30, 1941.

54Oswyn, Kone, 5-6. From late July 1941 to early 1943 the Italian Army fighting on Soviet soil grew to at least 10 divisions plus extras. Elizabeth Wiskemann, Rome-Berlin Axis: A History of the Relations Between Hitler and Mussolini (New York, 1949), 285. Some Italian staff officers agreed with Ciano’s poor opinion of the troops going to the East, but the new head of the general staff, General Ugo Cavallero, supinely supported Mussolini’s opinions. Mack Smith, Mussolini’s Roman Empire, 243. Mario Roatta, Otto milioni di balonette: L’esercito italiano in guerra dal 1940 al 1944 (Milan, 1946), 185-87, strongly argues that sending troops to Soviet Russia was unnecessary and overextended already taxed forces.

55Messe, La guerra al fronte russo, 25; Mack Smith, Mussolini’s Roman Empire, 273-74. See Mario Cervi, The Hollow Legions: Mussolini’s Blunder in Greece, trans. Eric Mobasher and Introduction by Frederick William Dampier Deakin (Garden City, NY, 1971), 251:
The deficiencies of the Italian military organization were always appalling—no lessons for Albania were learnt from the western front, no lesson for Russia was learnt from Albania. The puttees that slowed down the circulation might have been specially devised to encourage frostbite, the model 91 rifle would not fire at twenty degrees below zero because the bolt jammed...
In a colorful ceremony on the morning of June 26 at Verona, the Duce reviewed the first motorized division of the expeditionary corps heading to the Russian front. The official communique proclaimed that the Italians "presented themselves in a superb manner, complete with men, arms and motor vehicles." But Ciano was skeptical: [Mussolini] defined it as perfect [Ciano wrote]. But that as it may, I am concerned about a direct comparison between our forces and the Germans. Not on account of the men, who are, or who may be, excellent, but on account of their equipment. I should not like to see us play once more the role of a poor relation.\textsuperscript{36}

The spearhead of the hastily assembled troops passed through Vienna on July 13. A member of Italy's Embassy in Berlin noted that they were dirty, ill-equipped, and likely to make a bad impression.\textsuperscript{37}

And they did. After the war, Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel bitterly remembered yet another group as they were reviewed by Mussolini and Hitler in Galicia near the end of August. He called them "a boundless disappointment" and asked, "How were half-soldiers like these supposed to stand up to the Russians, if they had collapsed even in face of the wretched peasant folk of Greece?"\textsuperscript{38}

Clearly, Mussolini's fascist legions, so gratuitously thrown into the fray, were not the sort of stuff to turn into reality the Duce's fantastic dreams of a new Roman Empire.

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\textsuperscript{36}\textit{New York Times}, June 27, 1941; \textit{The Times (London)}, June 27, 1941.


\textsuperscript{38}Simoni, \textit{Berlino}, July 13, 1941. See \textit{DGFP}, D, 12; 924.
THE SS ECONOMIC ADMINISTRATION, 1934-1945
AN INTRODUCTION

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Historians studying the totalitarian regimes of the twentieth century must inevitably deal with the complex administrative and bureaucratic organizations created by those governments. No history of the Soviet Union, for example, can neglect the importance of institutions such as the Communist Party, GOSPLAN, and the KGB. Likewise, no history of Nazi Germany can fail to investigate the role of the Nazi Party, the Four Year Plan, and the Schutzstaffel (SS).

While the purpose of the SS was not bureaucratic but ideological, its growing responsibilities created a vast bureaucracy. By 1942, the SS bureaucracy contained twelve main offices. Each had specific functions such as security, operations, race and resettlement, and economics and administration. Most research on the SS has concentrated on the first three areas. The Reich's Security Main Office (Reichssicherheitshauptamt, RSHA) has received much attention from historians, because it controlled the SS's political terror apparatus through the Secret State Police (Geheime Staatspolizei, Gestapo) and Security Service (Sicherheitsdienst, SD). Operations came under the direction of the SS Operations Main Office (SS-Fuehrungshauptamt, SSFHA) which ran several SS departments, including the Waffen SS (Military SS) and long has been a popular area of study. The Race and Resettlement Central Office (Rasse- und Siedlungshauptamt, RuSHA) has received historical scrutiny for its role in the SS's murderous "Germanization" policies in Eastern Europe.¹

Surprisingly, the Economic and Administrative Main Office (Wirtschafts- und Verwaltunshauptamt, WVHA) has not undergone the same detailed historical analysis as the above organizations. As the office responsible for administration and economic activity within the SS, the WVHA was one of the largest and most powerful of all the SS agencies. It had financial and administrative responsibility over the entire SS, including the concentration camp system. The WVHA managed all the SS's industrial and business ventures, which by the end of the war totaled dozens of different enterprises. It provided slave labor from its pool of concentration camp inmates to work in many sectors of German industry. Finally, the WVHA's management of the concentration camps meant that it was intimately involved in running the "Final Solution of the Jewish Question."²

The forerunner of the WVHA was the SS Administrative Office (Verwaltungsamt) headed by the future chief of the WVHA, Oswald Pohl. A former naval disbursing officer, Pohl joined the Nazi Party in 1926. Three years later he entered the ranks of the Sturmbataillonen (SA), but in 1934 he decided to accept a position in the SS.

In 1934, the SS was still in its formative stages and its leader, Heinrich Himmler, wanted to fill the SS leadership

¹For information on the organization of the SS, see Martin Broszat, Anatomie des SS-Staats (Osten und Freiburg: Walter-Verlag A.G., 1965) and Robert Lewis Kochl, The Black Corps (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985).

with a cadre of competent, hard working, and loyal professionals. He noticed Pohl’s financial and administrative background in the navy and asked him to join the SS in the position of deputy to the chief of the SS Administrative Office. Pohl, however, was not to remain second-in-command for long. His superior died in February 1934, and Pohl advanced to the top position. At that time, Pohl’s office was one of many departments within the SS Main office. The Administrative Office’s tasks were restricted to the administration of the Allgemeine SS (General SS).

On April 20, 1939, Himmler reorganized the SS Administrative Office and expanded Pohl’s responsibilities. The former Administrative Office became a separate SS Main Office responsible for both administrative matters and economic affairs. Himmler also created a Main Office for Budget and Buildings; he put Pohl in charge of both. The overlapping duties of these main offices created bureaucratic confusion. On February 1, 1942, therefore, Himmler ordered another reorganization, and both main offices were fused into one large SS Economic and Administrative Main Office (WVHA) under Pohl’s direction.3

The WVHA’s role in the German economy increased dramatically as a result of the military setbacks suffered by the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front in the winter battles of 1941 and 1942. Heavy material losses led to Hitler’s decision to increase armaments production. Always ready to increase the influence of the SS, Himmler received the Fuehrer’s permission to begin the building of armaments plants on the site of some of the SS’s concentration camps. Himmler ordered Richard Gluecks, the Inspector of Concentration Camps, to provide thousands of slave laborers for the new armament projects. Because the armament plants came under the jurisdiction of the WVHA’s responsibilities for all SS economic affairs, and because these plants required the use of Glueck’s concentration camp inmates, there was a great potential for bureaucratic confusion and infighting. Himmler, therefore, ordered yet another reorganization of the WVHA. In March 1942, Himmler put Gluecks’ office of the Inspector of Concentration Camps under the authority of Pohl’s WVHA.

The WVHA had become a “super organization” within the overall SS bureaucracy which now consisted of five main offices: Main Office A under Obergruppenfuehrer August Frank controlled the finance and administration of the SS; Main Office B under Gruppenfuehrer Georg Loerner controlled the SS’s food supply, uniforms, billeting, and equipment; Main Office C under Obergruppenfuehrer Hans Kammler controlled the construction tasks of the SS, including the building of gas chambers and crematoria; Main Office D under Obergruppenfuehrer Richard Gluecks administered the concentration camps; and Main Office W under Obergruppenfuehrer Oswald Pohl ran the WVHA’s economic enterprises.4

In its role as the administrative department of the SS, the WVHA had an important function in both the Allgemeine SS and the Waffen SS. During the pre-war years Pohl’s Verwaltungamt handled the administrative functions of the Allgemeine SS, including controlling the funds raised from members of the Allgemeine SS, developing an administrative organization for all the branches of the Allgemeine SS, and training the personnel for this administrative system.

However, administration of the SS in the midst of a world war obviously entailed more duties and more work for Pohl’s office than had been required in the pre-war period. The WVHA continued his old job of administering the Allgemeine

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4See the description of the WVHA in ibid., 5: 215-20.
SS, though during the war the latter organization had little work to keep it busy. As few as twenty WVHA men administered the Allgemeine SS during the war years. Their Allgemeine SS duties consisted of paying the salaries of the few remaining full time employees, overseeing property, creating a new payroll system, and directing the Allgemeine SS’s social welfare programs.

While the war years decreased the WVHA’s administrative work in the Allgemeine SS, the period brought a tremendous increase in its administration of the Waffen SS. The Verwaltungsamt was responsible for all supply and administrative affairs of the Waffen SS before February 1942. After the February reorganization of Pohl’s offices, his new WVHA continued his old responsibilities for the Waffen SS by procuring or manufacturing certain supplies for Waffen SS units, managing supply depots, administering disbursements to Waffen SS personnel, and acquiring land and buildings for Waffen SS use. These duties meant that WVHA personnel served in the field with Waffen SS units or were assigned to Death’s Head Units (Totentropfverbaende) guarding the concentration camps. Closely related to the Waffen SS, the latter both guarded the camps and fought as military units. The WVHA administered these elements as it did those of the Waffen SS. Moreover, many Waffen SS men also served as officials of the WVHA, and many members of the WVHA were transferred to the Waffen SS to avoid their being drafted into the Wehrmacht.5

As a result of German conquests in the Second World War, the SS came to play a crucial part in Germany’s occupation policies. On a general level the WVHA was an important component of German occupation forces in that it directed the administration and supply functions of the entire SS. It has already been noted that the WVHA was inextricably linked to the Waffen SS, formations of which were directly involved in occupation operations. The WVHA’s administrative and supply responsibilities also extended to the personnel of such SS organizations as the Gestapo, SD, the Criminal Police (Kriminalpolizei, Kripo), and the Regular Police (Ordnungspolizei, Orpo). These agencies performed most of the terror, imprisonment, and extermination policies of the German occupation authorities.

Other WVHA men functioned as Wirtschaft (economic specialists) on the staffs of the Higher SS and Police Leaders (Hoheere SS- und Polizeifuehrer, HSSPFs). The HSSPFs were charged with the supervision and conduct of all economic, supply, and administrative activities of SS and police forces.6

In addition to these administrative responsibilities within the occupied territories, the WVHA also ran the various SS economic enterprises located throughout Nazi occupied Europe. One of the more notorious of these enterprises was the Eastern Industries Limited Liability Company (Ostindustrie, Ost). The WVHA formed this company in March 1943 as a result of the SS’s campaign of slave labor and eventual extermination against the remaining Jews in German-occupied Poland. According to the Nuremberg Military Tribunal the purposes of Osti were:

(1) to utilize the working capacity of the Jews by erecting industrial plants in connection with Jewish labor camps.


6The role of the HSSPFs is covered extensively in Ruth Bettina Birn, Die Roheren SS- und Polizeifuehrer: Himmler’s Vertreter im Reich und in den Besetzten Gebieten (Duesseldorf: Droste Verlag GmbH, 1986).
(2) to take over commercial enterprises which had been maintained by the Higher SS and Police Leaders in Poland.
(3) to confiscate all Jewish machinery and raw materials.
(4) and to utilize all former Jewish machines, tools, and merchandise which had been transferred to non-Jewish ownership.7

These confiscations of Jewish property led to Osi control of eighteen manufacturing establishments, employing some 52,000 slave laborers. These businesses included a glass works, a textile mill, a peat cutting factory, an iron foundry, a brush manufacturing plant, a stone quarry, and a pharmaceutical laboratory. Osi is just one example of the involvement of the WVHA in economic enterprises throughout Nazi-occupied Europe.8

What were the characteristics of the WVHA’s other economic enterprises? The SS developed economic enterprises as early as 1933. Supposedly, the reason for these enterprises was ideological. The SS claimed to be carrying out the tenets of National Socialism which held that "the State does not exist for the benefit of the economy; but the economy exists for the benefit of the State."9 Himmler, however, did not want the SS economy to be subordinate to the State. He wanted the SS to be economically independent of both the State and the Party. By the end of the war the SS, working through the WVHA, controlled over fifty large economic enterprises. Ostensibly private firms under a parent holding company,

Deutsche Wirtschaftsbetriebe (German Economic Enterprises, Ltd., DWB), they were actually State monopolies which the WVHA managed under the cover of DWB. The DWB umbrella covered several WVHA industries, some examples of which were the German Earth and Stone Works, Ltd., the Bohemian Ceramic Works, Ltd., Public Utility Dwelling and Homestead, Ltd., House and Real Estate, Ltd., German Medicines, Ltd., Berlin Furniture Factory, Ltd., the German Equipment Works, Ltd., and Nordland Publishing House. These firms and other WVHA industries received the bulk of their labor force from the concentration camps. In fact many of the firms were located on the very sites of the camps.10

One of the more interesting aspects of the WVHA’s economic enterprises was an attempt, under Himmler’s direction, to create an SS armaments industry based on concentration camp labor. This episode provides a good example of the confusion and infighting prevalent in the management of Nazi Germany’s war economy.

In 1942, several individuals and agencies exercised influence in the German economy: Herman Goering was the nominal head of the economy as the director of the Four Year Plan; Albert Speer was Plenipotentiary General for Armaments and Munitions; Walter Funk was Reichsminister for Economics; and Fritz Sauckel was Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation. While these men competed for control of economic power, they also had to contend with the machinations of Himmler and the officials of the WVHA.

During the winter of 1941-42, the Wehrmacht suffered huge losses of men and material on the Eastern Front. These losses called for large increases in armaments production. An increase in armaments production entailed a corresponding

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7Trials of War Criminals, 5: 259.
8Ibid., 5: 260.
9Ibid., 5: 309.
10Ibid., 5: 243-45.
expansion of the labor force. Himmler used this emergency situation to strengthen the role of the SS in Germany’s war economy. He convinced Hitler to allow the SS to produce armaments using concentration camp labor and entrusted this new SS enterprise to Pohl and the WVHA.11

This venture was never very large or successful because of SS mismanagement, the poor quality of work performed by slave laborers, and infighting between the SS and those State agencies—such as Speer’s Ministry of Armaments—responsible for armaments production. However, in one area—the production of V-2 rockets—WVHA’s involvement in the armaments sector did meet with some real success.

The WVHA’s activities in the A-4 program (the code name for rocket development) began in August 1943, when Hitler authorized Himmler to take charge of the development and manufacturing of the V-2. Himmler assured Hitler that the SS, unlike the private sector, could ensure the secrecy needed for the A-4 program by using concentration camp labor. The SS chief then assigned responsibility for the program to Pohl, whose WVHA was responsible for all SS armament matters, and to Hans Kammler, one of the WVHA’s leading economic officials.

Under WVHA direction the A-4 program produced the V-2 rockets which eventually pounded London and Antwerp, causing thousands of civilian casualties. Some 80,000 slave laborers produced these weapons in the inhuman conditions of the WVHA’s Nordhausen-Dora complex, where thousands of concentration camp inmates perished from disease, starvation, and execution.12

The WVHA also had a strong relationship with private German industry, and during the war the WVHA provided hundreds of thousands of slave laborers for work principally in the private German armaments sector. Many prisoners also labored in private consumer firms and on private farms.

Pohl told his Allied captors: "All the armament firms that were in Germany came with their requests to us. Whether it was the steel works down to the last factories, they came with requests to us."13 A few of the important German industries to receive labor from the WVHA included Heinkel, Messerschmitt, Salzgitter, Krupp, Siemens-Schuchert, and I.G. Farben companies. Furthermore, the WVHA supplied labor to the massive State-owned Hermann Goering Works. Pohl attached WVHA officials to the above firms to oversee the huge slave labor force and to advise those industries on labor matters. The intimacy of the WVHA and the private industrial sector was further realized by Pohl’s attendance at meetings of Himmler’s "Circle of Friends," an informal gathering of SS economic officials with directors from private industry. These meetings were held at regular intervals both before and during the war. Perhaps no other Party or State agency worked in such close partnership with private industry in Germany as did the WVHA.14

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12Trials of War Criminals, 5: 238.


14Ibid.
No other aspect of the WVHA has received as much attention as its crucial part in carrying out "The Final Solution," Nazi extermination policies. With the incorporation of the office of Inspector of Concentration Camps into the WVHA in March 1942, Pohl's organization was inextricably tied to the operation of both the concentration camps and the death camps of Eastern Europe. The WVHA administered the camps, directing everything from such mundane chores as supply and sanitation to the grisly accounting of the gold the SS procured from the teeth of its dead victims. Through its administration of the concentration camps and extermination centers such as Auschwitz, direction of slave labor, procurement of victims for medical experiments and the Nazi euthanasia program, and managing the accounting of confiscated Jewish property, the WVHA was an essential link in the chain of genocide.

After the collapse of Nazi Germany and the end of the war in Europe, the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg declared that the SS was a criminal organization, and the Americans organized separate war crimes trials for the personnel of various SS agencies. Because the WVHA played such a crucial role in carrying out the SS's racial extermination policies, several WVHA officials were tried as war criminals soon after the close of the war.

While some WVHA leaders like Kammler either disappeared or escaped capture by the Allies, Pohl and seventeen other WVHA leaders were not so lucky. The Americans tried these men from January to November 1947. Hundreds of documents and numerous eyewitnesses detailed the WVHA's function in the Final Solution. All of the defendants were found guilty of greater or lesser crimes and fourteen of them received prison sentences of varying lengths. Pohl and three other defendants received the death penalty, however, only Pohl was executed in the end. The three other men, Georg Loerner, Franz Eirenschmalz, and Karl Sommer, had their sentences commuted. Pohl was executed along with four other SS criminals in June, 1951.¹⁵

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¹⁵For the WVHA's role in the Final Solution and the trial of various WVHA officials see, Trials of War Criminals, vol. 5.
ZONE OF DESTINY
GERMAN NAVAL OPERATIONS IN NORWAY
1942-1943

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Off the North Cape of Norway at 7:45 pm on the evening of December 26, 1943, a powder magazine exploded. Within seconds, the German pocket battleship *Scharnhorst* sank, taking with her all but thirty-six of the crew. The disaster effectively ended German heavy surface ship operations in the Arctic Theater. The strategy of employing large warships to interdict Allied merchant convoys carrying war materials to the Russian ports of Archangel and Murmansk ultimately cost Germany the bulk of its capital ship assets. Appropriately, the final signal from *Scharnhorst*, sent at 6:24 pm, indicated that she would "fight to the last shell."¹

Allied convoys to the Soviet Union began in August 1941 and initially consisted of fast merchantmen, either lightly protected or sailing independently. Until April 1942, hostile action destroyed only one ship. That month heralded a change in the fortunes of the Allied Arctic mariners. Despite the arrival of US Navy escort and capital ships, the next several months saw intensified German activity against the convoys. Between April and June 1942, German air and submarine attacks resulted in the loss of twenty-three merchant vessels.²

The German Naval Staff had come to feel that the destruction of Allied merchant shipping could be the basis for overall victory. Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, Navy Commander-in-Chief, argued that the destruction of the maximum amount of Allied seaborne tonnage would cripple or abort Allied offensive operations as well as reduce pressure on the Russian Front. This "commerce war" (*Handelskrieg*) reflected Raeder's grand strategy which assigned three roles to surface warships. As surface raiders, this strategy complemented the submarine campaign by attacking independently sailing merchants and lightly defended convoys on a "target of opportunity" basis. Designed to draw off and destroy enemy assets to reduce British numerical superiority, surface warships conducted periodic sorties into the North Sea. Pocket battleships (*Panzerschiffe*) and auxiliary cruisers deployed as commerce raiders in distant operational areas diverted Royal Navy assets from home waters.³ Using heavy surface ships to raid Arctic convoys supported of Raeder's grand strategy, the destruction of Allied seaborne commerce.

The loss of the battleship *Bismarck* in May 1941 demonstrated the unacceptably hazardous nature of North Atlantic operations. However, the fiords of Norway provided nearby sanctuary to raiders which could reach a target within hours, deliver a devastating blow, and return to safe waters before the battleships and carrier aircraft of the Home Fleet responded. Norway provided the vital element of land-based airpower for reconnaissance, patrol, and ship defense. Hitler concurred

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with Raeder's strategy for the capital ships and stressed that attacks on the Arctic convoys had the highest priority.4

Both the Naval Staff and Hitler expected an imminent Allied invasion of Norway. The December 1941 Naval Staff appraisal of the strategic situation in the Arctic Theater concluded that a series of British small actions heralded an Allied invasion, thus supporting the plan to transfer large surface combatants to the area. The suspected British objectives, aimed at a larger follow-on "bridgehead operation," included the destruction of outposts and batteries, harassment and disruption of German merchant shipping, and terrain and defense intelligence gathering.5

The Naval Staff recommended that capital and support ships, centered around the battleship Tirpitz, be transferred to Norway. The protection of the German position against invasion and the interdiction of convoys formed the primary objectives. Threatening the Allies' northern flank forced the diversion of Allied assets which might otherwise be deployed to other theaters. This "fleet-in-being" threat chronically troubled the British Admiralty and, in fact, did cause the diversion of significant Royal Navy assets to the Arctic Theater.6

Hitler believed Norway to be the "zone of destiny" and ordered the rapid reinforcement of all arms, particularly naval and air.7 The battleship Tirpitz sailed to Trondheim in January 1942 followed by the pocket battleship Admiral Scheer in February and the heavy cruisers Admiral Hipper and Luetzow in March and May respectively. Lighter destroyer forces accompanied the larger ships to provide anti-aircraft and anti-submarine protection.

Almost immediately the German plan to form an overwhelmingly powerful surface battle force encountered problems. On February 23, a British submarine torpedoed the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen as she approached Trondheim, and a badly damaged rudder forced her to return to Germany for extensive repairs. Despite the absence of the Prinz Eugen, the Naval Staff resolved to attack the next outbound (PQ) and returning (QP) convoys with the assembled surface forces.8 The Tirpitz and three destroyers sortied from Trondheim on March 6 in search of convoys PQ12 and QP8. Sinking only a straggling Russian merchantman, the force returned after seven frustrating days. The raiders actually passed "close astern" of PQ12 and just ahead of QP8, but, owing to poor visibility and lack of effective radar, neither side realized its close proximity to the other.9

Reacting to the German raid, the Home Fleet covering force operating south of Jan Mayen Island, turned east to engage but could not bring the Germans to a surface action. On the 9th, a strike force of twelve Albacore torpedo-bombers


5Fuehrer Conferences, Dec. 29, 1941.

6Ibid.

7Ibid., Jan. 22, 1942.

8Commander P. Q. Edwards, RN, was the officer in charge of the Admiralty's Director of Operations Division which initially planned the Arctic convoys. This is where the "PQ" designation for eastbound convoys originated. Westbound return convoys were called "QP."

from the carrier H.M.S. *Victorious* engaged *Tirpitz*. No torpedoes struck home, but machine gun fire from the aircraft wounded three officers on the bridge. Fearing an encounter with superior enemy capital forces, the Germans fled for the refuge of Narvik.

The Naval Staff, and particularly Hitler, drew four conclusions from this initial operation. First, carrier-based aircraft posed the "greatest menace" to the surface ships. Next, Arctic Theater operations could not be conducted without land-based air support for reconnaissance, torpedo, and bomb attacks, particularly against enemy capital ships. Third, any future operations required a concentration of forces which could not be committed until "the enemy's exact position and strength has been accurately and unequivocally ascertained by air reconnaissance." Finally, Hitler focused on the critical need for an aircraft carrier to support the surface battle groups. Hitherto, the Navy had relied solely on land-based aircraft for operational support and long-range ocean reconnaissance as provided by the naval air arm (*Seelüftwaffe*).  

The German Naval Staff was finding it difficult to produce an aircraft carrier. The *Graf Zeppelin*, laid down as the initial carrier in the late 1930s, could not be operational before summer 1943 due to a halt in construction at the outbreak of the war. The development of a catapult mechanism and the necessary modifications to the JU87D bomber and BF109F fighter to make them carrier operable emerged as the thorniest problems. A new type of carrier-based aircraft could not be in mass production before 1946.  

On March 14, Hitler ordered intensive attacks on the Arctic convoys. He directed the Navy to concentrate U-boats in northern waters and the Luftwaffe to strengthen its high-level bomber and torpedo assets as well as its long-range maritime patrol and reconnaissance capability. The joint service operational plan, based on the "lessons learned" from the first raid, called for the Luftwaffe to counter enemy carrier-based aircraft and to maintain a constant air assault on Murmansk. Submarine forces assumed the roles of reporting convoy and covering force position and movement plus attacking "targets of opportunity." Heavy surface units, supported by destroyers, took on two missions: neutralizing both the Allied cruiser close covering force and the lighter close escort force consisting of destroyers, corvettes, and armed trawlers; and then sinking the unprotected merchantmen before enemy heavy units could arrive on the scene. The Fuhrer directed that "it is necessary that maritime communications over the Arctic Ocean between the Anglo-Saxons and Russia, hitherto virtually unimpeded, should henceforth be impeded."  

Under the command of Admiral Otto Schniewind (Fleet C-in-C) at Trondheim, the First Battle Group (FBG) formed, consisting of *Tirpitz*, *Admiral Hipper*, and the 5th and 6th

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10Fuhrer Conferences, Mar. 12, 1942.

11The *Seelüftwaffe* came under operational control of the Luftwaffe and flew Dornier Do18, Heinkel HE59, HE115, and HE119 sea and float planes for long-range reconnaissance and air/sea rescue. The four-engine Focke Wulf FW 200 Condor flew high-level bombing missions which proved remarkably successful against the slow-moving merchant ships.
Destroyer Flotillas. At Narvik, the Second Battle Group (SBG) formed, consisting of Luetzow, Admiral Scheer, and the 8th Destroyer Flotilla. On March 28, the first combined operation commenced and was directed against convoy PQ13. Three destroyers engaged the light cruiser H.M.S. Trinidad on the 29th. One of her own errant torpedoes struck and crippled Trinidad, but British gunnery sank an attacking destroyer. The raiders destroyed only one Panamanian freighter. Air and submarine forces eventually located the convoy and inflicted losses of 25 percent. Attacks on PQ15 and QP11 followed at the end of April, resulting in the sinking of the light cruiser H.M.S. Edinburgh against the loss of a single destroyer. Convoy PQ16 faced a running battle with German air and submarine forces from May 25 through June 1, 1942 and lost seven of thirty ships and 31,000 tons of cargo despite the heaviest escort to date and no surface attack.

To the Naval Staff, the strategy of surface interdiction combined with air and sub-surface assault seemed to be working. German losses remained minimal and each new convoy suffered ever heavier damage, including damage to some escort warships. Significantly, during June, a minimum number of days where sea fog limits visibility combined with twenty-four hours of continual daylight allowed for around-the-clock aerial reconnaissance. On the other hand, calm seas aided destroyer action, because good visibility and fair seas hampered a submarine’s ability to approach and engage undetected. Most importantly, the ice barrier had not yet far receded and placed any passing convoy at only 240 nautical miles from German naval and air bases on the North Cape. From these northern bases, surface raiders could strike a convoy well before the Home Fleet covering force could interfere. Given these good omens, Naval Group North issued an operational directive, "Knight’s Move," for a combined arms attack on PQ17.15

Two overriding concerns influenced German actions in the PQ17 operation. The surface raid could only be undertaken if reconnaissance clearly established that no chance existed of an engagement with superior Home Fleet forces. Second, the threat from carrier aircraft to German surface forces, borne out by the Albacore attack on Tirpitz, concerned Hitler so deeply that he directed that the raid could only commence after the enemy carrier had been located and "rendered harmless" by Ju88 bomber attacks. This restriction significantly hampered the subsequent deployment of the surface battle groups in "Knight’s Move." The operations order established the primary goal as the rapid destruction of the merchant ships with attacks on escorts conducted only as necessary to accomplish the mission. The plan called for follow-up air and submarine action to deal with crippled ships.16

The operation employed both battle groups with FBG sailing north to Vestfjord and then to Altenfiord, while SBG headed directly to Altenfiord. Upon transmission of the codeword from Naval Group North, all units would proceed out of Altenfiord at maximum speed to a rendezvous point, two hundred miles northeast of the North Cape. All were to maintain high speed throughout the operation to counter enemy submarines. For air cover, the Luftwaffe was to maintain

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14 *Operationen und Taktik Heft*, Aug. 1944.

15 The operational directive was the "Operative Weisung für Einsatz der Dronthein-und Narvik-Gruppe gegen einen PQ-Geleitzug." Admiral Schniewind issued the final operations order, "Operationsbefehl. Einsatz der Flottenstreitkräfte im Nordraum gegen eines PQ-Geleitzug," on June 14, 1942. The text of the Operations Order for the attack forms an appendix to Fachrer Conferences, June 15, 1942.

16 Fachrer Conferences, June 15, 1942.
reconnaissance sweeps at least five hours ahead of the track of the battle force in a two hundred-mile search arc.\textsuperscript{17} Once the battle force located the convoy, the destroyers were to engage the close escort to prevent torpedo attacks against the heavy units. The Luftwaffe would deliver a massive bombing raid on PQ17 just prior to the surface attack. Shadowing submarines, already on patrol to locate enemy escorts and to report shipping movements, could not attack surface units larger than destroyers until positively identified as hostile. No ship attacks of any kind were authorized in heavy weather. The lack of experience in combined surface, air, and sub-surface operations, combined with the inherent risk of damage by "friendly fire," concerned the Naval Staff planners and led them to prohibit surface attack against any submarine contact.\textsuperscript{18}

On July 1, a German Condor bomber sighted PQ17 and reported its position, course, and speed. Luftwaffe reconnaissance aircraft sighted the Home Fleet that evening and reported "three battleships and a carrier" steaming northeast of Iceland. Hitler's first requirement had been met. The Germans knew the location of the feared aircraft carrier. The battle groups departed their anchorages late on the 2nd for a costly transit. Luettzow grounded and sustained flooding damage which forced her to return to Germany for four months of repair. Three destroyers founedered on the rocks of the treacherous Vestfiord. Despite the losses, the plan proceeded. The Naval Staff, however, refused to transmit the codeword, even though reconnaissance aircraft reported Victorious 300 miles southwest of the convoy, well out of operational range. On Tirpitz, Admiral Schniewind was agitated by the lack of positive direction, and on his own initiative, he put to sea late on the 3rd for the next step in the operation, the move to Altenfiord. Fearing the probability of German surface attacks, on the evening of July 4, the Admiralty issued orders to scatter the convoy and to withdraw the cruiser force. The confusing Admiralty signals, caused the close escort commander to expect German warships on the horizon at any moment. He withdrew his destroyers and joined the departing cruisers, leaving the scattered ships of PQ17 without substantial defenses.\textsuperscript{19}

For the Germans, an element of doubt remained. A patrol aircraft sighted the cruiser covering force late on the 3rd and erroneously reported it as a battleship (or heavy cruiser) and two light cruisers, implying the presence of Home Fleet forces in the vicinity of the convoy.\textsuperscript{20} The restriction concerning the aircraft carrier and location of Home Fleet remained overriding.\textsuperscript{21} In spite of his concerns, Raeder ordered the battle groups to get underway, when a report early on the 5th placed Home Fleet 800 miles from the attack zone zone

\textsuperscript{17}\textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{18}\textit{Kriegstagebuch der Seekriegsleitung: War Diary, Operations Division, German Naval Staff, 1939-1945, Naval Historical Center, Operational Archives Branch, Washington, DC (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1984), microfilm, May 27, 1942. The War Diary, along with numerous other military and naval records captured by Allied troops in 1945 at Schloss Tambach, are known as the Tambach Papers. US Naval Intelligence translated the diaries, in which the German Naval Staff assess and summarize daily events and chronicled operational and administrative incidents and decisions.}

\textsuperscript{19}Jack Broome, \textit{The Convoy Is to Scatter} (London: William Kimber, 1972). Captain Broome detailed the events which led to the confusion created by Admiralty signals and the scattering of PQ17.

\textsuperscript{20}\textit{War Diary, July 3, 1942.}

\textsuperscript{21}\textit{Ibid., July 1-5, 1942. The diaries clearly reflect the concern over the location of the Victorious and the Home Fleet. Appropriately, Admiral Schmundt on July 4 ordered the submarines to make the Home Fleet covering force their primary target.}
and unlikely to be operating very far east due to the threat of land-based aircraft. At midday on the 5th, he issued the codeword. The operation came to naught, because British and Russian submarines had sighted and reported the battle force movements. Raeder ordered his ships to return to port late on the 5th.

For the sailors of PQ17, nonetheless, the Arctic became a killing ground as air and submarine forces attacked the scattered merchantmen and sank twenty-three of the original thirty-five ships.

Despite the overall success against PQ17, the recall of the surface sortie squandered Germany's best and ultimately last chance to employ the heavy surface units in a tactically advantageous engagement.

On December 30, 1942, the Admiral Hipper, Luetzow, and several destroyers sortied to intercept convoy JW51B in Operation "Regensbogen," which ended in failure and destroyed any remaining confidence in the heavy ships on the part of the Fuehrer. In the confused action, Luetzow completely missed the enemy ships passing astern of her while fleeing from Hipper. The arrival of the British light cruisers, H.M.S. Jamaica and H.M.S. Sheffield, plus the stout resis-

tance of the close escort, convinced the German commander, despite his superior firepower, to break off the engagement and retire to the west. In his defense, he had received, just after departure, a signal modification to the standing operations order which held that a commander must avoid action with a superior enemy. The modification read: "DISCRETION BE EXERCISED IN FACE OF ENEMY OF EQUAL STRENGTH OWING UNDESIRABILITY OF SUBMITTING CRUISERS TO MAJOR RISK." The reminder of the standing order to avoid risk implied that he must take none.

The retreat of the cruisers without inflicting serious damage enraged Hitler. He ordered Raeder to scrap the heavy ships, asserting that the air and escort assets to protect them, compared to the dismal tactical results obtained to date, did not justify their continued use. Their heavy guns could be used for coastal defense, and valuable metals, particularly steel, nickel, and copper, could be salvaged. Operation "Regensbogen" ended Raeder's career.

In his place came Grand Admiral Karl Doenitz, the former commander of the submarine force. Doenitz initially concurred with the plan to break up the heavy ships, but soon altered his stance. The initial plan called for all heavy ships except four cruisers to be decommissioned by Autumn 1943, which would have made 250 officers, 8,000 petty officers and seamen, and 1,300 shipyard workers available for reassignment. Doenitz argued that the severe limitations placed on the previous operations had made them ineffective. He

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22Ibid., July 5, 1942.

23The codeword was actually a sentence which read: "SECRET: THE PRACTICE AMMUNITION PROVIDED AS PER NAVAL GROUP NORTH SECRET SIGNAL NO. 3756 IS WITHDRAWN."

24Roskill, The War at Sea, 143.

25After the embarrassment of PQ17, the Admiralty began designating convoys on a new system based on departure and arrival ports. PQ18 in September 1942 was the last to use the now notorious designation system.


27Fuehrer Conferences, Jan. 6, 1943.

28Ibid., Feb. 8, 1943.
asserted that the Arctic convoys made "excellent targets for large ships" and that not only should they be maintained, but that the Scharnhorst should be sent to Norway to form a more powerful raiding force. Reluctantly, Hitler agreed to the plan and granted a six-month period for the heavy ships to prove their worth despite his opposition to "any further engagements of the surface ships because, beginning with the Graf Spee, one defeat has followed another." 29

The fuel oil situation critically limited operational planning. The early March 1942 raid had consumed 7,500 tons of fuel oil. This rate mandated that in all future operations the target had to be clearly located and identified prior to surface raiders getting underway, a restriction difficult to meet in Arctic conditions. 30 In fact, decreasing oil supplies had plagued the Naval Staff from the war's outset and by late 1941 had caused the reduction of the Navy's monthly allotment by 50 percent. The delivery of 90,000 tons of fuel oil to the Italian Navy in January 1942 and the reluctance of Romanian producers to deliver oil except for payment in gold complicated the problem. 31 Despite the limitations, by June 1942 Naval Group North's fuel oil situation had markedly improved and allowed for a "simultaneous attack by all naval units in northern waters." 32 By late 1942, however, reserves again had fallen so low that fueling depots were "unable to keep sufficient supplies on hand," and bunkering large ships required advanced fuel stockpiling. 33

Analysis of the effectiveness of the German surface naval strategy in the Arctic Theater produces two paradoxical conclusions. On the one hand, through the temerity to risk heavy ships, the Germans lost opportunities to inflict debilitating damage on the Arctic convoys and their escorts. Doenitz urged his subordinate commanders to conduct aggressive offensive actions, but few occurred. On September 22, 1943, British midget submarines, called "X-Craft," launched a successful attack against Tirpitz at anchor in Trondheim and rendered her unavailable for the catastrophic final mission of Scharnhorst. 34 Given the original conception of using heavy surface ships as commerce raiders to destroy convoys by overwhelming firepower and speed, the actual tactical results had proved a dismal failure.

On the other hand, by posing a consistent threat, German surface warships required the Allies to maintain sizeable forces in theater and thus unavailable for more productive employment elsewhere. The suspension of the convoys after September 1942, except for winter sailings in periods of minimum daylight, was largely due to the implied threat of surface

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29Ibid., Feb. 26, 1943.


31Fuhrer Conferences, Dec. 12, 1941.


33Fuhrer Conferences, Dec. 22, 1942. Pocket battleships and submarines were not affected by the crisis as they operated on diesel rather than marine fuel oil. Diesel fuel remained generally in good supply through the early war years.

34The Naval Staff claimed that she fought to the last shell, no doubt based on the 6:24 pm signal (see n.1), and sank with ensign flying. This heroic description cannot diminish the fact that with Scharnhorst's demise, the surface naval strategy had failed disastrously. See War Diary, Dec. 22-27, 1943.
action, and, in effect, partially met German criteria for success.35

In the end, submarines and aircraft did cause significant Allied losses, but the third leg of the German strategic triad, the employment of heavy surface units, when compared to the expectations of early 1942, proved fragile and disappointing.

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THE LIBERTY SHIP:
UNIQUE CARGO SHIP OF WORLD WAR II

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World War II’s beginning created a need for large numbers of cargo ships. It also required that these ships be built quickly. This, in turn, necessitated additional shipyards. The Merchant Marine Act of 1936 provided the foundation for such a massive building program. This legislation replaced the Shipping Board with the U.S. Maritime Commission and emphasized the importance of a Merchant Marine to the defense and international commercial development of the United States.1

The U.S. Maritime Commission began as a New Deal agency with the goal of modernizing the United States fleet of large merchant vessels, 90 percent of which were over twenty years old. The Commission was responsible for regulating the merchant industry. It was also empowered to increase the construction of ships by subsidizing private companies or contracting for the ships directly. Joseph P. Kennedy was the Commission’s first chair. Rear Admiral Emory S. Land, a personal friend of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, was appointed to replace Kennedy when he resigned in 1937.2

The Liberty Ship’s ultimate design was a modified version of a British tramp cargo ship. Initially, as part of the ship-

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35Morison, History of United States Naval Operations, vol. 1: 365-66. After the voyage of PQ-18, the "Trickle" movement for independent routing was tried in late Fall whereby two unescorted merchantmen were dispatched daily.


2Charles Wollenberg, Marinship at War, Shipbuilding and Social Change in Wartime Sausalito (Berkeley, CA: Western Heritage Press, 1990), 17-19.
building program begun in 1937, the U.S. Maritime Commission had designed three standardized ships to meet the needs of different trade routes. The designs were for turbine-driven ships capable of averaging fifteen knots. The U.S. Maritime Commission’s long-range plans were to build fifty ships annually for ten years. President Roosevelt doubled this goal to one hundred per year in 1939. Construction of ships using these designs began in 1940. The first, all-welded version was completed in November, 1940, and weighed six hundred tons less than the average rivetted ship.

A British Merchant Shipbuilding Mission team came to the United States in September, 1940, to order sixty ships. Admiral Land of the U.S. Maritime Commission assisted them. The British brought a J. L. Thompson & Son design with modifications that made it simpler to build than the American model. This "Ocean" hull design, capable of carrying ten thousand tons and travelling at eleven knots, became the basis for the Liberty Ship. Admiral Land disliked this slower ship and disassociated the U.S. Maritime Commission from this design by making arrangements for the British to contract directly with private shipyards.

Land changed his opinion of the British design when German destruction of British cargo ships necessitated faster construction. President Roosevelt suddenly increased the U.S. Maritime Commission’s quota to two hundred ships annually in August, 1940. The propelling machinery necessary for the turbine-driven design in use was not available in quantities necessary to meet the new quota. Consequently, the U.S. Maritime Commission had to change to a simpler ship design. There was no time to completely design a new ship. After considering alternatives, the Commission decided to use the British "Ocean" hull design with modifications. The President informed the American public of the emergency shipbuilding program in a February 1941 broadcast in which he described the ships as "dreadful looking objects."

The U.S. Maritime Commission’s official classification of this ship was "EC2-S-C1," which described many of its characteristics. The "EC" designated an "emergency cargo" ship. The "2" indicated the ship’s large size with a waterline length between 400 and 450 feet. The "S" designated a steam engine and "C1" the specific ship design and modifications. Despite its official classification, the ship was initially referred to as an "ugly duckling," a name the press borrowed from President Roosevelt’s initial reaction when Land showed him the plans. "Admiral, I think this ship will do us very well," President Roosevelt said. "She’ll carry a good load. She isn’t much to look at, though, is she? A real ugly duckling." Admiral Land referred to the ships as the Liberty Fleet and further attempted to counter this negative image by proposing September 27, 1941, as "Liberty Fleet Day" to coincide with the launching of the first Liberty Ship, the Patrick Henry. He undermined this in 1943 when he referred to them as "the expendables," a phrase the press quickly adopted.

The Americans modified the British "Ocean" hull design for several reasons. The U.S. Maritime Commission needed a ship that could be produced quickly using mass production

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4Ibid., 6.
5Bunker, Liberty Ships, 6.
6Sawyer and Mitchell, Liberty Ships, 4.
7Bunker, Liberty Ships, 7.
techniques. The design had to be as simple as possible, because many builders would be new to the shipbuilding industry. Steel was scarce; wood was not. Therefore, wood was used for interior items such as furniture, fittings, ceilings, linings and hatch covers. The wooden hatch covers could double as life rafts. Anchors were reduced to 240 fathoms from the 300 fathoms in the design. A further decrease to 210 fathoms, divided between two anchors, one 135 fathoms and one 75, was later required. Some vessels had only one anchor.

War zone service required greater protection than a peacetime cargo ship. Chain rails were replaced with bulwarks, solid walls to protect people and cargo on deck. Crew members on watch had booths protected by bridge plating rather than canvas wind dodgers. According to Evon Brewton, their slow speed made Liberty Ships "sitting ducks for submarines. So all ships were reinforced by concrete from [the] bottom up to three feet above water line. . . ." They were also "fitted with a degouzing (sic) cable around the inside of [the] ship. An anti-magnetic field created by a generator current sent through this cable caused the ship to repel magnetic mines and torpedoes."

Weaponry consisted of two three-inch naval guns and eight 20mm machine guns. The naval guns were placed at the bow and stern of the ship and could be used against U-boat or aircraft attacks. The machine guns were located in shielded tubs along the sides of the ship. Barrels with ingredients to provide a smoke screen were located at the ship's stern. The Liberty Ships travelled in escorted convoys. The key protection was staying with the convoy. The ship was too slow to outrun an enemy ship.

The war effort demanded ships built to maximize cargo capacity. The decks were steel, rather than wood. Liberty Ships often sailed with full hulls and decks covered with cargo. This required a design modification that replaced the arched deck with a straight deck from the sides of the hatches to the sides of the ship. The decks had metal "eyes" welded onto them to tie down deck cargo. Liberty Ships seemed capable of carrying anything; a ship could hold as cargo "2,840 jeeps, 440 light tanks, 230 million rounds of rifle ammunition, or 3,440,000 C-rations." Each ship had booms and cranes built into them to load and unload cargo.

Liberty Ships were operated by private shipping companies on behalf of the US government. Consequently, a Liberty Ship crew included civilian officers and crewmen, plus an Armed Guard. The officers had private rooms, but the crewmen and Armed Guard personnel shared rooms. There

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8This condition changed in 1943 with a shortage of lumber and an easing of the steel shortage. The result was a change to using steel, rather than wood, when possible. Sawyer and Mitchell, Liberty Ships, 5.

9Ibid., 5.

10Ibid., 5.

11Evon Brewton (Panama City, FL), date unknown, personal notes given to Martha E. (Bottie) Ray (Panama City, FL).


13This device was pointed out to the author by a guide at the Jeremiah O'Brien, the last known Liberty Ship on display in San Francisco, California.

14Sawyer and Mitchell, Liberty Ships, 5.

15Bunker, Liberty Ships, 7.
were separate dining areas for all three groups. These accommodations were in the center of the ship, another modification in the British "Ocean" hull design. The U.S. Maritime Commission preferred this central location for safety reasons during Atlantic Ocean crossings. It also minimized materials for plumbing, heating and outfitting. A distillation system made sea water drinkable.

Welding rather than riveting was a relatively new concept in shipbuilding. Though used with some ships, welding had not been used for cargo ships operating with heavy deck loads and under wartime conditions. One of the resulting modification mistakes was a square hatch opening, a source of cracks in some ships. A crack in a welded ship could continue indefinitely, with the result that ships could break in two. This was a particular problem in the frigid Arctic waters which made the steel more brittle than usual. In a riveted ship, the crack ceased once it reached the edge of that sheet of metal. A curved reinforcement strip welded to each corner of the hatch corrected the problem.

With these modifications, the British "Ocean" hull design became the American Liberty Ship. Speed of construction was a major consideration in selecting the Liberty Ship design, and contractors received rigidly uniform specifications, which made it possible to minimize construction time. The average production time declined from 108 days in 1942 to less than 50 days in 1943.

Prefabration and preassembly were the key elements of the mass production process used by Liberty shipyards. The vast majority of the 250,000 pieces that went into a Liberty Ship were prefabricated (pre-shaped) and preassembled into approximately one hundred sections to assemble on the ways. The last two hundred pieces were added at the outfitting dock, an area where workers added equipment to the ship after its launching. This process minimized the length of time the ships were on the ways, an important consideration given the limited space along the waterfront.

Uniformity was vital to the Liberty Ship’s successful construction. The mold loft department’s work was critical to this goal. It built a complete full scale model ship and then developed a pattern from each part of this model. The pattern pieces, called templates, were used to cut each part of the ship.

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14Ibid., 7.
15Sawyer and Mitchell, Liberty Ships, 5.
16The Wainwright Liberator, May 26, 1945. The Wainwright Liberator was a weekly newspaper which, according to its header, was: "Published by the J. A. Jones Construction Company, Inc. for the Builders of Ships for Freedom." Its first issue was published July 25, 1942, and cost five cents. Beginning with the Sept. 19, 1942 issue, the paper was free.
17Sawyer and Mitchell, Liberty Ships, 5. When the author visited the Jeremiah O’Brien, the last known Liberty Ship on display in San Francisco, California, the guide pointed out this corrective device and explained the problem.
18Sawyer and Mitchell, Liberty Ships, passim.
19Wollenberg, Marship, 28.
21Earl Boons, interview by Peggy D. Pelt, June 9, 1992, Wainwright Shipyard Oral History Collection, Gulf Coast Community College Library, Panama City, FL.
A standardized design allowed for interchangeable parts, and the ability to exchange parts in foreign ports was particularly beneficial to the ship's operation. The uniformity of the Liberty Ship made it possible to make a "new" ship by joining the parts of two ships. After the war the Albaro was constructed using the afterpart of the Josephine Shaw Lowell, built by Wainwright Shipyard, and the forepart of the Samdaring, built by the New England Shipbuilding Corporation.

The U.S. Maritime Commission modified the basic Liberty Ship design for specialized cargoes. Wainwright Shipyard produced eight Z-EC2-S-C2s, a Liberty Ship designed to carry army tanks. Wainwright was the only shipyard contracted to build these and only eight were built. In 1944, the shipyard contracted to build another Liberty design, the Z-EC2-S-C5, to transport boxed aircraft. Wainwright was one of only two shipyards contracted to build these. In 1945, Wainwright Shipyard began work on six T1-M-BT2 oil tankers as part of a U.S. Maritime Commission contract, although they were built for the British government as part of a lend-lease agreement.

The Liberty Ship performed well despite the misgivings of traditional shipbuilders to the mass production concept of the Liberty Ship program. Several articles in The Wainwright Liberator lauded the design's success. One vessel required three days to sink in the South Atlantic after receiving two torpedo hits. The U.S. Maritime Commission sent a congratulatory telegram to the Oregon Shipbuilding Corporation with a report of its Edgar Allan Poe's exploits. This ship assisted in sinking a Japanese submarine after having been hit by five-inch and eight-inch shells. After the battle the Edgar Allan Poe was towed to port. The crew prevented damage to the cargo by plugging the holes with bedding. In response to criticism of the welded construction, the telegram noted: "This was made possible by welded construction, which confined the shell holes to the immediate points of contact. Riveted plates would have torn apart under the strain, causing openings too large for temporary plugging."

The George Ade, built by the Wainwright Shipyard, returned to service after surviving torpedo damage and a hurricane in one trip. In fact, only one of the seventy-four

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25 Located in Panama City, FL and named after General Jonathan Wainwright, Wainwright Shipyard built Liberty Ships between 1942 and 1945. Housing for its workers occupied the current site of Gulf Coast Community College.

26 Sawyer and Mitchell, Liberty Ships, 90.

27 "Wainwright Yard History is Bright One," Wainwright Liberator, Aug. 19, 1944.

28 Sawyer and Mitchell, Liberty Ships, 200-207.


32 "Our George Ade Survives Sub Attack, Storm," ibid., Nov. 4, 1944.
Liberty Ships built at the Wainwright Shipyards was lost during World War II. This was the John Bascom, sunk December 2, 1943, by a German air attack while docked in Bari Harbor, Italy. 35

Companies new to shipbuilding could successfully construct the Liberty Ship because of its simple design. Only five of the eighteen firms involved in producing Liberty Ships by the end of World War II were operated by established shipbuilding firms. Even then, the shipyards were sometimes newly built and located far from the established parent company. The American Shipbuilding Company, with headquarters in the Great Lakes area, operated the Delta Shipbuilding Company, located in New Orleans, Louisiana. The J. A. Jones Construction Company was one of the firms new to shipbuilding, having entered this industry at the U.S. Maritime Commission's request. The Commission also asked the Jones Construction Company to take over the Brunswick, Georgia, shipyard when the original operators could not produce. 34

Some suggested that the use of new firms was, perhaps, beneficial, because these nontraditional shipbuilders were willing to try nontraditional building methods, such as prefabrication, welding, and assembly line techniques. It was said that Henry Kaiser, the leader in mass production, "did not build ships but simply produced them." 35 Fittingly, busi-

nesses new to shipbuilding were in charge of workers new to industry. 36

Staffing the shipyards was another challenge. Manpower was, perhaps, in even shorter supply than was steel. The pre-war national shipyard labor force was less than 100,000. An estimated 700,000 were needed in 1943 to meet the president's goals, and the number of experienced shipbuilders were inadequate to meet the sharp increase in demand for ships. Additionally, men were required for military service. Therefore, the Liberty Ship program had to rely on an inexperienced work force. The simplicity of the design made it possible to hire unskilled labor, provide minimal training, and produce ships. Not only were these workers inexperienced in shipbuilding; most were new to any industrial environment. The manpower shortage necessitated the introduction of non-traditional workers, such as African-Americans and women, into the factory setting. 37 Although the standardized design of the Liberty Ship made it possible to hire unskilled workers, over forty trade skills were still necessary for its construction. 38

The U.S. Maritime Commission used a "cost-plus-variable fee" contractual arrangement to pay for the Liberty Ships. In 1941, the government reimbursed the shipbuilder for costs and paid an additional $110,000 fee if the ship was built using the established average of 500,000 man hours. The fee also varied according to the speed of delivery, ranging from a minimum of $60,000 to a maximum of $140,000. The fee schedule was adjusted during the war as the average produc-

35 Sawyer and Mitchell, Liberty Ships, 89-93.

34 Ibid., passim.


36 Ibid., 9.

37 Bunker, Liberty Ships, 13-14.

tion time decreased. The Liberty Ships produced by the Jones Construction Company cost an average of two million dollars each. 

Reports on the total number of Liberty Ships built vary due to confusion surrounding the various modified versions of the ship. According to the American Bureau of Shipping, the total was 2,742, inclusive of the various models. Jones Construction Company’s two shipyards built a total of 195 ships, involving four different designs. This was 7 percent of the ships built. Wainwright built approximately 4 percent of the total.

The Liberty Ship’s simple design had made its production under such circumstances possible. The introduction of new assembly techniques such as prefabricating the parts and welding them together had contributed to the success of this emergency shipbuilding program. The Liberty Ship performed valiantly in delivering the troops and supplies vital to winning the war.

At the war’s end, nevertheless, the fleet was “mothballed.” Later the ships were sold to shipbreaking companies for scrap. Ultimately, the Wainwright Shipyards was converted to a shipbreaking yard. In the 1960s, the yard removed steel plates from the old Liberty Ships and rolled and shaped them for welding into prefabricated sections for use in barge construction at a shipyard at Green Cove Springs, Florida. In a different form, the Liberty Ships continued to serve. At least seven of the Liberty Ships built by Wainwright Shipyards were scrapped at Panama City, including the George Ade, the ship that survived the torpedo and hurricane. But neither it nor the shipyard could survive the ensuing peace.

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Peggy Pelt recently received her PhD in American history from Florida State University. Her dissertation is entitled “Wainwright Shipyards: The Impact of a World War II War Industry on Panama City, Florida,” and she has written elsewhere on women and the homefront in World War II. Dr. Pelt has taught at Gulf Coast Community College since 1972.

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39Wollenberg, Maris, 25.

40Sawyer and Mitchell, Liberty Ships, 84, 89.

41Bunker, Liberty Ships, 17.

42Sawyer and Mitchell, Liberty Ships, 84, 89.

43Ibid., 89-93, 207, 219-22.
A PEOPLE PROVIDENTIAL, ELECT, AND OPPORTUNISTIC: COMMON EXPERIENCE IN COLONIAL BRITISH NORTH AMERICA

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During the past two decades, scholars of America's colonial period have increasingly stressed the diverse demographic and cultural nature of British North American settlement. The ground-breaking work of Bernard Bailyn in The Peopling of British North America and Voyagers to the West shows the flow of immigrants to be complex and multi-charactered. Following in the footsteps of Robert Gross's The Minutemen and Their World and Darrett Rutman's A Place in Time, a growing number of local and regional studies have brought out the intricate social individualities of numerous colonial communities. John McCusker's and Russell Menard's impressive work in The Economy of British America reveals a multifaceted and dynamic world of colonial commerce, rich in local nuance and regional variation. Richard Dunn's Sugar and Slaves compellingly looks into the unique dynamics of a sometimes over-looked theater of British North American settlement, the Caribbean. Most notable of all, David Hackett Fischer's controversial Albion's Seed makes a case for four great, separate migratory waves which carved out their own distinct and lasting dominant cultures upon the North American continent.1

These works, a handful among many, have helped to shatter any lingering vision of a monolithic and homogeneous British colonial cultural experience. Indeed, in the words of Bernard Bailyn, they show the colonial world as something akin to "The Rings of Saturn," which may, from afar, appear smooth and uniform, but when viewed closely reveal a rough, even chaotic, amalgam of disparate parts.2

Given the magnificent geographic sweep of North America alone, the diversity of the British colonies should not prove too great a surprise. Stretching over 2,000 miles from the fog-shrouded, craggy approaches of the Maritime Provinces to the hurricane-swept, jungled islands of the Caribbean,


2 Bailyn, Peopling, 47-50.
the variety of weather and landscape guaranteed each new settlement its own distinction.

Into this wild land came equally dissimilar groups of immigrants, who, though largely English in the area under consideration in this essay, came from different places and were armed with different religions, different conceptions of society, different traditions, and different intentions. Instead of a single, integrated community of transplanted Europeans spread across the New World, a kaleidoscope of regional and local societies emerged, each molded by the demands of its geography and climate and shaped by the diverse origins, mind-set, and expectations of its immigrants.

English Puritans poured into New England in a brief, intense exodus from 1629 through 1640. From the 1640s through the 1670s, a much larger wave, an odd mixture of a royalist elite, lesser gentry, and a mass of laborers and servants, overwhelmingly male and largely Anglican in its religion, flowed into the Chesapeake. From 1673 to 1715, a third great wave, dominated by Quakers, left England and Europe to settle into the rich Delaware Valley and Pennsylvania. The fourth and greatest migration rolled over the continental mainland in successive waves between 1717 and 1775. This tide of immigrants largely arrived from England’s “borderland,” the northern counties, Scottish lowlands, and the north of Ireland, and it drained away from America’s coast into the “back country” of the colonies. These peoples pressed the boundaries of settlement westward and over the crest of the Appalachians and Alleghenies.

In the seventeenth century, the great British rush to the Caribbean in pursuit of sugar, “white gold,” created a movement of people which easily eclipsed these other migrations. Of the estimated 378,000 British immigrants to North America between 1600 and 1700, some 220,000 went to the islands. Beyond these, over 300,000 blacks were imported to power the mighty economic machinery of the cane plantations.

In addition to these primary currents of English immigration, flowing westward from Europe dozens of smaller eddies swirled along the stream. These carried numerous nationalities, varying sects, and splinter religious groups; they carried refugees from persecution, seekers of safe harbor, and followers of dreams, monetary and spiritual.

Across this vast canvas of colonization, the portrait was painted in many colors. It is hard to imagine two communities more different than, say, the restrained orderliness of a small, tight-knit, Puritan Massachusetts town, complete with its undertone of stretched passions and Calvinistic angst, and the earthy, raucous spectacle of Jamaica’s Port Royal and its collection of soldiers, sailors, planters, merchants, ne’er-do-wells, and thieves. Yet, as markedly dissimilar as these colonial communities were, they represented not the apposition of poles but opposite ends of the same spectrum. Both communities were part of the same continuum of expansionist settlement. Owing their origin and livelihood to the wave of largely English immigration that swept across the Atlantic in the seventeenth century, both were part of the same colonial world. The same can be said of almost every other combination of North American colonial settlements.

If all of these varied regions with their peculiarities are thought of as complex and different tapestries, can it then be said that they might share some common thread? The answer, at least in some ways, is yes.

There is no denying the catalytic power of religion in the settling of British North America. Numerous religious groups found immigration to the colonies the answer to pressing spiritual and temporal problems. Still many other voyagers, if not directly moved to cross the Atlantic by matters of God,
at least brought Him along as their travelling companion, for in the seventeenth-century western world, the Christian religion was an inescapable cultural reality.

It is possible, however, to be so over-awed by the amazing variety of immigrating religious groups and to be so fascinated with their differences as to miss the obvious element that binds most of them. Whether Anglican, Presbyterian, Congregationalist (Arminian or Antinomian), Separatist, Anabaptist, Quaker or any of a myriad other sects, subgroups, pietist movements, or splinters, colonial religion was overwhelmingly Christian and largely Protestant.

In an American century that is heir to the Enlightenment, the Industrial Revolution, the Age of Science, the legacy of Darwin, and, finally, the endless propagation of denominations rippling down from the two Great Awakenings which hide the relative homogeneity of colonial Christian thought and practice, the great significance of this is easily lost. Irrespective of its diversity, Christianity in the seventeenth century occupied far more definite theological boundaries than it does today, and if not of direct, personal significance to the immigrant, it at least formed a major part of the cultural and social background against which the voluntary immigrants lived. Besides its very ubiquitoussness, what facet of Christianity can be found at work across the range of colonial experiences?

The majority of Christian colonists took as a fact the existence of a spiritual world beyond the physical, the role of Christ as the savior of a sinful mankind, and the existence of God as the single creative force, the ultimate power, the ultimate judge and ultimate arbiter of man’s fate. Though some would argue on exactly how and to what degree God was active in worldly affairs, few denied that God worked directly and indirectly in human affairs to accomplish His purposes. In short, the colonial Christian tended to view the world in a providential fashion—the world was God’s domain and His hand was ever active in it.

Events, especially those beyond the individual’s control, manifested divine purpose. The Puritans, for example, often spoke of “God’s Remarkable Providence in the World,” or simply, “remarkables,” which might be anything from the omen of a falling star, to the deflection of a fire by a shift in the wind or the course of economics. “It pleased the Lord,” wrote Governor Winthrop in 1647, “to open to us trade with Barbados and other islands in the West Indies.”

In the Chesapeake among a largely Anglican society, providence was expressed directly, and additionally in an indirect form through the strong belief in fortuna, or fate. Fortune moved strongly in the Chesapeake mind. Fate explained much: the course of a man’s life lay determined by a greater power residing in higher, unfathomable places, and it manifested itself in myriad ways. God’s favor or will could be found in a streak of luck at cards or could be sealed in death. Speaking of his servants, William Byrd wrote in his famous diary, “My people were still ill. God save them if it be his good pleasure. . . . God gives and God takes away.”

In the backlands of the colonies, the successive waves of so-called “Scotch-Irish” often combined their raw-boned religion with deep strains of mysticism and tints of sorcery. Folk-remedies, incantations, and charms were visible evidence of a deep belief that the physical world moved to the powers and designs of a spiritual realm.

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In this colonial world where events were divinely scripted, even the enslavement of other men could be a providential blessing. A Barbadian commented upon the profitable switch from tobacco to sugar and the switch from white servants to black slaves, "There is a great change on this island of late, from worse to the better, praised be God." Providence certainly was most easily considered manifest in tragedy. When half of Port Royal fell into the sea during the great earthquake of 1692, almost everyone agreed that the city had been punished for its manifold sins.

Such attitudes and examples fill the breadth of colonial experience and record, for the providential mind-set, no matter its particular form or depth, constituted a basic part of seventeenth-century life. In a violent, unpredictable world where economic failure, pestilence, calamity, and war often swept suddenly across the land, the providential mind-set provided an understanding of the world, a shield against the monumental uncertainty of life, an explanation of failure and a justification for success.

One reason Christians could believe so deeply in the providential nature of life was that they believed with equal or greater depth in the fact of their own special status as the elect, as God's chosen people in the world. Though "election" is almost always associated with Calvinist theology and the Puritans' inner turmoil, every Christian group considered themselves to be the saved, God's children, destined for eternal life with Him. The concept of election, a special relationship between the believer and Creator, was an inevitable adjunct to the Christian faith and a powerful force present all along the continuum of colonial experience.

Christianity, in its orthodox Protestant forms, is a religion which brooks no haziness or uncertainty—one is either a believer or a pagan, saved or damned, a possessor of eternal truth or a slave to darkness dwelling in falsehood. Even the most anxious Puritan, though he may doubt his own salvation, did not hesitate to count himself in the camp of true believers and condemn those outside the fold. Puritan New England's record of religious intolerance speaks volumes in this account. The implications, nuances, and force of this conviction worked themselves out in different ways from group to group, but its power and place in the colonial mind-set seem obvious. Its effects ranged from a fiery sense of special mission and purpose in the world, to a confident sense of superiority, to a rigid and conservative mind-set fearing all innovation and change. In its most negative manifestations, this conviction led to the distorted attitude of complete disdain for all other creeds, nationalities, and races.

Both Puritans and Quakers came determined to show the world how true Christianity should be practiced in individual and communal ways. Their societies, at least in the early generations, were marked by an order and stability partly rising from their firm belief and confidence in who they were and what they were about. That Quakers proved more tolerant of religious diversity than did Puritans is not so much because The Friends entertained doubts about their own rightness, but because they were willing to let others have the freedom to be wrong.

In the Chesapeake and Caribbean, the Anglican manifestation of this mind-set evidenced itself in other ways. The notions of providence and election reinforced the planter elite's conception of a hegemonic world in which they held complete sway. God, after all, had blessed them and appointed them to their lot. The confidence gained from knowledge of one's own saved, elect status could manifest itself in basic ways. For example, when William Byrd regularly ended diary
notations of his sexual conquests and laxity in prayer with ".. for which God forgave me," he was not so much invoking a talismanic phrase as he was voicing confidence in the surety of his own forgiveness and his stature before God. He might temporarily depart from the straight and narrow, but he never doubted his place in the cosmos or his relationship to the creator of that cosmos.

In the Chesapeake and Caribbean, however, the negative possibilities of this mind-set also found powerful expression. If surety of one's own rightness could instill a wholesome sense of self-confidence, it could also magnify a sense of superiority. Convinced of the preeminent nature of his religion and his culture, the colonial Christian at times found ready intellectual and emotional support for the most horrific acts against the "savage" and "barbaric" Indians and for the economically advantageous enslavement of blacks. Planters in the West Indies, plunging into the fantastically profitable sugar market, embraced chattel slavery and created the most brutal manifestation of that institution in the English colonies. The continental mainland, lacking such a marketable product, only inched into slavery. Yet, in both locales, the superiority the colonists felt played a substantial role in their willingness to accept slavery in its new and most exploitive form. The Barbados Slave Code of 1661 captured this mind-set in its description of the black as "heathenish, brutish and an uncertain, dangerous kind of people... as being created Men, though without the knowledge of God in the world."  

The power of Christian belief in election worked itself out in diverse but omnipresent ways. That colonists latched on more easily to the intoxicating possibilities of Christian confidence than they realized the more difficult call to Christian compassion, testifies more to the seductive power of that confidence and the frailty of human nature than it does to the irrelevancy of their beliefs to their lives.

If a providential mind-set and a sense of election were common to the colonial experience, so were optimism and opportunism. That the British colonization of North America was driven, in part, by the seeking of self-advancement and personal gain is no new idea. Most recently, Jack Greene strongly expressed this concept in his Pursuits of Happiness, 8 where he finds opportunism at work both across the colonial landscape and in the parent nation. America offered the immigrant seemingly boundless possibilities to those wealthy, crafty, determined, courageous, lucky, or desperate enough to seek them. Despite the many differences between the various migrating peoples, the voluntary immigrants were united in their belief that the colonies offered opportunities that could be achieved.

To both the Puritans and the Quakers, America offered an opportunity to escape persecution, and both hoped that in that distant and fertile America, they might construct a Christian society for the world to see. Catholics, though in smaller numbers, similarly sought Maryland as a refuge. Hope for spiritual reward was in no way limited to large movements or flight from hostility--innumerable sects, splinters, and offshoots voyaged to the New World in search of their own particular goals. Thus, optimistic that they would find "the

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Lusting after the rank and comfort in English society that success might grant them, in the Chesapeake and Carolinas similar hopefuls constructed a plantation economy centered around rice, indigo, and tobacco. That more planters achieved their goals in the Indies than on the mainland is less a comment on the intent of the Chesapeake's elites than it demonstrates the market ascendency of sugar.

Nor was it only elites with capital who grasped the opportunities available in the colonies. The vast majority of seventeenth-century, voluntary immigrants to the plantation regions came as servants already in, or headed for, bonded servitude. If they survived the voyage and their term of service, the prospect of freedom clearly meant to them an opportunity to achieve things beyond their grasp at home. Though chances for a freeman to rise from yeomanry to planter dropped dramatically after the first generation of settlement, the chance for an artisan or laborer to gain land, trade, or a business for himself remained real and a powerful incentive. That perhaps 80 percent or more of voluntary immigrants came as servants, indicates the price people were willing to pay to gain access to colonial opportunity.

In the 1700s, the large numbers of "Scotch-Irish" who poured into the back-country suffered much in transit and came to a region fraught with danger and plagued with the greatest economic inequality on the North American mainland. Yet, so harsh were the conditions from where they had left and so different the land into which they had come that their optimism remained intact and the opportunities still seemed worth the cost. "I do not know one that has come here,"

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* Bailyn, Peopling, 123-24.

**Ibid.,** 125-27, 185-86.
wrote a Pennsylvania immigrant in 1767, "that desires to be in Ireland again."11

The struggle to seize the opportunities inherent in the newly opened lands at the Empire's edge cut across lines of region, religion, society, and economic orientation. The catholic nature of the phenomena is nowhere better illustrated than in the colonial fascination with land speculation. Speculation in North America constituted, in the words of Bernard Bailyn, a "ubiquitous enterprise."12 From Massachusetts to the Delaware Valley, across the Chesapeake, throughout the western back-country, and across the Caribbean basin "every farmer with an extra acre of land became a land speculator."13 Thus the land itself became both the coin and symbol of the optimistic opportunism which characterized the colonial experience.

Opportunism, and its more extreme and negatively connoted manifestation, exploitation, are double-edged swords. The process of seeking and grasping is a dynamic one, and dynamism inherently implies change and evolution. In chasing his dreams, spiritual and physical, the colonial immigrant brought himself into a new environment and triggered chains of reactions which multiplied upon themselves and drew both land and settler into a spiral of economic, cultural, political, social, and religious transition.

If the wilderness of North America presented the colonists with a seemingly infinite source of possibilities, it also threatened, challenged, and changed them in powerful ways. Over the variety of patterns which characterized the details of colonial settlement, the inescapable, elemental power of the frontier experience loomed large. Whether described as life "beyond the line" or living on "the periphery" of the Empire, pressed against an untamed and unsettled environment, the colonist's world lay at the margins of European civilization. Extremes of weather and distance, strange flora and fauna, wary and often hostile indigenous populations, isolation, tenuous and distant authorities, limited resources, the brooding threat of wars—these fearsome realities hovered over all the colonies in ways often more immediate and profound than had any threats back home. As such, they provided constant stress and proved a constant catalyst to change.

Perched on the edge of the realm, the tensions between the bounds of society, the breadth of opportunity, and the thin nature of authority strained and warped the threads of civilization in strange and dangerous ways. Endemic violence, extremes in exploitation, piracy, rebellion, lawlessness, vigilante justice, near-genocidal Indian wars—all of these found fertile ground in the tumultuous and unpredictable world "beyond the line." Perhaps it is not surprising that the most harsh and wild environment, the Caribbean, produced the colonies' most radical excesses and worst moral collapses.

Against this rock even Puritan will broke, with their Caribbean colony of Providence Island collapsing in chaos and decay. Even in the salubrious climate of New England, the force of the frontier could not be escaped. The Puritans knew their own sufferings, Indian wars, crimes, and violence. The dark woods on the margins of their settlements loomed large and threatening, not just because of the visceral, primal fear of the unknown, but also because the wilderness and the Indians it harbored constantly reminded them that here civilization

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12 Bailyn, Peopling, 69.

13 Ibid., 67.
had only a thin and tenuous hold, and that they were all, physically and spiritually, just a few steps away from barbarism.

The power and reality of change bred from opportunism and environment operated across the breadth of colonial experience, and even the most stout fortresses of colonial religious will eventually caved to the forces unleashed. For example, though the Puritan and Quaker religions contained strong warnings against the corrupting power of Mammon's pursuit, they also were plagued by the paradoxical belief that earthly success among believers likely indicated election, God's favor, and the deserved fruits of a devout, diligent character. The presence of a particularly strong strain of the Protestant work ethic in each society further blurred the lines between opportunity well-grasped and greed unbridled.

Here arose the dilemma of Boston's premier merchant, Robert Keayne. In 1639 he found himself charged in General Court with the rare and grievous crime of oppressing the poor—seemingly not so much for the fact of his wealth, as the proceedings revealed, but for his arrogant attitude toward it. The passage of two and three generations in the land, however, abated each society's "ascetic" strains, and Puritanism's or Quakerism's ultimate compatibility with economic opportunism is demonstrated by the shipping, banking, manufacturing, and merchant edifices each society constructed in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.

From the beginning of their own particular experiences in the new land, colonists seemed aware of the surrounding currents of change and dislocation. Against this force, immigrants clung determinedly to those elements of their homes which they had brought with them and longed nostalgically for the things they had been forced to leave behind. Different groups of voyagers carried with them the pillars and trappings of the particular English society that spawned them—common law, church, parish, vestry, militia, representative assemblies, building styles, fashions, foods, recreations—and they held on to them even when impractical and even dangerous. The longing for and preservation of the rituals, traditions, and ornaments of home served numerous purposes, but it ultimately provided a connection with the familiarity and relative security of a known past and a bulwark against an uncertain future and potentially harmful change.

Faced with the daunting reality of the frontier, colonists almost universally responded with some mixture of nostalgia for their past and anxiety for their future. Though there was optimism for the exploitation of opportunities, secular and spiritual, there was also fear that their delicately transplanted and painstakingly crafted societies might be irrevocably altered by time and the very opportunities they sought to master. This anxiety was not without reason, for no society is absolutely static, and the passage of time assures change. The forces of the frontier and the new realities of life "beyond the line" were already entering into the evolution of each region's unique character. So, after a generation the surviving Puritan pioneers watched with horror as their posterity, born to the new world, began to think more in terms of worldly than in heavenly pursuits. Quaker families found themselves painfully breaking ties with children, who, in ever greater numbers, began to marry outside The Society. Faced with a threat to their world, Caribbean planter elites turned to increasingly oligarchic and coercive government to limit competition, and those who had introduced slavery to their economic benefit now had to deal with the volatile and new culture. Everywhere the character of the periphery was in flux, with change begetting change. In its midst the colonist lived in a dynamic world, both embracing it for what it had to offer and fearing it for what it might cost.

Fischel, Albion's Seed, 156, 161.
It is evident that the amazing variety of experiences in the colonial world share at least some elements in common. The voluntary immigrants to the British North American colonies were overwhelmingly Protestant Christians sharing a tendency toward a providential, mystical mind-set which explained and ordered the world in terms of divine direction and intervention. As Christians they largely shared a conviction of their own election and of the correctness of their beliefs, practices, and lifestyles. From this they gained a certain confidence, even if sometimes tenuous, of their place in creation and their relationship to God. While this confidence and conviction of their own righteousness provided a powerful personal bulwark in a tumultuous life, it often also engendered a certain rigidity of view and helped create within them a sense of personal, religious, and cultural superiority, a mind-set which played an important part in their dealings with both each other and different ethnic and racial groups.

The immigrants were also an optimistic and opportunistic people, drawn to the colonies by hopes and expectations of spiritual and material gain. In striving for these goals they evidenced great energy and a genius for exploitation. In achieving their goals, they created new societies, established new ideas, and left an indelible mark upon the landscape. However, that landscape, in all its varieties and with all its opportunities, immersed the colonists in a demanding, often harsh frontier lifestyle, where natural, social, and moral forces could often blur the line between civilization and savagery. Against this unsettling environment, colonists tended to react with a mixture of nostalgia for their past and anxiety about their future. They sought to preserve elements of their origins and to protect the stability of their society, while new immigration and change unfolded uncannily around them.

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THE 1968 FLORIDA TEACHERS' STRIKE
AND THE EMERGENCE OF TEACHER UNIONISM

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In 1968, Florida teachers staged the nation's first statewide teachers' strike and temporarily focused the state's attention on education. The strike also marked the rise of militant unionism over professional associationalism among Florida's teachers. Opposing views regarding the education crisis, however, contained a basis for agreement which offers an explanation of that bitter conflict.

Governor Claude Kirk protested that striking teachers were seeking a salary increase and negotiation rights to gain control of Florida's education system. While Wade Hopping, the Governor's chief of staff during the strike agreed, he added that teachers deserved a salary raise, and education needed increased funding. Hopping has suggested that the discord began as a reform movement, although the National Education Association (NEA) soon became involved and instigated the strike. "I felt sorry for Constans," Hopping later exclaimed, "he just wanted to reform the schools" and provide teachers a justifiable salary increase.1

Phil Constans, from 1967 to 1969 Executive Secretary of the Florida Education Association (FEA), an NEA affiliate, insisted that he had led the educators' walkout to protest the deteriorating conditions in Florida's schools. He has maintained, "I really believed that what we were doing" was an effort "to get better education for children."

then the editor of Florida Education, the FEA's official publication, has corroborated Constans' position and has argued that the association leader did not want to strike but was concerned only with the quality of Florida's school system. Constans was forced into the strike.2 On the other hand, Pat Tornillo, the militant leader of the Dade County Classroom Teachers Association (DCCTA), an FEA-NEA affiliate, did pursue a Florida teachers' strike.

Brown, like Hopping, has argued that the strike's origins went beyond Florida and involved the NEA. Strikers, they have said, promoted school reform, improved education funding, and higher teachers' salaries. But the conflict's real inspiration was in a broader national conflict between the NEA and the American Federation of Teachers (AFT).3

Competition between the two national organizations began in 1961, when the AFT defeated the NEA in an election to represent New York City's teachers. The Federation advocated collective bargaining and strikes to obtain teachers' goals, and after their victory the Federation struck the New York schools and won significant salary gains for teachers. The strike's success enhanced the union's position, and AFT leaders spread its militant message across the nation in direct competition with the NEA to represent teachers.

The NEA, chartered by the federal government as a professional association, had rejected collective bargaining and strikes as unprofessional. But, with the growing Federation threat, proponents of unionism in the NEA began to support union tactics to counter AFT gains. They joined with activists

like Tornillo in Florida to improve school funding and increase teacher salaries. Their campaign, resisted by a recalcitrant governor, led to the 1968 teachers’ strike. Association militants advocated the strike and used the Florida conflict to generate unionism within the association. Union proponents achieved their goals. After the strike, the NEA immediately began to adopt union positions. In Florida the walkout precipitated an AFT-NEA conflict that resulted in the state’s being equally divided between the two national teacher unions.

The campaign for association unionism began in 1962 at the NEA Representative Assembly, the Association’s policy making body. Despite the AFT threat, association leaders who espoused professionalism resisted change. William Carr, the NEA’s Executive Secretary from 1952 to 1967, led the fight against unionism. He championed association professionalism, maintaining that student welfare was the organization’s first concern. Most importantly he unequivocally repudiated teacher strikes. In his opening remarks to the 1962 Assembly, Carr addressed the delegates, “I think I can say on your behalf” that “the members of the National Education Association . . . will keep their pledged word and they will never walkout on the students in their charge.” However, in 1962 Dr. Carr’s professionalism faced a challenge from the new association militants.

Association activists demanded a means to counter the AFT insurgency and to promote teacher welfare. Their insistence had already led to the creation of an urban division within the association. The new division represented the NEA in the cities where it was most vulnerable to union intrusions. In 1961, activists had passed a professional negotiations policy to counter the AFT’s collective bargaining strategy. At the 1962 convention, delegates strengthened that policy with a resolution that increased assistance for locals involved in negotiations.

The new militants’ primary objective was an association policy that mandated NEA support for striking affiliates. While professionals reluctantly agreed to an urban division and accepted the concept of professional negotiations, they refused to move on the strike issue. Strike proponents failed to win an association strike policy in 1962. Rather, delegates adopted a sanctions resolution to assist locals in their negotiations disputes. This sanctions policy advocated using public relations to inform the public and teachers when a school district’s program fell below an acceptable standard. Strike proponents rejected sanctions as a substitute for strikes in negotiations campaigns. The strike issue divided NEA unionists and professionals in contentious debate until unionism triumphed in 1968.

Much of the support for the union movement in the association came from urban locals. The creation of the NEA’s urban division in 1962 gave urban associations greater unity to promote their interests. In 1963, better organized urban association leaders established the National Council for Urban Education Associations (NCUEA) to support their demands for a more militant organization.

Among the leaders to emerge in that group was Dade County association leader Patrick Tornillo. In 1963, he called for organizational militancy in his successful campaign for president of the Dade County Classroom Teachers Association. After his election Tornillo embraced sanctions and

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*ibid., 70-72.

*ibid., 67-71.
professional negotiations in a campaign to negotiate a salary increase for Dade teachers. When the school board refused to negotiate, Tornillo turned to the NEA and the FEA for assistance. The NEA, through its urban division, gave Dade both staff and financial assistance throughout 1964 and 1965 and urged the FEA to do likewise. But in 1964 the state association, like the national, was firmly entrenched in the professional camp and was reluctant to become involved in the Dade salary dispute. The state organization's reaction caused Tornillo, Janet Dean, and other Dade teacher leaders to use DCCTA activism in promoting a more aggressive state organization.†

Tornillo's campaign proved successful when in May 1965, the FEA Board of Directors requested an NEA investigation of Florida politics and education. Association leaders called for the investigation, because they believed Governor Haydon Burns and the legislature had relegated education to a secondary status. The educators expressed their concerns in a professional appeal, arguing that the governor's position of no new taxes deprived the schools of adequate funding and denied children a quality education. The FEA noted the deterioration of teacher salaries in its request for NEA assistance.‡

After a preliminary investigation of conditions in Florida, the NEA approved the state association's request. Between May 1965 and March 1966, the NEA's Professional Rights and Responsibility section conducted a study of how Florida's political system had affected the state's education program. In March 1966, the national published its report which concluded that increasingly militant teachers had become concerned with the government's neglect of public education. The findings indicated that total revenues for education from the state's general revenue fund had decreased from 54.62 percent in 1963 to 1965 to 53.7 percent of the state budget in 1965 to 1967. That decrease came in the midst of a population explosion among school age children in Florida. At the county level, recalcitrant school boards had aggravrated local associations in Dade, Broward, and Hillsborough into imposing sanctions. Sanctions included actions like those invoked by the Dade teachers' organizations including censure of school officials and the threatened withdrawal of summer school services.§

The report revealed serious problems in the Florida school system. Deficiencies included inadequate teacher salaries, overcrowded classrooms, and an insufficient kindergarten program. The report contained a list of recommendations describing how Florida's government might improve education. Among the recommendations suggested were the levying of new taxes for education purposes, improving the local tax base, and further school reorganization. The most serious issue, however, was that the state had never properly utilized its existing funding system. Florida, the report maintained, had the available means to immediately improve education.¶

On March 20, 1966, the FEA Board announced that Florida's teaching profession was in a state of sanctions alert. State association officers warned government officials to correct the problems described in the NEA report and threat-

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†Pat Tornillo, interview with author, Tallahassee, FL, Feb. 24, 1992; West, National Education Association, 47-51; CTA (Classroom Teachers Association), Request for Assistance, 1964, Records of Florida Education Association [hereafter cited as FEA Records], M86-011, Box 11, FF 24, Florida State Archives, Tallahassee, FL.

‡FEA Request for NEA Investigation, n.d., FEA Records, Box 28, FF 2.


ened to impose sanctions if the deficiencies continued beyond the 1967 legislative session.\textsuperscript{11} Sanctions later imposed included a censure of the governor and state legislators who supported his school program, a request that teachers not under contract to teach in Florida refrain from seeking employment in Florida until state officials provided significantly increased support for education, and notification that any educator accepting "employment in the Florida schools will be subject to changes of violation of the Code of Ethics of the Education Profession." However, before the NEA could impose sanctions and before the 1967 legislative session, Floridians elected a new governor.

Miami Mayor Robert High King had defeated incumbent Governor Burns in the May 1966 Democratic primary and opposed Claude Kirk, a flamboyant Jacksonville millionaire, in the November 1966 general election. In their campaigns neither candidate offered constructive solutions to school concerns. King agreed that some new taxes were necessary, but he lacked a coherent education plan. Kirk in his grandiose style produced an education white paper that promised to make Florida first in education. Drawn directly from the NEA investigation report, it promised increased teacher salaries, an additional 4,400 classrooms, and a kindergarten system in every school district. Kirk, however, proposed that these changes could be accomplished without implementing any new taxes. Association leaders understood the hollowness of Kirk’s pledge and endorsed King.\textsuperscript{12}

Despite the FEA’s opposition, Kirk won the election, becoming Florida’s first Republican governor since Reconstruction. From the beginning of his tenure, Kirk’s style precipitated conflict both with the legislature and the FEA. Wade Hopping has pointed out that Kirk was not a consensus builder; rather he would develop a plan and pursue it until he achieved his goal. Hopping has described him as a man, "who would beat you up," or "bust your chops." His confrontational style resulted in a battle in his first legislative session over school spending. He effectively used the veto to block legislative proposals which would have required new taxes for increased school funding. In that session Kirk established that he had the votes to block veto override attempts, and the veto became an integral part of his relationship with the legislature. The regular session ended in April 1967, without an education budget.\textsuperscript{13}

Angry association officials, frustrated with Kirk’s tactics, imposed statewide sanctions on May 24 and requested further NEA assistance. State sanctions included censuring the governor and national notification that Florida was an unsatisfactory place in which to teach. In Washington, DC, NEA activists, convinced that a victory in Florida would strengthen their cause, moved to support Florida teachers.\textsuperscript{14}

On June 5, the NEA Executive Committee reviewed a report prepared by the Professional Rights and Responsibility committee headed by Assistant Executive Secretary Cecil Hannan. The committee concluded on the basis of their review that education had deteriorated further since the NEA’s

\textsuperscript{11}Position Statement, Board of Directors, Mar. 16, 1966, FEA Records, Box 7, FF 9; Press Release (Sanctions), Mar. 21, 1966, FEA Records, Box 7, FF 9.


\textsuperscript{13}Hopping interview; Cass, "Politics and Education," 63-65, 76-79.

\textsuperscript{14}Brown interview; "How Florida Slept: Background on the Developing School Crisis," Bob Lee private papers, Secretary Treasurer, Florida Education Association/United.
1965 investigation. NEA Executive Committee members voted to support the FEA's actions and joined in the FEA's censure of Kirk. Association officials advised teachers not to seek positions in Florida, warning that those who did would be in violation of the Teaching Profession's Code of Ethics.\textsuperscript{15}

Despite sanctions, Kirk and the legislature continued their adversarial politics during the extended legislative session in June. Legislators seeking a compromise introduced three separate budget proposals, but the governor rejected them. On June 29, Kirk used his line item veto power to write a state budget, one condemned by educators.\textsuperscript{16}

On July 1, the NEA Board of Directors, as if in response to Kirk, reversed the association's absolute opposition to strikes. Janet Dean, president of the Council of Urban Education Associations, was largely responsible for the new board policy. To support local negotiations efforts that continued to prohibit NEA support for affiliate strikes, the Impasse Resolution Committee had developed an impasse proposal. Dean, a committee member, opposed the report and wrote a minority opinion. She led a lobbying effort that persuaded NEA directors to adopt her position. Though Dean's language did not promote strikes, it did authorize the NEA, in the event of a strike, to "offer all of the services at its command to the affiliate concerned to help resolve the impasse." Then Dean reported the board's action to the Florida press, suggesting that the new policy might support a Florida teachers' strike.\textsuperscript{17}

William Carr announced his retirement at the 1967 Representative Assembly following the board meeting. Sam Lambert, one of five NEA Assistant Executive Directors, replaced him as the association's Executive Secretary. Lambert, though not as conservative as Carr, was no unionist. Delegates at the convention passed a resolution supporting their colleagues in Florida and urging teachers not to violate the code of ethics by applying for employment in Florida. Dr. Cecil Hannan had already left for Florida to direct the NEA's field operations in the state.\textsuperscript{18}

Teacher salaries in Florida had deteriorated since 1960. In 1967, Florida teachers earned an average of $7,200, less than the national average and below that their colleagues in Georgia and Alabama earned.

Hannan, working with the FEA, developed a campaign to force Kirk to call a special legislative session. They wanted the session limited to educational funding with special attention to teacher salaries. Hannan was assisted by thirty-five NEA organizers, and he planned a union strategy to achieve association objectives. His campaign began with a luncheon for congressmen, at which he described Florida's school problems as the most severe in the nation. To resolve the conflict and to save Florida's schools, Hannan proposed a meeting of influential individuals in the state, including

\textsuperscript{15}National Education Association Addresses and Proceedings (Washington, DC: National Education Association, 1967), 357-358.

\textsuperscript{16}Atlanta Journal Constitution, Sept. 17, 1967, in Larry Brown private papers. This particular date was missing from the microfilm collection at Florida State University; "How Florida Slept."


\textsuperscript{18}National Education Association Addresses and Proceedings, 1967, 504-505.
education leaders, industrialists, the governor, and other state officials. Kirk refused to consider such a meeting, and he warned that sanctions would not affect his decisions.19

Even before the governor’s warning, Hannan realized that sanctions would not force a settlement. He did believe, however, that sanctions had a public relations value, and he constantly reminded teachers of their unfair treatment. When Kirk refused to meet, the association imposed additional sanctions, including an informational campaign to national businesses and industries describing the problems with Florida schools. The national staff also began to develop a system to assist Florida’s teachers in locating jobs outside the state. While the NEA escalated its sanctions strategy, Hannan moved in a more militant direction.20

NEA policy prohibited promoting strikes, and Hannan’s strategy violated that rule. Throughout August, Hannan and his staff toured Florida seeking to intensify teacher militancy. They focused on South Florida’s urban centers, where Hannan believed there was a greater likelihood of success. During the first week of August, he urged Pinellas County teachers to take more militant action. Hannan warned that a statewide walkout was a distinct possibility. He contended that “a teacher revolt was sweeping the nation and the Florida problem is the biggest education problem in the nation today.” The NEA would do whatever was necessary to save Florida’s schools. Hannan’s rhetoric was a small part of a larger effort repeated in all of Florida’s urban areas. According to

Hopping, NEA’s only purpose was to “lather up the teachers” with the single purpose of inciting a strike. Former FEA staff person Larry Brown concurred with Hopping. If that was Hannan’s intent, he succeeded in Pinellas County.21

On Friday August 11, Pinellas County teachers rejected a school board salary proposal. Teacher leaders angrily announced that, “We are not willing to wait any more—we are fed up with waiting for next year, the next legislative session.”22 On August 14, the county’s teachers voted 1,555 to 222 for the state’s first teachers’ strike and to stay out until they received an adequate salary schedule. The school board obtained an injunction ordering teachers back to work. Teachers returned to work on August 17, but more than 2,000 had turned over signed resignation forms to local association leaders, threatening a future strike.23

Thirty-five thousand teachers met the following week in a display of strength and solidarity at the Tangerine Bowl in Orlando. Hannan brought a $50,000 check to support whatever was necessary to obtain justice for Florida teachers. The teachers were meeting, NEA leaders explained, because of the crisis in Florida’s schools and Kirk’s refusal to call a special legislative session. National leaders, like Pinellas’ teachers, contended that Florida educators were fed up, and they demanded immediate action. While many expected teachers to call a strike, Phil Constans, the charismatic FEA

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Executive Secretary, told teachers, "On this day I must ask you to turn the other cheek—to go the extra mile—to try again." Larry Brown has suggested that teachers did not strike at that time, because Constans and others were trying "to maintain this air of respectability and professionalism." Association officials finalized a resignation strategy to circumvent the state constitution's no strike provision. Teachers in Orlando, rather than strike, signed resignation forms and threatened a later walkout.

Encouraged by the NEA staff, even before the Tangerine Bowl rally, Broward teachers had threatened to strike because of poor salaries. On September 5, they acted on their threat when local association leaders submitted 2,384 signed resignation forms to the school board. Their action closed the county schools for a week. Strikers in Broward returned to work after gaining a paltry $158 salary increase and assurances from the school board that it would join in the demand for a special legislative session. Again, as in Pinellas, Hannan and NEA organizers precipitated the strike.

Teacher strikes in Pinellas and Broward and the NEA presence led to strike talk in other urban areas. Teachers in Dade, Hillsborough, and Duval counties threatened strikes. The FEA designated October 1 as "crisis Sunday," when teachers encouraged citizens to make on-site investigations of the schools' inferior conditions. Thirty-five NEA organizers crisscrossed the state "lathering up" the teachers. The combined FEA-NEA forces designated October 22, 1967 as D-Day, when teachers would meet to take a strike vote. Kirk reacted, announcing that his "Quality Education Commission Investigation," which had not been scheduled for completion until the end of 1968, would be completed in December. He proposed to report on his study in December and then to call a special legislative session to deal with school funding.

After Kirk announced his intention to reconvene the legislature, the NEA lifted its sanctions as a public relations gesture. Sanctions, after all, had not affected the governor's decision. The NEA warned from its national office that until a final settlement was reached, the lifting of sanctions affected only its public relations component. More important, NEA organizers remained in Florida. Hannan insisted that NEA staff would help the governor complete his education study during the truce period.

That truce was interrupted briefly by a three-day strike in Bay County. Although the Bay County salary dispute was not a part of the NEA's militancy campaign, it reflected the changing mood of Florida teachers. Teachers in Bay County had gained the courage to strike from their colleagues in Pinellas and Broward. The strike reminded Governor Kirk of his commitment to call a special session.

25Brown interview.
26Brown interview; Hopping interview; Florida Education 45 (Nov. 1967): cover, 6; Clearwater Sun, Sept. 7, 1967.
30Bay County Walkout File, FEA Records, Box 106, FF 5.
On January 13, 1968 Kirk summoned the legislature to reconvene on the 29th. Teachers set a March 1 strike deadline to remind legislators of the seriousness of their demands. Early in the session optimism prevailed, when the Senate passed a bill acceptable to the FEA. But the House-Senate Conference committee cut expenditures from the original bill. Then the conference committee proposed revenues for purposes other than education. Militant teachers rebelled at the reductions and at the politicians' proposal to use tax money earmarked for education for non-school programs. Kirk objected to the bill and threatened a veto, because the legislation did not contain a provision for a referendum on new taxes. Association leaders did not wait for Kirk to act on his veto threat. On February 16, FEA officials announced that they had activated over 35,000 resignations to take effect on the following Monday.31

Janet Dean and Pat Tornillo met with the NEA Executive Committee on February 17, in Washington, DC. Dean and Tornillo, acting on behalf of the FEA, requested NEA strike assistance, but only if it came with no conditions. Hannan supported their request, commenting "FEA does not want NEA to be involved unless it is willing to go all the way."32 Dean spoke firmly, telling the NEA committee that, "the teachers of Florida will do whatever must be done to effect the ends they seek by whatever means are available to them. The problem is whether the NEA representatives are prepared to take the same action."33 NEA activists like Hannan joined with urban militants like Tornillo and Dean in Florida to transform the FEA into a militant organization, willing to strike for teacher salaries. The issue Dean presented at that Saturday meeting was whether or not the NEA's established leadership was undergoing a similar change.34

National leaders seemed to hesitate. Sam Lambert, obviously concerned about the NEA's taking a leadership role in the strike, asked "whether state or local staff would give visible leadership."35 He was assured that was the plan. Other committee members expressed concern about finances, injunctions, and possible wildcat strikes. During the course of the discussion, a committee member pointed out the organization's Minneapolis pledge to support affiliates that strike. NEA Executive Committee members upheld the Minneapolis pledge, and approved the Dade leader's request. Tornillo, Dean, and Hannan returned to Florida.36

On Monday, February 19, 1968, more than 35,000 of Florida's 58,000 educators went out on strike. The NEA, Hopping later explained, "got the monster started and could not get it under control."37 Actually, the NEA militants who had provoked the walkout never made any effort to get it under control. Bellicose national organizers, in alliance with Florida urban activists, had instigated the protest. They had pressured FEA officials, angered by Kirk's charades, into calling for the work stoppage. Woefully underpaid teachers


33Ibid., 1968, 378-379.

34Ibid., 1968, 378-379.


36Ibid., 378-379.

37Hopping interview.
who had sought improved salaries since the 1965 NEA investigation heeded the call.\textsuperscript{38}

To achieve victory, the union needed to close the schools and keep them closed by preventing strikers from breaking ranks and inducing non-striking teachers to walkout. Unionists failed in their effort to shut down the system. Larry Brown has commented on the situation:

Bottom line, they were never able to close the schools. I mean that was the key issue. The whole thing was predicated on being able to shut the schools down, and they could not do that.\textsuperscript{39}

Floyd Christian, the Secretary of Education in Florida, and other state officials used unqualified substitutes and other means to keep the system open. According to Brown, they maintained a statewide babysitting service, but the schools remained open. Thus, parents never put pressure on local school officials to resolve the conflict with striking teachers. Local school boards used intimidation, threats, and power to hold teachers in, and they convinced many desperate teachers to return to work.\textsuperscript{40} By March 7, 15,000 teachers, afraid of losing their jobs, returned to their schools. Twenty thousand strikers remained locked in combat with government forces.\textsuperscript{41}

On March 7, the education bill passed in the special session became law without the governor’s signature. The new school funding provision allocated an additional $2,170 for every classroom. It provided teachers at the beginning of the salary schedule with pay increases ranging up to $1,000. More experienced teachers received even larger salary increases. Florida’s average teacher salary increased from $7,216 in 1967 and 1968 to $8,130 in 1968 and 1969. Florida teachers moved from twenty-second to thirteenth in average salary among the states. Teachers had won the salary issue.\textsuperscript{42}

The press disputed this contention arguing that, because the legislature had passed the bill prior to the walkout, teachers would have received the increases without a strike. The press, however, missed some crucial points. The legislation, although passed prior to the strike, did not become effective until March 7. Wade Hopping, the governor’s closest advisor, has pointed out that Kirk had a record of "[v]etoing everything in sight,"\textsuperscript{43} and Kirk had threatened to veto the bill, because it contained no referendum provision on new taxes. Ultimately, Kirk did not veto the bill, because on March 7 there were still 20,000 teachers out on strike. A veto might well have swelled the strikers’ ranks. Instead, he allowed the legislation to become law and thereby brought the strike to an end.\textsuperscript{44}

On March 8, the FEA leaders called off the strike. Total chaos occurred with the strikers’ return to work. Individual county associations began to negotiate local settlements.

\textsuperscript{38}Ibid.; Brown interview.

\textsuperscript{39}Brown interview.

\textsuperscript{40}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{41}Ibid.; Hopping interview.


\textsuperscript{43}Hopping interview.

\textsuperscript{44}“How Florida Slept,” Bob Lee private papers; Hopping interview; Brown interview.
Brown described Constans' anger as disorder spread: "I mean he was totally incensed because locals like Hillsborough made their own special deals." Teacher security demanded that teachers maintain ranks until all strikers had been guaranteed reemployment. But the organization splintered as the strike came apart. Vengeful school boards took retribution, refusing to rehire some strikers, demoting administrators, and in other ways harassing returning employees. Bitterness increased as hundreds of strikers were forced to seek employment outside of Florida or in non-education fields. The press, which had opposed the strike, decided that this post-strike chaos, bloodletting, and economic contention proved the strike had failed.45

Despite the press' epitaph, beyond increased salaries and education funding, strikers accomplished another goal. Perhaps more important, union proponents in both the FEA and the NEA had achieved their strike objective. In the post-strike period the NEA changed to reflect unionism rather than professionalism. Unionism also emerged in Florida and resulted in a statewide NEA-AFT power struggle. The NEA's conversion began at the 1968 NEA Representative Assembly.

Sanctions against Florida were still in effect when the 1968 NEA Representative Assembly convened in July. Assembly delegates implemented the strike's purpose by passing a resolution making it to be association policy that the NEA support affiliate strikes. In his opening address to the delegates, Sam Lambert proclaimed that in Florida, "We reversed a 10-year trend of educational neglect and decay," and "[w]e increased the financial outlays for education by at least $2,000 per classroom." His remarks encouraged strike proponents when delegates debated strike policy later in the convention.46

NEA president Braulio Alonso, fired from his Tampa school administrator's position because of his role in the strike, chaired the assembly. He symbolized Florida's struggle and the strike issue, and he must have influenced the vote. Janet Dean led the floor fight for resolution 68-19 which approved association support for strikes, although NEA members remained divided on the strike issue. Some delegates still objected that strikes were unprofessional. In the often bitter debate, Dean and her allies defeated numerous attempts to weaken and defeat the resolution. During the debate, Dean admonished other delegates that 68-19 will, I believe dispel for all time this most specious of all arguments—that an individual who is a teacher, who is a citizen, and has the courage of his convictions is unprofessional or immoral.47

Dean and her allies prevailed. The resolution in part read,

Strikes have occurred and may occur in the future.
In such instances the association will offer all of the services at its command to the affiliate to help resolve the conflict.48

That language came directly from the impasse procedure adopted at Dean's insistence by the NEA Board in 1967, and which later was used to gain NEA support for the Florida strike. Activists who wanted the association to become more


47National Education Association Addresses and Proceedings, 1968, 205.

48Ibid., 527.
like a union and less like a professional association had achieved their goal.  

In 1969, the NEA strengthened its unionist position. First, the association adopted a stronger strike policy. Delegates also passed a resolution calling for a federal negotiations law. Lambert spoke for the measure, "I will admit right off the bill legalizes the work stoppage in education." The association began developing plans for a political action committee to enable it to enter more effectively into the political arena. While the association took steps into the union camp at the national level, post-strike organizational warfare also led to teacher unionism in Florida.  

During the post-strike period, organizational conflict between the FEA-NEA and AFT led the FEA into the AFT camp. In 1968 and 1969, the AFT began to challenge the FEA-NEA in various locations across the state. FEA leaders such as president-elect Louise Alford and board member Joe Whelpton deserted the FEA to become AFT organizers. Tornillo and the Dade teachers association withdrew from FEA and began to promote an FEA-AFT merger. His AFT merger position provoked a statewide conflict between the two national unions in Florida. Tornillo and the FEA affiliated with the AFT, while the NEA established a new state organization to promote its cause.  

In the early 1990s, the battle continues between two equally divided unions in Florida. Both groups agree on the importance of collective bargaining and strikes. Both represent rural areas as well as urban centers. Unions and the union conflict of the 1960s have significantly affected the Florida school system and teachers' relations with government officials for the past twenty-five years.

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BEAUTY AND SCIENCE:
THE AESTHETIC IMPULSE TO
SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS

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In this age of unprecedented scientific advance, a new breed of historians of science is attempting to understand, and maybe even refine, the notion of "progress." How are these historians attempting to explain scientific progress, and how are they dealing with the one aspect of the doing of science that has parallels in the so-called subjective disciplines, such as art, theology, poetry, music, and the classics? These disciplines which recognize and capitalize on the subjective elements of the human experience may have more in common with science than was once thought.

Those who would claim that science is a purely objective discipline and would deny the validity of "truth" that goes beyond the boundaries of a logical, positivist epistemology seem to have ignored a prime motivator of many of science's most revered innovators and discoverers: the search for beauty! Aesthetics is not only a pleasure to the spirit and imagination, it is also an important component of discovery and invention that cannot be supplied by mere logic.

In 1934, Karl Popper in his book, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, attempted to argue against the view of science as progressing by induction, a conviction that had prevailed since the time of Bacon and Hume. He proposed a hypothetico-deductive method to explain scientific progress. In this model, an hypothesis is subjected to deductive testing, a process he covered in some detail in his book.

One main principle of Popper's method is that all statements [or all "meaningful" statements] of empirical science must be capable of being finally decided, with respect to their truth and falsity. . . . But because, in Popper's view, there is no such thing as induction, "not the verifiability but the falsifiability of a system is to be taken as a criterion of demarcation." Popper's picture of the scientific enterprise, however, is lopsided on the falsification side, because, in fact, scientists do not just try to falsify their hypotheses. They also attempt to verify them. In addition, Popper's explanation of scientific progress was just too rational and systematic to explain what scientists seemed actually to be doing.

It was not until the 1960s, though, that a radical alternative was proposed. In 1962 in his The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Thomas Kuhn caused quite a stir with his rejection of any theory of science as a merely logical process of accretion. He reported other elements involved in scientific progress, such as arbitrariness, extraordinary science (the almost random speculation to explain anomalies), intuition, idiosyncracies of autobiography and personality, and, most important for this paper, an individual's sense of the aesthetic.

Probably the most revolutionary concept, and the most developed in his book, is his explanation of science as progressing in paradigmatic revolutions rather than smooth logical accretions. Kuhn sees science as progressing by current theory reaching a crisis of anomalies that can only be resolved by the acceptance of a new theory or paradigm. A period of "normal science" occurs where problem solving is done successfully with the accepted paradigm as a guide.


2Ibid.
Eventually a number of anomalies are revealed that can only be explained by accepting a new paradigm, and so forth. In this view, the greatest discoveries are made in the periods of paradigmatic revolution, not during the periods of normal science.\textsuperscript{3} The most impressive evidence for his theory is his explanation of the Copernican revolution.

Kuhn states that the prevailing Ptolemaic astronomy was "admirably successful in predicting the changing positions of both stars and planets."\textsuperscript{4} In succeeding centuries, however, the attempts to deal with minor discrepancies had made the system so complex and cumbersome that some began to doubt it. Other pressures, especially the demand for calendar reform, compounded the crisis in Ptolemaic astronomy.

One interesting point about Kuhn’s theory of paradigm shifts is that he claims that new theories usually do not answer any more questions than did the old ones. That is, new theories are not accepted because they necessarily answer all or most questions the old theories had failed to solve. Rather, the crisis with the old theories led scientists to give another theory a chance, a theory that is "incommensurable" with the former.\textsuperscript{5}

The heliocentric astronomy of Copernicus was indeed revolutionary and caused a theological crisis for many in the church who thought the Bible taught a geocentric universe. But is Kuhn’s theory of paradigm-shift an accurate description of the way science progresses? Do minor and major scientific

advances in theory demonstrate the "crisis-followed-by-paradigm-shift" model?

In the 1980s, Paul Feyerabend offered his alternative: an anarchistic picture of scientific progress. Arguing that the Copernican revolution exemplifies the anarchistic method at work, he summarizes his approach as follows:

The attempts to increase liberty, to lead a full and rewarding life, and the corresponding attempt to discover the secrets of nature and of man entails, therefore, the rejection of all universal standards and of all rigid traditions.\textsuperscript{6}

Feyerabend has been attacked for distorting history, but he himself presents the best refutation. For, even as he sends forth the cry for "no methods" as the method of scientific progress, at the very same instant he has to admit:

There may, of course, come a time when it will be necessary to give reason a temporary advantage and when it will be wise to defend its rules to the exclusion of everything else.\textsuperscript{7}

It is hard to take Feyerabend seriously, when he realizes the ultimate consequences of everyone following his proposals: chaos. On the other hand, he does successfully remind us that the preponderance of scientific discovery and invention is not the result of induction. Indeed, the "random speculation" that Kuhn reported occurring during periods of "extraordinary science" is still largely unexplained by any of these philosophers of science.

\textsuperscript{3}Thomas S. Kuhn, \textit{The Structure of Scientific Revolutions} (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 77.

\textsuperscript{4}\textit{Ibid.}, 68.

\textsuperscript{5}\textit{Ibid.}, 150.

\textsuperscript{6}Paul Feyerabend, \textit{Against Method} (London: Thetford Press Ltd., 1984), 20.

\textsuperscript{7}\textit{Ibid.}, 21.
A closer look at Popper's book reveals that he probably has received more criticism than he deserves, for he seems to be accused of explaining scientific progress as occurring by his hypothetico-deductive process of falsification. But Popper explains in the introduction to his work that he has no logical explanation for the seemingly intuitive process of the production of new ideas, theories or hypotheses:

"It so happens that my arguments in this book are quite independent of this problem. However, my view of the matter, for what it is worth, is that there is no such thing as a logical reconstruction of this process. My view may be expressed by saying that every discovery contains "an irrational element", or "a creative intuition..."\(^8\)

Popper, therefore, does not deal with this crucial element of scientific progress, the act of conceiving or inventing a theory. He even declares it to be "irrelevant to the logical analysis of scientific knowledge."\(^9\)

Of these three important views of the progress of science, the first declines even to speculate on the crucial conception of new ideas; the second only hints at progress resulting from "an individual's sense of the appropriate or the aesthetic;"\(^10\) and the third suggests anarchism (even a negative sophistic approach of making "the weaker case the stronger")\(^11\) as the only producer of new ideas. On the contrary, scientists themselves have disclosed one key to scientific progress and the production of new ideas, theories, hypotheses or paradigms: the search for beauty.

This impulse to discovery and invention can no longer be ignored in the attempt to understand the progress of science. Mathematicians and scientists use terms associated with the arts to describe mathematical and scientific discoveries and inventions. For instance, how is it that a formula such as,

\[ \int_0^{\infty} e^{-2bx^2} \sin bx \, dx = \frac{1}{x} \sum_{n=0}^{\infty} \frac{(-1)^n x^{2n+1}}{n!} \]

can be described as giving someone "a thrill which is indistinguishable from the thrill which I feel when I enter the Sestrasia Nuova of Capella Medicea?\(^12\) How, too, can our definition of "the beautiful" encompass Michelangelo's David and Marcel Duchamp's bicycle? Or Leonardo da Vinci's The Last Supper and Picasso's Guernica?

The answer might be found in the writings of the fourth-century BC philosopher Aristotle. Indeed, Aristotle's explanation of the pleasure human beings receive from the dramatic arts can be shown also to explain much of the aesthetic pleasure they experience in other arts and in the sciences.

Aristotle begins by asserting that man is differentiated from animals, because he is the most imitative and learns his first lessons by imitation. All men find pleasure in imitation and Aristotle gives as proof the fact that things that distress people in person do not do so when viewed in representations. This is so, because an act of learning from imitation, although most pleasurable to philosophers, is also in a lesser sense pleasurable to all.

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\(^8\) Popper, Logie of Scientific Discovery, 32.

\(^9\) Ibid., 31.

\(^10\) Kuhn, Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 155.

\(^11\) Feyerabend, Against Method, 30.

And here is the key to this pleasure: in viewing representations men learn and infer that "this is that." "This is that" is explained more fully when Aristotle asserts that poetry is superior to history, because poetry is concerned with universals rather than particulars. He explains that by universal he means what sort of man turns out to say or do what sort of thing according to probability or necessity rather than merely "what Alcibiades did or experienced." So learning and inferring that "this is that," universals from particulars, is the first key to pleasure for man in art and, as will be seen, in mathematics and science.

Aristotle indicates that harmony and rhythm are also innate to mankind, and he refers to the beauty of mathematics and mentions order as one of the chief forms of the beautiful. Expanding on these ideas, the mathematician H. E. Huntley, in his attempt to define a mathematical aesthetic, ties the beauty of mathematics together with the ideas of harmony and rhythm without specifically referring to these passages in Aristotle. Huntley discusses the remark of the French mathematician, Henri Poincaré, "but for harmony beautiful to contemplate, science would not be worth following." He also asserts that, "Mathematical beauty is found in patterns." Furthermore, "It is a matter of common observation that patterns can be a source of aesthetic pleasure, whether they are found in nature or in the creative output of a mathematical imagination." Rhythm or pattern as an element of the aesthetic is also discussed in reference to music: "The pattern of notes of a melody form a sequence in time, but unless memory allows the whole to be grasped in an instant, the beauty vanishes." Therefore the human aesthetic pleasure in patterns is related to Aristotle’s argument of the basic human pleasure in learning and inferring universals from particulars, discovering order out of chaos. J. W. N. Sullivan suggests this very thing, when he describes patterns as bringing order out of chaos:

Since the primary object of the scientific theory is to express the harmonies which are found to exist in nature, we see at once, that those theories must have an aesthetic value. The measure of success of a scientific theory is, in fact, a measure of its aesthetic value, since it is a measure of the extent to which it has introduced harmony in what was before chaos.

In summary, the aesthetic pleasure that mankind experiences in art and science is an intellectual pleasure rooted in a learning experience. Most successful art and science provide this pleasurable learning experience through the discovery of universals in particulars, through patterns that emerge to provide order from chaos. Whether learning about suffering or power or love or hate by viewing a work of art, or

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12. Ibid., 1451 b 6,7: ἢ μὴ γὰρ τόσοις μᾶλλον τὰ καθόλου, ἢ δ’ ισορροία τὰ καθ’ έκαστον λέγει.

13. Ibid., 1448 b 20, 21.


grasping the concepts of light or motion or conductivity by discovering laws or principles of science, these finds can all be called "beautiful." There is indeed an aesthetic element in the motivation behind scientific progress that seems to parallel that in the art world. As Wechsler comments: "Bohr, Dirac, Einstein, Heisenberg, Poincaré, and others acknowledge intuitive and aesthetic judgments as decisive factors in the acceptance or rejection of a particular model."

Poincaré poignantly witnesses to the aesthetic pleasure and resulting motivation for science:
The Scientist does not study nature because it is useful to do so. He studies it because he takes pleasure in it; and he takes pleasure in it because it is beautiful. If nature were not beautiful, it would not be worth knowing and life would not be worth living . . . I mean the intimate beauty which comes from the harmonious order of its parts and which pure intelligence can grasp.

Cyril Stanley Smith, writing on aesthetics in science, adds his testimony, declaring that "discovery derives from aesthetically-motivated curiosity and is rarely a result of practical purposefulness." Though this flies in the face of logical positivists and even some less rigid scientists who, nevertheless, consider themselves objective pursuers of fact, many introspective men in science have attributed their motivation and success to this aesthetic cognition.

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23Chandrasekhar, "Beauty and the Quest for Beauty," 29.


Erwin Schrödinger, in his quest of a "beautiful theory for describing atomic events," was contemplating Louis de Broglie's ideas of waves associated with particles. He produced his wave equation by "pure thought, looking for some beautiful generalization of de Broglie's ideas and not by keeping close to the experimental development of the subject. . . ."

Another scientist who was conscious of this mode of aesthetic cognition in discovery and invention was Herman Weyl. In spite of his convictions from the observable facts that his gauge theory of gravitation was wrong, he pursued it for its "beauty." Much later his instinct was proven to be correct and the formalism of gauge invariance became incorporated into quantum electrodynamics. Commenting on his scientific method, Weyl said, "My work always tried to unite the true with the beautiful; but when I had to choose one or the other, I usually chose the beautiful."

James Watson, the Nobel Prize-winning biologist, has given great insight into the real methods of scientific progress. In his fascinating account of the discovery of the structure of DNA in The Double Helix, he reveals the influence of personalities, cultural traditions, chance and an aesthetic sense on the progress of science. The last element is particularly interesting, because it was a major key to unlocking the secret structure of the hereditary molecule.

As Watson describes his adventure, he mentions Linus Pauling's suggestion of an -helix structure. Though it was shown to be false, Watson talks about how Pauling does


science. During the lecture when Pauling suggested his theory, Watson reports that "with eyes twinkling, Linus explained the specific characteristics that made his model—the -helix—uniquely beautiful." 27 Again there is an aesthetic sentiment in the description of a scientific model.

The aesthetic impulse to the discovery in Watson's case is hinted at when he remarks, "Perhaps the whole problem would fall out just by our concentrating on the prettiest way for a polynucleotide chain to fold up." 28 When Watson decided to work on a two-chain model for the structure of DNA, besides being an aesthetically motivated choice based on simplicity, beauty, and the fact that many important biological objects come in pairs, he did so in spite of evidence to the contrary. Assuming that the data must be incorrect, his aesthetic cognition urged him to go forward. This aesthetic judgment was indeed proven correct, for measurements of the water content that would not allow the double helix structure were subsequently proven to be incorrect. 29

Science does indeed seem to have more in common with the subjective disciplines of the humanities than is often supposed. Indeed, the realization of this common impulse—the search for beauty—at work in the sciences as well as the arts must be taken into account in any history of science. The realization of this aesthetic impulse to scientific discovery could be a contact point, in fact, to broaden the interdisciplinary movement among the humanities to include new dialogue with the sciences.

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28 Ibid., 61.

29 Ibid., 108.