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Florida International University

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Letter From the Editor

After a long and successful term as editors of the Selected Proceedings dating back to the 1995 meeting, Will Benedicks and Kyle Eidahl passed on this responsibility to me in Spring, 2004. Their service to the Florida Conference of Historians will be long remembered and appreciated. I hope that this edition under new editorial supervision will approach the high quality of Volumes 3 through 11.

I would especially like to thank the FIU MA and PhD students who volunteered to assist me in this undertaking. Anthony Atwood, Yamilene Hurtado, Jonathan Jacobs, and Silvia Mitchell have all participated in various ways in the project, including most importantly copyediting the articles and putting them in the form you see here. Blaine T. Browne and Jay Clarke have also assisted in the editing process, and I am grateful for their considered participation which has resulted in a much better final product than could have been produced without them.

Editorial errors are the editors' responsibility; the quality of the papers is a credit to the contributors. I look forward to editing the papers from the March, 2005 conference in Tampa.

Joseph F. Patrouch

Miami, Florida
March, 2005
Thomas M. Campbell Award

Beginning with Volumes 6/7 in 1999, the Florida Conference of Historians has presented the Thomas M. Campbell Award for the best paper published in the Annual Proceedings of that year.

Thomas M. (Tom) Campbell was the driving force behind the creation of the Florida Conference of Historians, at that time called The Florida College Teachers of History, over 30 years ago. It was his personality and hard work that kept the conference moving forward. Simply put, in the early years he was the conference.

Tom was a professor of U.S. Diplomatic History at Florida State University. The Thomas M. Campbell Award is in his name so that we may recognize and remember his efforts on behalf of the Florida Conference of Historians.

Past Recipients

Volumes 6/7: J. Calvitt Clarke III, Jacksonville University
Volumes 8/9: J. Calvitt Clarke III, Jacksonville University
Volumes 10/11: Robert L. Shearer, Florida Institute of Technology
Volume 12: David Michel, Chicago Theological Seminary
Florida Conference of Historians
2004 Annual Program

Hosted by
Sean McMahon
Lake City Community College
Lake City, Florida

Thursday, March 4

6:00 – 8:00 P.M.
Registration
Light refreshments in the Santa Fe Room

Friday, March 5

8:00 A.M.
Continental breakfast available
Registration continues all day in the lobby.
Be sure to visit the book vendors and also the exhibit table from the Columbia County Historical Society in the Santa Fe Room.

8:30 – 9:45 A.M.

Session A: The Cold War at Home and Abroad – Santa Fe Room

Chair: David Proctor, North Florida Community College

Christopher Griffin, Florida State University

“For God and County: Bishop Sheen’s Crusade Against Communism”
Michael Epple, Florida Gold Coast University
Session B: World War II – Suwannee Room

Chair: David Mock, Tallahassee Community College

“The Fog of War: American Preceptions of the Japanese Battleship Yamato”
Jay Clarke, Jacksonville University

“Hitler’s Ideological Footsoldiers: German Students in the Incorporated Territories of Poland”
Bruce McCord, University of Florida

Session C: Early Modern European Perspectives – Osceola Room

Chair: Sean McMahon, Lake City Community College

“Britain and Morocco in 1841: A Crisis Avoided”
Fred R. van Hentesedt, Fort Valley State College (GA)

“A Woman’s Space: Rule, Place and Ysabel of Habsburg, 1570-1592”
Joseph Patrouch, Florida International University

10:00 – 10:30 – Break

10:30-11:45 AM

Session D: Religion in Context – Santa Fe Room

Chair: Paul Boyer, University of Wisconsin-Madison

“Jonathan Mayhew’s Rational Dissent and his Critique of Calvinism in the Seven Sermons”
J. Patrick Mullins, The University of Kentucky

“The Importance of Florida for the Early Pentecostal Movement, 1909-1923”
David Michel, Chicago Theological Seminary

Session E: Textbooks and Teaching – Suwannee Room

Chair: Will Benedicks, Tallahassee Community College

“What’s Wrong with Textbooks and How to Fix Them”
David Mock, Tallahassee Community College

“When Academic Success is Considered a Failure: Recent Trends in Female Education”
Jennifer Trost, Saint Leo University
“Is PowerPoint for Suckers? A Literature Review and Recommendation for Best Practices”
James Longhurst, The University of Tampa.

12:00 – 1:30 P.M.
Lunch “on your own”
FCH Working Lunch and Annual Business meeting: Officers and Members Invited

1:30 – 2:45 P.M.

Session F: American Women’s History – Sante Fe Room

Chair: Elna Green, Florida State University

“Razing the Magnolia Curtain: Ruth Perry and the Miami NAACP”
Judith Poucher, Florida Community College, Jacksonville

“Hester Vaughn: Infanticide, Women’s Rights, and Melodrama”
Patty Farless, Valencia Community College

Session G: Labor and Political Unrest in Early Twentieth Century Florida – Suwannee Room

Chair: Noel Jacoby, Lake City Community College

“Union Insurgence in the Deep South: The 1912 Railway Strike in Jacksonville, Florida”
Ric Kabat, Gainesville College (GA)

“500 Dollars and a Case of Scotch: 1947 Florida Legislature Bribery Scandal”
Michael Hoover, Seminole Community College

3:00 – 3:30 P.M. – Break

3:30 – 4:45 P.M.

Session H: Political Reform and Social Change in Florida – Santa Fe Room

Chair: Sean McMahon, Lake City Community College

“The Diary of A.M. Reed, 1874-1892”
Louis Zelenka, Jacksonville Public Library

“A New Deal for Welfare: Governor Fred Cone and the Florida State Welfare Board”
Dave Nelson, Florida State University
Session I: Air Power in the Cold War – Suwannee Room

Chair: Jay Clarke, Jacksonville University

“The Hughes H1 Racer and the Japanese Zero”
Will Benedicks, Tallahassee Community College

“Atoms for Peace?: Tactical Nuclear Deployment on NATO’s Southern Flank, 1954-1960”
Mark O’Neill, Tallahassee Community College

5:30 – 7:00 P.M.
Cocktails and Hors D’ouvres
Holiday Inn Courtyard
*In case of rain we will convene in the Suwannee Room

Welcome from Dr. Charles Hall, President, Lake City Community College

7:00 P.M.
Annual FCH Banquet – De Soto Room

Keynote Address: “666 and All That: Bible Prophecy, American Fundamentalism, and Contemporary World Trends”
Paul S. Boyer, University of Wisconsin, Madison

Saturday March 6

8:00 A.M.
Continental breakfast available.
Registration continues all morning in the lobby.
Be sure to visit the book vendors and place your final orders.

8:30 – 9:45 A.M.

Session J: Colonial and Antebellum Culture – Santa Fe Room

Chair: Jennifer Trost, St Leo University

“Cold War Barbecues: Revivalism and Political Culture in Territorial Florida”
Lee Willis, Florida State University

“Spanish Assistance During the American Revolution: A Convergence of Interests”
Phil Dove, University of North Florida

“The Demise of the Two Party Political System in Antebellum Florida”
Seth Weltz, Florida State University
Session K: Interpretations of British Imperialism – Suwannee Room

Chair: David Richards, Lake City Community College

"From Imminent Threat to Commercial Venture: Press Coverage of the First Afghan War, 1838-1842"
   Stephanie Laffer, Florida State University

"Meat Pie and the Treaty of Versailles"
   Amy Beth Carney, Florida State University

10:30 – 11:45 A.M.

Session L: Conflicts in the Post-Cold War Era – Sante Fe Room

Chair: Blaine Browne, Broward Community College

"The Wars in Kosovo and Iraq: the Views of Op-ed Columnists"
   Jack McTague, St. Leo University

"The Changing Strategic Situation in Iraq and Iran"
   Marco Rimonelli, St Leo University

"The Impact of War on Artifacts in Iraq"
   Colleen Harris, Jacksonville University

Session M: The Civil War in Florida and Beyond – Suwannee Room

Chair: Ric Kabat, Gainesville College (GA)

   Boyd Murphree, Florida State Archives

"Seceding from Secession: Geographic and Strategic Factors in the Partition of West Virginia and Virginia 1861-1863"
   David Clark, Georgia State University

12:00 Noon
Conference is Adjourned.
666 and All That: Bible Prophecy, American Fundamentalism, and Contemporary World Trends

Paul S. Boyer
University of Wisconsin, Madison

In 2001, a movie called Left Behind featured such events as "the Rapture," the rise of the Antichrist, and Armageddon. Many reviewers were mystified. The New York Times called it "a futuristic global thriller..., in the ... style of a 1970s ... disaster movie." In fact, the Left Behind movie and the fictional series on which it was based are only the tip of a very large iceberg of Bible prophecy belief in contemporary American culture. Preached in thousands of churches, promulgated by mass-marketed paperbacks and TV evangelists, these beliefs thrive at all levels of society, helping shape the political culture. In the 2000 election, George W. Bush's most committed supporters included such prophecy gurus as Jerry Falwell; Pat Robertson; and James Hagee, pastor of a 16,000-member church in San Antonio and author of From Daniel to Doomsday: The Countdown has Begun. Millions of Americans read Bible prophecy not as a spiritual allegory or as a source of images that have inspired great art, but as a detailed roadmap to coming events.

In this essay I would like to provide some historical context, look at how prophecy popularizers have interpreted key events since World War II, and offer some reflections on the larger implications of this worldview.

The Bible-prophecy beliefs that pervade contemporary America are rooted in ancient Mesopotamian myths of cosmic struggle between order and chaos, light and darkness, good and evil. These myths underlay the literary genre known as Apocalyptic that flourished in Second-Temple Judaism and early Christianity.1 (The Greek word "apocalypse" simply means the unveiling of hidden knowledge.) Apocalyptic elements appear in the biblical books of Isaiah, Daniel, Ezekiel, the Gospels, Revelation, and elsewhere. The early Church Fathers discouraged apocalyptic fervor, but it flourished in medieval Europe, preached by wandering prophets and reformist priests and represented in cathedral sculpture, tapestries, stained-glass windows, mystery plays, illuminated manuscripts, and the visions of Hildegard of Bingen. In the Reformation, pamphlets and woodcuts portrayed both the Pope and Martin Luther as the Antichrist. Seventeenth-century Puritans were steeped in apocalyptic speculation. Some in New England saw America as the site of Christ's millennial kingdom. Indeed, two centuries earlier, Columbus himself had written: "God made me the messenger of the new heaven and the new earth of which he spoke in the Apocalypse of St. John..., and he showed me ... where to find it."2

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1 For a more extensive treatment of the historical background of Bible prophecy belief, as well as other themes touched on in this essay, see Paul Boyer, When Time Shall Be No More: Prophecy Belief in Modern American Culture (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992).

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In eighteenth-century America, both the Great Awakening and the Revolution roused apocalyptic fervor. Jonathan Edwards preached that religious effort could bring the millennium in the present age. And Thomas Paine in his revolutionary tract *Common Sense*, proclaimed: “A situation, similar to the present, hath not happened since the days of Noah.... The birth-day of a new world is at hand.” Readers who knew their Bible easily grasped Paine’s allusion to Jesus’s words: “As the days of Noe were, so shall also the coming of the son of man be.”

Millennial hopes inspired antebellum reforms, including abolitionism. The Civil War’s great anthem, Julia Ward Howe’s “The Battle Hymn of the Republic,” is in fact an apocalypse: “Mine eyes have seen the glory of the coming of the Lord, He is tramping out the vintage where the grapes of wrath are stored...”

In the 1830s, meanwhile, followers of the New York prophecy scholar William Miller had begun to preach that the Book of Daniel foretold Christ’s return on October 22, 1843, later revised to 1844. Sustained by periodicals and colorful charts, the Millerite frenzy crested as the fateful day neared, leading to the “Great Disappointment.” From the ashes, however, arose the Seventh-day Adventist Church, whose followers still study the prophecies, though carefully avoiding date setting.

After the Millerite fiasco, a new interpretation arose, premillennial dispensationalism, formulated by the British churchman John Darby. Many U.S. evangelicals embraced Darby’s scheme, including Cyrus Scofield, whose 1909 Reference Bible, published by Oxford University Press, has sold some twelve million copies. The anti-modernist Fundamentalist movement, preaching biblical inerrancy and Christ’s bodily second coming, proved highly receptive to dispensationalism.

As a *premillennialist*, Darby taught that Christ would return before Christ’s thousand-year earthly reign, foretold in Revelation. (“Millennium,” of course, is from the Latin word for one thousand.) Darby’s dispensational system meant that God has dealt with his chosen people, the Jews, and with the Gentiles in a series of distinct epochs, each with its means of salvation. Like a person patiently assembling a jigsaw puzzle, Darby butted his system with proof texts drawn from throughout the Bible. Arranged in proper order, he believed, these texts reveal a clear sequence of future events.

Darby avoided datesetting, but he insisted that the end is near, citing the end-time signs revealed by Jesus to his disciples: wars, wickedness, persecution, and natural disasters. The Jews’ return to the Promised Land of Palestine, he taught, would be another key End-Time sign.

In Darby’s scheme, the present dispensation will end with the Rapture, when all true believers will join Christ in the air. Those left behind will endure the seven-year Great Tribulation, dominated by the Antichrist—the Beast of Revelation—who will arise first in Europe and then impose a global economic and political dictatorship.

After seven years comes the Battle of Armageddon, foretold in Revelation 16. Antichrist’s forces gather at Megiddo, an ancient battle site in Israel, to fight a vast army from the East. At this moment, however, Christ returns with his raptured saints, slaughters the earthly

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Matthew 24:37
armies, and launches his millennial reign from a rebuilt Temple in Jerusalem. After the Millennium and the Last Judgment, a New Heaven and a New Earth arise, with Christ reigning triumphant and the damned enduring eternal torment.

This belief system pervades modern America. In a 1996 poll, 42 percent agreed with the statement: "The world will end in a battle in Armageddon between Jesus and the Antichrist." Major Protestant denominations, as well as the fast-growing independent Bible fellowships and suburban megachurches, embrace Darby's scheme. In the sixteen-million-member Southern Baptist Convention, with 6,000 missionaries worldwide—65 percent of the ministers are premillennial. The Mormons, Jehovah's Witnesses, and Seventh-day Adventists, with millions of adherents worldwide, espouse particular versions of end-time belief. These teachings also pervade Latin America and Africa, thanks to many thousands of fundamentalist and Pentecostal U.S. missionaries.

Hal Lindsey's 1970 bestseller The Late Great Planet Earth, a popularization of dispensationalism, has sold millions of copies. Prophecy belief is purveyed by radio and TV evangelists, including Jerry Falwell, Jack Van Impe, and Pat Robertson, head of CBN, the Christian Broadcasting Network. Robertson, a lawyer turned televangelist, gained fame in 1985 when he prayed that a hurricane threatening his Virginia headquarters would change course. It did, and instead hit Fire Island, New York, a gay summer resort, destroying Calvin Klein's beach house.

Prophecy belief is spread, too, by Christian bookstores; by fundamentalist seminaries; by magazines, tracts, comic books, and bumper stickers advising: "If the Rapture Occurs, this Car Will be Driverless." (An answering sticker says: "When you are Raptured, Can I Have Your Car?") Apocalyptic belief entered 1970s mass culture through such movies as The Omen (1976) and rock songs such as Barry Maguire's "Eve of Destruction." Bob Dylan's brief phase as a born-again Christian gave us such apocalyptic songs as "When He Returns" of 1979.

Prophecy belief has historically been highest in the South, but in our mass-culture society, it is now a national phenomenon. End-time belief appears at all educational and income levels and among all racial and ethnic groups.

One reason for this phenomenon, obviously, is America's pervasive religiosity and laissez faire religious marketplace. We far outrank other Western nations in religious piety. Lacking an established church, America has always embraced free-lance religious innovators with weak or non-existent institutional ties, and prophecy popularizers like Hal Lindsey with no formal denominational links fit this pattern.

Dispensationalism's enduring power is also rooted in the symbolic language of the biblical proof texts, and the system's adaptability. New events are constantly being fit into the scenario, while events that fail to fulfill their expected prophetic role quietly vanish. From the 1920s through 1945, for example, many prophecy writers saw Mussolini as the Antichrist. With Mussolini's death, this theme simply dropped away.

Bible prophecy belief merits attention not only because it is so widespread, but also because it helps shape many Americans' views of current events. Let me illustrate with a few

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1Angus Reid Group Cross-Border Survey, "Canada/U.S. Religion and Politics," 80. Printout of survey results, 11 October, 1996, supplied to author by Professor Mark Noll. The pollsters interviewed a scientifically selected sample of 3,000 Americans and 3,000 Canadians.

2Boyer, When Time Shall Be No More, 4.
examples from the post-World War II era: First, the coming of the atomic bomb in 1945 roused interest in prophecies of the earth’s destruction. As II Peter 3:10 memorably puts it: “[T]he heavens shall pass away with a great noise, ... the elements shall melt with fervent heat....” Scores of postwar prophecy writers found atomic war foretold in such texts. Despite their claims to biblical literalism, they freely transformed the spears, bows and arrows, and beasts-from-the-sea of the apocalyptic scriptures into ICBMs, missile launchers, and nuclear-armed submarines.

These popularizers insisted that they were not advocating nuclear war, but simply viewing current events in the light of prophecy. But in finding atomic war foreordained, they encouraged passivity toward the threat. Why try to prevent the world’s destruction in a nuclear war, if it is inevitable—and especially if it will probably come after the Rapture?

Russia, too, preoccupied Cold War prophecy writers. Some interpreters had long identified Russia as “Gog,” the northern kingdom whose doom is foretold in Ezekiel 38. This view proved highly popular in the Cold War. Again, the prophecy writers proclaiming Russia’s coming destruction denied any intention of fomenting World War III: Russia’s end would be by divine, not human, means. But their message added fuel to Cold War tensions. If God has ordained the enemy’s doom, why resist the inevitable?

Postwar dispensationalists also wrote voluminously about the fate of the Jews, especially after the founding of Israel in 1948. In some respects, they saw the Jews’ destiny as glorious. Citing God’s grant to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob of all the land from the Euphrates to the “river of Egypt,” recorded in Genesis, they foresaw Israel’s vast future expansion. They also cited texts that appear to foretell the restoration of the Jewish Temple, destroyed by the Romans in 70 A.D.—on a site now occupied by a sacred Islamic shrine. The anti-Arab subtext here was clear. As one author put it in 1971: “When all the Jews return ..., God ... will lay the land of the Arabs waste... [God’s covenant] must be carried out to the letter.”

But the same writers who predicted Israel’s glorious future also portrayed the long history of anti-Semitic persecution as God’s “chastisement” of his wayward people. In 1991, in Jerusalem’s Yad Vashem Holocaust memorial, with its harrowing scenes of Nazi death camps, a fundamentalist prophecy believer whispered to me: “Surely when Jews see this, they must realize what a mistake they made in rejecting Christ.” During the Tribulation, dispensationalists also believe, Antichrist will try to exterminate all Jews. In short, anti-Jewish holocausts past and future, while tragic and deplorable, are prophesied in Scripture, and thus beyond human power to change.

Post-1945 prophecy popularizers also pointed to global economic and political developments as portents of Antichrist’s world order, foretold in Revelation 13: “And [the Beast] causeth all ... to receive a mark in their right hand, or in their foreheads. And ... no man might buy or sell, save he that hath the mark ... of the beast ..., Six hundred three score and six.” This number “666” exerts special fascination. The ancients often assigned numerical values to letters to uncover hidden meanings in words and names, and most Bible scholars view “666” as a coded allusion to the Emperor Nero.

Over the centuries, however, the fateful number was applied to the Pope, Napoleon, Mussolini, Hitler, King George III, Henry Kissinger, and countless others. In the 1980s, some noted that each of Ronald Wilson Reagan’s three names has six letters! The Internet is full of proofs that Bill Gates’ name adds up to 666.

\footnote{Arthur Bloomfield, Before the Last Battle: Armageddon (Minneapolis: Bethany House Publishers, 1971), 65.}
But postwar popularizers proved less interested in discovering Antichrist's identity than in exposing the global system he will exploit, including the UN, the European Union, and multinational corporations. They cited credit cards, computerized databases, and global communications systems as the means Antichrist will use to impose his worldwide tyranny.

As with nuclear war and the Soviet threat, the anxieties exploited here were real, reflecting uneasiness about mass culture, globalization, and media-driven politics. Indeed, the prophecy writers' view of an emerging world system echoed 1960s' New Left rhetoric, which also saw international capitalism as all-powerful. The New Left called it "the Establishment," and prophecy believers called it "the Beast," but the analysis of world trends was remarkably similar.

As for the United States, postwar prophecy writers took a view very different from the era when America had been seen as enjoying God's special favor. They now pointed to America's growing wickedness as a sign of the End. The government, once viewed as an instrument of God's purposes, became an agent of evil, legalizing abortion, banning school prayer, promoting evolution, homosexuality, and pornography, and preparing the way for Antichrist's global rule by collecting computerized data on citizens and intruding into every facet of life.

Such was the shape of popular prophetic belief around 1990, when the world suddenly changed: the Cold War ended, the Soviet Union collapsed, fears of nuclear war eased. But the popularizers quickly readjusted their end-time scenario, and this chameleon-like belief system not only survived, but also grew stronger. Prophecy paperbacks continue to proliferate; TV evangelists, magazines such as Midnight Call, and prophecy conferences in luxurious resort hotels continue to spread the word.

Rapture kitsch is everywhere: wristwatches that proclaim "One Hour Nearer the Lord's Return"; placemats featuring a Rapture painting, complete with crashing cars and airplanes; and a glass-fronted wall-plaque containing a videotape and the message: "When the Owner of This Video Suddenly Disappears, Open Immediately and View the Tape Within." The tape, of course, explains the Rapture and warns viewers to avoid the Beast's Mark. (A friend in Boston insists that he saw a T-shirt that said: "My grandma was raptured and all I got was this lousy T-shirt.")

And then there is the "Left Behind" series, a fictionalized treatment of Darby's scenario. The first, Left Behind, in 1995, covered the Rapture. Volume Ten, The Remnant, rocketed to number-one on The New York Times bestseller list in 2002. Volume 11, Armageddon, had an advance printing of 2.5 million copies. The final volume, The Glorious Appearing, came in March 2004. Tie-in marketing is in full swing, including Left Behind videotapes; comic books; T-shirts; a junior edition, Left Behind for Kids; and a radio dramatization aired on 350 Christian stations.

Mass-marketers and the Internet spread the word. Borders, Wal-Mart, and Amazon.com stock the "Left Behind" series and other prophecy books. Global media conglomerates, ironically, are cashing in on this lucrative market. Websites and chat groups are awash in prophecy speculation. A 2004 search for the keywords "Rapture" and "Antichrist" turned up 44,000 Websites. A website called "Rapture Index," which correlates current events with prophecy, registers 250,000 hits per month. As historian Timothy Weber writes in his recent
book On the Road to Armageddon, Bible prophecy has become simply “one more rest stop on the information super highway.”

The 1991 film “The Rapture” started a wave of end-time movies. “The Omega Code,” a 1999 prophecy film distributed by Trinity Broadcasting Network, earned $4.5 million in three weeks. Further fueling the 1990s surge of prophecy interest was the approach of the year 2000. General Mills briefly offered a variant of “Cheerios” called “Millennios,” with “twos” added to the “O’s” so kids could spell out “2000”! Even though most prophecy writers denied a link between the biblical Millennium and the year “2000” on our human calendar, Y2K clearly stimulated interest in prophecy, and that interest continues to flourish. Today’s prophecy popularizers focus on two major themes: the Middle East and the rise of a global political and economic order preparing the way for the Antichrist. On the Middle East front, post-Cold War popularizers painted Islam as an evil force doomed to destruction. This is, in fact, an ancient theme. The Crusaders battled to free Jerusalem from Muslims so its prophetic destiny could unfold. Later interpreters saw the Ottoman Empire as Antichrist. The 1991 Persian Gulf War revived this old theme. In full-page newspaper ads, the Jews for Jesus organization proclaimed: “[Saddam Hussein] represent[s] the spirit of Antichrist about which the Bible warns us.”

Prophecy writers focused especially on Saddam’s grandiose plans to rebuild ancient Babylon. In Revelation, this city on the Euphrates is the evil antithesis of Jerusalem, the holy city, and its fiery destruction is prophesied. Since Babylon cannot be destroyed unless it exists, Saddam’s rebuilding project took on great prophetic import. The cover of Charles Dyer’s The Rise of Babylon: Sign of the End Times of 1991 juxtaposed Saddam and Nebuchadnezzar, the Babylonian king who sacked Jerusalem in 586 B.C. and was condemned by God to eat grass in the fields. Wrote Dyer: “If Babylon is destroyed in the end times, who will destroy it? ... [T]he United States is a major world power—how could it not play a major role in the last days.”

This theme intensified after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. In 2002, Hal Lindsey’s Website featured a cartoon of a military aircraft emblazoned with a U.S. flag and a Star of David and carrying a missile with a label targeting “Saddam”. The caption quoted Zechariah: “In that day I will ... destroy all nations that come against Israel.” In short, when the Bush administration went to war against Iraq in 2003, prophecy believers were well primed, viewing the action as part of an unfolding divine plan for the Middle East.

The focus on Saddam was part of a larger demonization of Islam. Prophecy writers ignore Bush’s distinction between terrorists and Muslims in general. Soon after 9/11, Billy Graham’s son Frankin Graham, who prayed at Bush’s inaugural, denounced Islam as “a very wicked and evil religion.” In his 2003 book Beyond Iraq: The Next Move, prophecy-writer Michael Evans called Islam “a religion conceived in the pit of hell.”

Like communist hunters of the ’50s, prophecy writers gripped by an apocalyptic worldview see a holy war shaping up against an all-encompassing Islamic-Antichrist conspiracy. Endlessly they recite God’s curse on Abraham’s illegitimate son Ishmael and God’s blessing on

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Abraham’s legitimate son Isaac as proof of a foreordained conflict between Arabs and Jews. Like all apocalyptic battles, this conflict can end only in triumph for one, annihilation of the other. Compromise is unthinkable.

In Hal Lindsey’s 1996 prophecy novel Blood Moon, an Islamic fanatic, Ishamel Muhammed, prepares to launch a nuclear missile on Israel. But Israel’s military leader, Isaac Barak, foils the attack and retaliates with a massive nuclear assault that destroys “every Arab and Muslim capital ..., along with the infrastructure of their nation.” Genocide, in short, fulfills God’s prophetic plan. While demonizing Islam, today’s prophecy popularizers uncritically support Israeli hardliners who advocate ever-expanding Jewish settlements in the West Bank and denounce any compromise over Jerusalem. In 1998, when a settlement based on the principle of land-for-peace briefly seemed possible, Midnight Call magazine declared: “What we are witnessing ... is ... the stripping of the Holy Land from its rightful owners, the Jews. The Bible calls it a ‘covenant with hell.’” John Hagee wrote in Final Dawn Over Jerusalem (1998): “There can be no compromise regarding ... Jerusalem, not now, not ever ... Israel is the only nation created by a sovereign act of God, and He has sworn by His holiness to defend ... His Holy City. ... [N]ations that fight against [Israel] fight against God.”

In 2003, Midnight Call praised U.S. evangelicals “outspoken dedication to seeing that the God-ordained borders in Israel are restored and the land returned to its rightful owners, the Jews.” The website of the Left Behind series begins its list of “Five Compelling Signs of the End Time” with: “Israel Claims Her Land.” Gary Bauer, the arch-conservative head of the Family Research Council and erstwhile presidential candidate, was cheered in April 2003 when he told the American-Israel Political Action Committee: “God owned the land; he gave it to the Jewish people, and neither the U.N. or Russia or any [other nation] can give away land that does not belong to them, but belongs to you.”

Dispensationalists have attacked even George W. Bush’s road map to peace, which calls for a Palestinian state, shared governance of Jerusalem, and the closing of Jewish settlements in the West Bank. Michael Evans in Beyond Iraq denounces the road map as “a threat to the lives of all Americans” and continues: “Regardless of the opinions of men ..., God said the land of Israel belongs to the lineage of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. God keeps his promises ... The only road map for peace is the Bible ... God gave [the Jews] that land and forbade them to sell it.”

Israeli hardliners gratefully welcome this support. Michael Evans’ book includes photographs of himself with Menachem Begin, Yitzak Shamir, and Benyamin Netanyahu. When Prime Minister Netanyahu visited the U.S. in 1998, he met first with Jerry Falwell, then went to Washington to see President Clinton. On the same trip he told an audience of 3,000 prophecy-believing Christian conservatives: “We have no greater friends and allies than the people sitting in this room.”

But this support comes at a high price. Dispensationalists still preach, though in a more muted way, that Antichrist will slaughter most Jews, and that the surviving remnant will turn to Christ. In 2003, Midnight Call cited Ezekiel 22:21, among other scriptures, to prove that the

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15 Evans, Beyond Iraq, 11, 39, 94, 104.
Jews face yet another holocaust: “[I will] gather you and blow on you with the fire of My wrath, and you will be melted in the midst of it.” Glossing this passage, the writer says: “Like the metallurgist, the Lord will use the fire of the Tribulation to purge out the unfaithful.”17 Israeli leaders and others who court dispensationalist support would do well to ponder the larger belief system that underlies this support.

The dispensationalists’ rejection of compromise in the Israeli-Palestinian dispute grows out of a larger conviction that effort for the peaceful resolution of any world conflict is contrary to the foreordained end of human history in a cataclysmic struggle between good and evil. This apocalyptic worldview shaped prophecy believers’ view of the Cold War, and it shapes their view of the present crisis. As a writer in Midnight Call put it in February 2004: “Whatever type of peace the world may achieve is based upon deception, and it is temporary.”18

Today’s prophecy expositors also continue to point to the emerging global political and economic system as a prelude to Antichrist’s rule. Pat Robertson’s New World Order of 1991 is a key text. His title, of course, echoes the first President Bush’s allusion to a “new world order” as the Cold War ended—a phrase as notorious in prophecy circles as “Read my lips—no new taxes.” Robertson offers a deeply conspiratorial view of history, from the Masons, the Bavarian Illuminati, and the Rothschilds to the Federal Reserve Board, the UN, the Beatles, the European Union, and the World Bank, all culminating in the Antichrist’s coming dictatorship. Robertson even includes in the conspiracy the first U.S. Congress, which adopted the Great Seal of the United States with its motto, from Virgil, “Novo Ordo Seclorum,” which he translates as “New World Order.” He suggests that the conspirators staged the entire Cold War as a diversion from their plot to control the world. “A giant plan is unfolding,” he says, “Everything is perfectly on cue.”19

Robertson is not alone. In Lindsay’s Blood Moon, the UN Secretary General is unmasked as the Antichrist, and UN troops herd post-Rapture believers into concentration camps. In the film Omega Code, Antichrist is a Rupert-Murdoch-like media mogul who gains control of the European Union as a step toward world rule.

In this climate, conservative politicians and talk radio hosts realize that bashing international organizations carries little risk, since for many citizens, these organizations are quite literally—demonic. The more world leaders like Kofi Annan claim to be seeking peace, they more suspect they become, since Revelation says the Beast will initially pose as a peacemaker.

The belief in a demonic New World Order fuels suspicion not only of international bodies, but also of America’s civic institutions, from public schools to the federal government itself. Indeed, with the Cold War’s end, the apocalyptic worldview that saw Moscow as “the focus of evil in the modern world” (in Ronald Reagan’s memorable phrase) is now just as likely to cast Washington, D.C. in that demonic role. Michael Evans in Beyond Iraq lumps the U.S. State Department with other satanic forces trying to frustrate Israel’s prophesied expansion.

All these themes converge in the Left Behind books, in which all civic institutions are suspect—the media, the government, most churches, and of course the UN. As the plot unfolds, the Antichrist, the charismatic Nicolai Carpathia, poses as a man of peace, and becomes head of

the UN, which he promptly moves to a rebuilt Babylon, setting up the apocalyptic climax when both the UN and Babylon, the twin pillars of Satan’s New World Order, are simultaneously destroyed by fire from heaven.

*Left Behind* co-author Tim LaHaye has long been active on the religious right, and the *Left Behind* series simply gives him a new medium to pursue his agenda. As he boasts: “I’ve opposed the United Nations for fifty years.” His millions in royalties from the *Left Behind* books, and his recent $4 million four-book deal with Bantam Books, negotiated by his agent Michael Ovitz, are surely flowing into his fundamentalist causes, including the Creation Science Research Center; Concerned Women for America, run by his wife Beverly; and the secretive Council for National Policy, backed by House majority leader Tom Delay of Texas, a dispensationalist believer who recently visited Israel to denounce Colin Powell’s calls for a compromise solution to the Palestinian conflict.

Despite the pesky State Department, a fundamentalist and apocalyptic aura pervades the current administration. In his book *The Right Man*, former Bush speechwriter David Frum says that President Bush’s first words to him were: “Missed you at Bible study.” One wonders what passages are being studied. Since Bush’s 1986 religious conversion, he often seems convinced that his policies precisely mirror God’s will. When still in Texas politics, he said: “I could not be governor if I did not believe in a divine plan that supersedes all human plans.” Journalist Bob Woodward, after interviewing Bush before the Iraq War, became convinced that “the president was casting his mission and that of the country in the grand vision of God’s master plan.”

The most explicit articulation of this theme in high government circles was that of Lieutenant General William G. Boykin, deputy undersecretary of defense and a confidant of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. In sermons in evangelical churches and talks to prayer groups in 2002-03, Boykin, resplendent in full-dress uniform, repeatedly voiced his basic message: terrorists hate America “because we’re a Christian nation,... and the enemy is a guy named Satan.” Dismissing Allah as an “idol” and “not a real God,” Boykin reports his boast to a captured Muslim warlord in Somalia: “You underestimated our God.”

Bush distanced himself from Boykin after Muslim leaders protested, but the Pentagon resisted demands to demote him. In fact, the general was simply expressing openly what millions of Bush supporters on the Religious Right firmly believe on the basis of Bible prophecy. Indeed, Falwell, Graham, Hagee, Robertson, Evans, LaHaye, the editors of *Midnight Call*, and other prominent dispensationalists had already said as much.

Dispensationalism clearly helps shape the political climate within which today’s leaders operate. For prophecy believers, the administration’s war in Iraq; its near abandonment of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process; its tacit acceptance of expanding Jewish settlements in the West Bank; its suspicion of the UN and what Donald Rumsfeld calls “old Europe”; and its passivity on such issues as global warming all conform closely to the course of events that they believe are foretold in Scripture.

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Let me conclude then, with a few reflections on the apocalyptic worldview and its implications. To understand this belief system, one must try to grasp its appeal. Basic to this appeal is its utopian nature, evoked in the moving passage that concludes the Book of Revelation:

And I saw a new heaven and a new earth..., the holy city, new Jerusalem, coming down... out of heaven, prepared as a bride adorned for her husband. And I heard a great voice out of heaven saying, Behold, the tabernacle of God is with men, and he will dwell with them, and they shall be his people... And God shall wipe away all tears from their eyes; and there shall be no more death, neither sorrow, nor crying, neither shall there be any more pain, for the former things are passed away.\(^{22}\)

For dispensationalists, the Tribulation and Armageddon are the essential prelude to a glorious era of righteousness, peace, and justice. This is, of course, the original utopian vision that has inspired countless others, including that of Thomas More, who coined the word "Utopia" in 1516. Marx's *Das Kapital* is a secular apocalypse, with the overthrow of the capitalist ruling class as Armageddon, and the triumph of communism as a secular version of the Millennium. Others find a millennialist strain in Hitler's vision of a thousand-year Reich, which fell short of its goal by only 988 years.

In *The Open Society and Its Enemies* of 1945, Karl Popper attacked all utopian ideologies for encouraging violent means to turn the dream into reality, draining energy from efforts to achieve more modest, less cosmic reforms; and dividing people into starkly opposed categories: saved and unsaved, proletarian and capitalist, Aryan and non-Aryan.

Despite Popper's critique, many are still enticed by utopian dreams, including John Darby's. All such visions speak to our discontent with an imperfect world and our longings for a better society.

Dispensationalism's appeal also rests on its claim to give meaning to history. The history taught in our textbooks and public schools avoids speculation about its ultimate meaning or final outcome. Dispensationalist history, by contrast, is purposeful and full of cosmic meaning, advancing steadily toward its grand consummation. As one writer put it in 1971: "The twentieth century is a stream moving exactly in the pattern of the prophetic word."\(^{23}\) Filling a void left by the desacralization of historical scholarship, Darby and his successors stepped in to meet a deep popular longing for transcendent meaning in history.

And, finally, what are the implications of dispensationalism for our civic culture? On one hand, it encourages withdrawal from the public sphere. *Individuals* may accept or reject Christ, and thereby determine their personal destiny—salvation or damnation—but the *overall* course of events is inalterable. And if history is beyond human power to control, civic engagement is pointless.

Yet today prophecy popularizers also betray an impulse to help along God's plan, by supporting the most hard-line and expansionist forces in Israel, for example; stoking the fires of our domestic culture wars; and avoiding contaminating contact with the UN or other

\(^{22}\)Rev. 21:1-4.

international bodies that foreshadow Antichrist's world order. What we are witnessing today is an unprecedented political mobilization of prophecy belief, with implications that are impossible to predict.

Thus, the prophecy popularizers send a mixed message, urging America to get on God's side as the end approaches, while at the same time preaching a belief system that encourages passivity. They simultaneously encourage a starkly apocalyptic approach to complex issues while dismissing all efforts to resolve world conflicts, global problems, and domestic cultural differences. Such efforts are futile; resolution will come only at Armageddon. Indeed, the coming cataclysm is an essential prelude to the Millennium when, and only when, righteousness will prevail.

In the apocalyptic worldview, all conflicts dissolve into a cosmic struggle between good and evil. This mindset inevitably leads to absolutist and categorical thinking. On one side stand the forces of evil—whether Russia, Islam, secular America, the New World Order, or all of the above—that will culminate in Antichrist's rule. On the other side stand the forces of righteousness that will ultimately triumph.

While the prophecy writers denounce the satanic forces seeking to rule the world, their apocalyptic worldview is equally triumphalist, rooted in an obsession with eradicating all that is evil and impure. In the lurid world of apocalyptic belief, the opposing sides become, in reality, mirror images of each other.

In short, some of the more troubling features of today's America—the go-it-alone unilateralism, the simplistic worldview, the withdrawal from the public sphere, the suspicion of government and of social institutions—are vividly on display in this mass-culture apocalyptic material. Some prophecy believers have literally withdrawn from society and become survivalists, but even among those who remain among us physically, alienation runs deep.

We hear much today about "faith-based" organizations and "faith-based" values. Many insist that positions derived from religious dogma should be given greater influence in the public sphere. For example, Jean Bethke Elshtain, a professor of ethics at the University of Chicago, has recently written: "My religious views help to determine who I am, how I think, and what I care about. This is as it should be. In America, it makes no sense to ask people to bracket what they care about most deeply when they debate issues that are properly political."24

Fair enough. But today, millions of citizens' religious beliefs, "what they care about most deeply," have convinced them that humanity faces a final showdown between good and evil that will end in the destruction of most of the human race. And these citizens form their opinions about current political issues on the basis of these beliefs, promoting policies predicated on the assumption that humanity's final crisis is rapidly approaching and any efforts to divert history from its cataclysmic course is not only pointless but evil. These beliefs, in turn, are amplified and reinforced in the public arena by government officials, religious leaders, and all the technology of our contemporary mass media.

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Of course, the First Amendment guarantees the right of prophecy believers to promulgate whatever ideas they wish. But those who do not share this nightmarish vision of humanity's fate have the same constitutional right, and I would argue, an urgent obligation, to expose these beliefs to vigorous criticism and public debate. Bizarre as they may seem to some of us, the prophetic beliefs surging through modern American culture merit not just bemused indulgence, but close attention and scrutiny. To fail to understand their enduring appeal is to fail to understand contemporary America.
The Fog of War:  
American Perceptions of the Japanese Battleship Yamato

Mariko and Jay Clarke
Jacksonville University

Introduction

Before World War II, Japan had grown from depending on foreign technology and expertise to introducing independently first-rate weapons and innovative doctrines in amphibious operations, surface warfare, and carrier aviation. In 1941 and early 1942, Japan’s mastery of these innovative weapons and ways of war—including unique tactics built on long-range guns and torpedoes, and night combat—gave the Empire a marked advantage over its rivals. To understand Japan’s growing abilities, between the two world wars the U.S. Navy created a cadre of Japanese-speaking, militarily savvy junior officers, and more than half of the eleven U.S. naval attachés who served in Tokyo were captains. For its part, the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) employed officers who had lived and studied in Japan. These intelligence personnel monitored the Japanese navy’s order of battle and doctrine, but evaluating concepts not yet proven in combat challenged them. One U.S. naval attaché in Tokyo, nonetheless, naively suggested that about 95 percent of the information he sought was available in open sources.

Misplaced optimism. One pertinent story between 1936 and 1941 was how much—and how little—the United States divined about the 18.1-inch gunned, 73,000-ton leviathans, the battleships Yamato and Musashi, the Japanese built and commissioned as war broke out in the Pacific. As early as January 1936, as Japan was withdrawing from the London Naval Conference and the world was preparing for the imminent expiration of the Washington and London naval treaties, rumors began circulating that Japan was building super dreadnoughts. These new, 45,000-ton vessels supposedly would carry 16- or 18-inch guns, but U.S. intelligence consistently downplayed reports of the larger guns.

Willfully blind, only after war’s end did ONI nail down how formidable the Yamato and Musashi had been. One postwar analysis at the Naval War College showed that the war-time

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1 This is a condensed version of J. Calvitt Clarke III and Mariko A. Clarke, “Yamato wo meguru Bei-Kaigun no Joho-Katsudo” [Intelligence Activities of the US Navy Concerning the Yamato], Youichi Hiruma, ed., Senkan Yamato [Battleship Yamato] (Tokyo: Kodan-sha, 2003), 162-196. The authors would like to thank Lt. Cndr. Roger Thomas (ret.) of Jacksonville, FL and Dr. Jon Sumida of the University of Maryland for their encouragement and advice. Any errors, of course, are ours.


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assumptions that the two Japanese battleships carried 16-inch guns meant that America’s capital ships would have chosen to fight at a range favoring the *Yamato*: “[I]nstead of being superior, the [Iowa-class] *New Jersey* would have been inferior to *Yamato*.” By “shell-weight and penetration; and the ‘range band’ where *New Jersey* is shown superior on the diagram, is . . . the band she should avoid.” Other analysts have been more generous in their estimates of American chances: “Without question the *Iowa*-class battleships were the best ever built. They possessed an unmatched combination of great offensive power, good protection, and high speed. Ships of other nations occasionally equaled or surpassed them in specific categories, but no other capital ships ever built had such an impressively balanced combination of military characteristics.”

Incited by these contradictory opinions, since the war naval thinkers and military gamers have romanticized a mythical ship-to-ship battle pitting the *Yamato*’s 18-inch guns against the 16-inch guns of American’s *Iowa*-class battleships. America’s military planners before and during World War II, however, had to respond to Japanese construction based on a profound underestimation of Japanese designs and capabilities.

The Pre-War Fog

The Italo-Ethiopian War of 1935 and 1936 began the process of grouping the alliances that fought in World War II. More immediately, the war had consequences in the Western Pacific where, distracted by the Italian challenge in the Mediterranean, Britain’s Royal Navy could no longer be counted on to sufficiently challenge Japan.

The United States picked up the cudgel. The preliminary negotiations held in London in 1934 to prepare for renewing the Washington Disarmament Treaty had already illuminated the incompatibility of American desires for “equality of security” against Japanese wishes for parity in tonnage of naval vessels. By September 1935, President Franklin Roosevelt’s order making the western end of the Aleutian Islands the first of a series of powerful air bases in the Pacific further clarified the conflicting policies cleaving the United States and Japan.6

America’s naval attaché reported that Japan’s naval minister had secretly told the Diet in May 1936 that Japan wished to have a fleet as strong as any that could be formed in the Western Pacific to attack Japan. Implicitly recognizing Japan’s inability to match America’s productive capacity, the minister continued,

[E]qual strength . . . does not mean having a numerically equal force, ship for ship. As a result of the coming no-treaty period we shall enjoy freedom of action in construction of warships in respect to category, quality and characteristics. With this freedom we may

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construct those ships particularly adapted for our national requirements, thereby gaining an advantage which obviates the necessity for numerical equality.\(^7\)

In other words, the Japanese with fewer big ships hoped to overcome a greater number of U.S. and British vessels. To compete successfully with Japan, the United States would have to build ships too large to pass through the Panama Canal. The Americans would have to build two separate fleets, thereby halving the potential force Japan might have to face.\(^8\)

The Japanese, of course, designed their official, public pronouncements on battleship construction to obfuscate. Unfortunately, too many reports of America’s attachés in Tokyo reflected Japan’s effort to minimize the importance of its building program. In May 1937, one swallowed Japan’s naval minister’s assertion that Japan did not contemplate an armaments program “that might menace other countries.” Further, the minister denied as “sheer speculation with no foundation” that Japan proposed to build huge ships with guns larger than sixteen inches. The attaché commented:

This is the first definite announcement by the Navy department of the size and gun calibers of the two capital ships Japan is believed to be laying down. While it is of a negative nature, the Navy Department goes on record as denying current press reports of huge ships carrying guns larger than 16 inches. The opinion is gaining ground in Tokyo that Japan does not contemplate construction of capital ships of a size greatly in excess of present types nor mounting guns larger than those now installed.\(^9\)

He did note, however, that the frustrating limits imposed on visits to Kure, Kobe, and Yokosuka had led him to believe that important naval construction was either under way or contemplated at those places.\(^10\)

The view from Tokyo was never clear, and not everyone among their colleagues stationed in Tokyo agreed with the Americans’ more sanguine understanding of Japanese naval construction. One foreign officer claimed to have reliable information that Japan was building 50,000-ton capital ships mounting 18-inch guns.\(^11\) Other foreign attachés were insisting that

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\(^10\) NARA RG 38, microfilm, 1: Mar. 16, 17, 1937; 22 May; 26 June; 3 September; 29 October, 1937; Muir, "Rearming in a Vacuum," 476.

\(^11\) NARA RG 38, microfilm, 1: 22 May, 1937.
Japan would not adopt the 14-inch gun. The American attaché agreed, although he admitted that he had "no direct information" on the subject. The British ambassador had information that the Japanese were testing not only 16- but also 18-inch guns. Some were speculating that Japan might build a 50,000-ton ship "on the theory that the present type might thus be tendered obsolete and qualitative parity would result therefrom."12 Japan even kept its allies, Germany and Italy, in the dark. Meanwhile, public Japanese sources stressed Japan's need for an aggressive building program.13

Amid Japanese secrecy on their naval construction, America's attaché in 1938 described the problems he and his colleagues faced:

Japan's present building program is based upon surmise as to the meaning of the many statements made by high Naval authorities, estimates of Japan's requirements and conjecture as to the probable types to fulfill those needs. Undoubtedly, there have been leaks in the form of unguarded statements now and then from officers of lower rank and, possibly, information has been supplied by the Japanese Naval authorities to representatives of the two countries now allied with Japan.14

As the world girded for the approaching world war, America's attachés read the tea leaves on Japanese naval building as best they could.15 The U.S. Navy widely circulated their estimates and in 1940 reported them to the Senate Naval Affairs Committee as "reasonably certain." ONI listed with a "small margin of error" eight battleships, each armed with twelve, 16-inch guns as a conservative figure. The Naval War College saw the Japanese program as less threatening. In June, 1940, officers at Newport placed on the game board only four modern enemy battleships, each with nine, 16-inch guns.16

Among his last reports before Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, the United States attaché concluded that the Japanese had at last completed their eleventh battleship. Tentatively identified as the Kii, they had cloaked her in extraordinary secrecy. Laid down at Sasebo in October, 1937 and launched two years later, the battleship then went to Kure for fitting out and underwent trials in August 1941. Commissioned in October, she weighed in at 35,000

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14 NARA RG 38, microfilm, 1: 20 January, 1938; also see Japan Advertiser, 3 April, 1936.
tons, mounted nine 16-inch guns in three triple turrets, and could reach 28 knots. He was writing about the Yamato.

The Fog of War

American intelligence between 1941 and 1945 tenaciously clung to its pre-war underestimates of Japan’s capital ship construction. It persistently ignored significant evidence contradicting its prejudices, especially on battleship tonnage and the size of main batteries.

A document of January, 1942 summarized this pre-war conception. It pointed out that the Japanese had neither completed nor commissioned any battleships since 1921 except for the Kii [Yamato]. Over the previous four years, remarkably conflicting reports of new construction had emerged. In 1939, the naval attaché had reported his belief that Japan’s Replenishment Program had provided for building eight new battleships ranging in displacement from 35,000 to 45,000 tons. It had become increasingly obvious that the Japanese were effectively keeping secret the details of their building program. It appeared, however, that a lack of essential materials had delayed this original program. British intelligence had stressed the possibility that Japan was building four battleships of which one or two displaced not more than 42,000 tons. The others displaced about 35,000 tons.

After December 7, America’s sources of information on the Yamato changed dramatically. Analyses of aerial photography, prisoner-of-war interrogations, radio traffic routings, and decoded and translated radio intercepts, after a tenuous start, ultimately pieced together most of Yamato’s operational story. ONI, however, did not completely pierce the Japanese veil of secrecy. Only after war’s end did the United States finally understand the size of the potential threat embodied in the Yamato.

Soon after the war in Europe had begun, Edward J. Mathews put together a team of draftsmen, architects, and others having “some technical knowledge and capacity of third dimensional visualization.” This group set about pulling together the vast body of data available on Japan’s naval and merchant ships, organizing it, and processing it for distribution. Its goal was to put at the Navy’s disposal basic drawings, performance data, and general information on the appearance and technical capabilities of every Japanese ship of military value. For major ships, the group developed and constantly revised master drawings. The group kept reference drawings and data covering standard equipment—guns, mounts, range finders, cranes, davits, boats, torpedo tubes, and torpedoes, and more—to help uncover the size and capacity of unfamiliar ships. The group knew that the Japanese were building huge ships in secret as the war began. The Americans understood little more of their size, although they thought that two of them bore the names Yamato and Musashi.

The first information that came from the field proved disappointing. A Burmese in the British service managed to sneak into one of the protected enclaves to make some drawings. The Japanese caught the spy, and Mathews found the information of little use: “And it is sad to report

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17 NARA RG 38, Box 89: November, 1941.
18 NARA RG 38, Box 89: 6 January: 16 March, 1942.
that to him the new battleships looked for all the world like Burmese junks and the drawings provided no worthwhile data whatever!"  

In coming to understand the potential of the Japanese Navy, prisoner of war interrogations were crucial. Compared with other theaters of war, in the Pacific American forces did not capture large numbers of military men. Those Japanese who did fall into American hands, however, provided significant military intelligence, including information on the Yamato. Unfortunately, American intelligence too often ignored what they were hearing, especially when it challenged their preconceptions of Japanese abilities. Following the Battle of Midway in early June 1942, for example, the American submarine Trout picked up two survivors from the cruiser Mikuma. They stated that the latest battleship in Japan’s Navy, the Yamato, flew the flag of the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet, displaced 57,000 tons, and could reach a rumored speed of 30 knots. American intelligence dismissively refused to accept these statements without further confirmation.  

In August, America launched its first major move after its victory at Midway. U.S. marines took the little island of Tulagi, just off Guadalcanal Island. Caught “flatfooted,” the Japanese garrison “took to the bush.” After the battle, a marine intelligence officer came across a scrap of paper with a crude drawing of a ship. On the other side of camp, the Americans found a copy of a letter in a dump. It bore a multiple address to Pacific commands and read, in effect, “Here is a drawing of the Yamato to be used for recognition purposes.” The intelligence officer separated these two documents “from the immense mass of junk.” This information reached Mathews’ group a couple of weeks later. The sketch looked like nothing they had ever seen. From the main batteries and other details, the group concluded that the drawing was not of any known Japanese capital ship but rather represented one of the Yamatos.  

An ONI report in October 1942 estimated Yamato’s size at 35,000 tons and her main armament as nine, 16-inch guns. For security reasons, the Japanese termed the ammunition for these guns as “special type 40 cm,” deceiving ONI into believing that the 16-inch estimate was accurate. Naval Intelligence had a hard time budging from this estimate.  

On January 13, 1943, in a long report intelligence tried to describe the extent of Japanese naval construction. The report began with the obligatory, “The secrecy with which new construction for Japanese navy is shrouded us well known, and therefore it has been found virtually impossible to disseminate accurate figures on this vital subject.” ONI, nonetheless, suggested it had a decent handle on major ships. The Japanese had completed two new battleships, the Yamato and Musashi, since the outbreak of hostilities.

20 Ibid.
21 NARA RG 38, Box 89: 26 March; 15, 17, 21, 26, 28 June, 1942; n.d.
23 Ibid.
24 Prados, Combined Fleet, 415. Among captured documents, Americans found several pages of Life magazine showing pictorially the naval strength of the world’s sea powers. Three new Japanese battleships were sketched: the first two were Yamato and Musashi; the third was unnamed. NARA RG 38, Box 1448: Translations of Intercepted Radio Traffic and Miscellaneous World War II Documentations, 1940-1946, Japanese Orange Translations: 15 October, 1942.
In early 1943, several POWs reported on the Yamato’s deployment. Most importantly, two New Zealand antisubmarine corvettes on January 29 sank the I-1, a Japanese submarine that was carrying supplies from Rabaul to Guadalcanal. One of the survivors reported that the Yamato had been completed, and he boasted that a new battleship he had seen under construction would be bigger and better than was the North Carolina. Another claimed that he had seen the Yamato at Yokosuka in March, 1942. He estimated that the ship carried a main battery of nine 45-cm guns in three triple turrets. Intelligence officers concluded that, if the POW was correct, the Yamato probably had the most powerful main battery afloat. Documents recovered from the I-I also provided a windfall for the Americans.25

In July, 1943, the Americans intercepted a message from Tokyo to its naval attaché in Berlin. Responding to the Adolf Hitler’s “special request,” Tokyo had decided to allow Germany’s attaché in Tokyo to inspect the Yamato. The Japanese insisted on the strictest secrecy for the inspection, and because they did not want anything leaked to the Italians, they wanted their attaché in Berlin to see that the Germans exercised due caution. The German attaché was to see privately only the nominal specifications, which differed from the true figures. In fact, only a small circle in the Japanese Navy knew even the nominal specifications while “nothing” was “known to the German and Italian attachés.” If Hitler wished to know more, the Japanese would send an officer who would speak with the Germans.26

Yamato’s Nominal Specifications Reported to Berlin27

<table>
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<th>Length</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beam</td>
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<tr>
<td>Draft</td>
<td>9.15 meters</td>
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<tr>
<td>Standard displacement</td>
<td>42,000 tons</td>
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<td>Maximum speed</td>
<td>25 knots</td>
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<td>Main armament</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary armament</td>
<td>12 x 15.5 centimeter guns</td>
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<td>A/A armament (not exceeding?)</td>
<td>12 x 12.7 centimeter guns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turbines</td>
<td>4 developing 90,000 horsepower</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boilers</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keel laid down</td>
<td>November 1937</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completed</td>
<td>December 1941</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In October, 1943, the Americans intercepted a message sent from Berlin to the German naval attaché in Tokyo. Apparently, the Japanese were now only slightly more forthcoming with their ally. The Germans were asking technical questions, especially about Yamato’s side and horizontal protection systems. While the Japanese in Berlin were answering all questions as best they could, the Nazi government felt that Tokyo officials had held back valuable information. The German attaché was to send the requested drawings and descriptions as quickly as

25 NARA RG 38, Box 1448: 12 February, 1943; 3 March, 1943; RG 38, Box 89: 19 April, 12 May, 1943; Prados, Combined Fleet, 401.
26 NARA RG 38, Box 1448: 4 July, 1943.
27 Ibid.
possible—even in Japanese script, as there were satisfactory translators in Berlin. The Germans wanted to know the degree of Japan’s willingness to cooperate.24

The Americans held one significant advantage over the Germans in uncovering the Yamato’s true characteristics—they had access to prisoner of war information. In early July, 1943, one POW described the Yamato as 900 feet long, with three, three-gun main batteries. The guns were between 45 and 48 cm. The ship displaced about 50,000 tons and could reach rumored speeds of 25 to 35 knots. He believed the most likely speed was 28 knots.29 Another POW who had seen both the Yamato and the Musashi stated in mid-July that the two were identical. He added that the small craft housed in mysterious tunnels on the sides of the battleships were either submarines or motorboats.30

Into the autumn, American intelligence continued having hard time recognizing the full implications of the reports they were receiving from prisoners on the Yamato and Musashi. The two ships displaced, intelligence officers thought, 45,000 tons, “although less reliable sources” had given “the figures of 50,000 and 57,000 tons.” The class could reach 28 knots and carried three planes. “According to the best information, the main batteries consist of nine 16” guns, arranged in 3 triple turrets.” However, “[c]ertain Japanese sources [that is, POWs] gave the diameter of the guns as 45 cm, or 17.7”, but the figure is believed to be exaggerated.”31

The Americans always had a better grasp of Yamato’s operational record, and they well-understood that Japanese logistics were so stretched by late 1943 that they had to resort to using their major capital ships, including the Yamato, as supply vessels.32

Meanwhile, Allied intelligence was using its mastery over Japanese codes to set up submarine attacks. During November and December, for example, major vessels of the Imperial Navy suffered at least six torpedo attacks. Even the Yamato was not immune. As early as December 13, the Americans knew that the Yamato was to arrive at Truk on the twenty-fifth ferrying men and material. On Christmas Day, and 180 nautical miles north of Truk, the USS Skate struck the Yamato on the starboard quarter. This was Yamato’s first real contact with her American enemy. At 0518, it had been too dark for the Skate to know what she had hit other than a large warship. The Americans began to uncover the target’s significance only after intercepting several radio communications from the Yamato describing her damage. Still capable of making 20 knots, the Yamato was to leave Truk on January 10 and arrive on January 15 for dry-docking at Kure. Her damage repaired, the Yamato was quickly back at Truk.33

24 NARA RG 38, Box 1448: 24 October, 1943.
25 NARA RG 38, Box 1448: 8 July, 1943.
26 NARA RG 38, Box 1448: 17 July, 1943. For a report summarizing Naval Intelligence’s views of the state of Japanese battleship construction including the Yamato and the Musashi, see NARA RG 38, Box 89:28 July, 1943.
31 NARA RG 38, Box 1448: 9 September, 1943.
32 See, e.g., the radio intercepts from July through December in NARA RG 38, Box 1448 regarding the Yamato: 15, 19, 20, 21, 25, 30 July; 2, 3, 6, 12, 23 August; 10 October; 11, 13, 16, 20, 25 December, 1943.
33 NARA RG 38, Box 1448: 13, 24, 25, 29 December, 1943; January; 9 February, 1944; Prados, Combined Fleet, 533.
Soon the Americans had more information on the *Yamato* in the form of "the fuzziest, most distorted aerial photographs" with which Mathews' group ever had to work.\textsuperscript{34} On February 4, 1944, two U.S. Marine B-24 bombers flew over Truk. Photographs revealed the volcanic basin full of heavy cruisers, odd naval vessels, and a "large amorphous blob," out of center and focus, and at first taken as an island. Stereo viewers, however, revealed a vessel unlike any known to the Americans. With the distortion, uncovering accurate dimensions seemed impossible. The photographs then went to the photo interpretation center in Anacostia. One week later, the resulting drawings closely resembled the earlier Tulagi ones. They suggested astonishing dimensions: a length of 950 feet; a beam of 110 feet; a main battery of nine 18-inch/50 caliber guns, and a powerful secondary battery of 8- and 5-inch guns.\textsuperscript{35}

The photos over Truk stirred debate among analysts. On February 25, they were also processed at Pearl Harbor. ONI brought ship-design experts into the discussion, and they concluded that the *Yamato*-class displaced at least 60,000 tons. That also was the size experts thought necessary to mount 18-inch guns, but these same people argued that problems of stowage and propulsion, plus complications with docking and navigation, would render such a warship impractical.\textsuperscript{36}

Prisoner of war information again supplemented photographic evidence. One ONI report recognized that the *Yamato* and *Musashi* had long been mystery ships, even to Japanese personnel. For security reasons, the Japanese were publishing official documents with false figures on characteristics and capabilities. Nonetheless, with the help of "an intelligent prisoner ... believed to be fairly reliable," ONI produced a sketch. The prisoner, who had served aboard the *Yamato* and *Musashi* for a total of thirteen months, claimed that the ships were almost identical. On the controversial subject of main batteries, the POW confirmed the reported triple mounts, but insisted the guns were 45 cm rather than the smaller 40 cm. He claimed that projectiles for these guns stood six feet high, compared with the *Nagato*’s projectiles, which stood at only 5' 6". Ammunition ordered for the *Yamato* and *Musashi* was "40 cm, Type 2" rather than "40 cm, Type 1". According to the POW, this indicated 45-cm ammunition. The prisoner added that chief petty officers aboard the *Yamato* often joked that these guns were "the largest 40 cm guns in the Japanese Navy." Also controversial were the tunnel-shaped compartments on either side of the stern. Did they house submarines or PT boats? The prisoner explained that each tunnel was designed for two midget subs. He added that he had never heard of these subs being stowed there, and that he had no idea how they would be launched. The prisoner saw the compartments used for storage—"including CinC Combined beer." The hangar was large enough for eight planes with wings folded, but he had seen no more than three carried. The *Yamato*, the prisoner said, was of 55,000 tons and could reach 26.5 knots.\textsuperscript{37}

\textsuperscript{34} Mathews, "What Ship Is That?" 65.
\textsuperscript{35} *Ibid.*, 64-65. Muir, "Rearming in a Vacuum," 481, gives slightly different figures: length, 840 feet; beam, 125 feet; main battery, nine probable 16-inch guns in triple turrets; secondary battery included 8 probable 8-inch guns in twin mounts.
\textsuperscript{36} Prados, *Combined Fleet*, 534-35.
\textsuperscript{37} NARA RG 38, Box 89: n.d.
The next contact between a Yamato-class vessel and the Americans quickly came. Major Japanese units steamed out of Palau on March 29, 1944, among them the Musashi. Through radio intercepts, the Americans had long known her general location and responsibilities. As the Musashi left Palau, the battleship encountered the submarine Tunny, which launched a six-torpedo spread at the battleship. The Musashi turned to avoid but took a hit in the bow, one that would confine her to the Kure dry dock for slightly more than two weeks.

In April, 1944, a captured Japanese document revealed the official statistics on the Musashi and Yamato—figures similar to those earlier released to the Germans. Despite radio intercepts, including those revealing Japanese efforts to mislead their German allies with figures purposely underestimating the Yamato’s true power, ONI persistently put more faith in these official documents than it did in the veracity of captured Japanese personnel.

## Official Characteristics of the Musashi and Yamato

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MUSASHI</th>
<th>YAMATO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Class</td>
<td>Battleship</td>
<td>Battleship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length</td>
<td>235 meters</td>
<td>235 meters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beam</td>
<td>31.5 meters</td>
<td>31.5 meters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Draft</td>
<td>9.15 meters</td>
<td>9.15 meters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tonnage (standard)</td>
<td>42,000</td>
<td>42,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speed</td>
<td>25 knots</td>
<td>25 knots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boats</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Built in</td>
<td>Mitsubishi at Nagasaki</td>
<td>Kure Navy Yard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keel Laid</td>
<td>Mar. 29, 1938</td>
<td>Nov. 4, 1937</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Launched</td>
<td>Nov. 1, 1940</td>
<td>Aug. 8, 1940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completed</td>
<td>Aug. 5, 1942</td>
<td>Dec. 16, 1941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main Battery</td>
<td>9–40 cm</td>
<td>9–40 cm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Battery</td>
<td>12–15.5 cm</td>
<td>12–15.5 cm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/A Battery</td>
<td>12–12.7 cm</td>
<td>12–12.7 cm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torpedo Tubes</td>
<td>Blanks</td>
<td>Blanks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Searchlights</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machinery</td>
<td>(Same as BB-Haruna?)</td>
<td>(Same as BB-Haruna?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boilers</td>
<td>Kanpon</td>
<td>Kanonoshiki</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boilers</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Propellers</td>
<td>(Same as BB-Haruna?)</td>
<td>(Same as BB-Haruna?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horsepower</td>
<td>90,000</td>
<td>90,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Information continued to flow in that ought to have disabused the Americans of those misperceptions. In September, 1944, interrogations of Natori prisoners revealed that it was common knowledge in naval circles that the real dimensions of the Yamato and Musashi were so secret that even official documents used only nominal figures. One POW had seen their main

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38 See, e.g., NARA RG 38, Box 1448: 1, 2, 11, 14, 16, 24 March, 1944.
39 Prados, Combined Fleet, 548.
40 NARA RG 38, Box 1448: 14 April, 1944; NARA RG 19, Box 467, 15 April, 1944; Prados, Combined Fleet, 534-35. For captured Italian documents, see NARA RG 38, Box 89: 11 August, 1944.
41 NARA RG 38, Box 1448:14 April, 1944; NARA RG 19, Box 467, 15 April, 1944.
armament listed in documents as 40 cm, but he and his colleagues understood that it was actually 45 cm or possibly even more. The ships, he said, displaced at least 50,000 tons, and he estimated that their maximum speed was 27 or 28 knots. Of course, not all POW information was helpful. One prisoner claimed that Japan had completed ten new battleships and cruisers in 1943. He insisted that they could reach 47 knots, including the two whose names he knew—the Yamato and Asashō.43

Interrogations of Japanese survivors, radio intercepts, and captured diaries uncovered that Japan’s naval forces, as the First Diversion Attack Force on October 19 had left the Singapore area bound for Leyte to repel an attacking American invasion force. The Japanese, including the Yamato and Musash, arrived at Brunei Bay and refueled on October 21. The Americans clashed with this imposing force in the Battle of Surigao Straits of October 24 through 26 and repeatedly hit the Musash and her consorts. The Musash alone absorbed an astonishing nineteen torpedoes and seventeen bombs. A survivor of the destroyer Kiyoshimo described the last moments of that mighty warship. The crippled Musash had made her way to near Mindoro, where she was to be taken in tow; thirty minutes after the destroyers arrived, however, the Musash’s magazines exploded and she sank. The POW said the Japanese people would “shed tears” if they heard of Musash’s sinking. In his report, the interrogator commented—“Believe her sinking can be announced by us without prejudice.”44

The Battle of Surigao Straits was an overwhelming American victory. Of the original thirty-five Japanese ships, only fourteen or fifteen remained afloat. According to intercepted radio reports, Japan’s other dreadnought, the Yamato, had received minor damage from two bombs hits on the deck forward and three torpedoes hits forward on the port side. Causality included more than fifty killed and one hundred wounded. On October 28, the battered fleet arrived at Borneo, Borneo for temporary repairs, as there were no shipyards. It stayed there about a month awaiting further orders. About November 18, the Yamato and others fueled and left for Japan.45

The Fog of War Lifts: The End of the Yamato

By piecing together information divined from the levels and routings of radio traffic plus decoded and translated radio messages, ONI had kept reasonably abreast of the Yamato’s activities—despite early confusion between the battleship Yamato and a 4,379-ton merchant vessel of the same name.46 As the war progressed, prisoner of war interrogations, action reports, and aerial sightings supplemented radio intercept information, and the American estimates got more exact. In the war’s early stages, American intelligence could figure out where the Yamato had been and what she had done. Later, the Americans could grasp where the Yamato was and

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42 NARA RG 38, Box 1448: 13, 21 September, 1944.
43 NARA RG 38, Box 1217: 23 November, 1944.
44 NARA RG 38, Box 1448, 5, 24 October, 1944.
45 NARA RG 38, Box 1448: 24, 25, 26, 28 October, 18 November, 1944. Different sources give slightly different figures for the killed and injured on the Yamato.
46 NARA RG 38, Box 1448: 21 July, 1942.
what she was doing. By the end, they knew where the Yamato would be, how she would get there, and what she was to do once there. Compare the radio intercepts of April through June, 1942 surrounding the Battle of Midway, with those of mid-July, 1943 and later when American intelligence knew when the Yamato and its screening vessels would leave Kure carrying supplies to Truk. Not only did the Americans know what the Yamato would carry but even what anchorage the Yamato would be assigned once at Truk. By December, 1943 when the Yamato returned to Yokosuka, U.S. intelligence knew the exact times, precise distances from fixed navigational points, and exact bearings the Yamato would take to enter the harbor.47

The Yamato’s final sortie provides the most dramatic example of the accuracy of the Americans’ knowledge. By early April, 1945, it was clear that the commander of the “First Diversion Attack Force” was likely in the Kure area and aboard the Yamato. On April 4 the Americans had an inkling that this force would sortie with aerial forces against American ships moving on Okinawa. The next day, the Americans knew that the Japanese battle group, also called the “Special Suicide Attack Unit,” would take on 20,000 tons of fuel at Tokuyama on the morning of the sixth. The fleet would then arrive at an area east of Okinawa at dawn on the eighth. The Japanese assigned radio frequencies to the First Diversion Attack Force and informed other naval and air units of its future movements—movements precisely set to prevent friendly attacks. Simultaneously, of course, the Japanese were inadvertently also telling the Americans. The Yamato and her companions were to sortie from Bungo Channel on April 6.48

Armed with such accurate information, U.S. planes sighted the Japanese force late in the evening of April 6 in the waters near Kyushu. U.S. Navy Task Force 58 had all the advantages and at 1015 on April 7 launched 380 planes to strike the Japanese force. Guided by a tracking plane, the Americans were able to apply overwhelming force against the doomed Yamato. First reports from the attacking planes, which faced stiff antiaircraft fire but no covering planes, said that the Yamato, still identified at 42,000 tons, took a minimum of eight torpedoes and eight, half-ton bomb hits. The planes also left other ships badly burning. The Americans took losses of only seven aircraft.49

Intercepts of Japanese radio reports confirmed the day’s devastation. One of April 7 reported that about 300 American fighters, bombers, and torpedo planes had attacked the First Diversion Attack from 1230 to 1430. They had sunk the Yamato and other vessels; still others were unable to proceed. A message from one destroyer described the final torpedo attack on the Yamato and her explosion and sinking. Other Japanese radio messages estimated that the Americans had attacked with more than 2000 planes. They also reported that apart from two destroyers, the enemy had either sunk or badly damaged all ships of the Special Suicide Attack Unit.50

According to another radio intercept on April 7, Japanese ships had picked up about 600 survivors from the Yamato. On April 8, Japanese planes were to search for the missing ships in

47 For this progression, see NARA RG 38, Box 1418.
48 NARA RG 38, Box 1448: 5, 6 April, 1945.
49 NARA RG 38, Box 1448: 7 April, 1945.
50 NARA RG 38, Box 1448: 8 April, 1945.
an 80-mile radius and then return to Sasebo. That same day, the Surface Suicide Unit radioed its action summary and reported that they had shot down nineteen enemy aircraft. Poorly informed of the battle’s results, Japanese radio operators on April 8 and 9 were still trying to contact the Yamato.  

One American report, after analyzing the events of April 7, concluded that the losses sustained by the Japanese had significantly reduced the naval threat to America’s advance on Japan’s homeland. Only on August 29 did the Japanese delete the Yamato from their Wartime Organization charts. Two days later, they deleted the Musashi and Yamato from the Man-of-War Register. Even at this late date, the Americans continued to believe that the Yamato was only 45,000.  

The Fog Lifted: The Post-War Postmortem

Given that the science of warship design in the Japanese Navy dated only from 1918, the boldness of the Yamato’s design was impressive. After the war, ONI devoted considerable attention to her design and wartime performance, gathering documents and interviewing Japanese naval men. This was doubtless interesting and useful information, but it was also akin to closing the barn door after the horse had escaped.

Between the two wars, U.S. naval intelligence had particularly targeted the Japanese navy. In 1938 and 1939, Japanese naval codes and ciphers consumed all of the Navy’s cryptanalysis and 90 percent of its translation efforts. Even so, the Navy was able to read only about 10 percent of the Japanese navy’s coded traffic, mostly material encrypted in eight to ten minor cipher systems dealing with personnel, engineering, administration, weather, and fleet exercises. The Navy could read the main Japanese naval code, JN-25, only intermittently and was unable to read the flag officer’s code. Even so, the U.S. Navy had learned much about Japanese naval strategy from communications intercepted during fleet exercises.

ONI, however, only partly understood Japanese naval tactics. Between American racial and cultural prejudices as well as Japanese secrecy, U.S. Naval Intelligence only belatedly came to grips with Japan’s new approach to naval warfare. The Japanese Navy believed that it needed to defeat the U.S. fleet in a decisive battle to win the war at sea. America’s quantitative superiority had forced Japan to seek ways to offset the U.S. advantage. The Japanese naval staff believed that its ability to defeat the U.S. rested on ships that could outrange their American counterparts, striking U.S. ships beyond their ability to return fire. The Japanese navy therefore expended great effort to increase the range and accuracy of its gunfire. The Yamato-class battleships were the fruit of those efforts.

51 NARA RG 38, Box 1448: 7 April; 29, 31 August, 1945.
52 NARA RG 38, Box 1448: 8, 9 April; 31 August, 1945; n.d.; NARA RG 0019, Box 467: Bureau of Ships. General Correspondence 1940-1945: 24 July, 1945.
53 See, e.g., NARA RG 38, Box 1448: 6 September; 15, 16, 17, 25 October; 7, 12, 24, 25, November, 1945; NARA RG 38, Box 89: 7 November, 1946. The results of this information gathering can be seen in NARA RG 38, Box 89: “The Yamato and the Musashi,” 2-17 and “The Yamato’s 18-Inch Guns,” 17-19.
54 Mahnen, Uncovering Ways of War, 58.
55 Ibid., 58-59.
The battleship had been the centerpiece of both American and Japanese naval thinking between the wars, and ONI had devoted great attention to tracking Japan’s battleship program. Throughout the 1920s and early 1930s, U.S. intelligence did reasonably well at watching Japanese naval technology. Despite Japan’s secrecy, the U.S. Navy gleaned considerable data on Japanese naval construction—including accurate figures on the dimensions, tonnage, speed, and armament of Japanese warships—from public as well as foreign sources. Periodic visits to shipyards and naval bases before 1939 allowed attachés to gather insights on Japanese naval construction. U.S. officers gathered what turned out to be accurate intelligence on new weapons systems—the Type 93 torpedo, the Zero fighter, landing craft, and the speed and weight of modernized battleships—only to have the Navy disregard it. The Navy’s experts repeatedly dismissed accurate information showing the Japanese had mastered innovative technologies the United States lacked—reflecting the widespread assumption that Japan had to be inferior to the United States in naval technology. It was also the result of the Navy’s inability to verify empirically the claims made in intelligence reports. Japanese secrecy and rapid technological development considerably degraded the U.S. Navy’s ability to track Japanese naval technology before World War II. The failure to understand novel technological developments held dire consequences when the American and Japanese navies met in combat, especially early in the war.56

Not only did US analysts impose their preconceptions on the Japan’s navy and underestimate Japanese technological innovations, the Americans also underestimated their tactical innovations designed to use their new weapons systems. The U.S. Navy mistakenly assumed that Japanese tactics mirrored U.S. tactics.57

Scholarly and popular books and articles, websites, board and computer games, and model builders all testify to continued fascination with the *Yamato*. Amid great international publicity, her remains were located and examined in 1985 and reexamined more carefully in 1999. The great dreadnought lies in two main parts in some 1000 feet of water. Her bow portion, severed from the rest of the ship near the second, main battery turret, is upright. The amidships and stern section are upside down nearby, with a large hole in the lower starboard side close to the after magazines.

The *Yamato*, which should have been the greatest battleship ever built, in truth was already obsolete when launched in 1941—fire control radar and especially airborne aircraft had changed the nature of combat at sea. *Yamato’s* mystique depends on what might have been, rather than what was. In reality, she had been often reduced to ferrying men and matériel to threatened points in the Empire. Her grand moment, her last desperate sortie to redeem not just the *Yamato* herself but the entire concept of big-gun capital ships as the centerpiece of fleet strategy, led only to a valiant but futile death.

Spanish Assistance During the American Revolution:
A Convergence of Interests

Phil Dove
University of North Florida

Popular American perceptions of their War of Independence generally focus on images of the rebellious colonies fighting for political liberty and representation against a tyrannical and oppressive European monarchy. The historiography of the period has focused on the ideological and social origins and impacts of the War.¹ Indeed, one of the most significant implications of the independence of Great Britain's North American colonies has been the change in the ideological foundations of the political structure, in the United States and elsewhere, and in the social implications of these changes.

Much less discussion and focus has been on the American Revolutionary War in the context of the international situation, and how it was inextricably linked to the inter-play of the European power structure. The timing of the war, in the context of the contemporary international situation, played a significant role in its course and eventual outcome. This was, in part, because of the critical assistance that the rebelling colonists received from major European monarchies. Most obvious is the direct involvement of French naval and land forces at the battle of Yorktown. Spain also played an important role in the United States War of Independence. Because its military never fought directly with the American Continental armed forces and its assistance was primarily covert, Spanish contributions are less often mentioned. However, Spanish material and economic assistance at critical junctures was significant in affecting the outcome.

While lending significant material assistance to the North American rebels, the Spanish Crown did not enter the War on the side of the Colonists nor did they recognize the independence of the British colonies in North America until after the War's outcome had been decided. This was very different from the other Bourbon monarchy, in France, which did both. This paper will explore Spanish material and economic support to the rebel colonists during the American Revolution, and the motivations behind such support. What motivated the Spanish Crown to give such assistance but to withhold direct military and diplomatic support? As we will see, Spanish government policy was driven primarily by the potential of renewed threats by a former adversary, Great Britain, and by a desire to recover lost territory. However, the policy


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was limited by the potential precedent of colonial populations throwing off monarchical rule and the impact that may have among Spain's own colonial territories.

At the same time, there were a number of individual residents of Spanish colonial territories who also contributed directly to the American cause and a similar question arises about what motivated this assistance. While taking similar action, it is not likely that each of these individuals had the same motivations and perspective as the Crown, and it may have been driven more by personal considerations and direct self-interest. The motivations of the individuals who contributed or loaned significant sums of money are more difficult to ascertain. Nevertheless, an examination of the actions and motivations of the Spanish Crown and government, and those of individual residents of Spanish colonial territories, gives an opportunity to examine the issue on multiple levels.

The reaction of the Spanish government to the discontent in Britain's colonial empire must be placed in the context of international situation of the time. During the eighteenth century, an alliance had developed between Spain and France, culminating in the Family Compact of 1761—an agreement between the Bourbon monarchies of Spain and France. This alliance was fueled, in part, by both countries' opposition to the growing power of Great Britain. Only thirteen years before the United States declared its independence, the Seven Years War had ended with the Treaty of Paris. During the war, Great Britain had occupied Havana, seizing Cuba while raiding Spanish commercial shipping in the Caribbean, causing an estimated eleven million dollars in losses.² In the settlement ending the war, Spain lost control of Florida to the British, in return for the British evacuation of Cuba, and almost all the Spanish residents of Florida fled, the vast majority to Havana. Britain expanded its North American territories to the east bank of the Mississippi River and gained the right to navigate that waterway. Britain also gained the right to keep timber operations along the coasts of Spanish colonial holdings in Central and South America, and Spain was forced to agree to no longer interfere with the English settlements there. The Seven Years War saw a rollback of Spain's colonial territory and power. Spain and its allies no longer had complete control of the coasts of the Gulf of Mexico. For Great Britain, the War had resulted in an expansion of its colonial empire at the expense of both Spain and France. However, the costs of the war, and the desire to share the burden of those costs with their American colonies, became a double-edged sword for Great Britain. To help pay its war expenses and the costs of maintaining a standing army in the colonies, the British government raised taxes on its North American colonies and tried to impose stricter controls on its commerce. Coming out of a war that eliminated much of the threat to their security, many colonial leaders could not see the need for increased taxes nor tighter controls from the government in London. Tensions over these issues rose until armed conflict between Great Britain and her American colonies seemed likely.

Support from the Spanish Crown and government to the colonial insurgents began at an early stage. In October, 1775, two Spanish ships sailing from Central America called at Charleston, SC and sold gunpowder and supplies to a local rebel leader. When the British

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government formally protested, one of the ships’ captains was put on trial, to maintain the appearance of neutrality, but was later acquitted.\(^3\) In 1776, Captain Gibson of the Continental Army, who was under orders from General Charles Lee, appeared in Spanish New Orleans to meet with the Spanish Governor of Louisiana, Bernardo de Gálvez. Gibson proposed that the rebelling colonists and the Spanish government work together against the British. In exchange for supplies, Gibson offered that the colonies were willing to help Spain recover the Floridas, either by direct colonial action and then turning over the territory to Spain, or by joint action with the Spanish against Pensacola. Although Gálvez did not issue a formal reply on behalf of his government, he did give one hundred quintals of gunpowder to Gibson to send north and immediately sought direction from the Spanish Minister of Indies in Havana, urging action to assist the rebels.\(^4\)

Governor Gálvez was not stretching his authority or acting above the wishes of his government by giving supplies to Capt. Gibson. In May of that same year, unknown to Gálvez at the time, King Charles III (1759-1788) had given approval to a plan whereby the Spanish Crown and the government of France would finance a fictitious trading company, with seed money of one million livres each. The French company, Hortalez et Cie, would be a front for directing aid to the rebelling British colonies. Secretly run by Pierre A. C. de Beaumarchais, the author of *The Barber of Seville*, it initially funneled surplus French military supplies to the rebel colonists in North America. Thus, even before an American agent reached Europe, the governments of Spain and France had already put plans in motion to send aid.

These early, somewhat ad hoc efforts to aid the rebellious British North American colonists came at an important time for the rebellion, when the Continental forces were just getting organized and an effective system of supply was not yet in place and developed. The Spanish government was aggressive in wanting to give material and economic assistance to the burgeoning rebellion, and soon began thinking of ways to do so in a more organized fashion. The Spanish Foreign Minister, the Marqués de Grimaldi wrote to the Spanish Ambassador in Paris that Spain “was considering methods of furnishing direct assistance to the rebellious colonies”\(^5\) and had begun to develop definitive plans to get aid to the American rebels. Within weeks of Grimaldi’s writing, a Royal Order, dated 24 December 1776, was sent to the Captain-General of Havana and Governor of Louisiana, directing them to supply the rebels with whatever guns and gunpowder that they could spare and, if necessary, to ship these supplies on available Spanish merchant ships.\(^6\)

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\(^4\) Ibid., 50.

\(^5\) Grimaldi to Aranda, 9 December, 1776, reserved, no. 6, AGI, Santo Domingo, Leg. 2596, quoted in Cummins, *Spanish Observers*, 52.

The policies and direction being formulated in Madrid were being carried out just as aggressively. By spring of the next year, lines of credit for the American rebels had been secured with several major European banking houses, backed by Spain, to the amount of 7.73 million livres.\textsuperscript{7} Surplus resources from Spain's other colonial holdings in the Americas were directed toward Havana and New Orleans, to, in turn, be made available to rebel forces. In line with Spanish government policy, the colonial administration went to lengths to keep the assistance covert. When the first shipment of supplies arrived, for example, local customs officials in New Orleans did not know about the royal order and, since the paperwork showed the Spanish government as the owner of the shipment, the cargo was sent to the government warehouse. In order to keep the government's policy secret, the Governor of Louisiana, Bernardo de Gálvez, declared the supplies a government surplus and, following normal policy, sold them at a public auction. The Governor then secretly gave money to a local merchant to buy the military supplies and have them forwarded to Continental officials.\textsuperscript{8} Over the course of the war, it became much safer for shipments of supplies to be transported up the Mississippi River than by sea and the Spanish government increasingly used New Orleans as a staging point for aid shipments.

Governor Gálvez also set up extensive intelligence networks along the Mississippi and worked closely with a local American merchant, Oliver Pollack, who became the representative of the Continental Congress to the Spanish administration in New Orleans. The lengths to which the Spanish government would go to assist the rebelling British colonials is exemplified in the close working relationship that Gálvez and Pollack developed. Throughout the war, the Continental Congress and Pollack continued to ask for direct aid and loans to buy military supplies. However, the repayment of those loans was not always timely. In another sign of the desire to aid the cause, Gálvez routinely modified repayment terms, even going so far as to allow Pollack to use his slaves to work on various public works projects as a means for paying back money the Spanish government had loaned.\textsuperscript{9}

As the United States' War for Independence progressed, material and financial aid from the Spanish government continued to expand. Supplies continued to be funneled to Havana and New Orleans for aiding the colonial rebels. The Spanish government worked through a trading company, Gardoqui and Sons of Bilbao, to send aid to the North American colonists from ports in Spain. After the jointly funded French trading company, Hortevez et Cie, was compromised as a potential front for aid to the rebellion, Gardoqui and Sons became one of the primary avenues for funneling aid and shipments of military supplies to North America. The Spanish Minister of the Indies also sent Juan de Miralles to Philadelphia as an observer at the seat of the Continental Congress. In addition to sending back information, he was given 31,000 pesos from government treasuries to promote trade between Philadelphia and Havana. In some cases, Miralles used this money to buy ships for American merchants, which were used to transport foodstuffs, the

\textsuperscript{7} Chavez, Spain and the Independence of the United States, 68.
\textsuperscript{8} Cummins, Spanish Observers, 80.
\textsuperscript{9} Chavez, Spain and the Independence of the United States, 108.
proceeds of which bought military supplies for the War. Spanish officials also relaxed Spain’s commercial policies, allowing unlimited importation of foodstuffs and made other significant changes that helped supply the British colonists with funds. Havana and New Orleans continued to be focal points for sending direct aid to, and facilitating trade with, the rebels, and coordinated assistance to the colonial forces fighting the British grew. Spain was anxious to recover lost territory and create a buffer between the British and its own colonial empire, which would secure ocean links between Spain and its holdings in the Americas. The Crown’s assistance to the British rebels was a part of this effort.

By contrast, support from the Spanish Crown was not nearly as clear-cut on the diplomatic front. Despite its sympathy and early aid to the rebelling British colonists, Spain was not ready to make its support public or formal. In February, 1777, responding to the U.S. representative sent to Spain, Arthur Lee, who was urging stronger Spanish support, Grimaldi replied, “You have considered your situation and not ours. The moment has not come for us. The war with Portugal—France being unprepared, and our treasure ships from South America not being arrived makes it improper for us to declare immediately.” Economic aid to the British colonists was part of an overall strategy, which had defined limits and goals. The Spanish government would not be pulled into the war between Great Britain and her colonies deeper than Spanish national-interest would dictate. Still reeling from defeat in the Seven Years War, Spain was very aware of the risk posed by Great Britain to its position and to trade in the Caribbean and the Americas. Grimaldi’s concern about the potential risk surrounding the arrival of the Spanish treasure ships, combined with actual experience in the Seven Years War of British interdiction of Spanish commerce in the Americas, show the caution which was forefront in any action by the Spanish government.

When its ally, France, announced a treaty of alliance with the United States in March, 1778, Spain would still not be moved on the diplomatic front. Quite the contrary, the Spanish government and the Spanish Minister of State, the Conde de Floridablanca, saw this as a potential opportunity. Secret offers to Great Britain proposed that Spain use her alliance with France to mediate the dispute and seek an end to the war. In return for these services, the offer included a suggestion of compensation: Great Britain would return Gibraltar, at the mouth of the Mediterranean Sea, to Spain. At the same time, France was urging her ally and partner in the Family Compact to join the war and avenge their joint defeat at the hands of Great Britain in the Seven Years War. France had promised Spain the recovery of several former possession as the reward for helping win a war with Great Britain, including Gibraltar, Florida, the island of

11 Lee to the Committee of Foreign Affairs, 6 October, 1777, quoted in Buchanan Parker Thomson, Spain, Forgotten Ally of the American Revolution (North Quincy, MA: Christopher Press, 1976), 51-52.
Minorca and, if possible, Jamaica. After several months of having its attempts at mediation rebuffed by Great Britain, Spain joined its French ally in the war against Great Britain. Significantly, however, Spain’s alliance was with France alone and Spain did not recognize the United States, although it continued to send aid. Though Spain’s armed forces did not fight with Continental forces, its entry into the war against a common enemy had a military significance for the War of Independence. Spain moved against British settlements along the Mississippi River and, under orders from Governor Gálvez, Spanish forces took several British outposts along the Mississippi and also took the British fort at Pensacola, in Florida. By tying up British forces in the south and west, and forcing the British fleet to defend a much larger area of the Western Hemisphere, Spain, as well as France, engaged forces that otherwise may have been used to put down the colonial rebellion. Similarly, Continental forces tied up British military units that otherwise may have been spent defending Pensacola or the outposts along the Mississippi.

The significant and early material and economic aid given to the rebelling British colonists by Spain, shows a strong level of commitment to the policy. That this aid lasted over several years, growing and broadening in its scope over time shows a consistency of purpose in the effort. Yet the aid to the American cause was limited to economic and material assistance, and any political or diplomatic support was very limited or non-existent. Why did the Spanish government take different approaches in these different spheres?

As a major colonial power in the Americas, Spain had no ideological ties to the United States nor did the Spanish Crown believe that the colonists had an inherent right to throw off the rule of a monarch. The potential precedent of American colonies throwing off the rule of a distant European monarchy was enough to keep Spain from joining the war on the side of the British colonists and from recognizing their independence. To ally with rebelling colonists would be to risk setting an example for their own American colonies. France, on the other hand, had lost much of her Caribbean and American territory in the Seven Years War and was not nearly the colonial power that it once was in the Americas. Thus, France’s actions were different because any considerations about the impact to other American colonies were different, since France no longer had extensive colonial possessions in the area.

Yet Spain did hope to recover its own lands that had been previously taken by Great Britain. Additionally, Spain hoped to provide a buffer between the territory of a strong rival, in Great Britain, and its own long supply lines to its colonial territories in the Americas. In the Seven Years War, Spain had seen Havana sacked and Cuba taken by the British. By taking this gateway to the Gulf of Mexico, Britain was able to easily prey on Spanish merchant shipping and treasure ships. Even though the final peace gave Cuba back to Spain, the occupation of Florida by the British still threatened the security of the Spanish colonies in the Americas. As a former resident of Spanish Florida, he may have held the sentiment more strongly than some, but Juan Joseph Eligio de la Puente likely expressed the view of many Spaniards in Cuba when he remarked in 1777, “I am certain…” that the English want the coasts of Florida “...not solely for

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13 Francisco Morales Padron, ed. and Introduction, and Aileen Moore Topping, trans., *Journal of Don Francisco Saavedra de Sangonis During the Commission, which he had in his charge from 25 June 1780 until the 20th of the same month of 1783* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1989), 7.
defense against their enemies but for offense."\textsuperscript{14} The history of just over a decade previous showed that this was very possible.

By curbing the power of its rival, even if doing so meant covertly aiding a revolt among American colonies against a European monarchy, Charles III and the Spanish government hoped to put Spain in a position to make demands on an rival stretched thin, militarily and economically. Spain spent more than a year; from April, 1778 (a month after France joined the war on the side of the Americans) to the time that Spain joined the war on the side of France in May 1779, trying to regain some of its lost territory by offering itself as a mediator between Great Britain and France.\textsuperscript{15} Evidence that its support for the colonial cause was driven by its own self-interest, including the re-occupation of lost possessions, is given by the fact that Spain’s mediation offer and initial peace plans did not include formal independence for the British colonies but simply a long-term truce.\textsuperscript{16} If Spain was able to get Gibraltar without having to resort to war, then all other matters could be open for discussion. Only after Great Britain had repeatedly rebuffed Spain’s offer did Spain go to war to regain lost territory and to protect its colonial holdings. Even then, Spain went to war against the enemy of the rebellious colonists but did not go to war as their ally. Nor did Spain recognize their independence until after the war had been decided.

Spanish economic and material assistance to the emerging nation encompassed direct financial aid, loans, military supplies and trading privileges not afforded others outside the Spanish system, which, in turn, provided funds to purchase needed goods. The amounts of each of these forms of assistance were significant, and exceeded by no other country, with the possible exception of France. However, it was the rational pursuit of self-interest, not an ideological or philosophical sympathy, which drove the Spanish government to support rebelling British colonists. The interests of the Spanish Crown and the interests of the rebel British colonists aligned such that action against a common enemy anticipated a mutually beneficial outcome for both parties.

In addition to directing government resources from its American colonies, Spain made several efforts to raise money for the Continental forces among its own population. Appeals went out to its territories in North American southwest and west of the Mississippi, asking that each parish request a one-peso donation from each of their parishioners, for example.\textsuperscript{17} Money raised in such ways was then directed to aid the cause of the rebel colonists. Most significantly, however, in the amount of the donations, as well as the timing, was the appeal to residents of Havana to help the Continental and French forces heading toward what would later be known as the Battle of Yorktown. The French Admiral, the Comte de Grasse, was to take his fleet to aid

\textsuperscript{14} Chavez, \textit{Spain and the Independence of the United States}, 23.
\textsuperscript{15} Samuel Flagg Bemis, \textit{The Diplomacy of the American Revolution} (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1967), 78
\textsuperscript{16}Ibid., 172.
French and American forces that were heading south to oppose those of the British General Cornwallis. Both the French General, Rochambeau, and General George Washington of the Continental Army had appealed for money to pay their armies. Washington felt the need for money so urgently that he feared that without money to pay a month’s salary for his army, a large portion of the army would disappear and the army be immobilized. Additionally, Admiral de Grasse urgently needed funds to bring supplies to be able to maintain the forces already in the field. His appeals to the residents of the French Caribbean islands did not bring the desired results. As a result, Admiral de Grasse then turned to the Spanish government for help but they, too, were short of funds in the government treasuries and the treasure ships from Mexico had not yet arrived at the time of de Grasse’s request. As a last resort, Francisco de Saavedra, whom King Charles had sent to coordinate Spanish activities in the Americas, appealed to the residents of Havana. In a very short time, the government was able to raise over four and a half million reales, most of which was given directly to de Grasse. In his memoirs, Saavedra lists the residents of Havana who donated or loaned money as a result of his appeal.

Though it was not uncommon for prominent citizens, especially those in government service, to use or make loans of personal funds for government expenses, a number of these individuals did not hold government offices, though no doubt they were among the elite in Cuba. A similar question about motivations for helping the cause of rebellious British colonists appears to be worthy of examination. Initial assumptions were that these individuals likely were in a position to benefit personally from expelling the British from former Spanish-held territories, primarily in Florida. If they had held land in Florida, or hoped to obtain land grants after a British expulsion, they would likely be motivated to respond to an appeal on behalf of the rebels. However, close examination of the records show that none of these individuals owned land in the area of St. Augustine, the capital of Spanish Florida and its main population center, prior to the British takeover. Further, examination of records dating from the second Spanish period shows that none of these individuals held land in Florida for a long period after the Spanish regained control of Florida, if at all. If a recovery of former lands, or the gaining of new lands, were not the reasons that generated the strong and rapid response to the appeal for funds in Havana, what could have prompted such a response to the request of the Spanish government?

Those responsible for the funds of military units loaned approximately one-fifth of the funds out of regimental coffers. Sherry Johnson has examined the increased presence of the Spanish military in Cuba and its effects on attitudes toward the Spanish government.

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19Morales Padron and Topping, Journal, Appendix A.
20Juan Joseph Eligio de la Puente and Albert C. Manucy, trans., “Key to the Map of San Augustín de Florida, January 22, 1764,” Puente folio, St Augustine Historical Society Library, St. Augustine, Florida.
21Florida Historical Records Survey. Spanish land grants in Florida; briefed translations from the archives of the Boards of commissioners for ascertaining claims and titles to land in the territory of Florida. (Tallahassee: State Library Board, 1940-1941).
argues that the strong military presence and the increased money flowing into Cuba for defense of the island had the effect of solidifying support for the Crown and the policies of the Spanish government. This is one possible portion of an explanation.

Some of the individuals were prominent merchants in Havana. The protection of Spanish trade routes, or possibly the potential for expansion of trade with the British North American colonies, could have played a role in making personal funds available to oppose the British. Of course, security concerns were likely at the forefront of many considerations. The Crown spent a good deal of money reinforcing the defenses of Cuba after the Seven Years War. Many Havana residents had personal memories of the British attack on Havana and a latent anti-British feeling could very easily have provided a motivation to take an opportunity to help avenge past transgressions. Or, it could be that, on the individual level, some of these individuals sympathized with the ideological foundations of the Revolution.

Just as we examined the interests of the Spanish Crown and government, and how those interests aligned with those of the independence-minded British colonists, it would be valuable to do the same with these Cuban elites, at a more detailed level. Are the individual motivations aligned along the tenets of a budding Spanish nationalism in Cuba, more so than in other Spanish colonial territories, or are they more personal and only coincidentally working with the interests of the Spanish Crown and the British colonists in North America?

Whatever the case individually, it is clear that the international circumstances linked the self-interest of the colonists with those of Spain. A common enemy, which was threatened on several fronts simultaneously, allowed both Spain and the United States to achieve many of their objectives, without ever having been formally allied. The resulting cooperation helped in the birth of a new nation.
Bishop Fulton J. Sheen's Call for Religious Unity during the Cold War

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Bishop Fulton J. Sheen (1895-1979), a prominent member of the United States Catholic hierarchy during the Cold War, effectively used the new medium of television to attract millions of Americans to his crusade against communism. No other religious leader had previously appeared in a regularly-scheduled prime time television show on broadcast television. Sheen utilized his television show as he had his radio show, the Catholic Hour, to call for Protestants, Catholics, and Jews to join together in their opposition against Communism during the Cold War. He promoted the formation of the Cold War consensus by providing a theological justification for resisting communism that all three religious groups could accept. His television show, Life is Worth Living, enjoyed widespread popularity. In 1952 he won an Emmy in the category of “outstanding television personality”. Although Sheen appeared on television for five years, his strident anti-communism, and his role during the Cold War have been largely forgotten. Indeed, little has been published on Sheen’s life in general.  

Sheen paved the way for a series of religious leaders who embraced his themes. Clerics such as Billy Graham, Norman Vincent Peale, and Reinhold Niebuhr joined Sheen during the Cold War giving Americans reassurance that God would stand with them against the atheistic threat of communism. Graham in particular followed Sheen’s example of appealing to mass audiences through public television appearances. In fact, it was Grahams’ anti-communist messages in the late 1940s that brought him to the attention of William Randolph Hearst, who told his newspaper people to “puff Graham.”2 This garnered Graham a great deal more publicity than he might otherwise have received.

Prior to the beginning of the Cold War, Sheen had devoted a large portion of his life to saving America from the “evils of communism.” Sheen, a great admirer of the Middle Ages, saw himself in the mode of a medieval crusader. Whereas the crusaders set off to save the Holy land

1 Until recently the main published works on Sheen were D.P. Noonan, The Passion of Fulton J. Sheen (New York: Dodd Mead, 1972) and Sheen’s posthumous autobiography Treasure in Clay (San Francisco: Ignatius Books, 1980). In 2001, Thomas Reeves published the first full-length biography of Sheen since Noonan’s work, but he does not attempt to analyze Sheen’s role in the Cold War. Thomas C Reeves, The Life and Times of Fulton J. Sheen (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2001). Kathleen Field’s dissertation Bishop Fulton J. Sheen: An American Catholic Response to the Twentieth Century (University of Notre Dame, 1988) attempted to locate Sheen’s place in the history of American Catholicism but does not focus on his Anti-communism.


from the “infidel” Muslims, Sheen wanted to save Western Civilization from “Godless communism”. Instead of using physical weapons as the medieval crusaders did against Islam, Sheen utilized the media and the printed word to combat the communist infidels. Sheen viewed the Middle Ages as an ideal time when the Catholic Church exercised religious hegemony in Europe. This, in Sheen’s view, created a utopian society with morality firmly based in Christian teaching.

The utopia began to change with the Renaissance when Europe took the first steps toward establishing a secular society. The Protestant Reformation of the 1500s destroyed the Catholic Church’s religious hegemony and moved Europe away from the religious society of the Middle Ages. As Western society became more secular, a vacuum was created in the hearts and minds of the people. Sheen argued that people had an inherent need for God and that the Catholic Church had led them to fulfill that need. Without religious instruction, Western society turned to new ideologies to fill the void created by the abandonment of traditional Christian. Sheen argued that communism would prove to be the most harmful to America and Western civilization unless steps were taken to counter the appeal of Communism.

Sheen undertook a thorough study of Communism in the 1930s before he began attacking it. He claimed to have read every word written by Karl Marx and Vladimir Illyich Lenin. While Sheen may not have gone that far, he certainly spent a great deal of time studying communism as evidenced by his use of the two men’s writings on his shows and in his printed works.

In one of his earliest public references to Communism in 1933, Sheen argued that it had appeared because modern society refused to pray. Without regular prayer, humans could be fooled by false ideas attempting to replace Christianity. At the National Conference of Catholic Charities in 1935, Sheen presented a paper entitled, “The Mystical Body: The Church and communism.” In this paper, Sheen presented an argument against Communism that he would use throughout the remainder of his life. He viewed it as a religion that offered a counterfeit item for everything that Christianity possessed, which sought to take the place of God in men’s hearts. In March 1935, he called Communism “the ape of Christianity in its divine and historical forces.” He claimed “it has taken the whole content of Christianity and substituted the spirit of Satan for the spirit of Christ.” Sheen argued that neither fascism nor the “New Deal” of the 1930s could stop Communism. Only true Christian religion could fight it.

Sheen attacked Communism throughout the 1930s in public appearances, books, magazine articles, and on the radio. He rose to national prominence on The Catholic Hour radio program in the 1930s. He proved to be a popular speaker and at one point he received over 700,000 letters in a three-month period. When World War II began in Europe in 1939, he

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5 This figure comes from Noonan’s biography of Sheen. He had worked with Sheen and used the figure to point out Sheen’s popularity. Noonan, Passion, 51-52.
condemned Nazi Germany and fascist Italy for their actions, but he continued to insist that the Communist government in the Soviet Union presented the greatest danger to the world. Consequently, Sheen found himself in a difficult situation in late 1941 when the United States entered the war as an ally of the Soviet Union. He wanted to continue his crusade against Communism, but he did not want to appear disloyal to the United States. Sheen later claimed that his radio broadcasts during the war were carefully monitored and that if he suggested that the USSR was anything but a democracy, his microphone would be shut off, but offered no proof of interference in his broadcasts.8

During the late 1940s as the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union unfolded, Sheen found a renewed interest in his crusade against Communism. He wanted all Americans, no matter what their religious faith, to join against what he viewed as the greatest problem facing the world: Communism. To that end, he used Christian theology and Biblical references to help promote a united front against Communism and to allay the Cold War fears of Americans by providing assurances that God would not abandon them. During the late 1940s and early 1950s, Sheen used both his anti-Communistic rhetoric and religion in an attempt to rally Jews and Protestants to join with Catholics to oppose Communism.

As relations between the United States and the Soviet Union deteriorated in the late 1940s, Sheen attacked Communism on his radio broadcasts and sermons with a renewed vigor. In 1947, he began a series of broadcasts on *The Catholic Hour* radio program concerning Communism in which he encouraged American distrust of that ideology. In his introduction to the first show, Sheen recalled that he had been on the air for seventeen years and had never seen a time when "have the souls of men been more in the dark about the future."" He argued that civilization was in the process of decay, with Communism being a symptom of that decay. Americans seemed unaware of how badly and how fast the decay was taking place.

Sheen compared America to people in the days of Noah who watched him work for 120 years building the ark for a great flood and did nothing to prepare themselves for it. He quoted Matthew 24:38-39, which compared the attitude of the people of Noah's day to the attitude that people would have at the time of the Second Coming of Christ. Just as the people in Noah's day paid no attention to the possible end of their world, so the people of America failed to grasp the threat of Communism.

Sheen's use of Noah would appeal to Catholic, Protestants, and Jews in his audience, who would probably be familiar with the story. Sheen argued that the secular society that had first begun to appear at the time of Renaissance was drawing to a close and people would be returning to religion. However, it would not be the Christian religion that would attract people, but rather the false church of Communism. Although Sheen remained completely devoted to the Catholic Church, he purposefully used rhetoric that downplayed his Catholicism and emphasized that the three groups faced a common enemy. Sheen even dropped his references to the Protestant Reformation breaking the Catholic hegemony in Europe and pushing Western

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civilization toward secularism. This call to break down barriers and to unite against Communism would give the Cold War consensus that emerged a religious justification.

As part of his plan to reach Protestants and Jews, Sheen tried to reassure them that the Catholic Church opposed Communism for the same reasons that they did.\(^{10}\) It opposed Communism not on the basis of economics or ideology, but rather on moral and philosophical grounds. Communism distorted reality. This distortion was similar to what the communists accused Christians of doing to people when it labeled religion “the opiate of the people.” Communism deprived humans of their individuality because of its opposition to democracy. Therefore, Jews and Protestants should join with Catholics to keep the false religion of Communism from spreading across America.

While Sheen wanted to save America from Communism, he showed little interest in directly influencing the political situation by forming his own political organization. He ignored ardent anti-Communists such as Senator Joseph McCarthy. Sheen ignored McCarthy because, while he often warned that domestic communists could wreck the American government, he had little interest in the type of political theatrics that the McCarthy used to gain attention. If Sheen had actively supported McCarthy, it could have hampered his efforts to reach Protestants and Jews because McCarthy was Catholic. Sheen would not endorse a specific politician or political party, choosing instead to inform the American people of communist intentions and letting them make the choice on how to thwart them.

In the early 1950s, Sheen found a new way to deliver his message. He used the revolutionary new medium of television to demonstrate to America that he, a member of the Catholic clergy, could relate to their problems and could offer solutions on how to deal with them. So influential and effective was Sheen that he won an Emmy as the outstanding television personality of 1952. He titled his program *Life is Worth Living* to emphasize his hope that despite all the difficulties inherent in modern society, better life could be achieved by a revival of Christian morality and teaching. This show allowed Sheen to reach millions of people each week with a message that downplayed his Catholic doctrine in order to attract Protestants and Jewish viewers. He stayed away from religious subject matter that might seem to promote Catholic views and instead used Biblical references that all three faiths could accept.

The 1950s are sometimes called the “Golden Age” of television.\(^{11}\) Television moved from a scientific curiosity available to only a small number of American homes at the beginning of the decade to the predominant source of entertainment in homes by the end of the decade. During the 1950s, CBS and NBC dominated the new medium along with a smaller ABC, and an independent Dumont Network originating in the New York area. Sheen’s show first appeared on the Dumont Network and later switched to the ABC after the demise of Dumont in 1956.\(^{12}\)

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\(^{10}\) "Communism and the Church," broadcast on *The Catholic Hour*, 16 February, 1947.


Sheen foresaw that television would become a potent force in American culture, because viewers would be able to see as well as hear the programs. Sheen became a predecessor of later televangelists, like Reverend Pat Robertson and Reverend Jerry Falwell, in that he recognized the potential for reaching far more people by his television appearances than he ever could have in personal speaking engagements. However, unlike Robertson and Falwell, he never used his television show as a vehicle to launch political movements. Falwell founded the Moral Majority and Robertson helped create the Christian Coalition. The Moral Majority worked to elect Ronald Reagan to the presidency in 1980, and Robertson’s Christian Coalition has continuously worked to elect conservative politicians.

Sheen’s program was much plainer than the present, flashy productions of Falwell’s Old Time Gospel Hour and Robertson’s 700 Club, and not just because of the generally less elaborate staging of 1950s television. Sheen deliberately chose a format that would focus attention on the message rather than on the surroundings. The very novelty in the 1950s of being able to see the clergyman with his almost “hypnotic” dark eyes and to hear his pleasant speaking voice, was enough to attract both viewer attention and a significant number of responses. The only prop that Sheen used was a chalkboard to write on. His talks employed humor and everyday events to present his ideas.

Sheen at first met opposition to the idea of a religious show in what is now called prime time. Both NBC and CBS declined to broadcast the show, because commercial television was just getting established and neither network believed that a show by Sheen would attract a commercially viable audience. Eventually the Dumont Network agreed to put Sheen’s Life is Worth Living on the air. Dumont executives did not have much confidence in the success of Sheen’s program, and they put him opposite Milton Berle in the Texaco Star Theater on NBC, the most popular show at the time. Dumont did not even have a sponsor for the show and put it on to fill a gap in the schedule. Much to everyone’s surprise, the show did much better in the ratings than expected. A 1950s biographical sketch of Sheen claimed that the show drew an audience of ten million viewers by the end of that first season, earning ratings higher than Berle’s show. Although recent research has shown that Sheen could not have had a larger audience than Berle, he did receive an audience response in the form of over eight thousand letters a week, and tickets to tapings of his show were quickly given away. After its first season, Admiral Corporation agreed to sponsor Life is Worth Living. The company had a commercial at the beginning and the end of the show but did not interrupt the broadcast itself.

Sheen was a “Cold War Warrior” calling for his viewers to join him in a “Holy War” against the godless forces of Communism. This message had a powerful appeal as evidenced by

14 Mary Ann Watson in a 1993 article argued that the number of affiliate stations with the Dumont network could never have produced an audience larger than Milton Berle’s on NBC. She also claimed that in 1955, Sheen was at the height of his popularity and reached at most 5.5 million households. Mary Ann Watson, “And they Said ‘Uncle Fultie’ Didn’t Have a Prayer”, Television Quarterly, 26:3 (1993), 16-21. The number of letters comes from Conniff, Bishop Sheen Story, 11.
the number of letters he received and he later claimed, "in proportion to the population the greatest number of letters came from Jews, the second largest amount from Protestants and the third from Catholics." The truth of that statement cannot be verified, because Sheen ordered the correspondence destroyed to protect the privacy of the writers. During its first season, *The New York Times* noted that the program appealed to those of different religious faiths and called it, "a remarkably absorbing half hour of television, successfully refuting many of the preconceived notions of what constitutes model programming." The article also noted that Sheen was not interested in proselytizing and that all faiths could draw inspiration from the show.

Sheen's call for unity among the religions came at an opportune time in the history of American religion. A new wave of revivalism coincided with the beginning of the Cold War, and by 1960 more Americans claimed to be affiliated with a Protestant, Catholic, or Jewish congregation than at any other time in the twentieth century. Americans identified themselves as Protestant, Catholic, or Jew at 66 per cent, 26 per cent and 3.5 per cent respectively. Each of the three religions was regarded by the American people as "equi-legitimate expression," as each one viewed the other two as possessing similar values and morals. Identifying with one of the three religions was to identify oneself as an American. The fact that communist nations were perceived as both a strategic threat to the United States and atheistic as the same time would give the American people two legitimate reasons to oppose Communism and support people like Sheen who called for religious unity against the threat. Sheen, with his program in prime time, had the potential to reach more United States citizens with the call for unity than any other religious leader in the United States.

Six of Sheen's broadcasts dealt directly with Communism during the 1952-53 television season, but his most sensational broadcast occurred on 24 February, 1953, entitled "The Death of Stalin." What made it sensational was the announcement a week later on 5 March that Stalin had just died. Sheen began the program by describing the power struggle in the Soviet Union after the death of Lenin in 1924. He compared Stalin to Julius Caesar, who in the days before his assassination in 44 BCE claimed to be a god. Sheen declared that Stalin had set himself up as a god in the USSR, but that he too would die. Quotations from a speech in William Shakespeare's *Julius Caesar*, in which Caesar referred to his divinity, were used to apply to Stalin. This depiction of Stalin considering himself divine was part of Sheen's ongoing theory that

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17 Ibid.
21 Ibid., 238.
Communism tried to serve as a substitute for Christianity. Stalin modeled himself as a "god" as part of the ongoing process to offer people a substitute for Christianity.

Sheen warned his audience not to be concerned about Stalin's death, which would inevitably come, but to be more concerned about what happened after his death. He predicted that the leaders of the Soviet Union would try to exploit Stalin's death just as Caesar's assassins tried to benefit from his death. Although the broadcast emphasized many of the themes that Sheen had been using for years, the subsequent death of Stalin gave Sheen even more media attention. He claimed in his autobiography that he was besieged by newspapers from around the country demanding to know what inside information that Sheen might have on Stalin. However, Sheen claimed it was luck that Stalin died when he did.\(^{22}\) Nikita Khrushchev's memoirs also suggest that the death of Stalin was a surprise, even to the leadership of the Soviet Union.\(^{23}\)

After Stalin a struggle developed in the Soviet Union over succession. Sheen became concerned that the United States government and the American people might think that the new leadership would be willing to have better relations with this country. He warned that Soviet peace overtures could be used as stepping-stones to world domination.\(^{24}\) Peace from the communist perspective would only come when all private property and Western morality were abolished. Sheen asserted that real peace was more than an absence of war. Real peace that could only come from God would bring tranquility and justice to the world. Americans needed to look beyond the façade of Soviet peace offers and realize that peace on communist terms could only bring disaster for the West. Sheen further argued that Americans and the West must stop judging Soviet policy by whether it coincided with that of the Western powers as it did in World War II. He was referring to the alliance between the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States against Hitler. The alliance had formed only because both sides sought the same outcome, namely the end of the Nazi regime in Germany.

Although Sheen often talked about communism during his broadcasts, he attributed the success of the program not to Cold War fears, but to his ability to relate to everyday experiences of his audience. In an interview printed in the New York Times, Sheen claimed that he had no concerns with ratings and that he had gone on the air only to help his sponsor, God.\(^{25}\) He credited the success of the show as coming from a desire of the American people to be given clear reasons for the condition of the world. However, since Sheen saw the decline of Western civilization as being responsible for the condition of the world, even shows on topics like hate and fear fit within his call for people to return to God to reverse that decline. He refrained from promoting Catholic doctrine on the show and instead utilized a religious philosophical point of view. Sheen told the interviewer that the show was attracting Protestant and Jewish viewers for that reason. He wanted to attract Protestants and Jews to the show so that they could be persuaded to join the fight against communism.

\(^{22}\) Sheen, Treasure in Clay, 73-74.
Sheen’s television program ended in 1957. During the 1956-57 season, Sheen’s program aired on Monday nights against the number-one-ranked program, *I Love Lucy*. His audience soon began to decline. Sheen later claimed that it was his decision to retire. He announced that just as spiritual considerations had motivated him to retire, spiritual matters would determine his possible return to television. Sheen returned with a syndicated television series, *The Bishop Sheen Program*, which ran from 1961-68; however, it was never as popular as *Life is Worth Living*. This later television show was not carried by a major network and did not attract a large audience.

In the 1960s, Sheen became involved in the Second Vatican Council and served as the Bishop of Rochester before retiring. He talked much less about Communism during the last two decades of his life and criticized United States involvement in Vietnam. However, he remained convinced that Communism would one day collapse in the Soviet Union and its citizens would return to Christianity. Sheen died on 9 December, 1979. *The New York Times, Time Christianity Today*, and Dr. Billy Graham all lauded him. Graham’s comments demonstrated the appeal of Sheen across denominational lines; he called Sheen, “one of the greatest preachers in this century” and further stated that Sheen’s death was “a great loss to the nation and both Catholic and Protestant Churches.” However, the articles gave little coverage to his anti-communism and instead concentrated on his role as a pioneer in television religious broadcasting. Sheen’s views on Communism may have seemed less significant to the press in the 1970s when the Cold War received less attention than it had in the 1950s.

26 “Sheen Retires from TV,” *New York Times*, 19 October, 1957. There have been persistent rumors that Cardinal Spellman forced Sheen off the air because of differences between those two men. Reeves attempts to explore this in depth but admits to being stymied by lack of documents on the subject. Reeves, *Life and Times*, 363-371.
28 Sheen kept a replica of a Russian church in his private chapel to express his hope for the change in Russia. Sheen, *Treasury in Clay*, 90.
Hester Vaughan: Infanticide, Woman's Rights, and Melodrama

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On February 5, 1868, writing for the feminist newspaper the Revolution, Elizabeth Cady Stanton declared that there was a "notorious 'boarding-house' in this city, [New York] where mothers, married or unmarried, can be delivered of their offspring in the strictest confidence, and relieved of all bothers of maternity." According to Stanton, a leading nineteenth-century feminist, the direct reason for this deplorable situation was American society's failure to educate and enfranchise women. Infanticide deeply troubled Stanton, who viewed it as another example of woman's degradation. To this nineteenth-century feminist, at the heart of the infanticide issue was a woman's lack of political, economic, and legal rights.

During this same month in 1868, Hester Vaughan was arrested in Philadelphia for the murder of her newborn infant. The outcome of her trial served as a rallying point for Stanton, Susan B. Anthony, and the Working Women's Association. To these women, Vaughan's dilemma encompassed a variety of women's issues and rights ranging from and including: a woman's right to vote, to serve as a juror, to determine her own economic standing, and, to some extent, to defy society's sexual double-standard. The case also reveals the willingness of these

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1 "Infanticide and Prostitution," Revolution, 5 February, 1868, 6. The use of the term "feminist" is in keeping with Ellen Carol DuBois's demonstration of the emergence of a women's movement, which sought to solely rely on women and to only focus on women's rights. See DuBois, Feminism and Suffrage, The Emergence of an Independent Women's Movement in America, 1848-1869 (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1980), 19.
2 The word "woman" is used in place of "women" because many of the nineteenth-century women's rights advocates used it to symbolize the unity of their cause. When I use the term "women," it is in my own reference to women in the plural sense. See Nancy F. Cott, The Grounding of Modern Feminism (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1987), 3.
3 For a closer examination of Stanton's views on how women should be able to govern their own bodies see Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Eighty Years & More: Reminiscences 1815-1897, Introduction by Ellen Carol DuBois and Forward by Ann D. Gordon (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1993) Originally published in 1898 by T. Fisher Unwin. Also see: The Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony Reader: Correspondence, Writings, Speeches, Introduction by Ellen Carol Dubois and Forward by Gerda Lerner (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1992).
4 There are two spellings of Hester Vaughan: Vaughan, and Vaughn.
5 The Working Women's Association was formed by a group of female typesetters, who had been hired to work as typesetters for the New York World, during a strike in December of 1867 and were subsequently fired when the strike ended. The Working Women's Association became a mixture of middle-class suffrage advocates and female laborers. The group remained divided along class lines. The first group saw the vote as one of the greatest tools to use in combating injustices committed against women, while the laborers did not want to put the vote as the priority of their organization. Ellen Carol Dubois, Feminism and Suffrage, 132-134.

feminists, either consciously or subconsciously, to use melodramatic rhetoric to make this case a paradigm of every woman's discrimination in American society. As Peter Brooks notes, melodrama is democratic in its attempts to make its claims universal. The Revolution made Hester Vaughan's legal troubles universal: every woman stood equal to every woman in her victimization. The focus of this paper, then, is not on the outcome of the trial; rather, it is concerned with how this trial embodied the struggle for woman's equality and how these women employed melodramatic rhetoric to make Vaughan's case symbolic of every woman's degraded position in American society. The paper also considers why they chose to do so. Stanton and Anthony were politically vulnerable following their battles to gain support for woman's suffrage in Kansas and New York. Increasingly sensitive to their own political isolation, Stanton and Anthony sought new avenues and outlets to express their own political frustrations. Hester Vaughan's case served this purpose.

As Vaughan's case unfolded in the Revolution, Stanton and Anthony had recently been betrayed by their abolitionist and Radical Republican allies. During the Civil War, many women's rights activists had served their country well by establishing the Sanitary Commission, spearheading the passage and ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment, and, more importantly, suspending their campaign for woman's equality until after the Civil War to avoid hindering the Union's effort. Rightfully, they expected to be rewarded with woman's suffrage at the conclusion of the war, and, as can be imagined, were shocked and alarmed by the Fourteenth Amendment's passage in December of 1866 and ratification in July of 1868. This Amendment included the word "male" in its second section, outlining which class of citizens a state had to enfranchise and the penalty the state faced if it failed to do so. The battles that ensued as a result of this Amendment's passage—between those in favor of universal suffrage and those solely in favor of black male suffrage—became pivotal moments for the first generation of feminists. As the states began rewriting their constitutions, the American Equal Rights Association, formed by former abolitionists and women's rights activists, began campaigning for the removal of gender and racial voting restrictions throughout many of the states.

During the battles in Kansas and New York, Stanton and Anthony felt betrayed by fellow abolitionists, African-American men, and members of the Republican Party who stumped Kansas against female suffrage, fearing that the attachment of woman's suffrage to black male suffrage would ensure the defeat of both. Meanwhile, the woman's rights activists lost New York in part because of Horace Greeley's denunciation of woman's suffrage as unnecessary. Greeley, one of Stanton and Anthony's former allies, claimed that women should "spend the hours which

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9 Dubois, Feminism and Suffrage, 66.
they can spare from their labors...mastering the wisdom of the sages and philosophers who have elucidated the science of government, than in attendance on midnight caucuses, or in wrangling around the polls."  

On December 1, 1868, in what would be the height of the Hester Vaughan story, the Working Women's Association held a meeting at the Cooper Institute in New York City. Horace Greeley, who also attended this meeting, assumed his usual reluctant approach to the broader questions of woman's rights. He contended that "he had been apprehensive that this meeting might be perverted as to injure the cause for which they were assembled."11 To Greeley, the meeting was held to help Hester Vaughan and "they should measure their words and not complicate the case of this poor woman by any abstract notions not connected with it."12 The issue for Greeley was a wronged woman and the theoretical issues considered by Stanton, Anthony and other female reformers should be discarded. To Stanton and Anthony, Greeley's earlier denunciation of woman's suffrage at New York's constitutional convention reverberated in his Hester Vaughan argument. While Sarah Barringer Gordon argues that Greeley's articles in the New York Tribune provide evidence of the growing isolation of these nineteenth-century feminists, as noted earlier, the roots of this conflict date back to the battle over the politically explosive issue of woman's suffrage in New York.13 Although Greeley had initially presented himself as a woman's rights advocate, he subsequently withdrew his support when it threatened the expansion of suffrage to include African-American men. In retaliation, Stanton and Anthony embarrassed Greeley at New York's constitutional convention when they provided his political opponents with a suffrage petition signed by his mentally ill wife.14

Moreover, to Stanton and Anthony, a woman's political inequality paralleled her legal disability. In her address to Gerrit Smith, Wendell Phillips, and other former abolitionists, Stanton rhetorically questioned how do white women "fare in our own courts to-day by Saxon fathers, husbands, brothers, sons?"15 Stanton acerbically answered her own question that Hester Vaughan was imprisoned for a crime she did not commit, while "he who betrayed her walks the green earth in freedom...Such is 'manhood suffrage.'"16 In referring to Vaughan's legal predicament, the Revolution claimed that universal male suffrage would spell the end of woman's hopes for liberty.17 The passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the subsequent behavior of their political allies in Kansas and New York, convinced Stanton and Anthony that women could

12 Ibid.  
14 DuBois, Feminism and Suffrage, 88.  
15 Revolution, 14 January, 1869, 24-25.  
16 Ibid.  
no longer rely on men for their legal and political rights; women would have to rely on each other.

Following the suffrage campaigns in Kansas and New York, Hester Vaughan's case came to symbolize woman's complete discrimination in a male world. To Stanton, Anthony, and other woman's rights advocates it provided the perfect plot structure for a Manichean struggle of good and evil embodied in women and men, respectively. Stanton, in the Revolution, questioned how man could truly understand the moral dilemma faced by a woman when she became pregnant after succumbing to man's seductions. According to Stanton, society viewed a woman's illegitimate child as her disgrace and loss of virtue. As a result of this fall from grace, she became a pariah—socially, legally, and economically vulnerable. Facing this isolation, coupled with her inability to protect herself at the polls or the workplace, a woman often resorted to tragic, desperate solutions, such as infanticide. The double standard found in the legal system did not escape Stanton who claimed America's unjust laws "make crimes for women that are not crimes for men!" Of course, men participated in the Woman's Movement and were also involved in the Hester Vaughan case. Male allies were the only real political links for the feminists. Through their rhetoric, however, Stanton and Anthony sought to have women protect and rely on each other, rather than men. To Stanton and Anthony, their former political allies had broke the Garrisonian tradition of "not compromising" or "accepting half a loaf," when they settled for African-American male suffrage without female suffrage.

Despite close to a year's coverage in the Revolution, the reports on Hester Vaughan remained vague. The facts of the case and the possibility of Vaughan's guilt remained secondary to the broader agenda of demonstrating that situations like this occurred as a result of woman's inequitable status in American society and their betrayal by the men of the world. The presentation of the case also remained inconsistent until the story was molded into the perfect melodrama. Vaughan became the helpless, victimized, child-like angel, abandoned by her proper husband, taken advantage of by her wealthy male employer, and, finally, "raped" by the legal system itself through its denial of her basic civil rights. Establishing Vaughan as a hard working, industrious, young girl was paramount to the feminists. In melodramatic form, Vaughan had to symbolize good. She was depicted as a neat, clean, and pious woman, who always kept her cell tidy. The ladies who visited her reported that while she thanked them for their help and knew they would do everything in their power to help her, she placed her trust in God. Reportedly, she recited several hymns to them, which she had learned in Sunday school back home. Their reports of Vaughan always depicted her as honest, truthful, expressive, beautiful, and in every sense of the word, virtuous.

Following Vaughan's desertion by her husband, she had sought employment with a wealthy "benefactor," who proved her betrayer. In melodramatic fashion, Vaughan's employer and the other men she encountered throughout her troubles were always characterized as her

18 "Hester Vaughan," Revolution, 19 November, 1868, 312.
20 "The Case of Hester Vaughan," Revolution, 10 December, 1868, 357.
21 Ibid.
elusive betrayers, seducers, rapists, and villains. Symbolizing virtue and innocence, Vaughan refused to reveal the perpetrator’s name, thus, protecting his new, innocent wife. 22 Eleanor Kirk, in praising Vaughan’s silence at the Cooper meeting, quoted Vaughan as saying, “if he were alone I would ring his name through the whole country,” but since he has recently married, “nothing will induce me to send terror and disgrace into the heart of an innocent, trusting woman.” 23 In stating this, Kirk, a journalist and member of the Working Women’s Association, could not help but exclaim, “Glorious Hester Vaughan!” 24 In the woman’s rights advocates’ presentation, Vaughan’s submissiveness demonstrated that she was a “true woman.” 25 Moreover, while Vaughan embodied the true woman because she sacrificed herself for another woman, she was also a “feminist” as she stood united with a fellow woman. Vaughan had placed united womanhood above all other considerations, including her own execution.

The circumstances surrounding Vaughan’s dilemma remained ambiguous and vague, often fluctuating between rape and seduction. Only occasionally were direct statements made regarding what might have happened. Dr. Clemence Lozier, one of the first female gynecologists, reported in the New York Times that Vaughan “became a victim—not of seduction or misplaced affection—but of rape, by a brute.” 26 In some sense, maintaining that Vaughan was raped enabled her to continue as a virtuous and “true woman.” 27 Her physical inability to protect herself from her stronger, male employer paralleled woman’s legal standing and symbolized their vulnerability in the workplace. However, allowing Vaughan to be seduced still maintained her as the victim. As a “Fallen Woman,” Vaughan held the potential to be restored to the status of an angel. 28 More importantly, Stanton and Anthony viewed women’s inability to protect themselves in the public sphere as the main source of their vulnerability to men’s desires. As Parker Pillsbury, co-editor of the Revolution, contended “no matter though she be an accomplice...it is still true...that man’s inhumanity to woman in general, to her in particular, has pointed, poisoned every arrow of her affliction.” 29

According to the Revolution’s reports, Vaughan’s pregnancy resulted in her immediate release from her employment. Forced to seek refuge in a cold, airy, Philadelphia garret, she gave birth to her child without any assistance. The garret and stark scenario have often served as important symbols in melodrama. 30 Moreover, in her report about the night that Vaughan gave birth, Eleanor Kirk asserted that it had occurred during one of “fiercest winter storms” of last year. 31 Conflict or action in melodrama often finds the heroine exposed and threatened by

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23 “The Case of Hester Vaughan,” Revolution, 10 December, 1868, 357.
24 Ibid.
29 “The Hester Vaughan Meeting At Cooper Institute,” Revolution, 10 December, 1868, 361.
30 Walkowitz, City of Dreadful Delight, 90.
31 “The Case of Hester Vaughan,” Revolution, 10 December, 1868, 357.
catastrophes or natural disasters. 32 Alone, Vaughan endured childbirth and afterwards dragged herself to the door to request water from a passerby. Her request for water resulted in her arrest for the death of her newborn infant. To Stanton and Anthony, this basic request and her subsequent arrest possibly reflected their own earlier request for the fundamental right of woman's suffrage and their betrayal by their former friends. Vaughan's seduction or rape and illegitimate child also symbolized the possible threat faced by all women. It was up to women to serve as Vaughan's and every other woman's protectors. 33 Men, including the legal system, had become woman's seducers and betayers. As Kirk noted, "Hester Vaughan fell to lust and the gallows." 34 Her victimization linked man's physical control with his legal control.

While the women's rights activists remained deeply concerned about the sexual double-standard embedded in American society as well as woman's political exclusion, they continued to also see this case as a blatant violation of woman's legal rights. Dr. Lozier, in her investigative report of Hester Vaughan's case, held that Vaughan had been unjustly tried and sentenced as a result of several questionable legal practices in the trial. According to Lozier and Dr. Susan Smith, a Philadelphia doctor, Vaughan's lawyer had visited her once, collected the last thirty dollars "she had managed to save, by the strictest economy," and never returned to see her until the day of the trial. 35 Vaughan's denial of adequate counseling prevented puerperal fever and blindness from being entered as the defense for why she did not see her child and had subsequently rolled on top of it, thus, crushing the skull. 36 Vaughan, to these women, was innocent. She was not a murderer and the child's injuries resulted from Vaughan inadvertently rolling onto the child. Exposure to Philadelphia's harsh winter in an unheated room served as another justification for the child's death. 37

Following the report issued by Drs. Lozier and Smith, the Working Women's Association at the December meeting concluded that Vaughan had been unjustly convicted of murder based on insufficient evidence. They further declared in their resolutions that

in all civil and criminal cases, woman shall be tried by a jury of her peers; shall have a voice in making the law, in electing the judge who pronounces her sentence, and the sheriff who, in case of execution, performs for her that last dread act. 38

Hester Vaughan's lack of legal rights equaled all women's lack of legal rights. No longer did the case revolve around her wrongful sentence; rather, the solution was now to provide all women a voice in the legal system. This right also included the right to train and seek

32 Brooks, The Melodramatic Imagination, 32.
34 "The Case of Hester Vaughan," Revolution, 10 December, 1868, 357.
35 Ibid., 358.
36 Ibid.
37 "Hester Vaughan," Revolution, 10 December, 1868, 360.
38 Revolution, 10 December, 1868, 358.
employment in the field of law. According to the speeches given at this December meeting, Vaughan's case carried a lesson to the "women of wealth, education and leisure [who should] study the laws under which they live that they might defend the unfortunate of their sex." Moreover, they asserted that "the wise men of New York [should] open Columbia Law School at once to girls who have brains to understand the science of jurisprudence and hearts big enough to demand justice." While Stanton, Anthony, and the Working Women's Association refused to rely on patriarchal authority and power for protection of their "daughters," their request for women's admission into law school forced them to work within the male system of authority and power. This poignantly and tragically served as a reminder that all women were victims of gender oppression, thus, contributing to the belief held by Stanton, Anthony, as well as the Working Women's Association that only women could serve as protectors for women.

The role as protectors for women was often found in the form of protective mothers: "In the name of womanhood, we implore the mothers of that state to rescue that defenseless girl from her impending fate." The article in the Revolution further lamented, "Oh! make her case your own, suppose your young and beautiful daughter had been thus betrayed...justice should take the life of her seducer rather than her own." In this respect, the Revolution's use of melodrama echoed Josephine Butler's crusades to help prostitute women, in which the avenging father had been replaced by an avenging and protective mother. Women, in Stanton and Anthony's opinion, were the only ones who would truly protect other women. Moreover, the Revolution, like Josephine Butler, used "two versions of political melodrama...the melodrama of female heroism and self-sacrifice." Vaughan was heroic and self-sacrificing in her attempt to deal with adversity and in her refusal to name her betrayer. The women who supported Vaughan were also heroic and self-sacrificing in their willingness to devote their time and money in support of one of their own--an innocent, victimized woman.

The story evolved until Vaughan was innocent of infanticide. In an article entitled "Infanticide" published on August 6, 1868, the Revolution noted Vaughan's sentence of death and recognized her guilt. This recognition, however, disappeared by the December presentation of the case. Despite the accepted guilt in the August article, Vaughan was not portrayed as a criminal; rather, she was presented as a victim of the legal system. According to the Revolution, "if that poor child of sorrow is hung, it will be deliberate, downright murder. Her death will be a

39 The claim that women had the right to practice law was defeated in the 1872 case of Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 16 Wall. (1872). In this case, the Supreme Court ruled that Illinois did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment when it employed gender discrimination to deny Myra Bradwell the right to practice law.
40 "Hester Vaughan," Revolution, 10 December, 1868, 360.
41 Ibid.
42 Revolution, 19 November, 1868, 312.
43 Josephine Butler worked as female reformer who campaigned to overturn the Contagious Disease Acts, eliminate child prostitution and the white female slave trade in Victorian England.
44 Walkowitz, City of Dreadful Delight, 92.
45 Ibid., 93.
far more horrible *infanticide* than was the killing of her child." To Stanton, Vaughan was the child of society and civilization, "begotten and born of it, seduced by it, by the judge who pronounced her sentence, by the bar and jury." While the earlier report had also found her innocent of a crime, the argument was based on woman's political, social, and legal inequalities, not her actual innocence. By the December meeting, Vaughan's supporters conveniently failed to acknowledge her alleged admission of guilt. A special dispatch was issued on December 6, 1868 and printed in the *Revolution* on January 21, 1869. According to the dispatch, Governor John Geary considered the attempt by the feminists to make Vaughan a heroine "injudicious and improper" in light of her admitted guilt—once to Pennsylvania Governor John Geary's secretary, and another time to Dr. Smith. Dr. Smith, of course, denied that she had ever heard this. While it is uncertain whether Vaughan actually killed her infant, what is evident is the shift in the argument by Vaughan's supporters. It was no longer acceptable to brazenly place her claims of innocence in sweeping political, legal, and judicial terms; rather, it had become necessary to establish her as actually innocent of the crime. This change did not signify that the broader issues of woman's plight had been forgotten; Vaughan, the agency used to address these rights, however, had to be more acceptable.

Vaughan's innocence or guilt may never be determined because the *Revolution*’s presentation of the case remained inconsistent, ever-evolving, and universal. The gender bias of the American legal system also contributed to the truth’s distortion. However, what can be discerned from the *Revolution*’s reports were the editors’ attempts to make this case symbolic of woman's deprivations, by appealing to public sentiment through the use of melodrama. By viewing Hester Vaughan's case in this light, Stanton and Anthony used her story as a vehicle for promoting their overall agenda of woman's equality. In the process, Hester Vaughan, as revealed in the *Revolution*, became more of a myth or symbol, than an individual case. Equally important in viewing this case is its place in the overall history of the Women's Movement. Nursing their wounds of betrayal by their former allies, Hester Vaughan's case also served as a way for these feminists to insulate themselves from the conflicts they had recently endured and those they were currently fighting.

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47 Ibid.
It has been argued that Vaughan’s case was a failure for Stanton and Anthony, furthering their alienation from American society. These women saw woman’s alienation already existing in American legal history and Vaughan’s trial served as the perfect opportunity, whether she was guilty or innocent, to demonstrate the need for woman’s involvement in the legal, political and economic arenas. Stanton and Anthony concluded from their own recent experiences that only women could truly understand the dilemmas faced by women. Following this case, they were willing to break with old allies, creatively challenge the Reconstruction Amendments, and to fight for woman’s access to the public sphere. Vaughan’s case was a victory for Stanton, Anthony and the Working Women’s Association. Vaughan received a pardon.\textsuperscript{50}

\textsuperscript{50}The Working Women’s Association,” \textit{Revolution}, 3 June 1869, 346-347.
“$500 and a Case of Scotch:”
The 1947 Florida Legislative Bribery Scandal

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Introduction

The 1947 Florida legislative session was one of the most productive and, up to that point, progressive sessions in the state's history. Leading the way was a comprehensive general education act intended to repair and improve an educational system that had been ignored following the collapse of the 1920s "land boom." A second important accomplishment was the appropriation of $2,000,000 to purchase land to create Everglades National Park in South Florida. Legislators passed other noteworthy legislation including measures establishing co-ed education at the University of Florida in Gainesville as well as at the Florida State College for Women in Tallahassee, renamed Florida State University, and granting women the right to sit on juries for the first time. Additionally, the legislature substantially increased funding for both "aid to dependent children" and public health programs, earmarked money for forest conservation and fire protection, and extended the state's bribery laws to cover attempts to influence not only members of the legislature, but also legislative staff and candidates for office.

If the 1947 Florida Legislature was historic because of the magnitude of legislation that was passed, it was eventful because of an allegation of bribery leveled from within the House of Representatives. There were three weeks remaining in the biennial 60-day session (April 8 to June 6) when the incident occurred during the afternoon session of May 14. Floor debate had begun on a number of important bills, among them a so-called "boobie bill" (H.B. 590) intended to prevent telephone and telegraph companies from leasing private wires used for transmission of gambling information.1 Proponents asserted that the legislation would cripple off-track bookmaking operations that they claimed did more business than legalized horse and dog tracks. Legal pari-mutuel facilities would attract more customers if the bill passed, thereby enhancing the tax revenue that the state received from racing. Opponents of the bill argued that it would do nothing to increase track-site business because individuals who placed their bets with bookmakers were unlikely to attend the racetracks. In a deceptive turn, they maintained that the only effective means of stopping off-track betting would be a prohibition on newspaper publication and radio broadcast of race results. The opposition even claimed that, if approved, the bill would result in declining state tax receipts because bookies bet heavily at the track to hedge their outside bets and this business would be lost if they were put out of operation.


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Revealing the Bribe

The House had unanimously approved an "anti-bookie" bill two years earlier that never came up for a vote in the Senate. In 1947, the Senate passed a version of the bill with only two dissenting votes; the House, however, rejected H.B. 590 by a vote of 41-37. Two seventeen legislators, a number of assembly leaders among them, did not vote on the measure. Following the bill's defeat, Rep. Brailey Odham (Sanford/Seminole County) came forward with the charge that he had been offered a bribe to vote against the bill. Speaking on personal privilege, he did not identify the member who had allegedly made the offer; he asserted, however, that

a bunch of unscrupulous racketeers are trying to influence the vote of this House. They're in this legislature today and there's money on the line. This is a grave issue. It's a cancer. I was approached and I'm hot about it."

The gallery, filled with spectators who had come to watch the floor debate and vote on the gambling legislation, erupted into applause when Odham made his allegations. Hand clapping also broke out among some legislators on the floor. When several members challenged the claim, Odham indicated that he would "call names" even though doing so would "embarrass members of this house."

The youngest member, at age 27, of the 1947 Florida Legislature, Brailey Odham had no political credentials, little political background, and few political contacts. He had been in Tallahassee a mere five weeks representing a county that was no major player in the general scheme of state politics. As Odham remembers,

I was so impressed in those first few weeks. At church one Sunday morning in Sanford, I told people what a good bunch there was up there [in the legislature] and how good and clean politics was. A week later we had the piece of legislation that changed my view forever."

Odham had distinguished himself in committee work and day-to-day activities of the assembly in the short time that he had served. Having quickly developed a reputation as a high-minded and sincere individual, he was not suspected of having political motives for the charges he leveled nor was he thought the type to sound off in order to gain personal publicity. As one newspaper

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2 A second "bookie bill" was submitted to the House in 1947. An attempt was made to move that legislation out of a hostile committee two days before the session's end. The motion to move, however, failed by a vote of 44-43. Afterwards, a successful voice vote was taken to have all references to the bill removed from House records. *Tampa Tribune*, 5 June, 1947.
4 *Miami Herald*, 15 May, 1947. Odham was not given an opportunity to identify the alleged culprit because the House adjourned for the day following Speaker Thomas Beasley's ruling that a motion to reconvene in a closed executive session was out of order.
5 Author's interview with Brailey Odham, 5 February 1994. Odham's "campaign" for his legislative seat consisted of qualifying as a candidate and issuing a statement to the local newspaper thanking his erstwhile Democratic Party primary opponent, a several-term incumbent who decided against running for re-election, for his service in office. Odham faced no Republican opponent in the general election.
editorial commented, Odham's "only interest" was "constructive public service" and, therefore, he had gotten into politics with the "idea of cleaning it up."6

The bribery allegation quickly swept aside all other legislative business. The state Senate voted to call for appointment of a joint committee from both houses to investigate the charges. The House rules committee adopted a motion to hear statements that any legislator wished to make on the matter and also appointed a committee to determine the assembly's legal responsibilities. Legislators talked of little else as numerous "sub-current" conversations took place in the Capitol corridors and in the hotel rooms where most stayed while the legislature was in session. As St. Petersburg Times reporter Stan Cawthorn wrote "the significant part of the story was that no legislator was heard to say he believed that Odham was lying or was even mistaken about the bribe offer."7

Questions did arise about Odham's judgment in making statements so difficult to prove, but rumors also circulated about other legislators having received bribe offers. Perhaps most serious were concerns expressed about the behavior of the seventeen legislators who failed to vote on the anti-bookie legislation. Members who were considered models of integrity and independence were looked at with suspicion. Explanation by those who failed to vote on the measure included not understanding the bill, having to go to the restroom, and requiring medical attention at the time of the final vote. The most forthright of those who did not vote stated that bookmakers in his county had given him substantial unsolicited support in his election campaign and, while they had not asked for any favors, he felt that he owed it to them to leave the chamber before the roll call.8 Most legislators agreed that those who "took a walk" were responsible for the defeated bill.

The Story Unfolds

Braley Odham and Representative Archie Clement (Tarpon Springs/Pinellas County) met with Governor Millard Caldwell who, when asked directly whether he planned any investigation into the charges, commented "that is a matter for the legislature."9 Personally reserved and philosophically conservative, Caldwell could nevertheless exhibit active and energetic leadership. In this instance, he favored prohibiting the use of telegraph and telephone lines to transmit gambling information, but his focus at the time was on funding a new statewide public school program.10 Interestingly, Caldwell declined to comment on a proposed bill to

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6 Ft. Myers Press News, 19 May, 1947. This same piece issued a prophetic warning about the incident noting that there were no witnesses to the bribe attempt, so it was Odham's word against another person's word, which meant that "finding the culprit legally guilty is hardly possible."
7 St. Petersburg Times, 18 May, 1947.
8 Ibid.
9 Miami Herald, 16 May, 1947. Odham maintains that he was in Caldwell's office when the governor received a telephone call from an individual inquiring about the possibility of hiring Caldwell's law firm for legal defense. He says that the governor told the caller that the firm was not available and that the governor remarked the call had been from Bernie Papy. Odham would name Papy several days later as the perpetrator of the bribe offer. Odham interview, 5 February and 23 April, 1994.
10 Caldwell, who had a long and prominent political career before becoming governor, was strongly committed to bettering Florida education and he remains noteworthy for the 1947 Minimum Finance Program (MFP) that substantially reformed the public school system. R. L. Johns, The Evolution of the Equalization of Educational Opportunity in Florida, 1926-1976, (Gainesville: University of Florida, 1976). Caldwell assumed office on the cusp
legalize and tax slot machines (pending on the senate calendar with finance and taxation committee endorsement), stating that he would maintain his policy of not speaking about ways for the legislature to raise the money he estimated was needed.

When Odham was out of town on family business for a day and a half after meeting with the governor murmurs surfaced about his absence, but permission had been granted prior to the alleged incident. Odham recalls the chronology of events: "I made the charges on Wednesday. I went to see the governor on Thursday. I was out of town on Friday. And, I returned on Saturday to a stack of messages waiting for me at the Cherokee Hotel where I was staying in Tallahassee."

Little went on in the state capital on weekends as both legislators and reporters took time off from their regular activities and, on that Saturday afternoon, Odham was unable to contact anyone who had requested further comment on the bribery matter. He did, however, run into respected political columnist Allen Morris near the capitol building. Odham told the scribe that the story was available only if Morris would make copies to distribute to other reporters.

Brailey Odham revealed to Allen Morris that the person involved was a member of the House of Representatives and he indicated that he was prepared to name the person for legislative investigators. Morris, who agreed to withhold the briber's name, quoted Odham as saying that he was returning from lunch when

I was approached just outside the house chamber and asked to vote against the bill. The man who approached me is a member of the House. He asked me to help him kill this bill. I told him, I think it is a good bill and one needed. He then said, "Do you mind if I get personal?" Before I even answered, he said either I'll give you $200 or I'll get you $200. I told him that I would not consider this. On the next morning, as I walked into the chamber, this same member approached me and said, "I'll make it five and a case of Scotch whiskey if you'll just take a walk. Some of the best members of the House are going to do so." I told him again that I was going to support the bill and would speak for it on the floor. Then I walked off.

Odham would be criticized in some quarters for disclosing his story to the press before providing a full accounting to the House of Representatives. Defending himself, he asserts that doing so was a kind of insurance policy. The action is understandable given his lack of status in the

of political modernization (in terms of improved and expanded public services) in the state. He was generally successful on both administrative and legislative fronts, proving to be an able executive during the immediate post-World War II period. Widely perceived to be forthright and honest, Caldwell would later be appointed to Florida's supreme court, serving for a time as chief justice. David R. Colburn and Richard K. Scher, _Florida's Gubernatorial Politics in the Twentieth Century_, (Tallahassee: University Presses of Florida, 1980).

11Odham interview, 5 February, 1994. He missed the day because he took his pregnant wife to visit her family in Louisiana.

12_Miami Daily News_, 18 May, 1947. Odham's account of the two specific incidents remained absolutely consistent throughout the process that ensued. He would tell the exact same story to the assembled House of Representatives, to a grand jury, and as a witness in a jury trial. Forty-seven years did little to lessen his memory of what happened. His recounting of these events had not changed. Odham interview, February 5, 1994.

13_Ibid._ Odham also maintains that self-defense led him to reveal the briber's name to a trusted and respected House member, a former Speaker who had been among those who left the chamber rather than vote on the anti-bookie bill. Claiming that seventeen other legislators initially indicated to him that they, too, had been offered bribes, Odham
assembly, the fact that several long-standing members accused him of insulting the integrity and dignity of the body, and the desire by some to brush aside the incident as innocent vote trading enabling opponents to defeat a bill.

Naming the Alleged Briber

The rush of events over a six-day period culminated on May 19, 1947 when Brailey Odham named Bernie Papy (Key West/Monroe County), the senior member of the House of Representatives, as the person who offered the bribe. Several minutes later, Representative Clarence Camp (Ocala/Marion County) accused Papy of offering him $100 to vote against the "bookie bill." Papy took the floor maintaining that he had told both his accusers: "I'd heard they are offering $100 for a vote against this bill." Papy also indicated that Odham's brother had recently asked his help in getting a job at one of the Miami racetracks, saying that he believed "a friend could return a favor" and so he had "asked him [Odham] to support my side to kill the bill."

Generational lines were quickly drawn; old-line House members rose on Papy's behalf while younger members, many of them World War II veterans, spoke to the issue of clean government. The assembly voted 50-39 to request a grand jury investigation of the charges, but not before the resolution (H.R. 26) was amended allowing Papy to retain his membership rights to speak and vote. In fact, several of the "old guard" pushed to have the matter dropped entirely on grounds that it was a misunderstanding. The debate reached its nadir when one legislator shouted: "there isn't a man who could sit on any jury and convict the sorriest nigger on this kind of testimony." The capitol press criticized the House for refusing to deal with a controversial internal affair. Several columnists even alluded to the appearance of a "whitewash" after several assembly members professed the view that a subpoena from a local grand jury was not binding on a legislator while the body was in session.

A Leon County (Tallahassee) grand jury was quickly convened and newspapers around the state were quick to call for a forthright investigation of the charges. Editorial writers

was gaining confidence and was angered when he heard this influential member plead the briber's case. First, this individual said that some people do not know any better because they operate by making deals. Secondly, he confessed that he had been approached a couple of times when he was younger and that he knew that it had happened to others as well. Finally, the visitor said that previous incidents had gone away because those involved had refused to pursue the matters. According to Odham, "If I had listened to his advice, he would have sold me down the river for a debt he owed...They want you to compromise yourself so that you dare not disagree...There are a lot of effective ways to silence someone... camaraderie, social clubs."

14 Sanford Herald, 19 May, 1947.
17 Rep. J. E. Stokes (Panama City/Bay County) delivered the racist epitaph remark. Tampa Daily Times, 19 May, 1947. As Robert Sherrill writes, it is a reminder that "those Tallahasseans legislators [were] operating about twenty miles from the Georgia border." Sherrill, Gothic Politics in the Deep South (New York: Grossman Publishers, 1968), 141.
18 Newspapers editorializing about the severity of the charges and the need for a thorough investigation included the Ft. Lauderdale News, Ft. Myers News, Glades County Democrat, Jacksonville American, Jacksonville Journal, Lake
expressed concern, however, that the local state attorney, Orion C. Parker, had neither the experience nor the staff to successfully try such a case if an indictment was handed down. The only precedent in Florida legislative history for the charges leveled by Odham and Camp had occurred during Reconstruction when black senator Charles H. Pierce was expelled from the upper house and convicted of bribery in circuit court. Over time, the state assembly had developed a reputation of indifference to racketeering and legislative observers were not so naive as to presume that an alliance of crime and corruption never influenced the institution's business. Still, after several days of testimony, a grand jury indicted Bernie Papy on three counts of attempted bribery.

Papy had been a leader in the fight against the "bookie bill"; serving his seventh term during the 1947 session, he was a wealthy man and power broker who entertained lavishly in the $500 a month house that he rented during the legislative session. Papy's personal influence and popularity contributed to the House sending the matter to a grand jury rather than carrying out its own ethics investigation. Throughout the affair, he referred to the incident as "horse-trading"; he displayed both confidence and arrogance by appearing in public with a dog track representative as well as with an individual who had been indicted in an election fraud case. Papy actually voted against his own suspension on a motion that restored him to full membership in the assembly. While he eventually resigned from the House, Papy spent most of the day on which he was indicted in the cloakroom outside a door of the House chambers, even appearing before a committee in opposition to a bill.

On the eve of Bernie Papy's indictment on bribery charges, both houses of the Florida legislature unanimously passed a bill (H.B. 1323) extending the state's bribery laws to cover attempts to influence legislative attaches and candidates as well as elected members. Prior to

Wales Daily, Ocala Star-Banner, Pensacola Journal, Sanford Herald, Sarasota Herald Tribune, St. Petersburg Independent, Tampa Morning Tribune.

19 Dayton Beach Examiner, 24 May, 1947. Pearce was an African Methodist Episcopal (AME) preacher who had previously been expelled, along with three other Black delegates, from Florida's post-Civil War 1868 constitutional convention on grounds that he was not a citizen of Florida; legend has it that he was Canadian. The Florida Supreme Court upheld Pearce's conviction but he was granted a gubernatorial pardon and actually returned to the legislature for a time. William Watson Davis, The Civil War & Reconstruction in Florida (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1964).

20 Odham and Camp were among a group of House members who testified before the grand jury. Others included: James McClure (St. Petersburg/Pinellas County), Charles Usina (St. Augustine/St. Johns County), Richard Simpson (Monticello/Jefferson County), Bourke Floyd (Apalachicola/Franklin County), Russell Morrow (Lake Worth/Palm Beach County), Jerry Collins (Sarasota/Sarasota County), and Farris Bryant (Ocala/ Marion County). Sarasota Herald Tribune, 23 May, 1947.

21 Miami Herald, 25 May, 1947. Papy, who boasted of having "made a success and retired at a very young age," owned an oil distributorship, a hotel, an apartment complex, a service station, and an insurance company in Key West. Jacksonville Journal, 24 July, 1947. Mid-twentieth century Florida legislators were paid six dollar per day, or $360 per session, and they received a $10 per diem for expenses.


23 Ibid.

24 St. Petersburg Times, 3 June, 1947.

25 Future Florida governor Farris Bryant (Ocala/Marion County), Jerry Collins (Sarasota/Sarasota County), Russell Morrow (Lake Worth/Palm Beach) R. B. Gautier (Miami/Dade County), Bill Lantaff (Miami/Dade County), and
the vote on that measure, House Speaker Thomas Beasley disclosed that he had been offered $5000 to appoint Papy to chair the Committee on Public Amusements which customarily considered bills on racing and gambling. Legislators also learned from House Clerk Dewey Hooten that Papy had offered him $100 to help defeat a bill.26 Neither instance violated then-existing state law; Hooten was a staff member while Beasley was technically a candidate because the alleged incident occurred after he was named Speaker-elect at the close of the 1945 session, but before he was re-elected to his House seat.

The Bribery Trial

Bernie Papy pleaded innocent to the charges that he offered cash bribes to Odham and Camp. His attorneys proceeded to file a series of legal motions, including requesting that the presiding judge, W. May Walker, dismiss the charges made by Odham on grounds that Papy attempted to influence him not to vote rather than to vote a certain way (omission rather than commission). Failing in that maneuver, they asked that Walker require the state to specify exact times and actual conversations in the indictment papers and that he exclude all testimony regarding conversations that occurred in or near House chambers on the basis that such items were privileged and inadmissible as court evidence.27 The judge eventually ruled against all defense motions, but Odham recollects that the prosecution could not effectively do its job because it lacked the proper resources. [Governor] Caldwell had appointed a special prosecutor in the case, but he had me up half the night reading law books in order to be able to respond to defense points.28

The legislators who earlier told Odham that they, too, had been offered money (in his words) "disappeared or developed amnesia" and the case, as many had expected it would, boiled down to one person's word against another's.

The trial lasted for five days during which Brailey Odham stuck doggedly to the account that he had told to both reporter Allen Morris and to the state assembly members. The defense paid less attention to Rep. Camp's charges, its strategy being to plant seeds of doubt in the prosecution's case by continually challenging Odham to respond to questions about the words "give" and "get" as they related to the alleged bribe attempt. While the defense was unable to shake Odham from his story, the jury may well have been affected by its attempt to create confusion over language. In a vigorous cross-examination, Papy attorney Pat Whitaker presented as evidence the House journal of May 19 that showed "no dollar marks" in relation to Odham's


26 Palm Beach Times, 2 June, 1947. Both Speaker Beasley and Clerk Hooten had testified before the grand jury that indicted Bernie Papy.

27 Miami Daily News, 8 and 14 June, 1947; Pensacola News, 22 July, 1947. With respect to the issue of omission versus commission, special prosecutor O'Connell successfully argued that not voting has the effect of voting against a bill that requires a majority to pass. As to the matter of excluding testimony, Judge Walker ruled against the defense after sending the jury from the courtroom and listening to Odham testify for an hour under cross examination.

statement purporting an offer of money. Whitaker attempted, also, to attach a political motive to the charges by asking Odham if he had been interested in the 1949 Speaker of the House position. Rep. Camp, who had been less vocal and less visible than Odham from the beginning, testified that when he told Papy that he supported passage of the "bookee bill" even as he was voting to refer the legislation to a hostile committee, the latter indicated that "if you'll just vote that way, it will mean $100 to you."  

Meanwhile, Bernie Papy testified in his own behalf as the only defense witness called to the stand. He stated that he opposed the anti-bookee legislation because it would mean a loss of tax revenue for the small counties and would provide news services with a monopoly on race result information. Papy acknowledged a first conversation with Brailey Odham and admitted to saying that he had heard "they were paying $100 to vote." He denied, however, having a second discussion with Odham, the instance when the offer of "$500 and a case of Scotch" was supposedly made. In his only reference to Camp, who had been called a "millionaire legislator" by defense attorney Weldon Starry, Papy stated that offering $100 to a member of one of Central Florida's wealthiest families would have been an insult.

In closing arguments, defense lawyers both narrowed and broadened the scope of the allegations while continuing to focus on the Odham charges. Starry began by calling him a "baby legislator" and a "self-styled dreamer." The attorney then suggested that Odham had a "Messiah" complex. In his remarks to the jury, Starry noted that Papy's conviction would mean financial and social ruin for him and his family while bringing his political career to an "inglorious end." Attorney Pat Whitaker then asserted that the state's largest newspapers had sponsored the "bookee bill" and that the bribery charges were the result of a conspiracy controlled by those same interests. He spoke repeatedly of a chronology of events in which Odham made his accusation and spoke to the press before naming the alleged culprit. Whitaker told the jury that after Odham saw his efforts to pass the [bookee] bill fail, he got his friends on the Miami newspapers to write up his charges in order to keep them under his pillow to avoid forgetting them...The newspapers knew they had him. They took charge of him. They helped him write his statement and they picked the name Bernie Papy.  

For its part, the prosecution hailed both of Papy's accusers as "men of moral courage" and asked the jury to display "guts and fortitude" by returning a guilty verdict. Special prosecutor Phil O'Connell from Palm Beach, challenging the defense's claim that newspaper interests were behind the anti-bookee bill, asked if the press would come under a provision prohibiting private wires used or intended for gambling purposes. O'Connell, responding to Papy's claim that he had said nothing to Odham and Camp other than the comment about $100 being offered to vote no

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on the legislation, asserted "all bribery starts that way." But, neither legislator who said they were solicited had been able to produce a third party who was present when the bribes were allegedly made. Therefore, the prosecution had tried a case in which "reasonable doubt" hung like a cloud over the proceedings.

Conclusion

Concerns about organized crime's impact on politics in Florida emerged during the "roaring" years of the 1920s as the growth of tourism, particularly in the southern portion of the state, encouraged the spread of gambling, both legal and illegal. Miami's Great Depression-era economy of the 1930s essentially sustained itself on gambling—horse racing, lotteries, slot machines, illegal hotel casinos. Al Capone was instrumental in transforming the latter; previously, local people had run such operations, however, he and his "out of town" colleagues took over because of the financial capacity they had to control both local law enforcement and elected officials in Dade County. Just north in Broward County (Ft. Lauderdale), Sheriff Walter Clark's two-decade reign of illegal gambling, dirty money, and politics reached the state capital in Tallahassee. Clark's relationship with many state legislators led to a Florida Senate reinstatement following Governor Spessard Holland's 1942 suspension of him for failure to enforce gambling laws. By this time in the 1940s, illegal gambling had become an "open secret" in South Florida. Following World War II, then-Atlantic Herald publisher John Knight (a man who liked to lay down a bet and someone who had frequented many a gambling establishment) decided to use his newspaper to crusade against gambling operators. According to former Herald reporter Nixon Smiley, Knight had come to believe that bookmaking corrupted law officers and political leaders, resulting in the debasement of the public's business.

The 1947 Florida legislative bribery scandal brought to public attention unseemly methods sometimes employed to influence legislative activities. One can only speculate as to how much—if at all—the case contributed to reducing the scope of such activities; after all, the extent to which corrosive legislative and lobbying techniques were common is not known. Two years later, Senator C. L. Alford (Grand Ridge/Jackson County) charged that John Scruggs, former Leon County legislator and a member of the Florida Democratic Executive Committee, had offered him $2000 to vote against a particular measure. Alford accepted the money and turned it over to police officers present at a pre-arranged meeting with Scruggs. Thereafter, a 1950 federal investigation into racketeering created another furor over political corruption in the state; a special US Senate committee on crime chaired by Estes Kefauver (D-TN) found repeated evidence of official wrongdoing. Among other things, the investigation revealed that three men contributed over $400,000 to Fuller Warren's successful 1948 gubernatorial campaign, among

33 Even Odham has acknowledged that the case boiled down to "my word against his. I guess when it can't be more substantiated than that, you should not convict." Odham interview, 26 March, 1994.
37 Sanford Herald, 29 April, 1949.
them a racetrack owner with previous connections to Al Capone. Still, several years hence, the "going price" to vote against a racetrack bill was said to be $3000. A 1953 legislator is said to have taken that amount, told the briber that he could secure another member's vote as well, and doubled his money. Many Florida legislators tended to believe bribery allegations when made because they knew of actual or supposed instances of vote buying. Unethical, but (at the time) not illegal, influence peddling included paying legislators' expenses while they attended sessions in Tallahassee and underwriting the cost of election campaigns. Another common practice was for lobby groups to maintain business relations with legislators via payment of legal retainers, insurance fees, and other monies for services rendered. Only the most naïve would not recognize the implication of such activities.

In any event, neither historians nor political scientists have paid attention to the 1947 scandal in their accounting of Florida political history. The obvious explanation rests with the fact that Bernie Papy was not convicted of the bribery charges. Rather, he was acquitted on all three counts after a thirty-five minute jury deliberation. Papy would be re-elected to the House of Representatives in 1948 and serve for another fifteen years. His fourteen terms (1935-1963) as a state legislator ranks as one of the longest tenures in Florida history. Long recognized as a champion of the small counties, he worked to see that racetrack pari-mutuel tax receipts remained divided evenly among the state's 67 counties rather than on a per-capita basis. His influence enabled him to have a part of the Big Cypress area south of the Tamiami Trail as well as several higher, more inhabitable, and heavily forested Florida Keys excluded from the 1947 Everglades land purchase. A monument to his "pork chop" politics is a bridge in Monroe County that runs between Big Pine Key and a small, uninhabited place called "No Name Key."

As for Brailey Odham, perhaps Florida's most colorful mid-twentieth century politician, his identification with fighting corruption left an indelible mark on the public consciousness. Eminently quotable because of his candor, he was a press favorite; columnists and pundits routinely mentioned his name as a gubernatorial or congressional candidate until the mid-1960s. Odham served a second term in the Florida House in 1949 but declined to seek a third, he says, when

42 Ibid., 43.
43 Odham's name was linked to the issue of graft throughout his political career. Never one to shy away from raising the specter of government corruption, the accolades that he received were always tempered by claims that he was reckless. An anathema for many of Florida's entrenched powerful interests, even admirers raised questions about his propensity to "call out" individuals, allude to "backroom deals" and "under the table" activities, and refer to the proverbial "they" who were ostensibly responsible for tainting the public realm.
a member who told me in '47 that he had been offered a bribe and then lost his memory was chosen Speaker-elect for the 1951 session. I could never have worked in an environment where he had a leadership role.44

Relying upon radio "talkathons" in a 1952 campaign for governor, he lost a 1952 run-off election.45 After finishing out of the running in the 1954 race for the state's highest office, his endorsement of Leroy Collins was credited with helping Collins in his run-off victory. Odham returned to the spotlight in the late 1950s as a publicly popular and combative chair of the commission responsible for regulating Florida's dairy industry and he made headlines when, as a delegate to the 1960 Democratic convention, he backed John Kennedy instead of "favorite son" U.S. Senator George Smathers. Odham's statewide political career closed with an ill-fated 1964 bid for the U.S. Senate campaigning as a "Kennedy-Johnson" Democrat in favor of civil rights, Medicare, and the minimum wage.

44 Odham interview, 26 March, 1994. Odham defeated a Democratic Party primary opponent by a 2-1 margin in his 1949 re-election. He faced no Republican opponent in the general election.

Labor Insurgence in the Deep South:
The 1912 Railway Strike in Jacksonville, Florida

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On October 28, 1912, most of the 226 streetcar operators employed by the Jacksonville Traction Company did not show up for work. Their decision to remain idle plunged the city into chaos. Out of the regular 52 cars that operated daily, only five made their scheduled runs. That afternoon Mayor William S. Jordan, Chief of Police W.D. Vinzant, Chairman W.M. Bostwick of the Board of Bond Trustees, and other Jacksonville officials met at Bostwick's downtown office to discuss the crisis. The city leaders confidently predicted a peaceful and rapid resolution to the strike.¹

By the next day, the city officials' early optimism had faded. That morning over 200 strikebreakers arrived in Jacksonville from New York City on the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad. Hired by the Traction Company, the imported workers' "services will be immediately called into play" reported the Jacksonville Florida Times-Union. Mayor Jordan, alarmed by the sudden turn of events, warned the strikers that the city would protect the company's right to operate the cars and that no violence would be tolerated. "The Jacksonville Traction Company," announced Jordan, "had a large investment in this city and ... was entitled to full and complete protection."²

W.E. Terry, an organizer for the Amalgamated Association of Street and Electric Railway Employees of America, affiliated with the American Federation of Labor (AFL), instigated the walkout. Sent to Jacksonville by the national union in Detroit, Michigan, in September, he rapidly built a local organization for the trainmen. Local drivers T.W. Kirby served as President and G.I. Ellis was elected Secretary of the Jacksonville Local 608. "With [Terry's] assistance," reported the union's national publication The Motorman and Conductor, "the local prepared and submitted a proposition for an increase in wages."³ When the strike began, Terry conferred with city officials and pledged to help preserve order. Nevertheless, with passions inflamed, peace proved difficult to

² Jacksonville, Florida Times-Union, 30 October, 1912.
maintain. When the strike ended 22 days later, almost all of Florida's militia units had been ordered to Jacksonville, and one soldier lay dead. By November 19, the streetcar workers' fledgling union was shattered.3

Prior to 1912, Jacksonville had remained largely unscathed by labor problems. The political leaders promoted business investment and development and continually proclaimed Jacksonville a growing commercial center of the New South. The city's population increased by over 60,000 persons in the first two decades of the new century, and suburbs sprang up around the downtown area. Residential communities such as Murray Hill, Riverside, Springfield, and South Jacksonville were connected by an expanding web of railway lines. The trains allowed many people to commute to the central city during the work day, but escape from the urban sector at night and on weekends. Therefore, the city's streetcars formed the lifeline of Jacksonville's commercial expansion.4

Jacksonville's railway network, like many of the city's other businesses, was owned by a northern corporation. The Stone & Webster Company based in Boston, Massachusetts, owned the Jacksonville Traction Company, a circumstance that put the city's politicians and businessmen in a precarious position. If they supported the demands of the strikers (who were paid $1.70 a day) for higher pay and shorter hours, they could jeopardize future northern capital investments. Yet, if they backed the company, they might alienate Jacksonville's large working class. In 1912, there were approximately 22 white unions in Jacksonville represented by the Central Trade and Labor Council.5

To further complicate matters, the strikers demanded that the company acknowledge their union as their sole representative. As W.E. Terry flatly stated, "our local union has resolved to conduct an open fight for recognition."6 Such rhetoric intensified the dilemma facing Jacksonville's businessmen, and the situation was similar to other labor problems that had confronted New South

5 Jacksonville, Florida Times-Union, 1 November, 1912. There are references to specific unions in Jacksonville scattered throughout the Florida Times-Union during the early twentieth century.
6 Ibid., 29 October, 1912. See also The Motorman and Conductor 20 (November, 1912), 13.
promoters and politicians. Desperately seeking a compromise, Jacksonville officials faced a predicament in which the two antagonists refused to compromise. 7

The transportation crisis had been developing for about two weeks before the strike began. According to the local newspaper, in October "numerous meetings held by the leaders and members of the local union" indicated that a strike or lockout was imminent. On October 28, in the early morning hours, a large group of men gathered at the intersection of Riverside Avenue and Stonewall Street and "accosted trainmen who were on their way to work." Threatened with violence, most of the workers joined the instigators. About 100 men claimed loyalty to the company and sought refuge at the company's car barn. But they refused to work because they feared physical harm. Local newspaper coverage of the walkout reflected the befuddlement of municipal officials. "Just why the men have been threatened with injury, if such is the case," proclaimed the Jacksonville Florida Times-Union, "and why they have been urged not to resume their daily runs, appears to be somewhat of a mystery." 8

Why the journalist thought the strike puzzling was the real enigma. Both sides had stated their positions clearly. The company's manager, Hardy Croom, declared that the "entire situation [was] ... the result of pressure brought to bear by men not employed by the company." Not surprisingly, the workers told a different story. "The officials of the company, in their opposition to the movement," claimed a union circular, "have discharged several of the oldest men in their employment without any reason other than their activity in aiding in the organization." The union leaders hoped that the "differences [could] be settled by arbitration to the benefit of all concerned." 9

Evidently, the company had fired 19 men in the days before the strike and planned to dismiss 37 more employees on October 29. The strikers argued that the men had been fired because of their union activities and that lockout conditions existed. "Men struck," announced a union flyer, "because [the] company discharged nineteen men for 'organizing a union.'" 10 Hardy Croom countered the workers' claim by stating that the men were dismissed "for good and sufficient reasons." 11 At any rate, a majority of the streetcar workers perceived their livelihood as


8 Jacksonville, Florida Times-Union, 29 October, 1912.

9 Ibid. See also The Motorman and Conductor 20 (November, 1912), 13.

10 Union circular, n.d., Albert W. Gilchrist Papers, Gubernatorial Folder, Strozier Library, Florida State University, Tallahassee.
subject to the arbitrary actions of the Traction Company and began acting collectively to assure job
security.

The arrival of 200 Yankee strikebreakers or "scabs" the next day indicated the Traction Company's unwillingness to negotiate. Company managers realized that public opinion would soon favor an end to the strike because: 1) thousands of distressed commuters would lose their patience, 2) citizens no less than government officials knew that violent disorder would damage the city's reputation. By importing strikebreakers, the company forced the issue. On Wednesday, October 30, the strikebreakers began running the cars with a full service schedule. During the early morning hours crowds gathered on the streets and hurled a "few harmless missiles" at the drivers. The situation remained peaceful until 11:00 a.m. when an automobile owned by Allen Drawdy was demolished by a streetcar on Main Street. The police arrested the conductor and charged him with careless driving, but the anger of the crowd was not appeased. Soon there was a "seething mass [of] men, women, and children cheering, hooting, and raising a general disturbance." The crowd fanned out into the downtown area and began "pulling the strikebreakers from the cars and beating them severely." One conductor, Thomas Nugen, was attacked by a group of knife wielding assailants who "badly cut [him]" before he could be rescued by the police.12

W.E. Terry wasted no time in distancing his union from the melee. "We were in no way responsible for the disorder that took place on the streets of Jacksonville yesterday morning," announced the union leader. "My instructions to the boys," he said, "was to keep off the streets and by no means to do or to say anything that might cause disorder." According to The Motorman and Conductor, based on Terry's reports, "The management of the company was evidently not slow in provoking a condition that would provide an excuse for calling in the militia, and Jacksonville is practically under martial rule." If the union's former accusation was difficult to prove, its latter observation was correct.13

Confronted with a city on the verge of anarchy, Mayor Jordan sent a telegram to Governor Albert W. Gilchrist requesting help from the state militia:

Jacksonville now in hands of mob. Serious acts of violence occurring wherever street cars are attempting to run. City authorities cannot control situation. Have asked sheriff to take charge. Sheriff needs aid of militia. We ask that you place the militia of the city subject to his order immediately. Also send all available militia from other cities to reach here tonight and tomorrow. Situation very serious and needs immediate action.14

The president of the Traction Company, George J. Baldwin, echoed the city officials' sentiments in a similar telegram to Gilchrist: "Howling mobs of violent persons attacked [the company's] cars and employees and committed all kinds of violence."15 Baldwin implored the governor to send the troops.

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11 Jacksonville, Florida Times-Union, 29 October, 1912.
12 Ibid., 31 October, 1912.
15 Jacksonville, Florida Times-Union, 1 November, 1912.
Gilchrist quickly responded to both pleas. By November 2, "twenty-one companies constituting two regiments of infantry and one company of coast guard" were in Jacksonville.16 Virtually the entire state's military forces converged on the city. Gilchrist appointed General J.C.R. Foster as his personal representative and advised him to "confer with [the] Traction Company and labor people and endeavor to reconcile their differences." Foster sent letters to W.E. Terry, Hardy Croom, and George J. Baldwin inviting them to a mediation conference.17

That same day Stone & Webster vice-presidents H.H. Hunt of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and F.J. Hovey of Boston arrived in Jacksonville. They were "lending their efforts," announced the Jacksonville Florida Times-Union, "toward improving the situation." The company managers soon got their chance. George L. Drew, president of the city's Board of Trade, sent them a letter asking them to meet with the workers and negotiate a settlement. Drew was responding to requests made by local unionists to pressure the Traction Company into meeting with the striking employees. The company refused. Our company "will not depart from its rule of individual employment and surrender the conduct of its operation to any organization," responded Baldwin, "or make membership in same a condition of employment."18 The Traction Company had unceremoniously rejected recognition of the union and demanded a return to the status quo.

Local businessmen, panicked by the violent confrontations, met at the Prince Theater to discuss methods of preserving order and ending the strike. Chaired by local politician and journalist Claude L'Engle, the meeting was dominated by W.E. Terry's summation of the situation. According to Terry, the strikers wanted a raise in their hourly wage from 17 cents to 22 cents for a 10-hour day with 27 cents for overtime. The businessmen in attendance agreed that the demands were reasonable and voted "unanimously in favor of arbitration." Concerned about preserving the city's law and order image, the businessmen wanted the state troops withdrawn, "there not being sufficient reason for their presence." The men created a Citizen's Committee consisting of prominent residents—United States Senators Duncan U. Fletcher and Nathan P. Bryan, Claude L'Engle, John N.C. Stockton, W.H. Dowling, E.C. Broward, John W. Rust, J.T. Prichard, and Frank Brown. The Committee hoped to bring an end to the conflict because it was "somewhat of a detriment to their ordinary daily business."19

Committee member John N.C. Stockton took the lead in pressing Gilchrist to remove the troops. He fired off an indignant letter criticizing the governor's action. "There is nothing in the situation," wrote Stockton, "to demand the presence of soldiers." Stockton had challenged Gilchrist for the Democratic gubernatorial nomination in 1908, and his opposition to the governor's decision was probably politically motivated. Gilchrist had responded to "partisan county and city officials," argued Stockton, who wanted to "humiliate our people by sending troops here." These (unidentified) partisan officials intended to "coerce our young men in becoming slaves to corporation greed." As the violence failed to abate, Stockton's position became increasingly out of

16 Ibid., 2 November, 1912.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid., 1 November, 1912.
19 Ibid.
harmony with the sentiments of the larger community. His rhetoric was greeted with little public approval.\(^{20}\)

GILCHRIST responded to Stockton's criticism by noting that he was simply following established law. Because Mayor Jordan and Sheriff R.E. Bowden asked for assistance, he was legally bound to provide it. His actions were the "plain mandatory duty imposed on [him] by law." Stockton remained unconvinced. "You are absolutely wrong," he wrote. Only when the civil authorities were completely unable to suppress disorder, argued the disgruntled Stockton, could the governor call out the troops. Faced with a crisis situation, most city and state officials ignored Stockton's inflammatory remarks. The main concern for city businessmen and politicians was to reestablish order and enable the city to maintain its commercial appeal to outside investors. As Mayor Jordan put it in his letter to Gilchrist, "our merchants and other citizens have made investments upon the faith and promise of [the autumn] trade and the accompanying prosperity must be realized upon during the remaining months of the year or a great loss will certainly ensue."\(^{21}\) For the mayor and many other Jacksonville citizens, petty political squabbling was counterproductive to resolving the strike.

While Jacksonville officials and businessmen debated the merits of bringing in troops and desperately sought a solution, the strikers tried to capitalize on the general unpopularity of the Traction Company's importation of strikebreakers. The company's insistence on running the cars with imported drivers, argued the strikers, had caused the militia to be activated. Angry but confident, the union printed a circular:

During last five years National Guard has been called out twice. Both times called out because Rockefeller, Morgan et al, largest combination of capital on earth, [had] brought thugs and bums into the state and caused trouble, in attempts to break up the organization of white natives. WHO OWNS THE STATE?\(^{22}\)

Aware of the pro-business sentiment among many prominent citizens, the strikers attempted to appeal to local pride. In effect, the workers tried to demonstrate to local government officials and businessmen that outside investment had costs as well as benefits. While a northern-owned railway company bolstered development of the city, the company exploited the local labor supply by paying such low wages. Commercial expansion in Florida's New South metropolis did not necessarily trickle down to its large working class.\(^{23}\)

\(^{20}\) *Ibid.* Stockton had long been associated with the "straightout" faction of Florida's Democratic Party. Consisting of politicians from Jacksonville, the "straightouts" trumpeted the rhetoric of the long defunct Populist Party. They condemned "corporate domination" and excessive northern investment in Florida railroads and industry. Best represented by the late reform Governor Napoleon B. Broward (1905-1909), the "straightouts" attacked mainstream Florida Democrats largely for political advantage. See Flynn, *Duncan Upshaw Fletcher*, 23-25.

\(^{21}\) Jacksonville, *Florida Times-Union*, 1 November, 1912.

\(^{22}\) Union circular, n.d., Gilchrist Papers, Gubernatorial Folder.

\(^{23}\) For the national union's analysis of this issue see *The Motorman and Conductor* 21 (December, 1912), 11. See also: Wright, *Old South, New South*, 203-204; Woodward, *Origins of the New South*, 291-320; Wayne Flynn,
Concerned with the explosive situation in Jacksonville, Governor Gilchrist decided to visit and help resolve the crisis. He arrived on November 1, and took up residence at the Aragon Hotel. The next day Gilchrist participated in a Joint Committee conference with members of the local Board of Trade, municipal officials, and Traction Company managers. Evidently, company leaders had reconsidered their previous hostility to Drew's offer to participate in a mediation conference. The company representatives ignored the advice of the Citizen's Committee and claimed that they would "confer with [the official Joint Committee] solely upon the situation." Although the company agreed to negotiate, it refused to concede anything. The Traction Company negotiators declared their business an open shop, and refused to rehire fired men. The company declared it would carry out a previous plan: install a higher wage scale on January 1, 1913. Gilchrist and city representatives relayed the proposal to W.E. Terry who asked for 24 hours to consider it.24

Terry submitted a counter proposal the next day. The workers, claimed Terry, demanded that the new wage scale be implemented immediately and that employees dismissed for participating in union activities be reinstated. "After consideration of the points involved," noted the local newspaper, "the company agreed to both propositions. But the company refused to accept the third and most important demand—union recognition. As a result, the strike continued and the Joint Committee resumed its deliberations."25

Meanwhile, angry mobs were wreaking havoc throughout the city. On Saturday, November 2, "some of the cars were stoned," reported the Jacksonville Florida Times-Union, "and the motormen and conductors attacked." Across the city, men used automobiles to chase after the trolley cars and assault the drivers. As the police and militia continued to make arrests, the newspaper ran daily accounts of "The Day's Assaults."26

Even so, for Jacksonville citizens, the aberrant event failed to fade away. On November 3, Gilchrist invited members of the City Council, Board of Bond Trustees, the mayor, and various other municipal officials to the Aragon Hotel to discuss methods of suppressing the violence. The governor's solution centered around a continued augmenting of the city's police force with state soldiers, but he notified his guests that the militia could not remain indefinitely. While Gilchrist and city leaders were meeting at the Aragon, the Joint Committee continued its negotiations with the union representatives and the Traction Company managers. Unwilling to concede recognition of the union, the company negotiators assured continuation of the strike.27

The violence increased as the strike wore on. On November 5, roving bands of labor sympathizers attacked cars throughout the city. They demolished windows and assaulted drivers. After one week "about fifteen strikebreakers," reported the Florida Times-Union, were "incapacitated ... as a result of wounds they [had] received." In addition, shooting into trains became almost daily occurrences.28

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24 Jacksonville, Florida Times-Union, 2 November, 1912.
25 Ibid., 3 November, 1912.
26 Ibid.
27 Jacksonville, Florida Times-Union, 4 November, 1912.
28 Ibid., 5 November, 1912; 7 November, 1912.
Unable to shake the intransigence of the Traction Company arbitrators, the Joint Committee halted its meetings on November 5. Gilchrist had already returned to Tallahassee, and the Citizen's Committee remained ineffective. The strike turned into an endurance contest. Because so many Jacksonville residents depended on the streetcars for transportation, the strikers began to lose public support. Pro-union "sentiment," General J.C.R. Foster informed the local police, "is apparently changing very rapidly."29

Four days later local journalists reported that the "backbone of the strike is broken and that conditions will shortly become normal again." In reaction to the rampant violence, the statement reflected the wishful thinking of Jacksonville's professional elite. Weary of the seemingly unending chaos, local officials and opinion shapers underwent a subtle transformation in their perceptions of whom to blame. Because the company agreed to increase the workers' wages and institute overtime pay, reporters began to suggest that the union was delaying a resolution of the strike. They failed to acknowledge that by refusing to employ workers associated with the union, the Traction Company was in effect negating the purpose of the walkout. Yet, for anxious citizens, a consensus emerged that the strike "hinged on union."30

On November 10, the strike registered its only fatality. Alva M. Roberts and Thomas Sebastian, both members of Company F, First Infantry, National Guard of Florida (widely known as the Jacksonville Rifles) "were talking in a jocular manner" and pointing their guns at one another when the latter's weapon discharged.31 The bullet severed Roberts's aorta, killing him instantly. Investigations conducted by Sheriff Bowden and the Florida National Guard cleared Sebastian of any intentional wrongdoing. In the company's muster report, Captain G.J. Garcia noted that "the men were best of friends and the shooting was purely accidental."32 Although unintentional, Roberts's death exemplified for many people the anarchic conditions produced by the strike.

To counter the shift in public opinion away from support of the strikers, Jacksonville's Central Trades and Labor Council representing 22 white unions met at its labor hall on the night of Roberts's death and voted in favor of a sympathy strike to support the railway workers. Representatives of Jacksonville's black unions also attended the meeting and supported the action. The Council declared that if "nothing [was] done within the next five days then we recommend that every union man and every other workingman quit his work until such time as the street car men are granted their just demands."33

The Council did not get the chance to act on its pronouncement. Over the next several days, Jacksonville's streets grew calmer and troops from out of town returned home. On November 17, the Traction Company rehired 50 of the economically strapped workers. "The men reinstated could rest assured," said Hardy Croom, "that their participation in the strike would not weigh against them." In response to a request made by the strikers, the Council abandoned its sympathetic strike on November 15. The striking union asked the Council to provide financial support rather than join

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29 Ibid., 6 November, 1912.
30 Ibid., 9 November, 1912; 10 November, 1912.
31 Ibid., 11 November, 1912.
32 Muster Rolls and Supporting Documents, 1826-1918, Series 1146E, Box 9, Folder 10, Department of Military Affairs, Florida State Archives, R.A. Gray Building, Tallahassee, Florida.
33 Jacksonville, Florida Times-Union, 12 November, 1912.
the walkout. The strikers' plea reflected their desperate financial status. Pleased with the situation, the Jacksonville Florida Times-Union reported that the "city may perhaps breathe easier."34

Following the Council's decision, the strike rapidly fell apart. Virtually all of the trains were making their ordinary scheduled runs. By November 18, the Traction Company had reinstated many of the strikers. With the cause obviously lost, the remaining union members decided to dissolve their organization the next day. "By a vote of 58 to 26," noted a local reporter, the men "renounced the union and agreed to apply for their old jobs back again." Demoralized and embittered, the trainmen issued a statement explaining and defending their struggle of nearly three weeks. Their demands were "right and just," they claimed, and may have succeeded if the Traction Company had not instigated the disorder by importing strikebreakers. The company's actions created an unnecessary expense on the city and state," argued the defeated unionists, "to protect the Rockefeller and Morgan millions against our little band of 226 Florida Crackers.35

Over the next several days the Traction Company rehired virtually all of the strikers. They were reinstated at their previous wages. The company agreed to install a pay hike conforming to the union demand on January 1, 1913. This was "met in an excellent spirit by the trainmen," reported the local newspaper. Even so, the workers' goal of creating a viable and recognized independent trade union was crushed. The strikebreakers quickly left town, and conditions throughout the city returned to normal.

If the Traction Company emerged victorious from the battle, the city's politicians and businessmen also benefited. The short-lived strike did not mar Jacksonville's reputation as a stable and prosperous New South City. A cheap and docile labor force served as prime motivation for northern investment in southern cities, and public opinion in Jacksonville assured potential investors that their capital was safe. As the Florida Times-Union made clear, "Jacksonville's prosperity will gain new momentum, [now] that the strike is off."37

Although the strikers (and to an extent the Citizen's Committee) tried to appeal to residents' local pride, they could not convince their neighbors that the Stone & Webster Company exploited its employees. Many citizens depended on the trains for transportation, and were indifferent to the union's pleas. In addition, local elites, as reflected in newspaper accounts, failed to press the Traction Company to formally recognize the union. According to W.E. Terry, the strike "exposed the political methods of the company and brought to light the corporate servitude of many an officeholder who, when called upon to do so, cheerfully served his master." Nevertheless, faced with an unreliable transportation network, violence in the streets, and damage to the city's reputation, many Jacksonville residents welcomed the end of the strike.38

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34 Ibid., 16 November, 1912.
35 Ibid., 20 November, 1912.
36 Ibid., 21 November, 1912.
37 Ibid., 15 November, 1912.
38 The Motorman and Conductor 21 (December, 1912), 18.
Obvious exceptions were the strikers who failed to get union recognition. Nevertheless, the national union tried to make the best of the failure. "Strikes such as that which the Association has just passed through in Jacksonville, Fla.," explained a writer for *The Motorman and Conductor*, "even in the face of temporary defeat, are a healthy experience." Only after "a community can be impressed that men who are rendering service as motormen and conductors are of a skill that makes them indispensable, makes them especially desirous to the community," noted the union's advocate, "there will be no end to the hope for better wages and better working conditions." Even so, all of this was small consolation for the men who had hoped to create a permanent union.39

Hitler’s Ideological Foot-Soldiers: 
German Students in the Incorporated Territories of Poland during the Second 
World War

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Between October, 1939 and January, 1945, the Nazi government attempted to drastically alter the ethnic and racial composition of Poland through the forced migration of hundreds of thousands of Polish citizens, and ethnic Germans from across Europe. Although this attempt ultimately failed, it was not due to a lack of effort on the part of a substantial portion of the German population. One especially enterprising segment arose from among Germany’s college students. These students played a crucial role in the ‘Nazification’ of the incorporated territories of Poland, as well as in the indoctrination of immigrating ethnic Germans. German college students, many of them women, participated due to a variety of reasons: to further their educations, to pursue the career opportunities offered in the east, for economic opportunism, or because of a desire to avoid less ‘pleasant’ duties. Perhaps most important was the desire to promote National Socialist ideological goals in the incorporated territories.269

In early October, 1939, following the collapse of Polish resistance, German Führer Adolf Hitler ordered the annexation of large tracts of western Poland into the Reich, including those territories lost to the Poles after World War One. The population of the incorporated territories was overwhelmingly Polish. For example, of the 4.2 million inhabitants of the largest of these four territories, known as the Reichsgau Wartheland,270 eighty-five percent, or approximately

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269 Relatively little has been written specifically relating to German student activities in the incorporated territories. Gerhard Remmel’s Hitler’s Children: The Hitler Youth and the SS (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989) devotes a chapter to student colonial activities in the east, but the work’s primary focus is on pre-college-aged students. Elizabeth Harvey’s Women and the Nazi East: Agents and Witnesses of Germanization. (Yale: Yale University Press, 2003) is a recently-published, and distressingly good, study focusing on German women’s activities in the east during the early twentieth century, including their roles in the Nazification of the incorporated territories in the early 1940s. One source that I have relied upon heavily is Melitta Maschmann’s Account Rendered: A Dossier on my Former Self, Geoffrey Strachan, trans. (New York: Abelard-Schuman, 1964). Maschmann’s autobiographic work is the best published account that I am aware of by a German student directly involved in the ethnic resettlement process on the Eastern Front.

270 This westernmost region of 1939 Poland, which contained the administrative center of Lodz, was alternately known as the Warthegau.
3.96 million inhabitants, were Polish, with a German minority of seven percent, consisting of a mere 327,000 persons.\footnote{Martin Broszat, Nationalsozialistische Polenpolitik, 1939-1945 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1961), 35.} The task of ‘germanizing’ the incorporated territories was assumed by Reichsführer SS Heinrich Himmler, who promptly styled himself the head of the Reich Commission for the Strengthening of German Folkdom (Reichskommissariate für die Festigung deutschen Volksstums - RKFDV).\footnote{For the ‘standard’ work on the RKFDV by which all subsequent works are judged, see: Robert Koehl, RKFDV: German Resettlement and Population Policy, 1939-1945 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957).}

Himmler viewed the roughly 10 million ethnic Germans, or Volksdeutsche, living in Europe, but outside of Germany’s borders, as cultural fertilizer useful primarily for the expanding Nazi state. These persons were to be brought “home into the Reich” (“Heim ins Reich”) and used to repopulate the incorporated territories with German blood. Jews, and those Poles who were without ‘Germanic’ characteristics, or who were not needed for slave labor, were to be driven out. This process began on 15 October, 1939, with the conclusion of a resettlement treaty with Estonia, followed by similar treaties with Latvia and the Soviet Union on 30 October and 3 November respectively. By the end of January, 1940, almost 190,000 Volksdeutsche had answered the Führer’s call, with even more on the way.\footnote{Valdis Lumans, Himmler’s Auxiliaries: The Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle and the German National Minorities of Europe, 1933-1945. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993), 161-165.}

The center of this Nazi resettlement scheme was the city of Lodz (renamed Litzmannstadt by the Nazis in Spring, 1940), which was located in the Reichsgau Wartheland. The majority of the new ‘German’ settlers were processed in one of three massive transit camps located in and around the city, which were run by the Ethnic German Liaison Office (Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle – VoMi). By mid-1941, nearly 500,000 Volksdeutsche had entered the expanded Reich, 300,000 of which were allocated to the Warthebau. Regardless of the partial resettlement, less than 1/10 of these immigrants were immediately settled, and roughly 9/10 remained in the internment camps. Thousands of settlers sat in these camps for a year or more awaiting placement in confiscated Polish homes.\footnote{Koehl, RKFDV, 100-1.}

The lengthy delay in settling these German immigrants must not solely be attributed to the difficulties involved in the physical expulsion of the Poles from their homes. It also occurred because of the difficulty of sifting the German ‘wheat’ from the East European ‘chaff’. Each settler was expected to undergo a lengthy series of examinations by the ‘racial assessors’ of the Race and Settlement Main Office (Rasse und Siedlungs-Hauptamt – RuSHA). In this way, only the best elements of the German nation would be utilized to form this German “community of the people” in the east, thereby creating a strong bulwark against Russian communism.

The taming of this newly conquered eastern “frontier” and the need to assimilate or indoctrinate these Volksdeutsche with Nazi political and social values opened up a plethora of new opportunities for Reich-born Germans in the east. As Ernst Wagemann, the President of the German Institute for Economic Research proclaimed (as a modified Horace Greeley): “Today Europe’s future lay no longer over the seas, but in that great space that starts beyond Vienna, Breslau, and Danzig and stretches deep into the Asiatic continent. The way it looks, “Go east, young man” will be the watchword for ambitious talents for decades to come.”\footnote{Ernst Wagemann, “Geh’ nach dem Osten, junger Mann!” Schlesische Tageszeitung, 30 December, 1941, 2.} Nazi attitudes regarding a woman’s role in society categorized women as mothers,
caregivers, and wives. Although Wagemann only sought after opportunities for young men in the east, young women, especially young college women, played a significant role in the 'germanization' of the Polish frontier. The Nazi movement had a strong, though certainly not universal, appeal to German college students despite Hitler’s well-known anti-intellectual views. This appeal arose from the action oriented nature of the Party, its regenerative nationalist message, as well as the Party’s early economic promises (and later success in helping to bring about an economic recovery from the Great Depression). In Summer, 1931 the German Students’ Union gained the dubious distinction of having become "the first national organization to surrender itself to Nazi control...a full eighteen months prior to Hitler becoming Chancellor." However, with the ongoing war, college-aged men who were not actively attending classes were expected to directly contribute to the war effort, usually through military service. Due to the absence of men, college women played a predominant role in the attempted assimilation of the Volksdeutsche.

The autobiographic account of Melita Maschmann provides a wealth of information regarding the actions of college women in the incorporated territories between 1939 and 1943. Maschmann, a devoted Nazi Party member, was a leader of the Girl’s Branch of the Hitler Youth (Bund Deutscher Mädel – BDM). In November, 1939, Melita became the first Reich German BDM leader to be sent to the Wartegau, initially for the purpose of running the press department for the Regional Leadership of the Hitler Youth in Posen. She had accepted the position on a volunteer basis in order to further her education in journalism and editing.

Maschmann’s promotion was not at all unusual. Many German college students were provided with educational opportunities in the east as a strong incentive to participate in the Nazi occupation. Graduate student Theodorich Hartmann accepted a low-paying research assistant post at the Institut für Deutsche Ostarbeit in Krakow in order to pursue a career in the field of land-use studies and to work on his dissertation. Beginning in Summer, 1940, student work programs, such as those created by the SS Settlement Staff (SS-Ansiedlungsstab), allowed students to gain practical experience in their fields of study in the conquered territories of Poland. During that first summer three medical students from Hamburg were sent to Lodz as student-interns. According to their reports from Lodz, the experience provided the students with a unique insight "into the many, often unsolved questions of modern mass migration." Participation in this SS program steadily increased from 800 students in 1940 to 2,500 participants by 1943.

Beyond furthering one’s education, there was also the careerist promise of upward

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10 David Bruce Furber II, “Going East: Colonialism and German Life in Nazi-Occupied Poland.” (Dissertation, University of New York, Buffalo, 2003), 191.
11 The Institut für Deutsche Ostarbeit had been established to prove that Krakow was really a German, not a Polish, city.
12 Giles, Students, 273-4.
13 Ibid., 274.
mobility in the east. Hitler spoke about the increase in career opportunities in May, 1942: "One attraction which will certainly appeal to the young is that by emigrating in this fashion they will find opportunities for promotion infinitely more rapid than those of their less enterprising comrades who remain quietly at home."14 Once conquered, Poland became wide open to aggressive young men and women looking for advancement opportunities, as the new eastern territories were frequently manpower deficient. This shortage of manpower was in part due to the chaotic command structure of overlapping party and state agencies under Nazi rule, and in part due to the severity of Nazi occupation policy against the Poles which resulted in the lack of Polish cooperation with Nazi 'colonial' rule. As a result, "the ratio of occupying German public employees, including post and railroad personnel, to non-Germans was 1:808 in 1940 and 1:333 in 1944. By way of comparison, 1:28,000 was the average ratio in British India; 1:27,000 in French West Africa; and 1:54,000 in British Nigeria. Only Japanese-occupied Korea came close...with a ratio of 1:420 during the mid-1930s."15 The ever-increasing demand for personnel in the east drew many young Germans to Poland in the hope of rapidly advancing their careers.

Another economic factor which acted as an incentive to draw Reich Germans to the "frontier," had been the spoils of conquest. The cities of Poland were a German shopper's paradise during the war. For example, as the war progressed, one could purchase two boxes of cigarettes in Poland for the cost of two cigarettes in Germany. Food was also in more plentiful supply for Germans in Poland than for those living in Germany proper. Prices were kept artificially low and food rations high to promote Reich-German colonization. Plus, for less reputable Germans, of which Poland received more than its fair share, there was always the promise of extortion or outright 'confiscation' of property.16

Still, for many, ideological reasons were equally as, if not more, important than these material concerns. To return to Melita Maschmann: while continuing her education and promoting her career were important factors in her decision to pursue opportunities in the east, Maschmann was also a Nazi idealist. She was one of that breed of 'true believers'. 'True believers', as one colonial proponent characterized it, were those who had: "the will to go forth, for the Reich, into undeveloped regions and to transform the wilderness into civilized lands."17 Maschmann, like many others, viewed Germany's expansion to the east as a redemptive action, by which Germany was recovering what had been forcibly taken from her during the First World War. The seizure of the incorporated territories seemed to have successfully demonstrated the superiority of German ingenuity, culture, and race, over backwards "Polish management."18

The level of Nazi Party membership in Lodz gives some indication of the level of the general ideological commitment of those Germans active within the incorporated territories. According to a study by David Bruce Furber II, while only 16 percent of German civil servants in pre-1939 Germany were Nazi Party members, for the 340 German civil servants he analyzed in Lodz, party membership was an astounding 90 percent. Additionally, while less than 1 percent

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15 Furber, "Going East." 150.
16 Ibid., 281.
17 Fritz Spiessrer, "Die Synthese: Die kleine, die große und die größere Welt," Der koloniale Kampf, (December, 1941), 3.
18 Maschmann, Account Rendered, 73, 76, 118
of Party members within Germany proper had joined the Party before Hitler’s assumption of power in 1933, 33 percent of the civil servants in the Warthegau were 
*alte Kämpfer*, ‘old fighters’, for the party.19 While the level and length of Party membership are not precise ideological yardsticks, the figures do indicate above average support for the Party amongst the German occupiers of Poland.

According to Maschmann, it was this drive to support and spread Nazi ideology amongst the Volksdeutsche, which led her to abandon her position in Posen and to join the Women’s Labor Service’s ‘Eastern Venture’ camp movement.20 In these Volksdeutsche settlements, female teenage German volunteers would act as teachers, counselors, settlement organizers, and in some cases as the de facto force of law. This was not an extremely popular form of student service, due to the relatively primitive conditions of the Polish villages, the six-month term of volunteer service, and the hard work and long hours involved in organizing these settlements for incoming ethnic Germans. However, those who served demonstrated that these women, who were acting as Nazi role models for the settlers, tended to be more ideologically motivated than the average German student.21

Maschmann’s first ‘Eastern Venture’ settlement, in the eastern reaches of the Warthegau, was only staffed by about a dozen young women. The eldest of the group, who also served as the camp leader, had been only twenty-three years old. These young women were granted a high degree of autonomy and responsibility within these camps. When Maschmann took over the leadership of a camp in early 1942, the only other Germans initially present in the village—beyond her twelve female counselor-teachers—were the Amtskommissar, his deputy, two policemen, the postmaster and their families. As this village had not yet been resettled, this handful of administrators and thirteen girls were responsible for maintaining control over a Polish village of over 2,000 persons.22

Normally, in such a situation, the Central Emigration Office (Umwandererzentralstelle: UWZ), originally known as the “Office for the Resettlement of Poles and Jews,” would coordinate the removal of these Poles with the local police force. The UWZ and police would then descend on the targeted village during the wee hours of the morning with a list of evacuees—those Poles considered not being ethnically German or who did not possess vital skills the Nazis required. These deportees would be given an hour to prepare (if that) and were only allowed to bring one 25 to 30 kg suitcase of belongings, 8 to 14 days of food, and no more than 100 Reichsmarks. Everything else was to be left behind for the coming Volksdeutsche settlers.23

The normal responsibilities for the Labor Service women were to prepare the Polish houses for their next occupants, and to help the settlers adjust to their new surroundings. Most of the incoming ethnic Germans were illiterate. Many who arrived from the Baltic States, various regions of Poland, or other areas of Eastern Europe, did not speak the German language, or only spoke it as a second language. It was the responsibility of these women to establish a school curriculum for the incoming Volksdeutsche and, again, to act as counselors should the settlers

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20 Maschmann, Account Rendered, 73, 90, 93.
21 Ibid., 92-135.
22 Ibid., 105.
23 Lumans, Himmler’s Auxiliaries, 234.
need comfort or aid. In addition to their usual responsibilities, the women acted as cultural missionaries, establishing the social (and political) norms for the community. They sought to form a distinctly German melting pot in these communities by blending the various cultures and dialects of the settlers into a homogeneous Nazi Volksgemeinschaft (national community).

The Labor Service women acted as social standard-bearers before both their ethnic German charges and the remaining Polish population. Maschmann claimed in her autobiography that the Women’s Labor Service had “social-educational aims rather than political ones,” yet the establishment of Nazi social norms within these communities was a political goal of the Party.24 For example, Maschmann and her fellow teacher-counselors constantly reinforced the social, and racial, divide between the Germans and the Poles. The large number of Poles, among them many Jews living within the Reich’s borders, and the thousands of ethnic Germans immigrating into these territories, increased the danger of fraternization with and sympathy for the subject peoples. Ethnic German immigrants who had not been subjected to intensive Nazi racial indoctrination and needed to be instructed in, and constantly reminded of, Nazi social norms. Racial indoctrination was a vital task for the German college students to perform. The German college students acted as the ideological foot-soldiers of the Nazi state.

Nazi fears of fraternization between the ethnic German settlers and the subject races of Poland were not unfounded. Nazi officials in the Wartheland soon came to realize that a large number of Polish deportees were returning there, even under the penalty of death. In some areas Baltic German families were living in “household communities” with Polish families who had hidden or for other reasons had not yet been deported. The Poles relied on the sympathy of the German settlers, and it was a gamble that they appeared to win more often than they lost. This was not a weakness solely belonging to the Volksdeutsche settlers. One member of the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle, SS-Hauptsturmführer Schröder complained that his superior, SS-Gruppenführer Koppie was “too sentimental to stand a few rebellious Poles up against the wall [and shoot them].”25

These racial issues were the sort of ‘problems’ with which Maschmann was constantly confronted. An example from Melita’s journal epitomizes the racial difficulties:

The farmer’s wife is very familiar with the Polish maids. She fools about with them all day and allows them to keep kissing the child. The farmer...observed, when I remonstrated firmly that he should surely speak German in his own home, “German or Polish, it’s all the same to me.”26

One of the [Polish] maids...sings German songs all day. In a dreadful thick accent of course... I have forbidden her to sing songs of this kind.27

Such statements indicate the lack of racial boundaries between the newly-settled ethnic Germans and Poles. Maschmann and her young colleagues actively promoted and enforced Nazi

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24Maschmann, Account Rendered, 104.
26Maschmann. Account Rendered, 96.
27 Ibid., 97.
racial policy, creating a racial hierarchy which the Poles and Volksdeutsche were expected to adopt without question. However, this lesson was not merely confined to the Volksdeutsche and subject races of the east. These Reich-German ‘pioneers’ also helped to reinforce racial stereotypes at home via their letters and press statements from the “primitive” eastern frontier. For example, the filthy conditions found in Polish homes upon their evacuation for settlement were often used as examples of ‘Polish management’, a sign of Polish primitiveness. However, this was likely a form of protest by the Poles against those forcing them from their homes and lands.

As a more direct expression of Nazi racial policy being put into action by these students, Polish/Jewish forced labor squads were often used to repair Polish cottages and roads, and for other duties in preparation for ethnic German settlement. In some cases, German students actively participated in the evacuations of Polish/Jewish villages. Maschmann herself, along with her team of girls, participated in the evacuation of the Polish population in the first settlement under her command. According to Maschmann, some of her volunteers were “even a little eager for adventure.”28 Faced with a product of such evacuations, the Jewish ghetto in Kutno, Maschmann had consoled herself with the belief that, “the driving out of the Jews is one of the unfortunate things we must bargain for if the ‘Warthebau’ is to become a German country.”29

While there were obviously a number of factors which influenced students’ (and others’) decisions to participate in the Nazi occupation of Poland and in the transfer of German and Polish populations, the actions of some of these students indicate a much deeper commitment to the Nazi cause than simply being cases of careerism or ‘academic opportunism’. Those who worked in the ‘Eastern Venture’ camps were the most involved and committed to spreading the tenets of Nazism. The young women not only helped to establish racial barriers between the Poles and the ethnic German population, but in many cases they actively participated in the use of forced labor and in the expulsion of Polish civilians from their homes and lands.

Comparatively, Hitler and Himmler’s experiment in forced migration failed due to the declining importance of the German resettlement program, relative to the decision to invade the Soviet Union in June 1941 and the subsequent development and implementation of a “Final Solution to the Jewish Problem.” The organizational demands and need for rail transportation to transfer troops, and later Jewish populations, to the Eastern Front left few resources for ethnic resettlement. Therefore, wide-scale resettlement ended in March, 1941. However, the actions of German students and others in supporting Polish population transfers would continue on a smaller scale until the final German expulsion from Poland in early 1945.

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28 Ibid., 119.
29 Ibid., 82.
Iraq and Kosovo as Viewed by Op-Ed Columnists

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In the run up to the March, 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, the airwaves and newspaper columns in this country were filled with invective, primarily voiced by conservative politicians and pundits, directed against those who opposed this preemptive war. The general tone of these charges was such that anyone who disagreed with the Administration's decision to attack Saddam Hussein was regarded as unpatriotic. Four years earlier, while Democrat Bill Clinton was in the White House, he initiated a campaign in Kosovo against Serbia. Surprisingly, some of the Republican politicians who later had been fervently in support of Bush's war in Iraq led the opposition to Clinton's campaign.

The most egregious example of a hypocritical politician is House Majority Leader Tom Delay, who last spring questioned Senator John Kerry's patriotism despite the fact that Kerry was a decorated Vietnam War veteran, while the Texas Congressman had never served a day in uniform. Back in April 1999, Delay actively opposed a House resolution to support the war in Kosovo, and partly due to his efforts, it failed by a 213-213 vote. One commentator noted that "in his floor speech Delay was kinder to [Serbian leader Slobodan] Milosovic than he was to Clinton".1

This author concluded that it would be a fascinating project to survey the major op-ed columnists, who primarily work for the New York Times and the Washington Post, in order to compare their views of the Kosovo and Iraq campaigns. Did the columnists support both wars? Did they oppose both? Did they defend one war and not the other? And, most importantly, what were the arguments which they employed to support their positions?

For the purposes of this paper, the columnists had to have written more than an occasional piece on each war. For example, the Times' Anthony Lewis and Abe Rosenthal both wrote extensively on Kosovo but both had retired by the time of the Iraq campaign. And that newspaper's Maureen Dowd has written numerous columns on Iraq but had little to say about Clinton's war in the Balkans. Even so, we found ten op-ed writers who produced a sufficient number of pieces to qualify. Among these are the Post's George Will, E.J. Dionne, Jim Hoagland, Richard Cohen, Charles Krauthammer and William Raspberry, the Times' William Safire and Tom Friedman, and the editorial boards of both papers.

Of these ten journalists, six supported both the Kosovo and Iraq campaigns. The journalists were: Will, Hoagland, Cohen, Safire, Friedman and the Post's editorial page. Only Raspberry opposed both, while Krauthammer, Dionne and the Times' editorial page alternated between viewpoints. Krauthammer supported Iraq but not Kosovo, while Dionne and the Times did the opposite.

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This writer was especially curious to see what stances the major conservative columnists such as Safire, Will and Krauthammer, who all strongly supported Bush on Iraq, had taken on Kosovo.\(^2\) This campaign began in March, 1999, only two months after Clinton’s impeachment trial, and Republican anger at the president was at a fever pitch. Would that anger infect their views on a war conducted for supposedly moral reasons by a president who had admitted to carrying on an affair with an intern in the White House and lying about it to the American people?

In the cases of Safire and Will it did not. Safire’s columns consistently supported the campaign in Kosovo and in fact chastised Clinton primarily for being too timid in restricting NATO to an air war. He feared that the president would not pursue the war vigorously enough because of fear of casualties and he even criticized some Republicans for their lack of support. Then he praised Sen. John McCain for having the courage to call for a ground war despite the deaths that would inevitably cause.\(^3\) As the war wound down in June he gave it a ringing endorsement: “The right thing was to place humanity’s resistance to barbarism above national sovereignty. When a nation commits a mass atrocity against a segment of its own people, other nations have just asserted their right to intervene with force.”\(^4\) This was consistent with some of his later arguments in support of the invasion of Iraq.

Likewise, George Will supported the Kosovo war but frequently criticized what he regarded as a half-hearted (no ground troops) effort to win.\(^5\) He argued that “Serbia’s atrocities are not genocide—a campaign to exterminate an entire category of people—but they are patent war crimes.”\(^6\) For that reason, he felt that Milosovic would have to be completely removed from any control in Kosovo for the war to be considered a success. And he, even more than Safire, chastised Republicans for playing politics with the war: “Republicans seem determined to do nothing—certainly not their duties, constitutional and others—that might make this seem like something other than the Clinton-Gore war ... But most Congressional Republicans seem to see only a chance for electoral advantage.”\(^7\)

But if Safire and Will were consistent in their arguments about the two campaigns, the same cannot be said for Krauthammer. His support for the war in Iraq was unwavering. He ridiculed chief UN weapons inspector Hans Blix, calling Blix, “neither strong nor determined...instead he is running a farce”, that the UN itself was “…on the verge of demonstrating finally and fatally its moral bankruptcy and its strategic irrelevance”, and “if it fails, you’ve exposed the UN for what it is: the League of Nations, empty, cynical, mendacious”; plus France, Russia, China and any other nation that opposed US policy.\(^8\) His exasperation with any organization or nation that opposed Bush’s policy was exemplified in one column by the

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\(^3\) NYT, 1 April, 1999, A28; 5 April, 1999, A21; 22 April, 1999, A31.

\(^4\) NYT, 7 June, 1999, A23.


\(^6\) WP, 30 March, 1999, A17.

\(^7\) WP, 29 April, 1999, A33.

statement (in reference to the UN vote in March which was never held): “Mr. President: call the vote and walk away”.9

However, four years earlier he stated some very different arguments as the Kosovo war unfolded. A month before the campaign began he stood out against it on the grounds that “...this would not be NATO going to the defense of a country invaded. This would be NATO actually invading a sovereign country, Yugoslavia.”10 Yet that qualm did not bother him in the case of Iraq. Later in the same article he complained that “at this point its (the Clinton Administration’s) attempt to inflate the stakes has become almost comical.”11 That was exactly the argument made by critics of the Iraq war, although no one uses the word “comical” to describe the Bush team’s exaggerated claims about WMD and ties to al-Qaeda.

As the aerial bombardment was about to start in late March, Krauthammer issued the sensible caveat that “it is not forgivable to send American men and women into battle in the name of a cause one can barely elucidate...When in doubt, play the Hitler card. No matter how ridiculous the analogy ... Its (Serbia’s) objective is merely to retain sovereignty over a province that has been Yugoslavia’s ... since 1918.”12 It is important note that just three years later Iraq came into existence by virtue of a British mandate, and was led by King Faisal I.

Shortly after that column, Krauthammer penned another in which he complained that Clinton, not Milosovic, was endangering the lives of Kosovars. The journalist asserted that the war was ruining diplomatic relations with Russia and China, two countries he condemned four years later for their lack of cooperation with Bush.13 Then, incredibly, a week later he reversed course and demanded that NATO hit Serbia harder: “Finally they are hitting targets—power plants, fuel depots, bridges, airports, TV transmitters—that may indeed kill the enemy and civilians nearby. Those who, like me, opposed this campaign from the start can only applaud this dawning of seriousness, because it provides the only possible way out of this war short of abject defeat.”14

His seemingly irrational desire to attack Clinton reached its peak over his criticism of the lack of NATO and American casualties (no Americans died during the entire 100-day campaign): “If the commander-in-chief does not have the courage to send soldiers to die, he has no business getting into this or any other war.”15 Yet, unlike Safire and Will, he had no comment whatsoever about the refusal of Congressional Republican leaders to support the war. He then inaccurately predicted that Clinton would accept a settlement short of his expressed goals, which were a total Serb withdrawal from Kosovo and its replacement with NATO forces, plus the return of all Kosovar refugees.16 He never acknowledged this mistake in later columns.

When the war ended in June he petulantly referred to it as a hollow victory, complaining about too many casualties among the Kosovars (he never refers to the thousands of Iraqis that

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11 Ibid.
13 WP, 2 April, 1999, A29.
14 WP, 8 April, 1999, A31.
15 WP, 23 April, 1999, A37.
have died in the current war) and lamenting that the US would now have to police a dangerous territory.\textsuperscript{17} Again, he has not made the same criticism of the occupation of Iraq.

Yet in March, 2003, in one of his columns supporting the Iraq campaign, he finally admitted that the war in Kosovo had been "just".\textsuperscript{18}

In the interest of objectivity, it is only fair to examine the other two inconsistent writers, Post columnist E.J. Dionne and the Times editorial board. They both took the contrary position, supporting Kosovo but opposing Iraq. Dionne seems to have based his views on the different motivations for the two wars. On the subject of Kosovo, he wrote, shortly after the bombing began, that "the brutality of Milosovic's forces now gives us little choice but to fight on until Kosovars regain security in their own land."\textsuperscript{19} In several other pieces he took Republicans to task for their failure to give Clinton support and, when the war ended in June, he wrote a triumphant column calling the campaign a success and rejoicing that Clinton-haters had lost once again.\textsuperscript{20}

But, while he readily accepted the need for war in Kosovo, he was much more skeptical about Iraq. A little more than a month before the campaign began he argued:

... if the war is only about weapons of mass destruction, then the doubters can keep arguing, plausibly, that as long as the inspectors are on the ground with the threat of force behind them, Hussein will be kept in a box and unable to threaten anybody...In particular, the Administration's relentless effort to insist on some link between Hussein and al-Qaeda, no matter what the facts showed at a given time, looks more like a public relations stunt than an honest effort to establish the truth.\textsuperscript{21}

He expressed his doubts in another way several weeks later by commenting "it's hard to escape the feeling that those who always wanted to finish the last Gulf War by getting rid of Hussein are using the events of September 11, 2001 as a rationale for doing what they wanted to do on Sept. 10, 2001."\textsuperscript{22} Later, he commented on the reasons why there arose so much worldwide opposition to the war in Iraq, which he argued "reflect fears that the US is going to war not just to rid Hussein of weapons but on behalf of a grand theory. The theory sees unfettered American power as capable of remaking the world. That's certainly bold. It's also dangerous."\textsuperscript{23} After the fall of Baghdad, Dionne congratulated Bush on the victory but noted that the decade-long policy of containment and sanctions had kept Saddam so weak that he was incapable of resisting and expressed worries about the postwar period, which as we all know has been difficult, to say the least.\textsuperscript{24}

The Times editorial board took positions similar to Dionne's. They backed the campaign in Kosovo from start to finish. Early on they argued, "NATO should not undertake bombing casually, especially to change the way a government treats its own citizens. But in this case, NATO must be united in carrying out its threat. If Mr. Milosovic does not immediately stop

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\textsuperscript{17} WP, 11 June, 1999, A37.
\textsuperscript{18} WP, 12 March, 2003, A21.
\textsuperscript{19} WP, 6 April, 1999, A23.
\textsuperscript{21} WP, 31 January, 2003, A37.
\textsuperscript{22} WP, 18 February, 2003, A25.
\textsuperscript{23} WP, 11 March, 2003, A23.
\textsuperscript{24} WP, 11 April, 2003, A27.
\end{small}
attacking ethnic Albanians and agree to the peace plan, bombing is the appropriate response.\textsuperscript{25} In fact, they pushed for an escalation of the campaign in the early stages, although never supporting the idea of introducing ground troops.\textsuperscript{26}

When Milosovic capitulated in June, the \textit{Times} editorial board wrote two celebratory pieces. The first one opined that "...the most dangerous military conflict in Europe since the Second World War will conclude as a victory for the principles of democracy and human rights ...The sustained bombing has been more effective than many critics allowed, and for the most part was conducted with restraint and a proper regard for civilian casualties."\textsuperscript{27}

The second boasted that "it is not too soon to conclude that the air offensive was just, and more effective than many critics expected ... it demonstrated that the U.S. and its allies can act decisively in defense of democratic principles and against ethnic violence in Europe."\textsuperscript{28} But it did caution that in the future such campaigns should not be undertaken without the approval of the UN Security Council and Congress, neither of which had given its support to the Kosovo campaign. That absence of Security Council approval became one of the newspaper's main reasons for opposing the war in Iraq.

While they accepted Clinton's rationale for his campaign in 1999, four years later the \textit{Times} editors regularly found fault with arguments put forth by the Bush Administration. They consistently advised the President to give the UN inspectors more time to find "Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and they worried that going to war without broad international support would be dangerous."\textsuperscript{29} They accepted the concept that Iraq had to be disarmed but warned, "...all chances of doing so peacefully should be explored before the world is asked to decide on war."\textsuperscript{30} One of their liveliest pieces, published in January, 2003, cautioned: "To go it alone, or nearly alone, is to court disaster ... There are some threats and some causes that require fighting even if America has to fight alone, but this isn't one of them."\textsuperscript{31}

Even after Secretary of State Colin Powell's famous presentation to the Security Council in February, 2003, the \textit{Times} editors remained unconvinced that Iraq posed a serious threat to the US or that Saddam had links to al-Qaeda.\textsuperscript{32} However, they did begin to criticize France by arguing that they "...must cease acting as if the real problem were to contain the US," and other European nations for not being tougher on Saddam.\textsuperscript{33} When war came, the \textit{Times} editors did not support it. On 17 March they commented, "this page remains persuaded of the vital need to disarm Iraq. But it is a process that should go through the UN ...The current path is reckless."\textsuperscript{34} The following day they argued that; "at a time when America most needs the world to see its actions in the best possible light, they will probably be seen in the worst."\textsuperscript{35}

\textsuperscript{25} NYT, 18 March, 1999, A24.
\textsuperscript{27} NYT, 4 June, 1999, A28.
\textsuperscript{28} NYT, 17 June, 1999, A30.
\textsuperscript{29} NYT, 2 January, 2003, A16; 5 January, 2003, 4-10.
\textsuperscript{30} NYT, 10 January, 2003, A22.
\textsuperscript{31} NYT, 26 January, 2003, 4-12.
\textsuperscript{32} NYT, 6 February, 2003, A38.
\textsuperscript{34} NYT, 17 March, 2003, A22.
\textsuperscript{35} NYT, 18 March, 2003, A32.
In mid-November they published a major editorial looking back on the war and their criticisms of it. Considering the fact that no WMD have been found and no credible evidence of links to al-Qaeda have been uncovered, added to the fact that the postwar period has gone so badly, they found their own position still valid. Only a few days later, Safire wrote his own retrospective on Iraq entitled "Mistakes Were Made." Of the ten mistakes he discussed, five were by critics of the war and four were by the Administration and its supporters. But, like the Times editorial board, he held fast to his original position: "Mistakes will be made in winning this war. But advancing freedom is never a mistake." ³⁷

One of the columnists under review, Richard Cohen of the Post, changed his opinion by the end of the year. He had supported the war, albeit reluctantly, in most of his pieces in the spring, primarily on the grounds that Saddam was a menace that would have to be dealt with someday: "...while war is bad—very, very bad—sometimes peace is no better, especially if all it does is postpone a worse war. That's what would happen if the US now pulled back." ³⁸ But by November he had become badly disillusioned by the fact that Bush's accusations about WMD and ties to al-Qaeda had failed to be borne out. He argued that maybe this was the result of an intelligence failure, and if so, he deemed it "massive and inexcusable." ³⁹ He went on to propose that:

The other possibility is that they—the top people in the Bush administration—knew the stated grounds for war were bogus. If that's the case, then we do not have a thrilling exercise in presidential power but an abuse that makes Watergate look as trivial as Richard Nixon's defenders said it was... It is possible—actually more than possible—that a clique of defense intellectuals either snookered the president into going to war or did so with his full cooperation. If this was done, then it represents a grave and reprehensible breach of faith with the American public.

The only columnist who opposed both wars was Post columnist William Raspberry. His arguments against Iraq were similar to those mentioned earlier in this paper and his criticism of the Kosovo war was based on his fear of a quagmire, the lack of an exit strategy, and the belief that negotiations would accomplish more than bombing, which he viewed as counterproductive. ⁴¹ Of all the columnists surveyed, he appeared to be the most reluctant to use war as an instrument of national policy.

In examining the various opinions expressed, some conclusions can be drawn. An important conclusion is that the war in Kosovo was justified while the one in Iraq was not. While this may appear to be inconsistent, several points need to be made by way of explanation:

1. *Reasons for War*—The primary justification for the Kosovo campaign was to prevent ethnic cleansing of Albanian Kosovars by Milosovic. While this was not a matter of national security for the US, it was clearly an issue of human rights, particularly since the world community had

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³⁶ NYT, 16 November, 2003, 4-12.
⁴⁰ Ibid.
permitted such slaughter in Bosnia and Rwanda only a few years before. Moreover, this ethnic cleansing was not a matter of speculation but verifiable. On the contrary, the justifications for attacking Iraq were either atrocities from the 1980s or early 1990s (gassing Kurds, invading Iran and Kuwait) or unproven actions such as possession of WMD and links with al-Qaeda. Saddam’s real threat to national security appears to have been greatly exaggerated.

2. *International Cooperation*—The war in Kosovo was conducted as a NATO operation with the full cooperation of all major US allies. The only opposition came from Russia, a traditional ally of the Serbs, and China, after the accidental bombing of its embassy in Belgrade. The Iraq campaign was carried on with a “coalition of the willing” without either NATO or UN support and even governments that joined the war—Britain, Spain and Italy—did so despite public disapproval of the war. Long-time allies such as France and Germany stood in opposition.

3. *Goals*—The goals of the Kosovo campaign were far more limited than in Iraq, which made international cooperation easier to obtain. NATO aimed only to drive Serb forces out of the province so as to allow the Albanian refugees to return and be able to live in peace and security. No attempt to invade Serbia or topple Milosevic was contemplated. The postwar occupation involved only Kosovo itself, and that business was turned over to the UN. No Americans died during the entire campaign, in contrast to the steadily growing body count in Iraq.

For all of these reasons, the conclusion of this paper is that Kosovo was a far more acceptable application of US military force than Iraq has proven to be. The arguments for going to war were clear and verifiable, and did not shift during the course of the campaign. The Kosovo intervention was not viewed around the world as a unilateral action, despite the lack of a UN mandate, and as a consequence did not arouse international ire as the war in Iraq has done. Additionally, the goals of the action in the Balkans were far more limited, thus making it easier for the world to accept. The fact that the engagement lasted for a mere one hundred days was a factor as well. It was too brief for opposition to develop any momentum, the way it did in Vietnam and now Iraq. Consequently, Kosovo is not as likely to be as closely compared as those two wars.
The Importance of Florida for the Early Pentecostal Movement
(1909-1923)

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In recent years, there has been a renaissance of Pentecostal studies. Yet the new surge of scholarship on American Pentecostalism has tended to be more generalistic in orientation.\(^1\) Even Grant Wacker's *Heaven Below* has failed to pay attention to regionalisms. One outcome of this limited focus has been that the whole mix of ethnicity and race has not been fully explored. Generally, ethnicity has been studied only within the framework of black/white polarizations, or white/Hispanic tensions, which do not do justice to places like Florida.\(^2\)

This paper will argue that the presence and idiosyncrasies of Bahamians allowed the Church of God (COG), a white Pentecostal denomination, to reach out to native blacks from 1909 onward. Although the COG was founded in 1886, it did not report black membership until 1909, when Bahamians started joining. I will proceed by describing the early growth of the COG and its connection with blacks in Florida, analyze the COG's lack of black outreach, and finally identify some particularities that helped spread Pentecostalism in Florida and beyond.\(^3\) Primary materials to be reviewed are the well-detailed diary of A.J. Tomlinson, COG leader for twenty years (1903-1923) and editor of the *Church of God Evangel*, and early church minutes.\(^4\)

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3 In 1912 more than half of Church of God (COG) congregations were in Tennessee and Florida. Overall, the COG reported sixty-six congregations with fourteen in Tennessee and twenty-four in Florida, *General Assembly Minutes: Photographic Reproductions of the First Ten General Assembly Minutes 1906-1914* (Cleveland: White Wing Publishing House, 1992), 127-28. Hereafter *General Assembly Minutes* will be abbreviated as "GA."

4 Throughout this paper, I will use the word "black(o)" to identify American-born blacks and the word "colored" to refer to Bahamians and African Americans.

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Church of God and Blacks in Florida (1909-1923)

The COG was founded in 1886 by a group of former Tennessee Baptists who joined the holiness movement in 1896. In 1903 Tomlinson, a former Quaker from Indiana, joined the COG and was given the pastorate of the church at Camp Creek, North Carolina, the only congregation of the new group. In 1904 he moved to Cleveland, Tennessee, and in 1908 invited G.B. Cashwell, a minister of the Pentecostal Holiness Church, to preach at the annual assembly. As Cashwell was preaching, Tomlinson spoke in tongues as he received the baptism of the Holy Spirit. The COG was now a Pentecostal organization.

The COG entered Florida when Tomlinson organized a white congregation in Tampa in May, 1909. During a following revival preached at the Pleasant Grove Camp Meeting in Durant, Tomlinson welcomed more than one hundred members into the COG. During the same year, a black congregation was later organized in Jacksonville through the agency of Sampson Ellis Everett. Everett, who was from Jacksonville, was saved through the preaching of Edmund Barr, a Bahamian immigrant who had joined the COG when Tomlinson first preached in the Pleasant Grove Camp Meeting. At this meeting, Tomlinson licensed and ordained seventeen whites and two people of color, Edmund and Rebecca Barr, as ministers. Everett went back to his hometown and ministered to his family, which became the nucleus of the Jacksonville COG, the first African American congregation of this white Pentecostal organization. However, the Jacksonville congregation was not the first founded by people of African descent: a Bahamian congregation had been planted earlier in Miami by Barr, the first colored minister in the COG.

Though an African American congregation was founded in 1909, black evangelism never caught the attention of either the general overseer or the Florida (white) ministers. Tomlinson went to Florida seven times between 1910 and 1922, but never visited the colored congregations. This he did while he used 75 percent of his official budget for transportation expenses. In 1911 he went on a missionary trip to the Bahamas along with ten other ministers, none of them being black. No black church was either founded or planted by Tomlinson in

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1. Charles Conn, *Like A Mighty Army: A History of the Church of God* (Cleveland: Pathway Press, 1977), 1-85. Early Pentecostals believed that speaking in tongues was the initial evidence of the Baptism of the Holy Spirit. This was the entry experience into Pentecostal life.

2. *GA*, 57-83; Conn, *Mighty Army*, 46, 483.


5. The Miami church was founded for Bahamian immigrants and Barr can be assumed to have been the founder since he was Bahamian and that no white COG minister is known to have preached to colored people in Miami. Simmons, *History*, 93.

Florida between 1909 and 1923. In fact, the first time that Tomlinson visited a black church was in 1923 when he was facing challenges to his general overseership.\(^1\)

It seems that from the above one cannot avoid the conclusion that the general overseer was not interested in black evangelism. Furthermore, the number of (Florida) black churches grew only from zero to two between 1909 and 1912 while the number of white churches increased from one to twenty-four.\(^2\) This leads us to posit that, like Tomlinson, white ministers did not reach out to black folk. In contrast, they were interested in other ethnic groups. Missionaries reached out to Jews in Punta Gorda and M. S. Lemons, the state overseer, preached to Cubans in Tampa where some were baptized in 1913.\(^3\) From 1910 onward, COG ministers sponsored various mission trips to the Bahamas and in 1921 John Ingram went to Bermuda while the black membership in Florida was less than forty by 1915.\(^4\)

During the early years of the COG, white ministers did not preach to blacks even when they preached or planted churches among foreign blacks and Cubans in the Bahamas and Florida. In their stead, it was British West Indians who were to reach American blacks.

Analysis of the Church of God’s Lack of Black Outreach (1906-1923)

After this general overview, I will discuss factors that can explain the attitude of the COG toward blacks.\(^5\) These are: indifference, lack of evangelical boldness, pure pragmatism, and the position of the church on the labor movement. White indifference can be noted by the fact that, at the 1910 General Assembly, no officials made any reference to the first colored ministers and congregations that had joined the COG in 1909.\(^6\) Another obvious indication of indifference resides in the fact Tomlinson never bothered to visit or preach in a colored community, even when he went to Florida seven times between 1910 and 1922. Meanwhile, Mexicans attended the Cleveland congregation, Cuba was explored as a mission field in 1910, and one Hispanic congregation from New Mexico was welcomed in 1911.\(^7\)

\(^{11}\) Conn, Mighty Army, 175-76; A.J. Tomlinson, diary, 21 March, 1923, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.; this is the original and handwritten diary of Tomlinson.

\(^{12}\) GA, 240-42. There were four colored congregations in Florida by 1912: Jacksonville, Webster, Coconut Grove, and Miami. Not much is known about the Webster congregation, but Coconut Grove and Miami were definitely Bahamian congregations. Coconut Grove shared a Bahamian settlement, Kebo, and a Baptist church had been founded there in 1894 by a Bahamian minister, Samuel Sampson; since it is known that Bahamians attended the Coconut Grove COG, therefore it can be reasonably assumed that it was Bahamian. See Dorothy Jenkins Fields, “Colored Town, Miami, Florida: An Examination of the Manner in Which the Residents Defined their Community during this Era of Jim Crow” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Union Institute, 1996), 82; Marvin Dunn, Black Miami in the Twentieth Century (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1997), 34-36, 107, 111-112; and Janet Spencer, ed., Black Women in the Church: Historical Highlights and Profiles (Pittsburgh: Magna Graphics, 1986), 8.

\(^{13}\) GA, 178; Church of God Evangel, 4 January, 1910, 7.

\(^{14}\) Spencer, ed., Black Women, 2, 29; Charles Conn, Where the Saints Have Trod: A History of Church of God Missions (Cleveland: Pathway Press, 1959), 81; GA, 324; Minutes of the Eleventh Annual Assembly of the Church of God (Cleveland: Church of God Publishing House, 1915), 26. Hereafter Minutes of particular assemblies will be abbreviated.

\(^{15}\) "Lack of black outreach" does not mean that there were no blacks in the COG; rather, it suggests that white ministers did not preach (or were not enthusiastic) in black communities before and after blacks entered the COG.

\(^{16}\) GA, 75-83. Up to January, 1913, annual assemblies were held in January so that the next assembly after the founding of the first colored churches would have taken place in January, 1910.

\(^{17}\) Conn, Mighty Army, 89, 133; ibid., 113-114, 133-134.
Mexicans seemed to have received quite some attention. One white preacher 
described a revival he was preaching in Corrumpa in 1914 as follows: "I have been here since 
last Friday. It has rained everyday and yet we have good crowds: Ten have been saved so far ... 
There have been nothing but Mexicans in the meeting so far, but it does me good to look into 
their earnest hungry faces."\textsuperscript{18} From this statement, it is obvious that the church had interest in 
minority groups but not in blacks. This indifference can be understood within the historical 
framework of the post-Reconstruction South. America was living through the most racist period 
of its history and Tennessee, where the COG's headquarters was located, was a former state of 
the Confederacy and the first to have passed Jim Crow laws in 1881. These tough racial 
conditions led the ground for Pentecostals to entertain reservations toward blacks even when the 
message of Pentecost would have inclined them to do otherwise.\textsuperscript{19} 

Another important component to keep in mind in trying to understand this lack of 
outreach is the absence within the COG of what I call "evangelical boldness," that is, a 
willfulness to get around Jim Crow restrictions in preaching the gospel. We have already 
mentioned that white COG leaders did not preach to blacks in Florida. However, that was not the 
case for all white Pentecostals. In 1917 Aimee Semple McPherson, an independent Pentecostal 
evangelist, went to preach to white people in Miami.\textsuperscript{20} After noting that blacks did not come to 
her meetings, she moved to the colored section where she held a camp meeting for the people 
living there. Later, she repeated the same scenario in Key West. Then McPherson went to West 
Palm Beach, Florida and Pulaski, Virginia where she preached to blacks and in black churches.\textsuperscript{21} 
Thus, however, were the Jim Crow restrictions in southern cities. This did not absolutely hinder 
the preaching of the Gospel, especially if white evangelists were welcomed to preach in the 
colored settlements.

Another factor is pure pragmatism. There were other black denominations that were 
working in the South, such as the Church of God in Christ (COGIC) and the United Holy Church 
of America (UHCA). Since the COGIC had three black congregations in Tennessee by 1907 and 
the UHCA had 120 congregations in Virginia and North Carolina by 1921, it could have been 
felt that black Pentecostals could better reach their own people. Generally, that was the attitude 
of the Assemblies of God in southern states where it welcomed Hispanics but not blacks.\textsuperscript{22} On 
the other hand, blacks could be taken to have shunned the COG primarily because of a growing 
bent toward religious autonomy in the South since the end of the Civil War. Thousands of 
southern blacks had left white denominations to found the Christian Methodist Episcopal Church 
(1870) and the National Baptist Convention (1895). Pentecostal blacks left the Fire-Baptized

\textsuperscript{18}Church of God Evangel, 1 August, 1914, 7. 
\textsuperscript{19}Syman, Movements, 167; Bobby Lovett, ed., Profiles of African Americans in Tennessee (Nashville: Annual Local 
Conference on Afro-American Culture and History, 1996), xxxiv-xxxv. For a quick appraisal of early Pentecostal 
intrerracialism, see Wacker, Heaven Below, 227-33. 
\textsuperscript{20}McPherson worked as an independent evangelist before joining the Assemblies of God in 1919 and founding her 
own organization, the Church of the Foursquare Gospel, in 1922. C.M. Robeck, Jr., "McPherson, Aimee Semple," in 
International Dictionary, 856-57. 
\textsuperscript{21}Aimee Semple McPherson, This Is That: Personal Experiences, and Sermons, and Writings (Los Angeles: Aimee 
\textsuperscript{22}Ithiel Clemmons, Bishop C.H. Mason and the Roots of the Church of God in Christ (Bakersfield: Pneuma Life 
Publishing, 1996), 66; Chester Gregory, The History of the United Holy Church of America 1886-2000 (Baltimore: 
Region 1901-1940" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Mississippi State University, 1996).
Holiness Church to form the Colored Fire-Baptized Holiness Church, which claimed twenty-five congregations and sixty-seven ministers by 1908. Similarly, blacks left the Pentecostal Holiness Church in 1913. In 1916, 95 percent of all black Christians belonged to black denominations and by 1929, 90 percent of black believers were affiliated with black churches. Clearly, it can be maintained that, for the sake of religious independence, blacks were not interested in joining the COG. Another factor that mitigated against blacks attending the COG is of course the perception that they would be mistreated and segregated as in ante bellum churches. Although the COG had held annual assemblies in Cleveland starting 1906, there was no record of black attendance before November 1913.

Another probable reason for blacks to ignore the COG was its stand against labor unions. In 1913 no union member could be a member of the church. This ban was later rescinded with the caveat that no minister should ever become a union member. Since many blacks were coal miners in southern Appalachia and the labor movement was trying to organize in the early decades of the past century, the COG must have looked much too conservative. To the above factors, one could add that Florida blacks could have had reservations about the COG in the early years because in the colored constituency was predominantly Bahamian; certainly one can not dismiss the possibility that ethnic tensions that existed in the secular society between foreign and native blacks were also extant in the religious sphere. In concluding this section, I must underscore that it would be difficult to maintain that Tomlinson was a racist. He was a northerner, having been raised in Westfield, Indiana. His grandparents had been involved in the antislavery movement and hid slaves in the Underground Railroad. In fact, Tomlinson's closest neighbors in Westfield had been black families and he made a positive reference to John Brown, a white abolitionist leader, in his book, the Last Great Conflict published in 1913. At best, Tomlinson may be the example of a northerner who had to accommodate himself to southern customs.

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26GA 279. Only one black attended the assembly in November, 1913, Edmund Barr, a bishop ("ordained minister") from Florida. Black people and churches are identified by "C" (Colored) in the records.  
27Ibid., 223.  
28Ibid., 319-20.  
30By the end of 1913, another colored church was founded in Miami (Colored Town) where there already was a Bahamian congregation. This might indicate that there were tensions between Bahamians and blacks attending the same church. Minutes of the Tenth Assembly, 34.  
31This is why I have used "indifference" instead of "racism" in defining Tomlinson's attitude regarding black outreach. This did not mean that other COG folk might not have been racist or segregationist.  
Florida Factors

Several factors encouraged these British West Indians to join the COG: the presence and openness of Bahamians to white rule and evangelism, the potential use of the local church as a means to overcome social deprivations; the desire for social promotion; and the interracism of holiness believers. These factors generated a push toward spreading Pentecostalism in Florida.

From 1900 to 1930 between 80,000 and 90,000 British West Indians entered the United States. Among them 3,000 Bahamians settled in Florida. By 1920, 5,000 Bahamians formed 52 percent of the colored population in Miami. What first encouraged Bahamians to work with a white church was their colonial experience with the Church of England back home. Since they were used to having white Anglican bishops, they were not averse to having white Pentecostal leaders and associating with white churches in America. In fact, Bahamians attended the Ebenezer United Methodist Church and the first Bahamian Episcopal churches in Florida had been served by white rectors. This latter point suggests that Barr could have been appointed as overseer because of his ability to relate to whites. In November, 1909, Barr took money from R.M. Evans, a white COG minister, and then landed in the Bahamas as an unofficial missionary. In early 1911, Tomlinson went to the Bahamas and observed first-hand the interactions between Barr and white Bahamians in this mixed country. By 1912 the COG was so familiar with Bahamians that Barr was made the first ordained colored minister. I want to also claim that Barr was ordained because he knew how to relate to American blacks to whom the church had not been reaching out. This view is further strengthened by this notation on Tomlinson's diary on the occasion of Barr's ordination: "Had a conference meeting yesterday to consider the question of ordaining Edmond Barr (colored) and setting the colored people off to work among themselves on account of the race prejudice in the South." It would appear from this statement that Barr was ordained not merely because he had already been pastoring, but specifically for the purpose of evangelizing colored people. Moreover, that this was Tomlinson's intent can be further confirmed by appreciating the constitutional significance of the act of ordination itself. In the COG, elevation to the ordained ministry granted the incumbent the authority to ordain ministers or license evangelists, which authority would be needed if Barr were to evangelize and plant churches among the colored people. Though apparently Barr was not given any official position through ordination, it is clear that he acted as if he were a state overseer by organizing colored churches and camp meetings. In fact, he even baptized people in

33Spencer, ed., Black Women, 9, 48; DuFres, Dictionary, 201. Not all Bahamians went to churches affiliated with white denominations. Some attended Bahamian congregations affiliated with the African Methodist Episcopal Church. See Dunn, Black Miami, 113.
34Fields, "Colored Town," 82.
35Conn, Missions, 50-52;
36A.J. Tomlinson, Diary, 4 June, 1912. Barr, who had been in the Bahamas since November, 1909, returned to America in 1911.
37We need to remember here that there were African American ministers in Jacksonville who were not ordained at that time. They may have overlooked because they were not evangelistic enough for white COG leaders.
38The COG had three orders of ministers: ordained elder (also called bishop), deacon, and evangelist. The evangelist was a preacher who was effective but not ready for ordination. The only difference between the evangelist and the bishop was that only the bishop could ordain other bishops and evangelists. All ministers could pastor churches. GA, 27, 67, 105.
camp meetings. Barr served as overseer from 1915 to 1917 and between 1917 and 1922, Florida and other southern black churches were put again under white supervision. In 1922 Thomas J. Richardson, an African American, was made overseer of black churches. In 1923 he left the COG when Tomlinson was impeached.

Speaking of evangelism, one must say that Bahamians were committed to preaching outside the COG. Barr was successful in evangelism, which was the essential ethos of this Pentecostal organization. Writing in 1913, Tomlinson noted that

when we fully realize the value of souls, the awfulness of hell, and have attained such a love for Jesus that His words will sink into our hearts like stones into water, then and not until then will we awake to the full responsibility that is now resting heavy upon us. We are so slow! Millions are dropping into hell that could have been rescued while we are studying and planning what to do.

Continuing in the same vein, Tomlinson spoke as follows in his 1914 annual address:

This is a time when every one that can preach or conduct a prayer meeting ought to be in the field. We speak in the fear of God, from a sincere heart, when we say that the world ought to be evangelized in this generation, and we should not dare to thrust this responsibility on a future generation.

As previously noted, Barr was so evangelistic that he introduced African Americans and Bahamians to the COG in 1909. He was the agent of black evangelism that the COG had been looking for. In due time, Miami became the center of evangelism for the black COG. Of course, it was not Barr and Bahamian men alone who engaged in evangelism. Janet Spencer has identified at least eight other Bahamian women who evangelized in South Florida from about 1912 to 1922.

Social deprivations also encouraged these British West Indians to join the COG. We know, for example, that in Miami Bahamians formed Episcopal and Catholic parishes even when

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39 Church of God Evangel, 22 February, 1914, 2; 13 March 1915, 2. In January, 1911, it was decreed that it was the responsibility of state overseers "to have the oversight of his state and as much as possible conduct or order a general evangelistic campaign over his state during the year." In COG parlance, this annual evangelistic meeting was (and is still) called a "camp meeting." GA, 109.

40 Tomlinson, Last Great Conflict, 41-42.

41 Minutes of the Seventh Annual Assembly, 6-7. This reference and others (Great Conflict, 43, 53) to "evangelizing the world in this generation" suggests that Tomlinson was influenced by the motto of the Student Volunteer Movement that had been coined by A.T. Pierson. Dana L. Robert, "The Crisis of Missions: Premillennial Mission Theory and the Origins of Independent Evangelical Missions," in Joel A. Carpenter and Wilbert R. Shenk, eds., Earthen Vessels: American Evangelicalism and Foreign Missions, (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1990), 38.

42 Miami was the place of residence of Barr, the location of his pastorate, and the place where the annual colored camp meeting (1915-1917, 1923) convened. Between 1918 and 1921, there were no colored overseers and, probably, no colored camp meetings as well.

43 Women evangelized in West Palm Beach, Deerfield Beach, and Fort Pierce among other cities. The eight listed by Spencer are: Priscilla Smith, Maude E. Duncombe, Marilita Weech, Zora Miller, Victoria Davis, Blanche Lowe Russell, Lillian Rahming, and Leanora Darville. Spencer, Black Women, 8, 26-29, 25-37.
there had been white churches of the same confession. In fact, two Episcopal parishes, founded by Bahamians, were called "Nassau churches" because these foreign Anglican immigrants made no attempts to proselytize native blacks. As foreigners, Bahamians were easily identifiable by their British accent and cultural manners and thus vulnerable to both white racism and black ethnocentrism. From the white community, Bahamians suffered from racism, segregation, and police brutality, to the extent that they requested that a British vice consul be appointed in Miami. Some joined Marcus Garvey's Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA). From the African American community, they were exposed to isolation and the children of Bahamians who were British citizens were charged extra fees in colored public schools. This may help us partially explain why St. Agnes and Christ Church, two Bahamian parishes, opened up parochial schools. Joining small COG congregations gave Bahamian immigrants a warm place where they could regroup and minimize cultural shock. These immigrants were for the most part farming and construction workers and a small close-knit congregation allowed them to fight social deprivations such as being called "niggers" (for the first time) and other potential aberrations associated with their cultural mores and occupational status.

Institutional factors also contributed to making the COG appealing to those immigrants who had aspirations to leadership. The COG did not have high educational requirements for ordination. Anyone who would answer some basic doctrinal questions could be licensed as a minister. This was much simpler than the sophisticated ordination examinations of the Anglican Church with which these immigrants were familiar back home. The COG granted to ordained ministers the title of "bishop," the same conferred to ecclesiastical superiors by the Church of England in the Bahamas. This title conferred to poor black immigrants must have increased self-esteem in their own eyes and those of their fellow compatriots, especially when one remembers that few native priests were being ordained in the Bahamas. In the case of Barr, the quest for social promotion was evident since he evangelized and planted churches in view of becoming a state overseer. This quest for social promotion must have agitated Bahamian

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46 Dunn, Black Miami, 110, 115-16. This does not mean that the Bahamian churches did not have native black as members, through intermarriage for example.
45 ibid., 102; Mohl, "Black immigrants," 288.
44 R. Reed, The Negro Immigrant: His Background, Characteristics, and Social Adjustment 1899-1937 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1939) 1970), 124; Dunn, Black Miami, 97. The concept of deprivation theory is borrowed from Charles Glock, Religion and Society in Tension (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), 247. The average colored COG congregation was very small with an average of fifteen members and so was an ideal place for cultural exchange and solace for oppressed minorities. In 1915 seven churches reported 111 members and in 1917 thirteen churches claimed 200 hundred members. The church Barr pastored in Miami had at about twenty-three members, [Christopher Moree], "Edmond S. Barr."
43 Harold Lewis, Yet With A Steady Beat: The African American Struggle for Recognition in the Episcopal Church (Valley Forge: Trinity Press, 1996), 89-90. Surprisingly, the titles for ministers were nearly synonymous in both the Church of England and the COG. In the Anglican Church there were bishops, priests, and deacons. In the COG there were bishops, deacons, and evangelists. Of course one difference was that the Anglican bishop was by definition a church executive while the COG bishop was not necessarily so. In the colored context, early colored ministers in the COG would have been poor while Anglican bishops were middle class.
42 The position of state overseer was created in January 1911. An overseer was technically responsible for the churches in his state, both black and white, so that existing black churches would have been under white control. Barr was ordained in June 1912 and in November 1915 was made overseer of the colored churches in Florida. It is clearly apparent that Barr closely followed church politics and knew what to do in order to secure official recognition as a leader, GA, 107.
women as well since the COG also licensed women as “evangelists,” which title granted them the right to be called “ministers,” a privilege they would not have been able to attain in the Church of England.\textsuperscript{49}

Another element that must be factored into the initial entry of Bahamians in the COG is the interracialism of the Pleasant Grove Camp Meeting. Founded in 1885, this former Methodist camp meeting was taken over by holiness Methodists who later formed the South Florida Holiness Association.\textsuperscript{50} While we are still waiting for a definitive work on race relations in the holiness movement, scholars generally claim that holiness people were somewhat more open to interracial participation than others.\textsuperscript{51} This interracial openness was demonstrated in the fact that both whites and blacks preached among members of the opposite race in camp meetings, churches, and other selected settings. Holiness denominations varied as to the level to which they welcomed blacks, however. During the postbellum era, African Americans such as Amanda Berry Smith had preached in white Methodist camp meetings and churches in many northern cities.\textsuperscript{52} Similarly, in Philadelphia white Methodist preachers had attended meetings in a black African Methodist Episcopal church.\textsuperscript{53} It was this racial openness, coupled with holiness piety, which allowed the Pleasant Grove holiness people to welcome Barr at their camp meeting in 1909.\textsuperscript{54} It was this welcoming that led the way for further black outreach in Florida and other states. From 1909 to 1922, the number of colored churches grew from zero to nineteen in Florida while nationwide the same number reached thirty.\textsuperscript{55} Today there are more than 500 colored churches and a colored membership estimated at 50,000.\textsuperscript{56}

\textsuperscript{49}G4, 33.
\textsuperscript{52}For a quick review of Amanda Berry Smith’s interracial meetings, see Adrienne M. Israel, Amanda Berry Smith: From Washerman to Evangelist (Lanham, MD and London: Scarecrow, 1998), 57-64, 99-100; Almer M. Pennewell, The Methodist Movement in Northern Illinois (Sycamore, Ill: Sycamore Tribune, 1942), 278.
\textsuperscript{54}The Methodist openness to blacks should not be understood as equivalent to a practice of racial equality. For example, though Methodists had appointed a black as missionary-bishop as early as 1856 one had to wait for 1920 to see the election of blacks to the episcopacy in the United States. J.H. Graham, Black United Methodists: Retrospect and Prospect (Washington: Vantage Press, 1979), 81,114, 116.
\textsuperscript{55}This number does not include churches that were disbanded, or left the organization for the COGIC, possibly because of racial segregation in the COG. Paul Thompson argues that 40 percent of colored congregations (14 of 35) founded before 1919 left the COG by 1922. Paul Thompson, “On Account of Conditions that Seem Unalterable: A Proposal about Race Relations in the Church of God (Cleveland, TN) 1909-1929,” unpublished manuscript, 10. The COGIC had entered Miami by 1918 and was appealing to blacks since, in addition to being a black church, by 1919 it had developed a Sunday School department, a women’s department, a youth ministry, two industrial schools and a Bible Institute. In an era where self-sufficiency and racial pride were promoted, it was not easy for a white church to retain black constituents. Dunn, Black Miami, 116; Bobby Bean, This is the Church of God in Christ (Atlanta: Underground Epics, 2001), 49, 207; Sherry DuFree, Biographical Dictionary of African American, Holiness-Pentecostals, 1880-1990 (Washington: Middle Atlantic Regional Press, 1989), 201; Buford Johnson, 82 General
At this end of this study, two things must be evident. First, the COG did not make black evangelism one of its priorities in the early decades of the past century. White ministers in Florida simply did not preach to blacks. On the other hand, Bahamians had no inhibitions about working in a white church and committing themselves to reaching out to their own and the native blacks. Positively, this study has found the black/white paradigm no longer valid or sufficient to interpret the experience of Bahamians and American blacks in the COG in Florida. Instead, it demands that this paradigm be replaced by a triple paradigm, a white/ black immigrant/native black framework. Implications of this study are that closer attention must be paid to ethnicity, migration, and culture and that generalizations are no longer sufficient to interpret American Pentecostal history.


For more details about the history of people of color in the COG, see David Michel, Telling the Story Black Pentecostals in the Church of God (Cleveland, TN: Pathway Press, 2000).
A Woman’s Space:
Rule, Place and Ysabel of Habsburg, 1570-1592

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Last year at this conference, I discussed the 1571 portrait by the French painter Francois Clouet of the queen of France, Archduchess Ysabel of Habsburg (lived 1554-1592, reigned 1571-1574). In that paper, I tried to tie an analysis of a painting to the dynastic struggles between the Houses of Habsburg and Valois and how they played themselves out in the Atlantic World, the Caribbean, and on the beaches near the conference hotel in Jacksonville. I wanted to point out how some of the claims and counter-claims to power and authority made by the various representatives of those dynasties were inscribed on the body of the archduchess by the painter and his choices, and also, incidentally but importantly, how these choices were tied to images and thoughts about the sea.

Today’s paper will attempt to build on the location of the conference here in Lake City, “Florida’s Crossroads,” to discuss some aspects of the political, economic, and religious influences during Ysabel’s period of rule as Dowager Queen of France (1574-1592), with particular reference to her activities in her widow’s seat in the Austrian archduchies, Vienna, from 1582-1592. In that Danubian trading center, Ysabel resided in apartments across the street from the Hofburg castle and founded a house of Poor Clares, an important contemplative order. At this time, Vienna was the seat of the princely Habsburg regent, Ysabel’s older brother Archduke Ernst (1553-1595), but not of the primary Habsburg ruler. This fact may have allowed Ysabel more space to develop her influence. (For some time following her widowhood, she resided in the imperial residence of Prague, but that phase of her life will be left out of the analysis today. My research concerning that period still needs to be completed.)

I hope to touch upon a number of issues relating to women and space in pre-modern Europe, particularly in early modern European urban environments, and specifically in the spaces defined as the Holy Roman Empire and the city of Vienna. In so doing, I will follow somewhat along the lines suggested so many years ago by Henri Lefebvre who, in the aftermath of the urban upheavals in France in ‘68 worked to understand space and the city environment, asking us to combine the physical, mental

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2 A preliminary overview of themes associated with this research was presented at the 22nd World Congress of the Czechoslovak Society of Arts and Sciences, Palacky University, Olomouc, Czech Republic, June, 2004. The paper was titled “Dowager Queen Alzbeta (1554-1592): From the Wars of Religion in France to Prague.” It will appear in the published conference proceedings.

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and social aspects of such an element of analysis. This undertaking is part of my ongoing research projects on the histories and images of the city of Vienna as well as on the histories of this archduchess.

Susanne Claudine Pils in her recent book on the countess Johanna Theresia Harrach (1639-1716) has emphasized the countess’ ties to the city of Vienna and beyond, pointing out the physical limits of this woman’s life. This paper would like to follow Pils’ analysis of wider connections to discuss the various levels of influence/power available to an early modern female aristocrat. It will be shown that physical space indeed had little to do with the broad circles of connections Ysabel of Habsburg negotiated. Pils describes the countess’ world of bedroom audiences, courtyard observation, aristocratic neighborly visits, and court appearances.

While the evidence for the archduchess’ daily activities is scant, the evidence of her various levels of spatial relationships is clear. Documents in the Haus- Hof- u. Staatsarchiv in Vienna and elsewhere, for example, help to “flesh out” a picture of a woman with ties to duchies in France, customs houses on the Hungarian border, pilgrimage activities to Styria, parochial holdings in Upper and Lower Austria, a house of nuns in Vienna (with that house’s ties to Bavaria,) and (of course) relatives throughout central and western Europe, with their ties to the world (including Florida). It is increasingly being understood how early modern women created themselves through social networks. This paper seeks to also shed light on the spatial characteristics of those networks.

Elisabeth’s mother María was from the increasingly-unified kingdoms of Iberia. She was a sister of the famous king of Spain, Phillip II (ruled, 1556-1598). Ysabel’s

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5 See for an overview of recent US work on early modern women: Adele Stett and Margaret Lael Mikesell, eds, *Culture and Change: Attending to Early Modern Women* (Newark, DE: University of Delaware Press, 2003). In Mikesell’s Introduction she reviews the contributions to the first three collections of papers from conferences sponsored by Center for Renaissance and Baroque Studies at the University of Maryland starting in 1990. Mikesell reports on a workshop where it was pointed out that the women “… fashioned their identities in relation to salons, convents, family circles, epistolarly communities, and social religious groups,” 36.

6 The empress María is one of the title figures in Magdalena S. Sánchez, *The Empress, the Queen, and the Nun: Women and Power at the Court of Philip III of Spain* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998).
older sister had been born there, and her parents had served the dynasty as regents of Spain before Elizabeth was born in Vienna in 1554. The story of the Habsburgs’ dynastic ties between Iberia and central Europe is a well-known and oft-told one, so I will not delve much into it here, except to point out that four of Elizabeth’s brothers and three of her sisters traveled to Spain. While her two older brothers Rudolf (as emperor Rudolf II, ruled 1576-1612) and the aforementioned Archduke Ernst returned after an extensive education there, her other siblings all stayed, including her older sister Anna, who became Queen of Spain and mother to the heir to the throne, the later Phillip III (ruled 1598-1621). While Ysabel never traveled to Iberia herself (an Iberia which included Habsburg Portugal as well as all of the Habsburg overseas possessions in Florida and the Caribbean, Central and South America, Africa and Asia after 1580), her mental universe clearly included these imagined parts of the globe. She is reported to have received boxes of gifts from her Iberian relatives, many of them from the Habsburgs’ overseas possessions, and her library on her death included numerous works by Spanish authors such as Luis de Granada and Teresa of Avila.9

Growing up, Ysabel moved between the residences of her grandfather and father, the emperors Ferdinand I and Maximilian II, in Prague, Vienna, Linz and Wiener Neustadt.10 When she was two, her sister Maria died in Linz where the children were residing while their parents were on dynastic business in the Low Countries. Maria is buried in Linz, and this is only one of the physical reminders of the spatial distribution of Elizabeth’s social worlds. (When she was seven, the family would again stay in Linz, seeking refuge as the plague hit downstream in Vienna.11) Over the years, Ysabel would have siblings, a husband, and a daughter buried in various places across Europe, including Prague in Bohemia, St. Denis in France, Vienna in Austria, and Madrid in Iberia.12 Her spatially-tied social networks extended through the dead as well as through the living.

Ysabel may have had some memories of the processions into Vienna in Spring, 1558 when she was almost four and her grandfather, the Iberian-born Ferdinand (named

10 On these two emperors: Joseph F. Patrouch, “Ferdinand I, (Holy Roman Empire),” II, 372-373; “Maximilian II (Holy Roman Empire),” IV, 64-65 in Dewald, Europe 1450-1789. Maximilian has been the subject of a recent English-language biography: Paula Sutter Fichtner, Emperor Maximilian II (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001).
11 The general context of the religious and social histories of this period in Linz and Upper Austria are discussed in Joseph F. Patrouch, A Negotiated Settlement: The Counter-Reformation in the Habsburg Province of Upper Austria (Leiden, Colognenaad Boston, 2000).
12 For specifics concerning the various archdukes and archduchesses, see Brigitte Hamann, ed., Die Habsburger: Ein biographisches Lexikon (Munich: Piper, 1988).
after King Ferdinand of Aragon, ruled 1556-1564) officially entered his residence city as Holy Roman Emperor.\textsuperscript{13} Ceremonial processing through space would be important for a princess such as this, one also to be publicly seen and displayed as part of the potential political networking that the Habsburg archduchesses represented. Ysabel would have many occasions in her lifetime to experience her body displayed and processed through the spaces of early modern Europe, and particularly the elaborate ceremonies which would accompany the ritual crossing of the boundaries between the rural and urban worlds, marked as these passages were by gates and civic guards in finely-burnished breastplates.

Four years later, the eight-year-old archduchess would again experience the entrees and processions associated with the coronations of her parents, first in Prague as King and Queen of Bohemia, and then in Frankfurt am Main as King of the Romans and his consort.\textsuperscript{14} The Vienna ceremonies continued as Maximilian entered the city of Vienna in March of 1563, followed in the fall by the elaborate ceremonies surrounding the election of Ysabel’s father as King of Hungary in the new coronation site of Bratislava, ceremonies which began outside the walls of Vienna, not too far upstream from the Hungarian capital.\textsuperscript{15}

The funeral ceremonies for her grandfather Emperor Ferdinand, who had died in July, 1564 and was buried in St.Vitus Cathedral in Prague the following year, corresponded with incoming bad news from the Hungarian front. Within months the Ottomans declared war, and Ysabel’s hometown of Vienna changed into a space of military preparation. From celebrating electoral triumphs to preparing for military uncertainties, the city was transformed. The war was brief and the successes few. Vienna, still rebuilding following the Ottoman siege of 1529, was a place of preparation, and these preparations continued years after the official end of the war in 1568.\textsuperscript{16}

Two years later Ysabel would be processed and paraded from Vienna to Prague to the Imperial Diet in Speyer and then, the following year, to Paris after having been crowned and anointed Queen of France in St. Denis in March, 1571.\textsuperscript{17} The elaborate

\textsuperscript{13} The standard English-language biography of Ferdinand is still Paula Sutter Fichtner, \textit{Ferdinand I of Austria} (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1982).

\textsuperscript{14} For the accession to the thrones of Bohemia and Hungary, see Fichtner, \textit{Emperor Maximilian II}, 56-58. As was often the case, controversies surrounded the imperial party’s entry into Frankfurt. Who was to accompany the emperor into the city, the representatives of the city council or those of the Archbishop-Elector and Imperial Chancellor, Mainz? Some of the correspondence concerning this controversy is to be found in the Stadthervich Frankfurt/Main, Reichssachen II, Nr. 1173. The Stadt- und Universitätsbibliothek in Frankfurt/Main contains a number of pamphlets describing the Prague, Frankfurt and Bratislava coronations. For sources describing the return trip from Frankfurt via Württemberg, an important territory for Habsburg influence in the southwest of the Empire, see Matthias Koch, ed., \textit{Quellen zur Geschichte des Kaisers Maximilians II. (Leipzig: Voigt & Günther, 1857)}, 6-8. They continued down the Rhine.

\textsuperscript{15} The Bratislava trip and ceremonies were described in dispatches from the Venetian ambassador to the Doge in September and October, 1563: Gustav Turba, ed., \textit{Venetianische Depeschen vom Kaiserhöfe, (1554-1576)} (Vienna: Temsky, 1895), III: 233-41.

\textsuperscript{16} For an overview of the war, see the official report to the Imperial Circles’ representatives at their assembly in Erfurt in 1567. Reprinted in Koch, \textit{Quellen}, 86-109: “Summarischer gemeiner Bericht von dem Anno 66. Biss Inn das 67 verloffenen Hungerischen Kriegswesens. Wider den ErbVeind.”

\textsuperscript{17} For some background and many specifics concerning the diet and the wedding, see Joseph F. Patrouch, “Reichstag und Hochzeit (Speyer 1570)” in Václav Bůžek and Pavel Král, eds., \textit{Slavosti a zivěst na
dual marriage alliance, with Ysabel’s older sister Anna marrying their uncle Philip of Spain by proxy in Prague in May followed by the sixteen-year-old Ysabel’s marriage by proxy to King Charles IX of France at the diet in Speyer in October, 1570 was combined with a ceremonial display of influence, a costly procession across the Empire. Ceremonial festivities marked the imperial entrances to various important cities such as Nuremberg.  

Ysabel’s years in France need not concern us much here. She married King Charles IX (born 1550, ruled 1560, died 1574) in the Gothic church Our Lady of Hope in the border city of Mezières shortly after crossing the frontier. Her entrée into Paris in March, 1571 is well documented, and was her chance to play the role she had seen her mother play entering Prague, Vienna, Bratislava, Nuremberg, Speyer, and elsewhere across central Europe. Thrown into a kingdom wrecked by religious warfare, ruling as queen during the time of the infamous St. Bartholomew’s Day Massacre, with a mother-in-law Catherine de Medici intent on maintaining influence even as Queen Dowager, the eighteen-year-old Ysabel was also confronted with the difficult political circumstance of giving birth to an infant daughter in October of 1572. Even with Queen Elizabeth I of England as a godmother, this little girl, Marie-Isabelle, had a difficult time in the cutthroat world of late Valois politics. After her husband’s death in May, 1574, Ysabel was no longer able to play a major role in France. Once her brother-in-law Henri made it safely back from his Polish adventure as king of that kingdom, Ysabel took her leave and progressed back into the Empire, this time in a much less ostentatious manner. She attended the Imperial Diet in Regensburg at which her father died and accompanied his body on its ceremonial route up to the Castle Hill in Prague, via Linz.  

The big sweeps of symbolic control of space were now over for the dowager queen, but her political ties remained multiple and extensive. As a widow, first in Prague and then in Vienna, Ysabel was able to exercise, directly or indirectly, substantial influence over events. As part of her marriage agreement, the Valois family in France had


18 Werner Goetz points out in his article on the relationship of the city of Nuremberg to the Empire that Aachen, Frankfurt/M., Regensburg and Nuremberg all had particularly important ties to the Empire. Ysabel visited all of them but the disputed (and losing in importance) Aachen during various symbolic trips across the spaces of the Holy Roman Empire between 1562 and 1576. Goetz, “Nürnberg—Kaiser und Reich,” 11-16 in the exhibition catalog of the same name, published by the Staatsarchiv Nürnberg, 1986. Her 1570 visit and entrée is discussed in the same catalog by Ursula Schmidt-Fölkersamb, “Kaiserbesuche und Kaisereinzüge in Nürnberg,” 115-127.

19 A contemporary pamphlet describing the wedding can be found in the Austrian National Library with the title Veritable Discours du mariage de treshaut,Trespuissant, &Treschretien, Charles neustesme de ce nom...  

20 See, for example, the discussion by Roy Strong in his Art and Power: Renaissance Festivals 1450-1650 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 109-111.

21 General background is provided in Michel Simonin, Charles IX (Paris: Fayard, 1995).

22 This trip is outlined in Louis Adolphe Spach, Deux voyages de Elisabeth d’Autriche, épouse de Charles IX, roi de France (Colmar: Decker, 1855). Ysabel’s brother-in-law ruled as Henri III. He was born in 1551 and assassinated in 1589, ending the rule of the Valois Dynasty in France.

23 On the Regensburg Diet of 1576, see Hugo Moritz, Die Wahl Rudolfs II., der Reichstag zu Regensburg (1576) und die Freistellungsbewegung (Marburg: N.G. Elwert, 1895), esp. chap. 5.
committed to a widow’s portion for Ysabel, and her chief of staff, the famous diplomat and humanist Oghier de Busbecq, administered incomes from a number of French properties in Ysabel’s name. Only well into her widowhood, and well into the religious wars and succession conflicts which accompanied them in France, did the incomes from that kingdom begin to dry up. For the first decade or so of her widowhood, it seems that Ysabel had enough income to lead a substantial court, first in Prague and then in Vienna, and to found a convent in the latter city in the early 1580’s.

After her brother Emperor Rudolf II decided to forsake the city of Vienna and move his residence officially to Prague, Ysabel and her brother Ernst were assigned the none-to-easy task of taking on the rebellious, Lutheran- (and somewhat Calvinist-) influenced populations of the city and the surrounding countryside. Vienna in the 1580’s was a tense and none-too-prosperous place. The emperor’s decision to move officially to Prague, the traditional rival to Vienna, had been preceded by the decisions to have the two previous emperors interred in the Prague cathedral, marking already a decline in the relative importance of the city on the Danube in favor of the city on the Vltava. While Jesuits and papal nuncios had been active in the Lower Austrian capital, they also seemed more inclined to trust and support Ysabel’s uncle Karl in Styria and its capital of Graz.

For her support and the support of her house of Poor Clares, which had been founded with personnel support from the Poor Clares in the so-called “Angerkloster” (or the house of St. James on the Anger) in the Bavarian ducal capital of Munich, Ysabel’s brothers agreed to dedicate various resources to her. These included most importantly the properties tied to the abandoned house of Benedictine nuns in the Lower Austrian village of Erlakloster, together with some local Vienna properties which had at one time (before the Ottoman assault of 1529) been tied to previously-existing houses of Poor Clares in the city. (The last of these two houses had gone bottom-up after its main buildings had been confiscated and transferred to the control of the city hospital and its nuns scattered to various houses about the city.) The city had often been overwhelmed

24 Busbecq also served as Ysabel’s chief court official immediately after she returned from France. See Hofkammerarchiv, Vienna, Hofzahltastbuch, 1576, entry dated last of May. The famous humanist and diplomat is often credited with making central Europe familiar with the tulip and the hyacinth. See Charles Thornton Forster and F.H. Blackburne Daniell, eds, The Life and Letters of Oghier Ghiselin de Busbecq (London: C.K. Paul, 1881).

25 The Styrian branch of the Habsburg Dynasty, led by Ysabel’s uncle Archduke Charles (1540-90) and her cousin Duchess Maria of Bavaria (1551-1608), has often been seen as the center of the Counter-Reformation in the dynasty’s central European lands. Most recently, see Regina Pörnter, The Counter-Reformation in Central Europe: Styria 1580-1630 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

26 This house has been discussed in some length in Charlotte Woodford’s Nuns as Historians in Early Modern Germany (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 51-2, 54-5, 62-3. The historical manuscripts analyzed from the house are outlined on 196-197. On Elizabeth and the cloister in Vienna (the “Queen’s Cloister”): Marie Hérey, “Elisabeth, Königin von Frankreich, die Stifterin des Königsklosters [sic] in Wien,” Katholische Warte 4 (1888-89), 379-84.

27 For a discussion of this cloister, and the general situation of the houses of female religious in Vienna at the time, see: Joseph F. Patrouch, “Das Königskloster—Wiener Klosterfrauen um 1580,” Pro Civitate Austriæ NF 7 (2002) 45-52. Many of the records of this cloister, which was closed by decree of Emperor Joseph II in 1782, have been lost. Some remain in the Vienna City and State Archive (Klosterakten) and the Vienna Archdiocesan Archive (Wiener Kloster/ Aufgeh/Königskloster). A substantial number are also now in the Haus- Hof- und Staatsarchiv [HHStA] in Vienna. (See especially Klosterakten, where records concerning Erlakloster are also to be found.) The church is now the place of worship of Vienna’s Lutheran
by the requirements of lodging the legions of courtiers and the billeting of troops, but now space was available due to the transfer of the imperial court, and Ysabel had space to build up a rather impressive set of apartments, a convent, and a respectable church in which to center Counter-Reformation activities as well as support the undertakings of the overwhelmed Bishop of Vienna from 1574-1594, Johann Caspar von Neubeck.28 The old pilgrimage across Lower Austria to Mariazzell in Styria was also reinvigorated by Ysabel and her supporters, stretching claims of authority from the city streets outside into the Austrian and Styrian countrysides and linking Vienna symbolically to that more-reformed Catholic province.29

There is some evidence that Ysabel took her lordly responsibilities in the parishes associated with Erlakloster seriously. The convent had rights of appointment over various parish priests in Upper and Lower Austria, and incomes from forests and vineyards in various places across the province of Lower Austria as well as in the vicinity of Vienna.30 In addition, after things began to look bad with the incomes coming from France, Ysabel’s brothers turned to writing over customs or toll incomes to her to support her activities. These included incomes from the important Hungarian border fortress of Magyaróva (Ungarische Altenburg), so Ysabel’s influence extended toward the lands of the Crown of St. Stephen ("Hungary") as well as into the Kingdom of France.31 (As stated earlier, she also had influence in the Kingdom of Bohemia (i.e. the lands of the Crown of St. Václav,) but those activities have to be left out of the present analysis.)

Even though there is little evidence of Ysabel’s movement outside of the city of Vienna during her widowhood there, this is not to say that her influence was not felt well beyond that city’s newly-rebuilt walls. One example may suffice: after the death of the Polish king Stephen Báthory in December, 1586, Ysabel supported her brother Maximilian’s candidacy for that elected crown.32 (Apparently, she even went so far as to provide him with some of her personal silver in order to help support the military undertaking he began in Fall of the next year.) Ysabel had been present when Maximilian

parish. For a brief description which includes a depiction of the convent in 1740, see the anonymous pamphlet Die Luthersche Stadtkirche, 2nd Ed., (Vienna, 1985).

28 Roderick Geyer, Dr. Johann Caspar Neubeck (Dissertation, University of Vienna, 1956). When Neubeck took over the troubled diocese, the episcopal office had been vacant for six years. See also Annemarie Fenzl, Die Bibliothek des Wiener Bischofs Dr. Johann Caspar Neubeck (Dissertation, University of Vienna, 1968).

29 It is reported that Ysabel made a pilgrimage to Mariazzell in late Summer, 1583 together with her brother, Archduke Matthias. Geyer, Neubeck, 245.

30 "Erla," in Historische Stütten Österreichs, I:246. Evidence of Ysabel’s active attention to the administration of the Erlakloster holdings can be found in HIStA, Handschrift W1099.

31 Ysabel began to receive income from Magyaróva in September, 1586. Correspondence about the continued dedication of these incomes to support costs associated with her estate after her death can be found in HIStA FamAkten 75. According to documents under this archival designation, the administrator responsible reported that Ysabel had received the proper amounts from this source for the period 1586-1592. After her death, reports from France concerning Ysabel’s incomes from that kingdom indicate that she had claims over incomes from the duchies of Bourbon and Auvergne and the counties of Forêt, and the two Marches, in addition to other seigneurial rights and incomes. See the letter from Ysabel’s secretary Johann Prossonäck to Archduke Ernst dated 25 August, 1592 under the same archival designation.

32 Heinz Nofjärscher, Glaube, Reich und Dynastie: Maximilian der Deutschmeister (1558-1618) (Marburg: Elwert Verlag, 1987).
had become a Teutonic Knight in a ceremony in Vienna in May, 1585. Since then, he had tried to build up his support as the leader of that order. Habsburg candidates had received substantial local support at the royal elections in Poland in 1573 and 1576 and Archduke Maximilian was optimistic about his chances in 1587. After an unsuccessful military campaign which ended in his capture, however, the Habsburgs were forced to renounce their claims to that country's throne. He would be released from captivity in 1589.

The final, sad years of Ysabel's life in Vienna are tied to the development of her house of Poor Clares. A new architect was named to complete the convent in January, 1589, and now reformed Catholic women had a secure and safe space to practice their religion. It seems that Ysabel's financial situation, probably because of deteriorating conditions and incomes from France, was precarious: it is reported that she had to begin to order the melting down of some of her silver furniture in order to pay her court's debts. Her brother Ernst was transferred to Styria to lead the government there after the death of Ysabel's uncle, the archduke Karl, in 1590. A number of Ysabel's important female relatives, her aunts Magdalena in Hall in Tyrol and Anna in Munich, passed away that year as well. In Rome, the death of Pope Sixtus V in 1590 was quickly followed by that of Pope Gregory XIV a year later and his passing was followed quickly thereafter by the death Pope Innocent IX the next month. In Vienna, the procession associated with Corpus Christi, a procession that would take on increasing importance for Habsburg family piety in the centuries to come, and one which Bishop Neubeck had tried to restart following Ysabel's move to Vienna, was disrupted by angry crowds in the streets.


34 In a report dated Vienna, 3 January, 1588, Archduke Maximilian's head silver official had to report that various pieces of silverware and plate which Ysabel had loaned to her brother for use in his Polish campaign had been lost. HHSTA FamAkten 75. The Treasury of the Teutonic Knights in Vienna contains a large number of objects from the collection of Archduke Maximilian. See Room 3 where items from his Kunstkammer are displayed. See the inventory of the collection: Amt des Hochmeisters des Deutschen Ordens, Die Schatzkammer des Deutschen Ordens (Vienna: Deutscher Orden, 2000), 63-74. Maximilian served as Hoch- and Deutschmeister from 1595-1618.

35 Jacob Vivian reported in an undated supplication found among Ysabel's posthumous estate records that he had been named her court architect on January 10, 1589. In his supplication Vivian claims to never have received any pay. HHSTA FamAkten 75.

36 Reports of melting down of various parts of a silver table. Some parts were used for incense burners, some for reliquaries, and some for debts, 1590-91. HHSTA FamAkten 75.

37 On the role of Corpus Christi and the Habsburg ideology of pious rule: Wheatcroft, Habsburgs, 29-31. It is reported that Bishop Neubeck organized a Corpus Christi confraternity in 1581 and started public processions again in 1582. See Geyer, Neubeck, 97 and 100.
A few months after these riots, Ysabel drew up her will. She passed away in her Viennese apartments on January 22, 1592 at the age of 37 and a half. Widowed and tied to the city of her birth, Vienna, she nonetheless exercised influence over a much wider space than she saw. With relatives across Europe, holdings in France, incomes from Hungary, properties in the Austrian archduchies, and a convent in Vienna, she reveals that space for this early modern Habsburg archduchess was not only tied to her body, like a dress in a portrait, but it was tied to a complex set of experiences, activities, and possibilities; experiences, activities and possibilities tied to spaces stretching from her deathbed across the continent and into the world.
The Demise of the Two Party Political System in Antebellum Florida, 1851-1856

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Noted Civil War diarist and South Carolina "fire-eater" or avid secessionist Mary Boykin Chesnut proclaimed on a visit to Florida late in 1860 that "no-one could live in this state unless he were a fire-eater".¹ This was not far from reality. Ten years earlier, the state was not ready to follow South Carolina into the abyss of secession even though the stout confidence Floridians held in the conservative Whig Party was shaken in the aftermath of the "Crisis of 1850." In 1850 Florida's statehood was only five years old but the economic and social makeup of the state was already deeply rooted and centered around the institution of slavery. The entire decade of the 1850's further entrenched these values, solidifying the landscape that helped dictate the events of 1860-61. The plantation system dominated Florida, thus the course the state would follow in the future was firmly tied to the security felt by the planter aristocracy. As the decade of the 1850's progressed, the formerly ultra-conservative planter class lost confidence in the Whigs as the party who could best safeguard their interests, clearing the path for radical Democratic domination of Florida after 1854 and secession at the beginning of the next decade.

The first scholar to analyze the two-party political system in antebellum Florida was Herbert J. Doherty. His 1959 work The Whigs of Florida, 1845-1854, while exploring the rise and fall of the Whig Party also dealt with the Democratic Party, and touched on the planter aristocracy.² However, it did not delve deeply into the way the political transformations in Florida cleared the path for the rise of extremism which, in turn, allowed the fire eaters to guide the state towards secession in January, 1861. Doherty claimed that the demise of the Whig Party in Florida was largely due to inept leadership. While this fact, coupled with shrewd propaganda created by the Democratic press helped push the issue, it was ultimately the defection of the elite planters of Middle Florida which sealed the Whigs' fate. Dorothy Dodd was another twentieth-century historian who dealt with early Florida politics and who contributed numerous articles to the field as well as serving as the first state archivist.³ Dodd was openly sympathetic to

³ See, for example, Dorothy Dodd, "The Secession Movement in Florida, 1850-1861, Part I," Florida Historical Quarterly 12 (1933), 16.

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the South and her numerous articles, therefore, present us with a partisan biased understanding of the time period.

As 1851 began, the Whigs urgently needed to counter the growing radical elements within society. Whigs were vexed at the prospect of being labeled the enemy of the South which was exactly the goal of the extremists as well as the Democratic Party after the "Crisis of 1850." In 1850 South Carolina had flirted with secession after Henry Clay and Stephen Douglas pushed a bill through Congress that became known as the Compromise of 1850 and was later labeled the "Crisis of 1850" since, in spite of the fact that the legislation contained concessions to both the North and the South, the majority of Southerners viewed the bill as a setback for Southern rights. The Democrats, then, wasted no time in playing up the fact that the Whigs, as a party, supported Henry Clay's bill. Thus, the diminished power Whigs held in 1850 as compared to 1848 was also an indication of the growing lack of confidence the voting public had in the party's ability and, more importantly, desire to defend slavery and Southern rights at all costs. This trepidation mobilized the conservatives to create Constitutional Union Clubs within Florida as well as throughout the rest of the South.

The movement originated in Mississippi, Georgia and Alabama before making its way further south. It drew the attention of many prominent Southern statesmen who were not eager to break the bonds of Union. In Florida, former governor and devout conservative Richard Keith Call took keen interest in this faction since he always had been and always would be a unionist. Call was interested in attracting as many disillusioned Democrats as possible to the unionist banner. Consequently, the union camp was composed of both Whigs and Democrats in Florida. These unionists shared anxieties over greater visibility of radical factions in both the North and South. Call urged all Southerners to join the Union Party, forecasting that this organization would pave the way for a serene decade ahead.4

Call campaigned vigorously in support of the Union Party, making speeches and striving to persuade his peers to enlist in his crusade against radicalism. He asserted that "the man who loves party more than he loves his country, who contracts his patriotism...is unworthy of the name of American Citizen".5 This plea was an effort to lure Democrats away from the rigid lines of partisan politics. To Call, unionism was the central objective which he desired the nation to achieve and maintain. Public pro-Union meetings were created to rival the radical Southern Rights Associations which sprang up following the Compromise of 1850. Tallahassee's Florida Sentinel endorsed this party and encouraged Florida to follow the lead of Georgia by declaring "whenever a Union Party shall be organized on broad, generous, liberal, constitutional ground, we propose to be with it".6

Call was not isolated in his labors as he was joined by fellow Whig Edward Carrington Cabell. Cabell represented Florida in Congress and was fearful of the impending disintegration of the national party in an election year. Like Call, he saw a Union Party as the best possible alternative to a splintered Whig Party. In a speech before

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5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
Congress in Washington, he distanced himself from the national party by throwing all his weight behind the Constitutional Unionists within the Whig Party who supported Millard Fillmore as the Whig presidential candidate because they believed his nomination would be the only hope of the party in the South. Despite the efforts of Call and Cabell, the Union Party never achieved the same status it had attained in Georgia or Alabama. Deep-rooted political animosity and profoundly entrenched party lines were stronger in Florida than in its sister states, save for possibly South Carolina.\(^7\)

The failure of the Whigs to consolidate power and generate a productive opposition to the growth of fanaticism in Florida was never more evident than in the gubernatorial election of 1852. The campaign and election of 1852 saw the birth of a new radical group known as the “South Carolina School” of Florida politics. This group, which would be responsible for pushing the state towards secession in 1860, consisted of disunionists and radicals alike whose supreme aim was to protect Southern Rights and the institution of slavery.

The Democrats were better equipped to handle the turmoil of sectional conflict in 1851-52 than the Whigs. They knew they needed to distance themselves from the fiery image born out of the crisis of 1850. They toned down their disunionist stance and desperately struggled to present a more peaceful demeanor. When the Democrats gathered in April to hammer out their platform for the upcoming state elections, they met amidst an atmosphere of moderation, adopting a platform that was perceived as inoffensive and temperate in character. The Democrats fashioned themselves as the party of the South and thus retreated from the vindictive overtly confrontational course which their previous campaigns had pursued.

The Whigs, however, did not believe that their rivals had truly transformed themselves. They saw these actions for what they were, a ploy to obtain votes and guarantee the election of a Democrat to the governorship to replace the moderate Thomas Brown. The Florida Sentinel, Tallahassee’s leading Whig paper asked “do they imagine that they can cause the people to forget their course but a short time ago, when some of them declared that the compromise ‘tore the Constitution to tatters’, and they would rather see the Union dissolved”?\(^8\) They urged Floridians to look to the past to see the true nature of the Democrats and called on them not to be duped by loquacious prose which they claimed was orchestrated in such a manner as to sway the voting populace into their camp.\(^9\)

Ironically, the Democrats, who now claimed to be a more moderate entity, chose fire-eating James Broome to headline their ticket. Broome, who was the leader of the “South Carolina School” had migrated to Leon County from South Carolina in 1837 and was labeled a “Secessionist in the abstract and the concrete, of the strictest sect of the South Carolina separationists”.\(^10\) This selection appeased the radicals in the party who had quietly opposed any softening of the party’s image. The nomination also demonstrated that the Democrats were confident enough in the validity and righteousness of their principles to take this risk. The Democrats were convinced that the Whigs were

\(^7\) Ibid.
\(^8\) Tallahassee, Florida Sentinel, 8 June, 1852.
\(^9\) Ibid., 11 May, 1852.
\(^10\) Marianna, Florida Whig, 11 May, 1852.
too badly divided as a direct result of the growth of the Constitutional Party to pose a legitimate threat.

The Whig Party platform also foreshadowed the emergence of the Nativists and Know-Nothing Party which would follow the Whigs in the middle part of the decade. The Whigs resolved that the Compromise of 1850 must be the final settlement on the sectional issues that had almost engulfed the nation in civil war. They naively rallied behind the bill as the ultimate savior of the Union. Out of these meetings emerged a demand for a statewide convention which was held on July 14 in Tallahassee. In addition to displaying unwavering allegiance to Clay’s compromise, the Whigs endorsed Millard Fillmore’s Presidential candidacy as well as selecting George Ward as their candidate for Governor along with supporting Cabell’s reelection bid.11

At the national convention in Baltimore, the Whigs’ nomination of Winfield Scott drew scorn from the majority of Southerners. The derision was more evident in Florida where the public held an old grudge against the general. This disdain found its roots in Scott’s unappealing assessment of Floridians made in 1836 during the Second Seminole War. He had ridiculed and lambasted the citizens when he issued Order #48, accusing what he deemed cowardly actions in the face of relentless Indian attacks. He questioned their patriotism and belittled them for the panic which they displayed. The “Hero of Churubusco” said he had “the misfortune to command a handful of brave troops in the midst of such a population”.12 Florida’s Whig newspapers hesitantly supported Scott since he was their nominee but they accepted the reality that the best they could hope for was a strict adherence to the principles of the Compromise.13 The Democrats added fuel to the anti-Scott fire by condemning the General since his candidacy had recently been endorsed by known Pennsylvania abolitionist Thaddeus Stevens.14

The Democratic national convention provided a shocking compromise candidate in New Hampshire’s Franklin Pierce. Pierce’s nomination was celebrated as a victory for Southern rights. Pierce was a “doughface,” a Northerner who was overtly sympathetic to the South and was perceived highly malleable, someone the powerful Southern wing of the party could control. The selection was met with praise and adulation from Florida’s moderate democrats such as Augustus Maxwell. Ironically when James Broome followed a moderate speech by Maxwell with a scathing speech of his own which denounced the Compromise, he was rewarded with a larger and more genuine ovation from those present.15

Radicalism was not dead by a long shot in Florida as the upcoming election was to prove. Though the Democrats had downplayed the extremist in their message, Broome’s nomination for Governor and the immense support he received frightened moderates and unionists alike. Broome, considered by many the leader of the “South Carolina School” of politics in Florida desired to replicate the South Carolina in Florida and had fervently encouraged migration south in the previous decades. It was his hope to surround himself with as many followers and allies as possible who all held the same

11 Ibid.
12 Tallahassee, Floridian and Journal, 22 May, 1852.
13 Pensacola, Gazette, 26 June, 1852.
14 Ibid., 4 September, 1852.
15 Ibid., 22 June, 1852.
radical vision for the state and the South. Broome was a wily politician who realized that in order to achieve his lofty ambitions, he would have to make sacrifices and compromises along his rise to power.  

However, Broome seemed to change his attitude in a speech delivered in Tallahassee where he shocked many attendees by vowing to support the Compromise of 1850. While this sudden about face stunned the audience, Broome reassured his supporters that the nation would not be held hostage by Clay’s bill.  

Broome was aided by the fact that between 1850 and 1860 the number of immigrants to Florida from South Carolina and Georgia doubled. By 1860 Georgians constituted the largest group of non-native Floridians and were closely followed by former residents of South Carolina. When the Whigs met in Tallahassee for their state convention they selected Richard Keith Call to lead the caucus. George Ward, the gubernatorial candidate, pledged to abide by the Baltimore Convention. Initially Cabell carried his hostility towards Scott back to Tallahassee with him claiming Scott “would not carry a single state or poll as many as 50 votes in Florida.”  

Cabell further urged the state convention to deal solely with the gubernatorial and congressional elections while ignoring the national election. When Ward heard of these comments, he vowed not to run on the same ticket with Cabell. Once again, the Whigs were plunged into a chaotic state of panic as Ward called a secret session to eliminate Cabell from the party’s label.  

The Democrats jumped at another opportunity to further soil the name of the Whigs when, regarding the absurdity of running Cabell on the same ticket with a pro-Scott man, the Floridian proclaimed, “surely such a farce was never before played off on an enlightened community.”  

Cabell’s rise to prominence was astounding and unheard of in the annals of Florida’s history but his continued association with the sickly Whig Party was slowly destroying his political career. The Democrats pounced on this opportunity and their press reported the death of the Whigs in Florida. The Jacksonville News relished the prospect of informing the state about the shortcomings of their arch-rivals. They boldly stated “the body will be embalmed and kept over ground till November, when it will be laid in a grave.”  

In the weeks leading up to the election incumbent Governor Thomas Brown fought vigorously against Broome, in many instances giving more impassioned speeches than the Whig candidate himself. The grim reality the Whigs faced was that most of their traditional support from the black belt of Middle Florida where the majority of Florida’s slaves lived was waning. Since territorial days, with the exception of Jefferson County, this region had been a strong bastion of Whiggery. The planter aristocracy was quickly realizing that the Democrats and not the Whigs were the only party strong enough to protect their peculiar institution.

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16 Tallahassee, Florida Sentinel, 28 September, 1852.
17 Tallahassee, Floridian and Journal, 11 September, 1852.
19 Pensacola, Gazette, 31 July, 1852.
20 Tallahassee, Floridian and Journal, 17 July, 1852.
21 Jacksonville, News, quoted in Pensacola, Gazette, 14 August, 1852.
When the dust cleared and the votes of the statewide election of 1852 were tallied South Carolina ruled Florida. James E. Broome defeated Ward 4,628-4,336. While the margin of victory was not overwhelming at fifty one to forty-eight percent, the writing was clearly on the wall as Cabell was not returned to Congress. The shifting of support in Middle Florida was made apparent when it was revealed that both Cabell and Ward had lost Leon and Gadsden Counties. These counties, along with Jefferson, were home to the highest numbers of slaves, bales of cotton produced and cash value of farms in the state and, as previously mentioned, the planters no longer felt their assets were safe in the Whig party. In all Cabell lost three counties in East Florida which had helped to send him to Washington in 1850. These counties of Marion, Alachua, and St. Johns were all important economically as the former two were driven by a plantation economy similar to the black belt.

The embarrassing thrashing at the polls left a permanent scar on Cabell’s once bold psyche. The promising energetic unionist stalwart was left distraught and disillusioned. He abandoned politics shortly after the election to assume the presidency of the Pensacola and Georgia Railroad, a title he held until he moved away from Florida immediately before the Civil War never to return. Cabell spent the remainder of his days quietly in Missouri until his death in 1896 at the age of 80.

Although the Whigs would meekly muster candidates for the 1854 midterm elections, 1852 is often cited as the true end of the party’s run in Florida as well as on the national level. National leaders Henry Clay and Daniel Webster died in 1852, more than offsetting fiery Democrat John C. Calhoun’s death two years earlier. This left the national party in the hands of New York’s William H. Seward which all but sealed its fate in the South. A further blow to the Whigs in Florida was the demise of their once influential newspaper ring which after 1853 consisted only of Tallahassee’s Florida Sentinel, Pensacola’s Gazette, and Jacksonville’s Florida Republican.

The Whigs had one last gasp of breath left in them which they directed in opposition to the Kansas-Nebraska Act in 1854. The bill was originally introduced in December of 1853 by Iowa Senator A.C. Dodge, and was championed by Stephen A. Douglas. It negated the premises of the Missouri Compromise which had outlawed slavery north of the 36-30 line. “Popular Sovereignty” was the new term that rose from the proposed bill. Douglas would embrace this phrase making it the centerpiece of the platform upon which he would ultimately rest his political fate. The South was initially opposed to the bill since Northerners were known to be more mobile, especially in migration to the western territories which the bill concerned. Ultimately, the Democrats viewed the bill as a possible victory for their cause, since it opened up territories north of the Missouri Compromise line to the possibility of being saddled with chattel slavery. Whigs, on the other hand, were highly critical of the law which they felt would reopen freshly healed wounds concerning the sectional and slavery debates that had recently thrust the nation to the brink of civil war. The Whigs in Florida quickly realized they were in the minority in opposing the bill. They held firm and this stance constituted the

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22 Ibid., 19 October, 1852.
23 Doherty, Whigs of Florida, 57.
24 Ibid., 58.
25 Ibid.
last failed effort to halt the growth of radicalism in Florida. In May 1854, President Franklin Pierce signed the bill making it the law of the land.

The majority of ordinary Floridians viewed the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act as a minor Southern victory in stark contrast to the way they had perceived the Compromise of 1850. However, support for Douglas' new bill in Florida was exaggerated by the Democrats in the state and it was evident that the Whig party would not be able to mount serious opposition to the Democrats in the midterm elections set to take place later in the same year. By 1854 the party did not have coherent leadership or a recognized platform on which their once powerful press could advertise. In hindsight, it is ironic to note that while the Democrats celebrated this Southern victory which furthered the demise of the Whigs, this bill and Stephen Douglas' undying support of Popular or Squatter Sovereignty would in due time spell doom for the Democratic Party and lead to civil war first in Kansas and later throughout the nation.

In 1854 the Democrats were eager to form a platform which would highlight the principles that the party extolled and on which their candidates would campaign in the coming months. The convention was scheduled to take place in July in Madison, the site of John McGehee's fiery secessionist speech three years earlier.26 As expected, the Democrats approved the Kansas-Nebraska Act. It was seen as a "measure in a spirit of justice to all the States" giving them new hope that they could finally put the disaster of Henry Clay's bill behind them. They once again nominated the moderate Augustus Maxwell for Congress knowing full well that they were likely to secure a majority in the General Assembly for two more years, thus enabling them to return the fire eating David Levy Yulee to Washington to look after the party and state's most important interests.27

Various Whigs favored a meeting in Alligator, present-day site of Lake City, in order to endorse their candidates as well as to oppose the growth of radicalism that the Democrats represented. Not all Whigs supported the idea of a convention because the party had never relied on such measures in the past even though the Republican saw the need for a statewide meeting to unite the party in resistance to the Kansas-Nebraska Act.28 The party selected Thomas Brown to oppose Maxwell and he began his campaign by accusing the Democrats of reopening the slavery issue by their unwavering allegiance to the bill. However, Brown vacillated on his views and seemingly contradicted himself by claiming that, had he been in Congress, he would have supported the Kansas-Nebraska Bill in the end because it truly was a victory for the South. Yet, Brown and the Whigs also realized that many Floridians were disenchanted with the former Governor since he was remembered for failing to fully embrace Southern Rights during his four year term that ended in 1852.

The Democrats observed the rupture in the Whig party regarding Douglas' Act and made overtures to the segment of the party which had favored endorsement of the measure. They ultimately invited them to join in an alliance with the Democrats to create a unified Floridian Party which would stand for the rights of the South. Brown opposed a coalition with his rivals because he did not want to abandon the Northern Whigs, even though they were now seen in the South as the abolitionist wing of the party. The

26 Jacksonville, Florida Republican, 29 June, 1854.
27 Ibid., 3 August, 1854.
28 Ibid., 10 August, 1854.
Democrats responded by trying to play on Southern patriotism and sentiment by exclaiming that unless a bond was established "they (Whigs) can do the South no good".  

The results of the 1854 midterm election illuminated the gravest fear of conservatives and unionists alike. The avenue towards radicalism and ultimately secession was cleared by virtual abolition of the two party system in Florida. Augustus Maxwell was returned to Congress in a landslide which saw him garner fifty-six percent of the votes to Brown's forty-four percent. In 1852 Maxwell had defeated Cabell by a mere 22 votes, but two years later the margin was 1,074. Gadsden County was the only county in Florida's black belt which reaffirmed its allegiance to the Whigs. The majority of planters again did not feel comfortable placing their fate in the hands of a party they felt could not protect their interests.

Democratic dominance in Florida was even more apparent after the election and so was the state's penchant for radicalism. The leadership in the Democratic Party had shifted from the more moderate element of the party, largely William Dunn Moseley and James Westcott, and was now firmly entrenched in the hands of the "South Carolina School", consisting largely of Governor Broome, John McGehee and future fire-eating Governor Madison Starke Perry who would lead Florida towards secession in 1860-1861. Gone was the romanticism which Call and numerous Whigs had implored to defend their actions and policies. The 1850's were a decade Call and the Whigs wished to forget as it had become engulfed by damaging emotionalism.

James Broome's address opening the seventh session of Florida's General Assembly focused almost entirely on Southern rights ignoring many internal issues which the holdovers from the Whig Party preferred to focus on. It was evident from this speech that the state was firmly in the hands of radicals whose sole goal was to protect slavery at all costs and who were not afraid to remove the state from the Union in order to accomplish that end. Following in South Carolina's wake, Florida seemed resigned to being driven purely by emotional rather than rational thought.

Newspapers had played an integral role in shaping Florida's history. In the antebellum period, newspapers throughout the nation served as political propaganda machines. Often these organs were the only means in which the literate populace learned about current events in the nation and the state, albeit in a slanted biased manner. In many instances, a larger city such as Jacksonville or Tallahassee would have multiple papers, with one serving the Democrats and the other the Whigs. Often it was easy to discern which party a paper supported by looking at the name as was the case of the Marianna Whig. Newspapers clearly fueled the sweeping tide of emotionalism that was spreading across Florida and the South in the 1850's and they would play an even larger role after John Brown's Raid in 1859. The papers were the voice of the extremists in the 1850's and they were used by their editors who were commonly involved in the affairs of the state as a means of further politicking to spread their gospel.

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29 Tallahassee, Floridian and Journal, 26 August, 1854.
30 Tallahassee, Florida Sentinel, 7 November, 1854.
The 1856 election was the last race of the antebellum period in Florida that saw the Democrats run opposed. Perry easily won the Governor's mansion, and the party maintained and even increased their stranglehold over the state legislature. When the dust had cleared the Democrats had won 42 of Florida's 65 seats or roughly Sixty-Five percent.32 The rise of the Republican Party in 1856 which coincided with the split of the American Party was the death blow for the old conservative camp in Florida as well as in the Deep South as a whole. The Republican Party would not even gain recognition in radicalized Florida and was absent from the ballots in 1856, 1858 and 1860. Call continued his fruitless efforts to keep Florida within the Union, but without a viable party to back him and more importantly without much support from the planter aristocracy, his crusade was hopeless. Upon hearing that Florida had voted 62-7 in favor of secession on January 10, 1861, Call was a broken man. When approached on the steps of the capital in Tallahassee and asked his reaction to the vote he stated "Yes, you have opened the gates of Hell, from which shall flow the water of the damned to sink you into perdition".33

The great metamorphosis in Florida's political culture from 1851-1856 was the key factor in the state's fervor to join South Carolina and Mississippi in becoming the third state to secede from the Union on January 10, 1861. The planter class, which controlled the black belt of Middle Florida, and in turn dominated the state's political structure, abandoned the conservatives in favor of the radical fire-eating Democrats. It was only under Democratic leadership that they felt assured that the peculiar institution of slavery and the Southern way of life to which they had grown accustomed to was safe and could survive and prosper.

32 Ibid., 29 November, 1856.
33 The Florida Peninsular Newspaper. 10 January, 1861.